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

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ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ.

ARISTOTELIS
DE RE PUBLICA,

LIBER I., III., IV(VII).

(BEKKER'S TEXT):

WITH NOTES

BY

Reginald

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PREFACE.

IN this edition of the Politics, Bekker's Berlin text (1855) has been followed throughout. The numbers of the sections from the Oxford Edition of 1839, have been added for convenience of reference. The notes consist of (1) a running paraphrase and analysis, (2) explanations and translations of particular passages and expressions in the text. I have made little use of any of the commentators, but I have freely consulted Bernays' German translation of Books I—III., and, occasionally, I have been under obligation to him for assistance in the rendering of particular passages. I desire here to thank my friend Mr. W. L. Newman, Fellow of Balliol College, for first calling my attention to Bernays' translation. It is to be regretted that it has not been carried on farther. His emendations of Bekker's text are generally plausible, and sometimes almost certain. I have referred to some of the most important in the course of the notes. Susemihl's edition of the text with various readings, founded chiefly on the old Latin translation of Moerbek from a MS. now lost, is interesting to compare, but he has not on the whole improved on Bekker. In one difficult passage IV(VII) xi. 1, he has, I think, succeeded in nearly restoring the original text,

I have written, chiefly, to supply a want that has been felt, of a short commentary on those portions of the Politics

which are taken up by Passmen at Oxford for the First and Second Public Examination. The execution of the work, the latter part especially, has been rapid, and I have had to decide on many points, which I would rather have had more time to consider. I trust that criticism will have the effect of removing any blunders I may have made, and of pointing out deficiencies.

OXFORD,
March 30, 1876.

ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Α.

1 Ἐπειδὴ πᾶσαν πόλιν ὁρῶμεν κοινωνίαν τινὰ οὖσαν Ed. maj.
καὶ πᾶσαν κοινωνίαν ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἕνεκεν συνεστηκυῖαν p.1252.
(τοῦ γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦντος ἀγαθοῦ χάριν πάντα πράττουσι πάντες), δῆλον ὡς πᾶσαι μὲν ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς στοχάζονται, μάλιστα δέ, καὶ τοῦ κυριωτάτου πάντων, ἡ 5
πασῶν κυριωτάτη καὶ πάσας περιέχουσα τὰς ἄλλας· αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἡ καλουμένη πόλις καὶ ἡ κοινωνία ἡ
2 πολιτική. ὅσοι μὲν οὖν οἴονται πολιτικὸν καὶ βασιλικὸν καὶ οἰκονομικὸν καὶ δεσποτικὸν εἶναι τὸν αὐτόν, οὐ καλῶς λέγουσιν· πλήθει γὰρ καὶ ὀλιγότητι νομί- 10
ζουσι διαφέρειν, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἴδει τούτων ἕκαστον, οἷον ἂν μὲν ὀλίγων, δεσπότην, ἂν δὲ πλειόνων, οἰκονόμον, ἂν δ' ἔτι πλειόνων, πολιτικὸν ἢ βασιλικόν, ὡς οὐδὲν διαφέρουσαν μεγάλην οἰκίαν ἢ μικρὰν πόλιν, καὶ πολιτικὸν δὲ καὶ βασιλικόν, ὅταν μὲν αὐτὸς ἐφεστήκῃ, βασιλικόν, ὅταν δὲ κατὰ λόγους τῆς ἐπιστήμης τῆς τοιαύ- 15
της, κατὰ μέρος ἄρχων καὶ ἀρχόμενος, πολιτικόν. ταῦτα
3 δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθῆ. δῆλον δ' ἔσται τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπισκοποῦσι κατὰ τὴν ὑφηγημένην μέθοδον. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ σύνθετον μέχρι τῶν ἀσυνθέτων ἀνάγκη διαιρεῖν (ταῦτα γὰρ ἐλάχιστα μόρια τοῦ παντός), οὕτω 20

καὶ πόλιν ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται σκοποῦντες ὀψόμεθα καὶ περὶ τούτων μᾶλλον, τί τε διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων, καὶ εἴ τι τεχνικὸν ἐνδέχεται λαβεῖν περὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ῥηθέντων.

2 εἰ δή τις ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ πράγματα φυόμενα βλέψειεν, 1 ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, καὶ ἐν τούτοις κάλλιστ' ἂν οὕτω θεωρήσειεν. ἀνάγκη δὴ πρῶτον συνδυάζεσθαι τοὺς ἄνευ 2 ἀλλήλων μὴ δυναμένους εἶναι, οἷον θῆλυ μὲν καὶ ἄρρεν τῆς γενέσεως ἕνεκεν (καὶ τοῦτο οὐκ ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις καὶ φυτοῖς φυσικὸν τὸ ἐφίεσθαι, οἷον αὐτό, τοιοῦτον καταλιπεῖν ἕτερον), ἄρχον δὲ φύσει καὶ ἀρχόμενον διὰ τὴν σωτηρίαν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμενον τῇ διανοίᾳ προορᾶν ἄρχον φύσει καὶ δεσπόζον φύσει, τὸ δὲ δυνάμενον τῷ σώματι ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἀρχόμενον καὶ φύσει δοῦλον. διὸ δεσπότῃ καὶ 3 δούλῳ ταὐτὸ συμφέρει. φύσει μὲν οὖν διώρισται τὸ θῆλυ καὶ τὸ δοῦλον. οὐθὲν γὰρ ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ τοιοῦτον οἷον χαλκοτύποι τὴν Δελφικὴν μάχαιραν πενιχρῶς, ἀλλ' ἓν πρὸς ἕν· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἀποτελοῖτο κάλλιστα τῶν ὀργάνων ἕκαστον, μὴ πολλοῖς ἔργοις ἀλλ' ἑνὶ δουλεῦον. ἐν δὲ τοῖς βαρβάροις τὸ θῆλυ καὶ δοῦλον τὴν αὐτὴν 4 ἔχει τάξιν. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι τὸ φύσει ἄρχον οὐκ ἔχουσιν, ἀλλὰ γίνεται ἡ κοινωνία αὐτῶν δούλης καὶ δούλου. διό φασιν οἱ ποιηταὶ "βαρβάρων δ' Ἕλληνας ἄρχειν εἰκός," ὡς ταὐτὸ φύσει βάρβαρον καὶ δοῦλον ὄν. ἐκ μὲν οὖν 5 τούτων τῶν δύο κοινωνιῶν οἰκία πρώτη, καὶ ὀρθῶς Ἡσίοδος εἶπε ποιήσας "οἶκον μὲν πρώτιστα γυναῖκά τ' βοῦν τ' ἀροτῆρα·" ὁ γὰρ βοῦς ἀντ' οἰκέτου τοῖς πέ-

νησιν ἐστίν. ἡ μὲν οὖν εἰς πᾶσαν ἡμέραν συνεστηκυῖα
κοινωνία κατὰ φύσιν οἰκός ἐστιν, οὓς Χαρώνδας μὲν 25
καλεῖ ὁμοσιπύους, Ἐπιμενίδης δὲ ὁ Κρὴς ὁμοκάπους·
ἡ δ' ἐκ πλειόνων οἰκιῶν κοινωνία πρώτη χρήσεως ἕνεκεν
6 μὴ ἐφημέρου κώμη. μάλιστα δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἔοικεν ἡ
κώμη ἀποικία οἰκίας εἶναι· οὓς καλοῦσί τινες ὁμογάλακτας παῖδάς τε καὶ παίδων παῖδας. διὸ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον 30
ἐβασιλεύοντο αἱ πόλεις, καὶ νῦν ἔτι τὰ ἔθνη· ἐκ βασιλευομένων γὰρ συνῆλθον. πᾶσα γὰρ οἰκία βασιλεύεται
ὑπὸ τοῦ πρεσβυτάτου, ὥστε καὶ αἱ ἀποικίαι διὰ τὴν
7 συγγένειαν. καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ λέγει Ὅμηρος, "θεμιστεύει δὲ ἕκαστος παίδων ἠδ' ἀλύχων." σποράδες γάρ·
καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἀρχαῖον ᾤκουν. καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς δὲ διὰ
τοῦτο πάντες φασὶ βασιλεύεσθαι, ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ οἳ μὲν
ἔτι καὶ νῦν οἳ δὲ τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἐβασιλεύοντο· ὥσπερ δὲ 5
καὶ τὰ εἴδη ἑαυτοῖς ἀφομοιοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, οὕτω καὶ
8 τοὺς βίους τῶν θεῶν. ἡ δ' ἐκ πλειόνων κωμῶν κοινωνία
τέλειος πόλις, ἡ δὴ πάσης ἔχουσα πέρας τῆς αὐταρκείας
ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, γινομένη μὲν οὖν τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκεν, οὖσα
δὲ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν. διὸ πᾶσα πόλις φύσει ἐστίν, εἴπερ καὶ 10
αἱ πρῶται κοινωνίαι· τέλος γὰρ αὕτη ἐκείνων, ἡ δὲ φύσις
τέλος ἐστίν· οἷον γὰρ ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῆς γενέσεως τελεσθείσης, ταύτην φαμὲν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι ἑκάστου, ὥσπερ
9 ἀνθρώπου ἵππου οἰκίας. ἔτι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ τέλος 1253
βέλτιστον· ἡ δ' αὐτάρκεια τέλος καὶ βέλτιστον. ἐκ 15
τούτων οὖν φανερὸν ὅτι τῶν φύσει ἡ πόλις ἐστί, καὶ
ὅτι ἄνθρωπος φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον, καὶ ὁ ἄπολις διὰ

καὶ πόλιν ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται σκοποῦντες ὀψόμεθα καὶ περὶ τούτων μᾶλλον, τί τε διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων, καὶ εἴ τι τεχνικὸν ἐνδέχεται λαβεῖν περὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ῥηθέντων.

2 εἰ δή τις ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ πράγματα φυόμενα βλέψειεν, 1 ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, καὶ ἐν τούτοις κάλλιστ' ἂν οὕτω θεωρήσειεν. ἀνάγκη δὴ πρῶτον συνδυάζεσθαι τοὺς ἄνευ 2 ἀλλήλων μὴ δυναμένους εἶναι, οἷον θῆλυ μὲν καὶ ἄρρεν 3 τῆς γενέσεως ἕνεκεν (καὶ τοῦτο οὐκ ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις καὶ φυτοῖς φυσικὸν τὸ ἐφίεσθαι, οἷον αὐτό, τοιοῦτον καταλιπεῖν ἕτερον), ἄρχον δὲ φύσει καὶ ἀρχόμενον διὰ τὴν σωτηρίαν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμενον τῇ διανοίᾳ προορᾶν ἄρχον φύσει καὶ 10 δεσπόζον φύσει, τὸ δὲ δυνάμενον τῷ σώματι ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἀρχόμενον καὶ φύσει δοῦλον. διὸ δεσπότῃ καὶ 3 δούλῳ ταὐτὸ συμφέρει. φύσει μὲν οὖν διώρισται τὸ θῆλυ καὶ τὸ δοῦλον. οὐθὲν γὰρ ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ τοιοῦτον οἷον χαλκοτύποι τὴν Δελφικὴν μάχαιραν πενιχρῶς, ἀλλ' 15 ἓν πρὸς ἕν· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἀποτελοῖτο κάλλιστα τῶν ὀργάνων ἕκαστον, μὴ πολλοῖς ἔργοις ἀλλ' ἑνὶ δουλεῦον. ἐν δὲ τοῖς βαρβάροις τὸ θῆλυ καὶ δοῦλον τὴν αὐτὴν 4 ἔχει τάξιν. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι τὸ φύσει ἄρχον οὐκ ἔχουσιν, ἀλλὰ γίνεται ἡ κοινωνία αὐτῶν δούλης καὶ δούλου. διό φασιν οἱ ποιηταὶ "βαρβάρων δ' Ἕλληνας ἄρχειν εἰκός," 20 ὡς ταὐτὸ φύσει βάρβαρον καὶ δοῦλον ὄν. ἐκ μὲν οὖν 5 τούτων τῶν δύο κοινωνιῶν οἰκία πρώτη, καὶ ὀρθῶς Ἡσίοδος εἶπε ποιήσας "οἶκον μὲν πρώτιστα γυναῖκά τε βοῦν τ' ἀροτῆρα·" ὁ γὰρ βοῦς ἀντ' οἰκέτου τοῖς πέ-

νησιν ἐστίν. ἡ μὲν οὖν εἰς πᾶσαν ἡμέραν συνεστηκυῖα κοινωνία κατὰ φύσιν οἰκός ἐστιν, οὓς Χαρώνδας μὲν καλεῖ ὁμοσιπύους, Ἐπιμενίδης δὲ ὁ Κρὴς ὁμοκάπους· ἡ δ' ἐκ πλειόνων οἰκιῶν κοινωνία πρώτη χρήσεως ἕνεκεν μὴ ἐφημέρου κώμη. μάλιστα δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἔοικεν ἡ κώμη ἀποικία οἰκίας εἶναι· οὓς καλοῦσί τινες ὁμογάλακτας παῖδάς τε καὶ παίδων παῖδας. διὸ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐβασιλεύοντο αἱ πόλεις, καὶ νῦν ἔτι τὰ ἔθνη· ἐκ βασιλευομένων γὰρ συνῆλθον. πᾶσα γὰρ οἰκία βασιλεύεται ὑπὸ τοῦ πρεσβυτάτου, ὥστε καὶ αἱ ἀποικίαι διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν. καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ λέγει Ὅμηρος, "θεμιστεύει δὲ ἕκαστος παίδων ἠδ' ἀλύχων." σποράδες γάρ· καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἀρχαῖον ᾤκουν. καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς δὲ διὰ τοῦτο πάντες φασὶ βασιλεύεσθαι, ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ οἳ μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν οἳ δὲ τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἐβασιλεύοντο· ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ τὰ εἴδη ἑαυτοῖς ἀφομοιοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς βίους τῶν θεῶν. ἡ δ' ἐκ πλειόνων κωμῶν κοινωνία τέλειος πόλις, ἡ δὴ πάσης ἔχουσα πέρας τῆς αὐταρκείας ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, γινομένη μὲν οὖν τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκεν, οὖσα δὲ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν. διὸ πᾶσα πόλις φύσει ἐστίν, εἴπερ καὶ αἱ πρῶται κοινωνίαι· τέλος γὰρ αὕτη ἐκείνων, ἡ δὲ φύσις τέλος ἐστίν· οἷον γὰρ ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῆς γενέσεως τελεσθείσης, ταύτην φαμὲν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι ἑκάστου, ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπου ἵππου οἰκίας. ἔτι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ τέλος 1253 βέλτιστον· ἡ δ' αὐτάρκεια τέλος καὶ βέλτιστον. ἐκ τούτων οὖν φανερὸν ὅτι τῶν φύσει ἡ πόλις ἐστί, καὶ ὅτι ἄνθρωπος φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον, καὶ ὁ ἄπολις διὰ

φύσιν καὶ οὐ διὰ τύχην ἤτοι φαῦλός ἐστιν ἢ κρείττων
ἢ ἄνθρωπος, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ ὑφ' Ὁμήρου λοιδορηθεὶς
"ἀφρήτωρ ἀθέμιστος ἀνέστιος." ἅμα γὰρ φύσει τοι- 10
20 οῦτος καὶ πολέμου ἐπιθυμητής, ἅτε περ ἄζυξ ὢν ὥσπερ
ἐν πεττοῖς. διότι δὲ πολιτικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῷον πάσης
μελίττης καὶ παντὸς ἀγελαίου ζῴου μᾶλλον, δῆλον.
οὐθὲν γάρ, ὡς φαμέν, μάτην ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ, λόγον δὲ
μόνον ἄνθρωπος ἔχει τῶν ζῴων. ἡ μὲν οὖν φωνὴ τοῦ 11
λυπηροῦ καὶ ἡδέος ἐστὶ σημεῖον, διὸ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις
25 ὑπάρχει ζῴοις· μέχρι γὰρ τούτου ἡ φύσις αὐτῶν ἐλή-
λυθεν ὥστε αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦ λυπηροῦ καὶ ἡδέος καὶ ταῦτα
σημαίνειν ἀλλήλοις· ὁ δὲ λόγος ἐπὶ τῷ δηλοῦν ἐστὶ τὸ
συμφέρον καὶ τὸ βλαβερόν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ
ἄδικον. τοῦτο γὰρ πρὸς τἆλλα ζῷα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἴδιον, 12
30 τὸ μόνον ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ
τῶν ἄλλων αἴσθησιν ἔχειν. ἡ δὲ τούτων κοινωνία ποιεῖ
οἰκίαν καὶ πόλιν. καὶ πρότερον δὴ τῇ φύσει πόλις ἢ
οἰκία καὶ ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ἐστίν. τὸ γὰρ ὅλον πρότερον 13
ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ μέρους· ἀναιρουμένου γὰρ τοῦ ὅλου
οὐκ ἔσται ποὺς οὐδὲ χείρ, εἰ μὴ ὁμωνύμως, ὥσπερ εἴ
τις λέγοι τὴν λιθίνην· διαφθαρεῖσα γὰρ ἔσται τοιαύτη.
5 πάντα δὲ τῷ ἔργῳ ὥρισται καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, ὥστε μηκέτι
τοιαῦτα ὄντα οὐ λεκτέον τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι ἀλλ' ὁμώνυμα.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ πόλις καὶ φύσει καὶ πρότερον ἢ ἕκαστος, 14
δῆλον· εἰ γὰρ μὴ αὐτάρκης ἕκαστος χωρισθείς, ὁμοίως
τοῖς ἄλλοις μέρεσιν ἕξει πρὸς τὸ ὅλον· ὁ δὲ μὴ δυνά-
μενος κοινωνεῖν, ἢ μηθὲν δεόμενος δι' αὐτάρκειαν, οὐθὲν

ος πόλεως, ὥστε ἢ θηρίον ἢ θεός. φύσει μὲν οὖν 10
ρμὴ ἐν πᾶσιν ἐπὶ τὴν τοιαύτην κοινωνίαν· ὁ δὲ πρῶ-
; συστήσας μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν αἴτιος. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ
ιεωθὲν βέλτιστον τῶν ζῴων ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν, οὕτω
10 καὶ χωρισθὲν νόμου καὶ δίκης χείριστον πάντων. χαλε-
πωτάτη γὰρ ἀδικία ἔχουσα ὅπλα· ὁ δ' ἄνθρωπος ὅπλα 15
ἔχων φύεται φρονήσει καὶ ἀρετῇ, οἷς ἐπὶ τἀναντία ἔστι
χρῆσθαι μάλιστα. διὸ ἀνοσιώτατον καὶ ἀγριώτατον
ἄνευ ἀρετῆς, καὶ πρὸς ἀφροδίσια καὶ ἐδωδὴν χείριστον.
ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη πολιτικόν· ἡ γὰρ δίκη πολιτικῆς κοι-
νωνίας τάξις ἐστίν· ἡ δὲ δίκη τοῦ δικαίου κρίσις.

1 ἐπεὶ δὲ φανερὸν ἐξ ὧν μορίων ἡ πόλις συνέστηκεν, 3
ἀναγκαῖον περὶ οἰκίας εἰπεῖν πρότερον· πᾶσα γὰρ πόλις
ἐξ οἰκιῶν σύγκειται. οἰκίας δὲ μέρη, ἐξ ὧν αὖθις οἰκία
συνίσταται· οἰκία δὲ τέλειος ἐκ δούλων καὶ ἐλευθέρων.
ἐπεὶ δ' ἐν τοῖς ἐλαχίστοις πρῶτον ἕκαστον ζητητέον,
πρῶτα δὲ καὶ ἐλάχιστα μέρη οἰκίας δεσπότης καὶ δοῦλος 25
καὶ πόσις καὶ ἄλοχος καὶ πατὴρ καὶ τέκνα, περὶ τριῶν
ἂν τούτων σκεπτέον εἴη τί ἕκαστον καὶ ποῖον δεῖ εἶναι.
2 ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ δεσποτικὴ καὶ γαμική (ἀνώνυμον γὰρ ἡ
γυναικὸς καὶ ἀνδρὸς σύζευξις) καὶ τρίτον τεκνοποιητική·
καὶ γὰρ αὕτη οὐκ ὠνόμασται ἰδίῳ ὀνόματι. ἔστωσαν 30
3 δ' αὗται τρεῖς ἃς εἴπομεν. ἔστι δέ τι μέρος ὃ δοκεῖ τοῖς
μὲν εἶναι οἰκονομία, τοῖς δὲ μέγιστον μέρος αὐτῆς· ὅπως
δ' ἔχει, θεωρητέον. λέγω δὲ περὶ τῆς καλουμένης χρη-
ματιστικῆς. πρῶτον δὲ περὶ δεσπότου καὶ δούλου εἴπω-
μεν, ἵνα τά τε πρὸς τὴν ἀναγκαίαν χρείαν ἴδωμεν, κἂν

ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ.

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WITH NOTES

BY

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τούτων ἔργον. ὅσα γὰρ ἐκ πλειόνων συνέστηκε καὶ γί-
νεται ἕν τι κοινόν, εἴτ' ἐκ συνεχῶν εἴτ' ἐκ διῃρημένων,
ἐν ἅπασιν ἐμφαίνεται τὸ ἄρχον καὶ τὸ ἀρχόμενον. καὶ 4
25 τοῦτο ἐκ τῆς ἁπάσης φύσεως ἐνυπάρχει τοῖς ἐμψύχοις·
καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς μὴ μετέχουσι ζωῆς ἔστι τις ἀρχή, οἷον
ἁρμονίας. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἴσως ἐξωτερικωτέρας ἐστὶ
σκέψεως, τὸ δὲ ζῷον πρῶτον συνέστηκεν ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ
σώματος, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἄρχον ἐστὶ φύσει τὸ δ' ἀρχόμενον.
30 δεῖ δὲ σκοπεῖν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσι μᾶλλον τὸ 5
φύσει, καὶ μὴ ἐν τοῖς διεφθαρμένοις. διὸ καὶ τὸν βέλ-
τιστα διακείμενον καὶ κατὰ σῶμα καὶ κατὰ ψυχὴν ἄν-
θρωπον θεωρητέον, ἐν ᾧ τοῦτο δῆλον· τῶν γὰρ μοχθη-
ρῶν ἢ μοχθηρῶς ἐχόντων δόξειεν ἂν ἄρχειν πολλάκις
τὸ σῶμα τῆς ψυχῆς διὰ τὸ φαύλως καὶ παρὰ φύσιν
ἔχειν. ἔστι δ' οὖν, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, πρῶτον ἐν ζῴῳ 6
θεωρῆσαι καὶ δεσποτικὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ πολιτικήν· ἡ μὲν
5 γὰρ ψυχὴ τοῦ σώματος ἄρχει δεσποτικὴν ἀρχήν, ὁ δὲ
νοῦς τῆς ὀρέξεως πολιτικὴν καὶ βασιλικήν· ἐν οἷς φανε-
ρόν ἐστιν ὅτι κατὰ φύσιν καὶ συμφέρον τὸ ἄρχεσθαι
τῷ σώματι ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τῷ παθητικῷ μορίῳ ὑπὸ
τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τοῦ μορίου τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος, τὸ δ' ἐξ
10 ἴσου ἢ ἀνάπαλιν βλαβερὸν πᾶσιν. πάλιν ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ 7
καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις ὡσαύτως· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἥμερα τῶν
ἀγρίων βελτίω τὴν φύσιν, τούτοις δὲ πᾶσι βέλτιον
ἄρχεσθαι ὑπ' ἀνθρώπου· τυγχάνει γὰρ σωτηρίας οὕτως.
ἔτι δὲ τὸ ἄρρεν πρὸς τὸ θῆλυ φύσει τὸ μὲν κρεῖττον
τὸ δὲ χεῖρον, τὸ μὲν ἄρχον τὸ δ' ἀρχόμενον. τὸν αὐτὸν

δὲ τρόπον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων ἀνθρώπων. 15
8 ὅσοι μὲν οὖν τοσοῦτον διεστᾶσιν ὅσον ψυχὴ σώματος
καὶ ἄνθρωπος θηρίου (διάκεινται δὲ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον,
ὅσων ἐστὶν ἔργον ἡ τοῦ σώματος χρῆσις, καὶ τοῦτ'
ἔστ' ἀπ' αὐτῶν βέλτιστον), οὗτοι μέν εἰσι φύσει
δοῦλοι, οἷς βέλτιόν ἐστιν ἄρχεσθαι ταύτην τὴν ἀρχήν, 20
9 εἴπερ καὶ τοῖς εἰρημένοις. ἔστι γὰρ φύσει δοῦλος ὁ
δυνάμενος ἄλλου εἶναι (διὸ καὶ ἄλλου ἐστίν) καὶ ὁ κοι-
νωνῶν λόγου τοσοῦτον ὅσον αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἔχειν·
τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα ζῷα οὐ λόγου αἰσθανόμενα, ἀλλὰ παθή-
μασιν ὑπηρετεῖ. καὶ ἡ χρεία δὲ παραλλάττει μικρόν· 25
ἡ γὰρ πρὸς τἀναγκαῖα τῷ σώματι βοήθεια γίνεται παρ'
ἀμφοῖν, παρά τε τῶν δούλων καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἡμέρων
10 ζῴων. βούλεται μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις καὶ τὰ σώματα δια-
φέροντα ποιεῖν τὰ τῶν ἐλευθέρων καὶ τῶν δούλων, τὰ
μὲν ἰσχυρὰ πρὸς τὴν ἀναγκαίαν χρῆσιν, τὰ δ' ὀρθὰ καὶ
ἄχρηστα πρὸς τὰς τοιαύτας ἐργασίας, ἀλλὰ χρήσιμα 30
πρὸς πολιτικὸν βίον (οὗτος δὲ καὶ γίνεται διῃρημένος
εἴς τε τὴν πολεμικὴν χρείαν καὶ τὴν εἰρηνικήν), συμ-
βαίνει δὲ πολλάκις καὶ τοὐναντίον, τοὺς μὲν τὰ σώματ'
ἔχειν ἐλευθέρων τοὺς δὲ τὰς ψυχάς· ἐπεὶ τοῦτό γε
φανερόν, ὡς εἰ τοσοῦτον γένοιντο διάφοροι τὸ σῶμα
μόνον ὅσον αἱ τῶν θεῶν εἰκόνες, τοὺς ὑπολειπομένους
11 πάντες φαῖεν ἂν ἀξίους εἶναι τούτοις δουλεύειν. εἰ δ' 5
ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος τοῦτ' ἀληθές, πολὺ δικαιότερον ἐπὶ
τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦτο διωρίσθαι· ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁμοίως ῥᾴδιον
ἰδεῖν τό τε τῆς ψυχῆς κάλλος καὶ τὸ τοῦ σώματος.

1255 ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν εἰσὶ φύσει τινὲς οἳ μὲν ἐλεύθεροι οἳ
δὲ δοῦλοι, φανερόν, οἷς καὶ συμφέρει τὸ δουλεύειν καὶ
6 δίκαιον ἐστίν· ὅτι δὲ καὶ οἱ τἀναντία φάσκοντες τρόπον 1
τινὰ λέγουσιν ὀρθῶς, οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν. διχῶς γὰρ
λέγεται τὸ δουλεύειν καὶ ὁ δοῦλος. ἔστι γάρ τις καὶ
κατὰ νόμον δοῦλος καὶ δουλεύων· ὁ γὰρ νόμος ὁμολογία
τίς ἐστιν, ἐν ᾧ τὰ κατὰ πόλεμον κρατούμενα τῶν κρα-
15 τούντων εἶναι φασίν. τοῦτο δὴ τὸ δίκαιον πολλοὶ τῶν 2
ἐν τοῖς νόμοις ὥσπερ ῥήτορα γράφονται παρανόμων, ὡς
δεινὸν εἰ τοῦ βιάσασθαι δυναμένου καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν
κρείττονος ἔσται δοῦλον καὶ ἀρχόμενον τὸ βιασθέν.
καὶ τοῖς μὲν οὕτω δοκεῖ τοῖς δ' ἐκείνως, καὶ τῶν σοφῶν.
20 αἴτιον δὲ ταύτης τῆς ἀμφισβητήσεως, καὶ ὃ ποιεῖ τοὺς 3
λόγους ἐπαλλάττειν, ὅτι τρόπον τινὰ ἀρετὴ τυγχάνουσα
χορηγίας καὶ βιάζεσθαι δύναται μάλιστα, καὶ ἔστιν ἀεὶ
τὸ κρατοῦν ἐν ὑπεροχῇ ἀγαθοῦ τινός, ὥστε δοκεῖν μὴ
ἄνευ ἀρετῆς εἶναι τὴν βίαν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου
μόνον εἶναι τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν. διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο τοῖς 4
25 μὲν εὔνοια δοκεῖ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, τοῖς δ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο
δίκαιον, τὸ τὸν κρείττονα ἄρχειν, ἐπεὶ διαστάντων γε
χωρὶς τούτων τῶν λόγων οὔτ' ἰσχυρὸν οὐθὲν ἔχουσιν
οὔτε πιθανὸν ἄτεροι λόγοι, ὡς οὐ δεῖ τὸ βέλτιον κατ'
ἀρετὴν ἄρχειν καὶ δεσπόζειν. ὅλως δ' ἀντεχόμενοί 5
30 τινες, ὡς οἴονται, δικαίου τινός (ὁ γὰρ νόμος δίκαιόν
τι) τὴν κατὰ πόλεμον δουλείαν τιθέασι δικαίαν, ἅμα
δ' οὔ φασιν. τήν τε γὰρ ἀρχὴν ἐνδέχεται μὴ δικαίαν
εἶναι τῶν πολέμων, καὶ τὸν ἀνάξιον δουλεύειν οὐδα-

μῶς ἂν φαίη τις δοῦλον εἶναι· εἰ δὲ μή, συμβήσεται τοὺς εὐγενεστάτους εἶναι δοκοῦντας δούλους εἶναι καὶ
6 ἐκ δούλων, ἐὰν συμβῇ πραθῆναι ληφθέντας. διόπερ αὐτοὺς οὐ βούλονται λέγειν δούλους, ἀλλὰ τοὺς βαρβάρους. καίτοι ὅταν τοῦτο λέγωσιν, οὐθὲν ἄλλο ζη- 5
τοῦσιν ἢ τὸ φύσει δοῦλον, ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἴπομεν· ἀνάγκη γὰρ εἶναί τινας φάναι τοὺς μὲν πανταχοῦ δού-
7 λους τοὺς δ' οὐδαμοῦ. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ εὐγενείας· αὐτοὺς μὲν γὰρ οὐ μόνον παρ' αὑτοῖς εὐγενεῖς ἀλλὰ πανταχοῦ νομίζουσιν, τοὺς δὲ βαρβάρους οἴκοι μόνον, ὡς ὅν τι τὸ μὲν ἁπλῶς εὐγενὲς καὶ ἐλεύ- 10
θερον τὸ δ' οὐχ ἁπλῶς, ὥσπερ ἡ Θεοδέκτου Ἑλένη φησὶ

"θείων δ' ἀπ' ἀμφοῖν ἔκγονον ῥιζωμάτων
τίς ἂν προσειπεῖν ἀξιώσειεν λάτριν;"

8 ὅταν δὲ τοῦτο λέγωσιν, οὐθενὶ ἀλλ' ἢ ἀρετῇ καὶ κακίᾳ διορίζουσι τὸ δοῦλον καὶ ἐλεύθερον καὶ τοὺς εὐγενεῖς 15
καὶ τοὺς δυσγενεῖς. ἀξιοῦσι γάρ, ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀνθρώπου ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἐκ θηρίων γίνεσθαι θηρίον, οὕτω καὶ ἐξ ἀγαθῶν ἀγαθόν· ἡ δὲ φύσις βούλεται μὲν τοῦτο ποιεῖν
9 πολλάκις, οὐ μέντοι δύναται. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔχει τινὰ λόγον ἡ ἀμφισβήτησις, καὶ εἰσὶ καὶ οὐκ εἰσὶν οἱ μὲν 20
φύσει δοῦλοι οἱ δ' ἐλεύθεροι, δῆλον· καὶ ὅτι ἔν τισι διώρισται τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὧν συμφέρει τῷ μὲν τὸ δουλεύειν τῷ δὲ τὸ δεσπόζειν, καὶ δίκαιον, καὶ δεῖ τὸ μὲν ἄρχεσθαι τὸ δ' ἄρχειν, ἣν πεφύκασιν ἀρχὴν ἄρχειν,
10 ὥστε καὶ δεσπόζειν, τὸ δὲ κακῶς ἀσυμφόρως ἐστὶν

25 ἀμφοῖν· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ συμφέρει τῷ μέρει καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ καὶ σώματι καὶ ψυχῇ, ὁ δὲ δοῦλος μέρος τι τοῦ δεσπότου, οἷον ἔμψυχόν τι τοῦ σώματος κεχωρισμένον δὲ μέρος. διὸ καὶ συμφέρον ἐστί τι καὶ φιλία δούλῳ καὶ δεσπότῃ πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοῖς φύσει τούτων ἠξιωμένοις· 30 τοῖς δὲ μὴ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, ἀλλὰ κατὰ νόμον καὶ βιασθεῖσι, τοὐναντίον.

7 φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ἐκ τούτων ὅτι οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστι δεσποτεία καὶ πολιτική, οὐδὲ πᾶσαι ἀλλήλαις αἱ ἀρχαί, ὥσπερ τινὲς φασίν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐλευθέρων φύσει ἡ δὲ δούλων ἐστίν, καὶ ἡ μὲν οἰκονομικὴ μοναρχία (μοναρχεῖται γὰρ πᾶς οἶκος), ἡ δὲ πολιτικὴ ἐλευθέρων καὶ ἴσων ἀρχή. ὁ μὲν οὖν δεσπότης οὐ λέγεται κατ' ἐπιστήμην, ἀλλὰ τῷ τοιόσδ' εἶναι· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ δοῦλος καὶ ὁ ἐλεύθερος. ἐπιστήμη δ' ἂν εἴη καὶ δεσποτικὴ καὶ δουλική, δουλικὴ μὲν οἵαν περ ὁ ἐν Συρακούσαις ἐπαίδευεν· ἐκεῖ γὰρ λαμβάνων τις μισθὸν ἐδίδασκε τὰ ἐγκύκλια διακονήματα τοὺς παῖδας. εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ ἐπὶ πλεῖον τῶν τοιούτων μάθησις, οἷον ὀψοποιικὴ καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα γένη τῆς διακονίας. ἔστι γὰρ ἕτερα ἑτέρων τὰ μὲν ἐντιμότερα ἔργα τὰ δ' ἀναγκαιότερα, καὶ κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν δοῦλος πρὸ δούλου, δεσπότης πρὸ δεσπότου. αἱ μὲν οὖν τοιαῦται πᾶσαι δουλικαὶ ἐπιστῆμαι εἰσί, δεσποτικὴ δ' ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἡ χρηστικὴ δούλων· ὁ γὰρ δεσπότης οὐκ ἐν τῷ κτᾶσθαι τοὺς δούλους, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ χρῆσθαι δούλοις. ἔστι δ' αὕτη ἡ ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲν μέγα ἔχουσα οὐδὲ σεμνόν· ἃ γὰρ τὸν δοῦλον ἐπίστασθαι δεῖ

5 ποιεῖν, ἐκεῖνον δεῖ ταῦτα ἐπίστασθαι ἐπιτάττειν. διὸ
ὅσοις ἐξουσία μὴ αὐτοὺς κακοπαθεῖν, ἐπίτροπος λαμ-
βάνει ταύτην τὴν τιμήν, αὐτοὶ δὲ πολιτεύονται ἢ φιλο- 20
σοφοῦσιν. ἡ δὲ κτητικὴ ἑτέρα ἀμφοτέρων τούτων, οἷον
ἡ δικαία, πολεμική τις οὖσα ἢ θηρευτική.

περὶ μὲν οὖν δούλου καὶ δεσπότου τοῦτον διωρίσθω
1 τὸν τρόπον· ὅλως δὲ περὶ πάσης κτήσεως καὶ χρημα- 8
τιστικῆς θεωρήσωμεν κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον, 1256
ἐπείπερ καὶ ὁ δοῦλος τῆς κτήσεως μέρος τι ἦν. πρῶτον 25
μὲν οὖν ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις πότερον ἡ χρηματιστικὴ
ἡ αὐτὴ τῇ οἰκονομικῇ ἐστὶν ἢ μέρος τι ἢ ὑπηρετική, καὶ
εἰ ὑπηρετική, πότερον ὡς ἡ κερκιδοποιικὴ τῇ ὑφαντικῇ ἢ
ὡς ἡ χαλκουργικὴ τῇ ἀνδριαντοποιίᾳ· οὐ γὰρ ὡσαύτως 30
ὑπηρετοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἢ μὲν ὄργανα παρέχει, ἢ δὲ τὴν ὕλην.
2 λέγω δὲ ὕλην τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ἐξ οὗ τι ἀποτελεῖται
ἔργον, οἷον ὑφάντῃ μὲν ἔρια ἀνδριαντοποιῷ δὲ χαλκόν.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ ἡ οἰκονομικὴ τῇ χρηματιστικῇ,
δῆλον. τῆς μὲν γὰρ τὸ πορίσασθαι, τῆς δὲ τὸ χρήσασ-
θαι· τίς γὰρ ἔσται ἡ χρησομένη τοῖς κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν
παρὰ τὴν οἰκονομικήν; πότερον δὲ μέρος αὐτῆς ἐστί τι 5
3 ἢ ἕτερον εἶδος, ἔχει διαμφισβήτησιν. εἰ γάρ ἐστι τοῦ
χρηματιστικοῦ θεωρῆσαι πόθεν χρήματα καὶ κτῆσις
ἔσται, ἡ δὲ κτῆσις πολλὰ περιείληφε μέρη καὶ ὁ πλοῦ-
τος, ὥστε πρῶτον ἡ γεωργικὴ πότερον μέρος τι τῆς
χρηματιστικῆς ἢ ἕτερόν τι γένος, καὶ καθόλου ἡ περὶ
4 τὴν τροφὴν ἐπιμέλεια καὶ κτῆσις; ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴδη γε 10
πολλὰ τροφῆς, διὸ καὶ βίοι πολλοὶ καὶ τῶν ζῴων καὶ

τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰσίν· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ζῆν ἄνευ τροφῆς, ὥστε αἱ διαφοραὶ τῆς τροφῆς τοὺς βίους πεποιήκασι διαφέροντας τῶν ζῴων. τῶν τε γὰρ θηρίων τὰ μὲν 5
15 ἀγελαῖα τὰ δὲ σποραδικά ἐστιν, ὁποτέρως συμφέρει πρὸς τὴν τροφὴν αὐτοῖς, διὰ τὸ τὰ μὲν ζωοφάγα τὰ δὲ καρποφάγα τὰ δὲ παμφάγα αὐτῶν εἶναι· ὥστε πρὸς τὰς ῥαστώνας καὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν τὴν τούτων ἡ φύσις τοὺς βίους αὐτῶν διώρισεν. ἐπεὶ δ' οὐ ταὐτὸ ἑκάστῳ ἡδὺ κατὰ φύσιν ἀλλ' ἕτερα ἑτέροις, καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ζωοφά-
20 γων καὶ τῶν καρποφάγων οἱ βίοι πρὸς ἄλληλα διεστᾶσιν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων· πολὺ γὰρ 6 διαφέρουσιν οἱ τούτων βίοι. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀργότατοι νομάδες εἰσίν· ἡ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμέρων τροφὴ ζῴων ἄνευ πόνου γίνεται σχολάζουσιν· ἀναγκαίου δ' ὄντος
25 μεταβάλλειν τοῖς κτήνεσι διὰ τὰς νομὰς καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀναγκάζονται συνακολουθεῖν, ὥσπερ γεωργίαν ζῶσαν γεωργοῦντες. οἱ δ' ἀπὸ θήρας ζῶσι, καὶ θήρας ἕτεροι 7 ἑτέρας, οἷον οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ λῃστείας, οἱ δ' ἀφ' ἁλιείας, ὅσοι λίμνας καὶ ἕλη καὶ ποταμοὺς ἢ θάλατταν τοιαύτην προσοικοῦσιν, οἱ δ' ἀπ' ὀρνίθων ἢ θηρίων ἀγρίων. τὸ
30 δὲ πλεῖστον γένος τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς ζῇ καὶ τῶν ἡμέρων καρπῶν. οἱ μὲν οὖν βίοι τοσοῦτοι σχεδόν 8 εἰσιν, ὅσοι γε αὐτόφυτον ἔχουσι τὴν ἐργασίαν καὶ μὴ δι' ἀλλαγῆς καὶ καπηλείας πορίζονται τὴν τροφήν, νομαδικός, γεωργικός, λῃστρικός, ἁλιευτικός, θηρευτικός· οἱ δὲ καὶ μιγνύντες ἐκ τούτων ἡδέως ζῶσι, προσαναπληροῦντες τὸν ἀκδεέστατον βίον, ᾗ τυγχάνει ἐλλείπων

πρὸς τὸ αὐτάρκης εἶναι, οἷον οἱ μὲν νομαδικὸν ἅμα καὶ 5
9 λῃστρικόν, οἱ δὲ γεωργικὸν καὶ θηρευτικόν. ὁμοίως δέ
καὶ περὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ὡς ἂν ἡ χρεία συναναγκάζῃ, τοῦ-
τον τὸν τρόπον διάγουσιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν τοιαύτη κτῆσις
ὑπ' αὐτῆς φαίνεται τῆς φύσεως διδομένη πᾶσιν, ὥσπερ
κατὰ τὴν πρώτην γένεσιν εὐθύς, οὕτω καὶ τελειωθεῖσιν.
10 καὶ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς γένεσιν τὰ μὲν συνεκτίκτει 10
τῶν ζῴων τοσαύτην τροφὴν ὡς ἱκανὴν εἶναι μέχρις οὗ
ἂν δύνηται αὐτὸ αὑτῷ πορίζειν τὸ γεννηθέν, οἷον ὅσα
σκωληκοτοκεῖ ἢ ᾠοτοκεῖ· ὅσα δὲ ζῳοτοκεῖ, τοῖς γεννω-
μένοις ἔχει τροφὴν ἐν αὑτοῖς μέχρι τινός, τὴν τοῦ
11 καλουμένου γάλακτος φύσιν. ὥστε ὁμοίως δῆλον ὅτι 15
καὶ γενομένοις οἰητέον τά τε φυτὰ τῶν ζῴων ἕνεκεν
εἶναι καὶ τἆλλα ζῷα τῶν ἀνθρώπων χάριν, τὰ μὲν ἥμερα
καὶ διὰ τὴν χρῆσιν καὶ διὰ τὴν τροφήν, τῶν δ' ἀγρίων,
εἰ μὴ πάντα, ἀλλὰ τά γε πλεῖστα τῆς τροφῆς καὶ ἄλλης
βοηθείας ἕνεκεν, ἵνα καὶ ἐσθῆς καὶ ἄλλα ὄργανα γίνηται 20
12 ἐξ αὐτῶν. εἰ οὖν ἡ φύσις μηθὲν μήτε ἀτελὲς ποιεῖ μήτε
μάτην, ἀναγκαῖον τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἕνεκεν αὐτὰ πάντα
πεποιηκέναι τὴν φύσιν. διὸ καὶ ἡ πολεμικὴ φύσει κτη-
τική πως ἔσται. ἡ γὰρ θηρευτικὴ μέρος αὐτῆς, ᾗ δεῖ
χρῆσθαι πρός τε τὰ θηρία καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὅσοι 25
πεφυκότες ἄρχεσθαι μὴ θέλουσιν, ὡς φύσει δίκαιον τοῦ-
13 τον ὄντα τὸν πόλεμον. ἓν μὲν οὖν εἶδος κτητικῆς κατὰ
φύσιν τῆς οἰκονομικῆς μέρος ἐστίν· ὃ δεῖ ἤτοι ὑπάρχειν
ἢ πορίζειν αὐτὴν ὅπως ὑπάρχῃ, ὧν ἐστὶ θησαυρισμὸς
χρημάτων πρὸς ζωὴν ἀναγκαίων καὶ χρησίμων εἰς κοι-

30 νωνίαν πόλεως ἢ οἰκίας. καὶ ἔοικεν ὅ γ' ἀληθινὸς πλοῦ- 14
τος ἐκ τούτων εἶναι. ἡ γὰρ τῆς τοιαύτης κτήσεως αὐ-
τάρκεια πρὸς ἀγαθὴν ζωὴν οὐκ ἄπειρός ἐστιν, ὥσπερ
Σόλων φησὶ ποιήσας "πλούτου δ' οὐδὲν τέρμα πεφασ-
μένον ἀνδράσι κεῖται." κεῖται γὰρ ὥσπερ καὶ ταῖς 15
ἄλλαις τέχναις· οὐδὲν γὰρ ὄργανον ἄπειρον οὐδεμιᾶς
ἐστὶ τέχνης οὔτε πλήθει οὔτε μεγέθει, ὁ δὲ πλοῦτος
5 ὀργάνων πλῆθός ἐστιν οἰκονομικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν.

ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ἔστι τις κτητικὴ κατὰ φύσιν τοῖς οἰκο-
νόμοις καὶ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς, καὶ δι' ἣν αἰτίαν, δῆλον·
9 ἔστι δὲ γένος ἄλλο κτητικῆς, ἣν μάλιστα καλοῦσι, καὶ 1
1257 δίκαιον αὐτὸ καλεῖν, χρηματιστικήν, δι' ἣν οὐδὲν δοκεῖ
10 πέρας εἶναι πλούτου καὶ κτήσεως· ἣν ὡς μίαν καὶ τὴν
αὐτὴν τῇ λεχθείσῃ πολλοὶ νομίζουσι διὰ τὴν γειτνίασιν.
ἔστι δ' οὔτε ἡ αὐτὴ τῇ εἰρημένῃ οὔτε πόρρω ἐκείνης.
ἔστι δ' ἣ μὲν φύσει ἣ δ' οὐ φύσει αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ δι'
ἐμπειρίας τινὸς καὶ τέχνης γίνεται μᾶλλον. λάβωμεν 2
15 δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐντεῦθεν. ἑκάστου γὰρ κτή-
ματος διττὴ ἡ χρῆσις ἐστίν, ἀμφότεραι δὲ καθ' αὑτὸ
μὲν ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁμοίως καθ' αὑτό, ἀλλ' ἣ μὲν οἰκεία ἣ
δ' οὐκ οἰκεία τοῦ πράγματος, οἷον ὑποδήματος ἥ τε
ὑπόδεσις καὶ ἡ μεταβλητική. ἀμφότεραι γὰρ ὑποδή-
20 ματος χρήσεις· καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἀλλαττόμενος τῷ δεομένῳ 3
ὑποδήματος ἀντὶ νομίσματος ἢ τροφῆς χρῆται τῷ ὑπο-
δήματι ᾗ ὑπόδημα, ἀλλ' οὐ τὴν οἰκείαν χρῆσιν· οὐ γὰρ
ἀλλαγῆς ἕνεκεν γέγονεν. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἔχει καὶ
περὶ τῶν ἄλλων κτημάτων. ἔστι γὰρ ἡ μεταβλητικὴ 4

πάντων, ἀρξαμένη τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν, τῷ τὰ μὲν πλείω τὰ δ' ἐλάττω τῶν ἱκανῶν ἔχειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. ᾗ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι φύσει τῆς χρηματιστικῆς ἡ καπηλική· ὅσον γὰρ ἱκανὸν αὐτοῖς, ἀναγ-
5 καῖον ἦν ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀλλαγήν. ἐν μὲν οὖν τῇ πρώτῃ κοινωνίᾳ (τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν οἰκία) φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστιν ἔργον αὐτῆς, ἀλλ' ἤδη πλείονος τῆς κοινωνίας οὔσης. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐκοινώνουν πάντων, οἱ δὲ κεχωρισμένοι πολλῶν πάλιν καὶ ἑτέρων· ὧν κατὰ τὰς δεήσεις ἀναγκαῖον ποιεῖσθαι τὰς μεταδόσεις, καθάπερ ἔτι πολλὰ ποιεῖ καὶ τῶν βαρβαρικῶν ἐθνῶν, κατὰ τὴν ἀλλαγήν.
6 αὐτὰ γὰρ τὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς αὐτὰ καταλλάττονται, ἐπὶ πλέον δ' οὐθέν, οἷον οἶνον πρὸς σῖτον διδόντες καὶ λαμβάνοντες, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων ἕκαστον. ἡ μὲν οὖν τοιαύτη μεταβλητικὴ οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν οὔτε χρηματιστικῆς ἐστὶν εἶδος οὐδέν· εἰς ἀναπλήρωσιν γὰρ
7 τῆς κατὰ φύσιν αὐταρκείας ἦν. ἐκ μέντοι ταύτης ἐγένετ' ἐκείνη κατὰ λόγον. ξενικωτέρας γὰρ γινομένης τῆς βοηθείας τῷ εἰσάγεσθαι ὧν ἐνδεεῖς καὶ ἐκπέμπειν ὧν ἐπλεόναζον, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἡ τοῦ νομίσματος ἐπορίσθη χρῆσις.
8 οὐ γὰρ εὐβάστακτον ἕκαστον τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἀναγκαίων· διὸ πρὸς τὰς ἀλλαγὰς τοιοῦτόν τι συνέθεντο πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς διδόναι καὶ λαμβάνειν, ὃ τῶν χρησίμων αὐτὸ ὂν εἶχε τὴν χρείαν εὐμεταχείριστον πρὸς τὸ ζῆν, οἷον σίδηρος καὶ ἄργυρος, κἂν εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἁπλῶς ὁρισθὲν μεγέθει καὶ σταθμῷ, τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον καὶ χαρακτῆρα ἐπιβαλόντων,

ἵνα ἀπολύσῃ τῆς μετρήσεως αὐτούς· ὁ γὰρ χαρακτὴρ
ἐτέθη τοῦ ποσοῦ σημεῖον. πορισθέντος οὖν ἤδη νο- 9
μίσματος ἐκ τῆς ἀναγκαίας ἀλλαγῆς θάτερον εἶδος τῆς
χρηματιστικῆς ἐγένετο, τὸ καπηλικόν, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον
ἁπλῶς ἴσως γινόμενον, εἶτα δι' ἐμπειρίας ἤδη τεχνι-
κώτερον, πόθεν καὶ πῶς μεταβαλλόμενον πλεῖστον ποιή-
σει κέρδος. διὸ δοκεῖ ἡ χρηματιστικὴ μάλιστα περὶ τὸ 10
νόμισμα εἶναι, καὶ ἔργον αὐτῆς τὸ δύνασθαι θεωρῆσαι
πόθεν ἔσται πλῆθος χρημάτων· ποιητικὴ γὰρ εἶναι τοῦ
πλούτου καὶ χρημάτων. καὶ γὰρ τὸν πλοῦτον πολλάκις
τιθέασι νομίσματος πλῆθος, διὰ τὸ περὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι τὴν
χρηματιστικὴν καὶ τὴν καπηλικήν. ὁτὲ δὲ πάλιν λῆρος 11
εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ νόμισμα καὶ νόμος παντάπασι, φύσει δ'
οὐθέν, ὅτι μεταθεμένων τε τῶν χρωμένων οὐθενὸς ἄξιον
οὐδὲ χρήσιμον πρὸς οὐδὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐστί, καὶ νο-
μίσματος πλουτῶν πολλάκις ἀπορήσει τῆς ἀναγκαίας
τροφῆς· καίτοι ἄτοπον τοιοῦτον εἶναι πλοῦτον οὗ εὐπο-
ρῶν λιμῷ ἀπολεῖται, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν Μίδαν ἐκεῖνον
μυθολογοῦσι διὰ τὴν ἀπληστίαν τῆς εὐχῆς πάντων
αὐτῷ γινομένων τῶν παρατιθεμένων χρυσῶν. διὸ ζη- 12
τοῦσιν ἕτερόν τι τὸν πλοῦτον καὶ τὴν χρηματιστικήν,
ὀρθῶς ζητοῦντες. ἔστι γὰρ ἑτέρα ἡ χρηματιστικὴ καὶ
ὁ πλοῦτος ὁ κατὰ φύσιν, καὶ αὕτη μὲν οἰκονομική, ἡ
δὲ καπηλικὴ ποιητικὴ χρημάτων, οὐ πάντως ἀλλ' ἢ διὰ
χρημάτων μεταβολῆς. καὶ δοκεῖ περὶ τὸ νόμισμα αὕτη
εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ νόμισμα στοιχεῖον καὶ πέρας τῆς ἀλλαγῆς
ἐστίν. καὶ ἄπειρος δὴ οὗτος ὁ πλοῦτος ὁ ἀπὸ ταύτης 13

τῆς χρηματιστικῆς. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ ἰατρικὴ τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν
εἰς ἄπειρόν ἐστι καὶ ἑκάστη τῶν τεχνῶν τοῦ τέλους
εἰς ἄπειρον (ὅτι μάλιστα γὰρ ἐκεῖνο βούλονται ποιεῖν),
τῶν δὲ πρὸς τὸ τέλος οὐκ εἰς ἄπειρον (πέρας γὰρ τὸ
τέλος πάσαις), οὕτω καὶ ταύτης τῆς χρηματιστικῆς οὐκ 15
ἔστι τοῦ τέλους πέρας, τέλος δὲ ὁ τοιοῦτος πλοῦτος
14 καὶ χρημάτων κτῆσις. τῆς δ' οἰκονομικῆς, οὐ χρημα-
τιστικῆς ἔστι πέρας· οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς οἰκονομικῆς
ἔργον. διὸ τῇ μὲν φαίνεται ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι παντὸς
πλούτου πέρας, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν γινομένων ὁρῶμεν συμβαῖ-
νον τοὐναντίον· πάντες γὰρ εἰς ἄπειρον αὔξουσιν οἱ 20
χρηματιζόμενοι τὸ νόμισμα. αἴτιον δὲ τὸ σύνεγγυς
15 αὐτῶν. ἐπαλλάττει γὰρ ἡ χρῆσις τοῦ αὐτοῦ οὖσα ἑκα-
τέρα τῆς χρηματιστικῆς. τῆς γὰρ αὐτῆς ἐστὶ χρήσεως
κτῆσις, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ ταὐτόν, ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν ἕτερον τέλος,
τῆς δ' ἡ αὔξησις. ὥστε δοκεῖ τισὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι τῆς οἰκο- 25
νομικῆς ἔργον, καὶ διατελοῦσιν ἢ σώζειν οἰόμενοι δεῖν
16 ἢ αὔξειν τὴν τοῦ νομίσματος οὐσίαν εἰς ἄπειρον. αἴτιον
δὲ ταύτης τῆς διαθέσεως τὸ σπουδάζειν περὶ τὸ ζῆν, 1258
ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸ εὖ ζῆν· εἰς ἄπειρον οὖν ἐκείνης τῆς ἐπι-
θυμίας οὔσης, καὶ τῶν ποιητικῶν ἀπείρων ἐπιθυμοῦσιν. 30
ὅσοι δὲ καὶ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν ἐπιβάλλονται, τὸ πρὸς τὰς
ἀπολαύσεις τὰς σωματικὰς ζητοῦσιν, ὥστ' ἐπεὶ καὶ
τοῦτ' ἐν τῇ κτήσει φαίνεται ὑπάρχειν, πᾶσα ἡ διατριβὴ
περὶ τὸν χρηματισμόν ἐστι, καὶ τὸ ἕτερον εἶδος τῆς
17 χρηματιστικῆς διὰ τοῦτ' ἐλήλυθεν. ἐν ὑπερβολῇ γὰρ
οὔσης τῆς ἀπολαύσεως, τὴν τῆς ἀπολαυστικῆς ὑπερ-

βολῆς ποιητικὴν ζητοῦσιν· κἂν μὴ διὰ τῆς χρηματιστι-
5 κῆς δύνωνται πορίζειν, δι' ἄλλης αἰτίας τοῦτο πειρῶνται,
ἑκάστῃ χρώμενοι τῶν δυνάμεων οὐ κατὰ φύσιν. ἀν-
δρίας γὰρ οὐ χρήματα ποιεῖν ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ θάρσος, οὐδὲ
στρατηγικῆς καὶ ἰατρικῆς, ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν νίκην τῆς δ'
ὑγίειαν. οἱ δὲ πάσας ποιοῦσι χρηματιστικάς, ὡς τοῦτο 18
τέλος ὄν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ τέλος ἅπαντα δέον ἀπαντᾶν.

10 περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς τε μὴ ἀναγκαίας χρηματιστικῆς,
καὶ τίς, καὶ δι' αἰτίαν τίνα ἐν χρείᾳ ἐσμὲν αὐτῆς, εἴρη-
ται· καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀναγκαίας, ὅτι ἑτέρα μὲν αὐτῆς οἰκο-
νομικὴ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἡ περὶ τὴν τροφήν, οὐχ ὥσπερ
10 αὐτὴ ἄπειρος ἀλλ' ἔχουσα ὅρον. δῆλον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀπο- 1
15 ρούμενον ἐξ ἀρχῆς, πότερον τοῦ οἰκονομικοῦ καὶ πολι-
τικοῦ ἐστὶν ἡ χρηματιστικὴ ἢ οὔ, ἀλλὰ δεῖ τοῦτο μὲν
ὑπάρχειν· ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ ἀνθρώπους οὐ ποιεῖ ἡ πολι-
τική, ἀλλὰ λαβοῦσα παρὰ τῆς φύσεως χρῆται αὐτοῖς,
οὕτω καὶ τροφὴν τὴν φύσιν δεῖ παραδοῦναι γῆν ἢ θά-
20 λατταν ἢ ἄλλο τι· ἐκ δὲ τούτων, ὡς δεῖ, ταῦτα δια-
θεῖναι προσήκει τὸν οἰκονόμον. οὐ γὰρ τῆς ὑφαντικῆς 2
ἔρια ποιῆσαι, ἀλλὰ χρήσασθαι αὐτοῖς, καὶ γνῶναι δὲ
τὸ ποῖον χρηστὸν καὶ ἐπιτήδειον ἢ φαῦλον καὶ ἀνεπιτή-
δειον. καὶ γὰρ ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις διὰ τί ἡ μὲν χρημα-
τιστικὴ μόριον τῆς οἰκονομίας, ἡ δ' ἰατρικὴ οὐ μόριον·
25 καίτοι δεῖ ὑγιαίνειν τοὺς κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν ὥσπερ ζῆν ἢ
ἄλλο τι τῶν ἀναγκαίων. ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστι μὲν ὡς τοῦ οἰκο- 3
νόμου καὶ τοῦ ἄρχοντος καὶ περὶ ὑγιείας ἰδεῖν, ἔστι δ'
ὡς οὔ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἰατροῦ, οὕτω καὶ περὶ τῶν χρημάτων

ἔστι μὲν ὡς τοῦ οἰκονόμου, ἔστι δ' ὡς οὔ, ἀλλὰ τῆς ὑπηρετικῆς· μάλιστα δέ, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, 30 δεῖ φύσει τοῦτο ὑπάρχειν. φύσεως γάρ ἐστιν ἔργον τροφὴν τῷ γεννηθέντι παρέχειν· παντὶ γάρ, ἐξ οὗ 4 γίνεται, τροφὴ τὸ λειπόμενον ἐστίν. διὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἐστὶν ἡ χρηματιστικὴ πᾶσιν ἀπὸ τῶν καρπῶν καὶ τῶν ζῴων. διπλῆς δ' οὔσης αὐτῆς, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, καὶ τῆς μὲν καπηλικῆς τῆς δ' οἰκονομικῆς, καὶ ταύτης μὲν ἀναγκαίας καὶ ἐπαινουμένης, τῆς δὲ μεταβλητικῆς ψεγομένης δικαίως (οὐ γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν ἀλλ' ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ἐστίν), 5 εὐλογώτατα μισεῖται ἡ ὀβολοστατικὴ διὰ τὸ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ νομίσματος εἶναι τὴν κτῆσιν καὶ οὐκ ἐφ' ὅπερ ἐπο- 5 ρίσθη. μεταβολῆς γὰρ ἐγένετο χάριν, ὁ δὲ τόκος αὐτὸ ποιεῖ πλέον. ὅθεν καὶ τοὔνομα τοῦτ' εἴληφεν· ὅμοια γὰρ τὰ τικτόμενα τοῖς γεννῶσιν αὐτά ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ τόκος 10 γίνεται νόμισμα νομίσματος· ὥστε καὶ μάλιστα παρὰ φύσιν οὗτος τῶν χρηματισμῶν ἐστίν.

1 ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὴν γνῶσιν διωρίκαμεν ἱκανῶς, τὰ 11 πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν δεῖ διελθεῖν. πάντα δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα τὴν μὲν θεωρίαν ἐλεύθερον ἔχει, τὴν δ' ἐμπειρίαν ἀναγκαίαν. ἔστι δὲ χρηματιστικῆς μέρη χρήσιμα τὸ περὶ τὰ κτή- 15 ματα ἔμπειρον εἶναι, ποῖα λυσιτελέστατα καὶ ποῦ καὶ πῶς, οἷον ἵππων κτῆσις ποία τις ἢ βοῶν ἢ προβάτων, 2 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ζῴων. δεῖ γὰρ ἔμπειρον εἶναι πρὸς ἅλληλά τε τούτων τίνα λυσιτελέστατα, καὶ ποῖα ἐν ποίοις τόποις· ἄλλα γὰρ ἐν ἄλλαις εὐθηνεῖ 20 χώραις. εἶτα περὶ γεωργίας, καὶ ταύτης ἤδη ψιλῆς τε

καὶ πεφυτευμένης, καὶ μελιττουργίας, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
ζῴων τῶν πλωτῶν ἢ πτηνῶν, ἀφ' ὅσων ἔστι τυγχάνειν
βοηθείας. τῆς μὲν οὖν οἰκειοτάτης χρηματιστικῆς ταῦτα 3
25 μόρια καὶ πρῶτα, τῆς δὲ μεταβλητικῆς μέγιστον μὲν
ἐμπορία (καὶ ταύτης μέρη τρία, ναυκληρία, φορτηγία,
παράστασις· διαφέρει δὲ τούτων ἕτερα ἑτέρων τῷ τὰ
μὲν ἀσφαλέστερα εἶναι, τὰ δὲ πλείω πορίζειν τὴν ἐπι-
καρπίαν), δεύτερον δὲ τοκισμός, τρίτον δὲ μισθαρνία.
ταύτης δ' ἡ μὲν τῶν βαναύσων τεχνῶν, ἡ δὲ τῶν ἀτέχ- 4
30 νων καὶ τῷ σώματι μόνῳ χρησίμων. τρίτον δὲ εἶδος
χρηματιστικῆς μεταξὺ ταύτης καὶ τῆς πρώτης. ἔχει
γὰρ καὶ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν τι μέρος καὶ τῆς μεταβλητικῆς,
ὅσα ἀπὸ γῆς καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ γῆς γινομένων, ἀκάρπων μὲν
χρησίμων δέ, οἷον ὑλοτομία τε καὶ πᾶσα μεταλλευτική.
αὕτη δὲ πολλὰ ἤδη περιείληφε γένη· πολλὰ γὰρ εἴδη 5
τῶν ἐκ γῆς μεταλλευομένων ἐστίν. περὶ ἑκάστου δὲ
5 τούτων καθόλου μὲν εἴρηται καὶ νῦν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος
ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι χρήσιμον μὲν πρὸς τὰς ἐργασίας, φορ-
τικὸν δὲ τὸ ἐνδιατρίβειν. εἰσὶ δὲ τεχνικώταται μὲν τῶν 6
ἐργασιῶν ὅπου ἐλάχιστον τῆς τύχης, βαναυσόταται δ'
ἐν αἷς τὰ σώματα λωβῶνται μάλιστα, δουλικώταται
10 δ' ὅπου τοῦ σώματος πλεῖσται χρήσεις, ἀγεννέσταται δ'
ὅπου ἐλάχιστον προσδεῖ ἀρετῆς. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἐνίοις 7
γεγραμμένα περὶ τούτων, οἷον Χάρητι δὴ τῷ Παρίῳ καὶ
259 Ἀπολλοδώρῳ τῷ Λημνίῳ περὶ γεωργίας καὶ ψιλῆς
καὶ πεφυτευμένης, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄλλοις περὶ ἄλλων,
ταῦτα μὲν ἐκ τούτων θεωρείτω ὅτῳ ἐπιμελές· ἔτι δὲ καὶ

τὰ λεγόμενα σποράδην, δι' ὧν ἐπιτετυχήκασιν ἔνιοι 15
8 χρηματιζόμενοι, δεῖ συλλέγειν. πάντα γὰρ ὠφέλιμα
ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τοῖς τιμῶσι τὴν χρηματιστικήν. οἷον καὶ τὸ
Θάλεω τοῦ Μιλησίου· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι κατανόημά τι
χρηματιστικόν, ἀλλ' ἐκείνῳ μὲν διὰ τὴν σοφίαν προσ-
9 άπτουσι, τυγχάνει δὲ καθόλου τι ὄν. ὀνειδιζόντων γὰρ 20
αὐτῷ διὰ τὴν πενίαν ὡς ἀνωφελοῦς τῆς φιλοσοφίας
οὔσης, κατανοήσαντά φασιν αὐτὸν ἐλαιῶν φορὰν ἐσο-
μένην ἐκ τῆς ἀστρολογίας, ἔτι χειμῶνος ὄντος εὐπο-
ρήσαντα χρημάτων ὀλίγων ἀρραβῶνας διαδοῦναι τῶν
ἐλαιουργίων τῶν τ' ἐν Μιλήτῳ καὶ Χίῳ πάντων, ὀλίγου 25
μισθωσάμενον ἄτ' οὐθενὸς ἐπιβάλλοντος· ἐπειδὴ δ' ὁ
καιρὸς ἦκε, πολλῶν ζητουμένων ἅμα καὶ ἐξαίφνης, ἐκ-
μισθοῦντα ἂν τρόπον ἠβούλετο, πολλὰ χρήματα συλ-
λέξαντα ἐπιδεῖξαι ὅτι ῥᾴδιόν ἐστι πλουτεῖν τοῖς φι-
λοσόφοις, ἂν βούλωνται, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ περὶ ὃ
10 σπουδάζουσιν. Θαλῆς μὲν οὖν λέγεται τοῦτον τὸν 30
τρόπον ἐπίδειξιν ποιήσασθαι τῆς σοφίας· ἔστι δ', ὥσπερ
εἴπομεν, καθόλου τὸ τοιοῦτον χρηματιστικόν, ἐάν τις
δύνηται μονοπωλίαν αὐτῷ κατασκευάζειν. διὸ καὶ τῶν
πόλεων ἔνιαι τοῦτον ποιοῦνται τὸν πόρον, ὅταν ἀπορῶσι
11 χρημάτων· μονοπωλίαν γὰρ τῶν ὠνίων ποιοῦσιν. ἐν
Σικελίᾳ δέ τις τεθέντος παρ' αὐτῷ νομίσματος συνε-
πρίατο πάντα τὸν σίδηρον ἐκ τῶν σιδηρείων, μετὰ δὲ
ταῦτα ὡς ἀφίκοντο ἐκ τῶν ἐμπορίων οἱ ἔμποροι, ἐπώλει 5
μόνος, οὐ πολλὴν ποιήσας ὑπερβολὴν τῆς τιμῆς· ἀλλ'
ὅμως ἐπὶ τοῖς πεντήκοντα ταλάντοις ἐπέλαβεν ἑκατόν.

τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ὁ Διονύσιος αἰσθόμενος τὰ μὲν χρήματα 12
ἐκέλευσεν ἐκκομίσασθαι, μὴ μέντοι γ' ἔτι μένειν ἐν
10 Συρακούσαις, ὡς πόρους εὑρίσκοντα τοῖς αὐτοῦ πράγ-
μασιν ἀσυμφόρους. τὸ μέντοι ὅραμα Θάλεω καὶ τοῦτο
ταὐτόν ἐστιν· ἀμφότεροι γὰρ ἑαυτοῖς ἐτέχνασαν γενέ-
σθαι μονοπωλίαν. χρήσιμον δὲ γνωρίζειν ταῦτα καὶ 13
τοῖς πολιτικοῖς· πολλαῖς γὰρ πόλεσι δεῖ χρηματισμοῦ
καὶ τοιούτων πόρων, ὥσπερ οἰκίᾳ, μᾶλλον δέ. διόπερ
15 τινὲς καὶ πολιτεύονται τῶν πολιτευομένων ταῦτα μόνον.

12 ἐπεὶ δὲ τρία μέρη τῆς οἰκονομικῆς ἦν, ἓν μὲν δεσπο- 1
τική, περὶ ἧς εἴρηται πρότερον, ἓν δὲ πατρική, τρίτον
δὲ γαμική· καὶ γὰρ γυναικὸς ἄρχειν καὶ τέκνων, ὡς
ἐλευθέρων μὲν ἀμφοῖν, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον τῆς
20 ἀρχῆς, ἀλλὰ γυναικὸς μὲν πολιτικῶς τέκνων δὲ βασι-
λικῶς· τό τε γὰρ ἄρρεν φύσει τοῦ θήλεος ἡγεμονικώ-
τερον, εἰ μή που συνέστηκε παρὰ φύσιν, καὶ τὸ πρεσ-
βύτερον καὶ τέλειον τοῦ νεωτέρου καὶ ἀτελοῦς. ἐν μὲν 2
οὖν ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἀρχαῖς ταῖς πλείσταις μεταβάλλει
25 τὸ ἄρχον καὶ τὸ ἀρχόμενον· ἐξ ἴσου γὰρ εἶναι βούλεται
τὴν φύσιν καὶ διαφέρειν μηθέν. ὅμως δέ, ὅταν τὸ μὲν
ἄρχῃ τὸ δ' ἄρχηται, ζητεῖ διαφορὰν εἶναι καὶ σχήμασι
καὶ λόγοις καὶ τιμαῖς, ὥσπερ καὶ Ἄμασις εἶπε τὸν περὶ
τοῦ ποδανιπτῆρος λόγον. τὸ δ' ἄρρεν ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ θῆλυ 3
τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον. ἡ δὲ τῶν τέκνων ἀρχὴ βα-
30 σιλική· τὸ γὰρ γεννῆσαν καὶ κατὰ φιλίαν ἄρχον καὶ
κατὰ πρεσβείαν ἐστίν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ βασιλικῆς εἶδος ἀρχῆς.
διὸ καλῶς Ὅμηρος τὸν Δία προσηγόρευσεν εἰπὼν

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1 φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι πλείων ἡ σπουδὴ τῆς οἰκονομίας 13
περὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἢ περὶ τὴν τῶν ἀψύχων κτῆσιν,
καὶ περὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν τούτων ἢ περὶ τὴν τῆς κτήσεως, ὃν
καλοῦμεν πλοῦτον, καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων μᾶλλον ἢ δού-
2 λων. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ δούλων ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις,
πότερον ἔστιν ἀρετή τις δούλου παρὰ τὰς ὀργανικὰς καὶ 10
διακονικὰς ἄλλη τιμιωτέρα τούτων, οἷον σωφροσύνη
καὶ ἀνδρία καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων
ἕξεων, ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδεμία παρὰ τὰς σωματικὰς ὑπερεσίας. ἔχει γὰρ ἀπορίαν ἀμφοτέρως. εἴτε γὰρ ἔστιν, τί
3 διοίσουσι τῶν ἐλευθέρων; εἴτε μὴ ἔστιν ὄντων ἀνθρώ- 15
πων καὶ λόγου κοινωνούντων, ἄτοπον. σχεδὸν δὲ ταὐτόν ἐστι τὸ ζητούμενον καὶ περὶ γυναικὸς καὶ παιδός, πότερα καὶ τούτων εἰσὶν ἀρεταί, καὶ δεῖ τὴν γυναῖκα εἶναι σώφρονα καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ δικαίαν, καὶ παῖς ἐστὶ
4 καὶ ἀκόλαστος καὶ σώφρων, ἢ οὔ; καὶ καθόλου δὴ τοῦτ' 20
ἐστὶν ἐπισκεπτέον περὶ ἀρχομένου φύσει καὶ ἄρχοντος, πότερον ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἢ ἑτέρα. εἰ μὲν γὰρ δεῖ ἀμφοτέρους μετέχειν καλοκἀγαθίας, διὰ τί τὸν μὲν ἄρχειν δέοι ἂν τὸν δὲ ἄρχεσθαι καθάπαξ; οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον οἷόν τε διαφέρειν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ
5 ἄρχειν εἴδει διαφέρει, τὸ δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον οὐδέν. ἐ[illegible]

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διακονικὰς ἄλλη τιμιωτέρα τούτων, οἷον σωφροσύνη
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ἕξεων, ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδεμία παρὰ τὰς σωματικὰς ὑπερεσίας. ἔχει γὰρ ἀπορίαν ἀμφοτέρως. εἴτε γὰρ ἔστιν, τί
3 διοίσουσι τῶν ἐλευθέρων; εἴτε μὴ ἔστιν ὄντων ἀνθρώ- 15
πων καὶ λόγου κοινωνούντων, ἄτοπον. σχεδὸν δὲ ταὐτόν ἐστι τὸ ζητούμενον καὶ περὶ γυναικὸς καὶ παιδός, πότερα καὶ τούτων εἰσὶν ἀρεταί, καὶ δεῖ τὴν γυναῖκα εἶναι σώφρονα καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ δικαίαν, καὶ παῖς ἐστὶ
4 καὶ ἀκόλαστος καὶ σώφρων, ἢ οὔ; καὶ καθόλου δὴ τοῦτ' 20
ἐστὶν ἐπισκεπτέον περὶ ἀρχομένου φύσει καὶ ἄρχοντος, πότερον ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἢ ἑτέρα. εἰ μὲν γὰρ δεῖ ἀμφοτέρους μετέχειν καλοκαγαθίας, διὰ τί τὸν μὲν ἄρχειν δέοι ἂν τὸν δὲ ἄρχεσθαι καθάπαξ; οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον οἷόν τε διαφέρειν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ
5 ἄρχειν εἴδει διαφέρει, τὸ δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον οὐδέν. εἰ 25

δὲ τὸν μὲν δεῖ τὸν δὲ μή, θαυμαστόν. εἴτε γὰρ ὁ ἄρχων
μὴ ἔσται σώφρων καὶ δίκαιος, πῶς ἄρξει καλῶς; εἴθ'
1260 ὁ ἀρχόμενος, πῶς ἀρχθήσεται καλῶς; ἀκόλαστος γὰρ
ὢν καὶ δειλὸς οὐθὲν ποιήσει τῶν προσηκόντων. φανερὸν
30 τοίνυν ὅτι ἀνάγκη μὲν μετέχειν ἀμφοτέρους ἀρετῆς,
ταύτης δ' εἶναι διαφοράς, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν φύσει ἀρχο-
μένων. καὶ τοῦτο εὐθὺς ὑφήγηται περὶ τὴν ψυχήν. ἐν 6
ταύτῃ γάρ ἐστι φύσει τὸ μὲν ἄρχον τὸ δὲ ἀρχόμενον,
ὧν ἑτέραν φαμὲν εἶναι ἀρετήν, οἷον τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος
καὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου. δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον
ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὥστε φύσει τὰ πλείω ἄρχοντα
καὶ ἀρχόμενα. ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον τὸ ἐλεύθερον τοῦ 7
5 δούλου ἄρχει καὶ τὸ ἄρρεν τοῦ θήλεος καὶ ἀνὴρ παιδός·
καὶ πᾶσιν ἐνυπάρχει μὲν τὰ μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλ'
ἐνυπάρχει διαφερόντως. ὁ μὲν γὰρ δοῦλος ὅλως οὐκ
ἔχει τὸ βουλευτικόν, τὸ δὲ θῆλυ ἔχει μέν, ἀλλ' ἄκυρον·
ὁ δὲ παῖς ἔχει μέν, ἀλλ' ἀτελές. ὁμοίως τοίνυν ἀναγ- 8
10 καῖον ἔχειν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἠθικὰς ἀρετάς· ὑποληπτέον
δεῖν μὲν μετέχειν πάντας, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον,
ἀλλ' ὅσον ἑκάστῳ πρὸς τὸ αὐτοῦ ἔργον. διὸ τὸν μὲν
ἄρχοντα τελέαν ἔχειν δεῖ τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετήν (τὸ γὰρ
ἔργον ἐστὶν ἁπλῶς τοῦ ἀρχιτέκτονος, ὁ δὲ λόγος ἀρ-
χιτέκτων), τῶν δ' ἄλλων ἕκαστον, ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει
15 αὐτοῖς. ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἐστὶν ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ τῶν 9
εἰρημένων πάντων, καὶ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ σωφροσύνη γυ-
ναικὸς καὶ ἀνδρός, οὐδ' ἀνδρία καὶ δικαιοσύνη, κα-
θάπερ ᾤετο Σωκράτης, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν ἀρχικὴ ἀνδρία ἡ

10 δ' ὑπηρετική. ὁμοίως δ' ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας. δῆλον δέ τοῦτο καὶ κατὰ μέρος μᾶλλον ἐπισκοποῦσιν· καθόλου γὰρ οἱ λέγοντες ἐξαπατῶσιν ἑαυτοὺς ὅτι τὸ εὖ ἔχειν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀρετή, ἢ τὸ ὀρθοπραγεῖν, ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων· πολὺ γὰρ ἄμεινον λέγουσιν οἱ ἐξαριθμοῦντες τὰς ἀρετάς, ὥσπερ Γοργίας, τῶν οὕτως ὁριζο-
11 μένων. διὸ δεῖ, ὥσπερ ὁ ποιητὴς εἴρηκε περὶ γυναικός, οὕτω νομίζειν ἔχειν περὶ πάντων· "γυναικὶ κόσμον ἡ σιγὴ φέρει," ἀλλ' ἀνδρὶ οὐκέτι τοῦτο. ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ παῖς ἀτελής, δῆλον ὅτι τούτου μὲν καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ οὐκ αὐτοῦ πρὸς αὐτόν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν τέλειον καὶ τὸν ἡγού-
12 μενον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δούλου πρὸς δεσπότην. ἔθεμεν δὲ πρὸς τἀναγκαῖα χρήσιμον εἶναι τὸν δοῦλον, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἀρετῆς δεῖται μικρᾶς, καὶ τοσαύτης ὅπως μήτε δι' ἀκολασίαν μήτε διὰ δειλίαν ἐλλείψει τῶν ἔργων. ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις, τὸ νῦν εἰρημένον εἰ ἀληθές, ἆρα καὶ τοὺς τεχνίτας δήσει ἔχειν ἀρετήν· πολλάκις γὰρ δι' ἀκο-
13 λασίαν ἐλλείπουσι τῶν ἔργων. ἢ διαφέρει τοῦτο πλεῖστον. ὁ μὲν γὰρ δοῦλος κοινωνὸς ζωῆς, ὁ δὲ πορρώτερον, καὶ τοσοῦτον ἐπιβάλλει ἀρετῆς ὅσον περ καὶ δουλείας· ὁ γὰρ βάναυσος τεχνίτης ἀφωρισμένην τινὰ ἔχει δουλείαν· καὶ ὁ μὲν δοῦλος τῶν φύσει, σκυτοτόμος
14 δ' οὐθείς, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνιτῶν. φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρετῆς αἴτιον εἶναι δεῖ τῷ δούλῳ τὸν δεσπότην, ἀλλ' οὐ τὴν διδασκαλικὴν ἔχοντα τῶν ἔργων δεσποτικήν. διὸ λέγουσιν οὐ καλῶς οἱ λόγου τοὺς δούλους ἀποστεροῦντες καὶ φάσκοντες ἐπιτάξει

χρῆσθαι μόνον· νουθετητέον γὰρ μᾶλλον τοὺς δούλους ἢ τοὺς παῖδας.

ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον· 15 περὶ δὲ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς καὶ τέκνων καὶ πατρός, τῆς τε περὶ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς 15 ὁμιλίας, τί τὸ καλῶς καὶ μὴ καλῶς ἐστί, καὶ πῶς δεῖ τὸ μὲν εὖ διώκειν τὸ δὲ κακῶς φεύγειν, ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰς πολιτείας ἀναγκαῖον ἐπελθεῖν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ οἰκία μὲν πᾶσα μέρος πόλεως, ταῦτα δ' οἰκίας, τὴν δὲ τοῦ μέρους πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου δεῖ βλέπειν ἀρετήν, ἀναγκαῖον πρὸς τὴν 20 πολιτείαν βλέποντας παιδεύειν καὶ τοὺς παῖδας καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας, εἴπερ τι διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ τὴν πόλιν εἶναι σπουδαίαν καὶ τοὺς παῖδας εἶναι σπουδαίους καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας σπουδαίας. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ διαφέρειν· αἱ μὲν 16 γὰρ γυναῖκες ἥμισυ μέρος τῶν ἐλευθέρων, ἐκ δὲ τῶν 25 παίδων οἱ κοινωνοὶ γίνονται τῆς πολιτείας· ὥστ' ἐπεὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων διώρισται, περὶ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν ἐν ἄλλοις λεκτέον, ἀφέντες ὡς τέλος ἔχοντας τοὺς νῦν λόγους, ἄλλην ἀρχὴν ποιησάμενοι λέγωμεν, καὶ πρῶτον ἐπισκεψώμεθα περὶ τῶν ἀποφηναμένων περὶ τῆς πολιτείας τῆς ἀρίστης.

ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Γ.

1 Τῷ περὶ πολιτείας ἐπισκοποῦντι, καὶ τίς ἑκάστη καὶ
ποία τις, σχεδὸν πρώτη σκέψις περὶ πόλεως ἰδεῖν, τί
ποτ' ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις· νῦν γὰρ ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, οἱ μὲν
φάσκοντες τὴν πόλιν πεπραχέναι τὴν πρᾶξιν, οἱ δ' οὐ 25
τὴν πόλιν ἀλλὰ τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἢ τὸν τύραννον. τοῦ
δὲ πολιτικοῦ καὶ τοῦ νομοθέτου πᾶσαν ὁρῶμεν τὴν
πραγματείαν οὖσαν περὶ πόλιν· ἡ δὲ πολιτεία τῶν
2 τὴν πόλιν οἰκούντων ἐστὶ τάξις τις. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ πόλις
τῶν συγκειμένων, καθάπερ ἄλλο τι τῶν ὅλων μὲν συν- 30
εστώτων δ' ἐκ πολλῶν μορίων, δῆλον ὅτι πρότερον
ὁ πολίτης ζητητέος· ἡ γὰρ πόλις πολιτῶν τι πλῆθός
ἐστιν, ὥστε τίνα χρὴ καλεῖν πολίτην καὶ τίς ὁ πολίτης 1275
ἐστὶ σκεπτέον. καὶ γὰρ ὁ πολίτης ἀμφισβητεῖται πολ-
λάκις· οὐ γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν ὁμολογοῦσι πάντες εἶναι πολί-
την· ἔστι γάρ τις ὃς ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ πολίτης ὢν ἐν ὀλι-
3 γαρχίᾳ πολλάκις οὐκ ἔστι πολίτης. τοὺς μὲν οὖν ἄλλως
πως τυγχάνοντας ταύτης τῆς προσηγορίας, οἷον τοὺς 5
ποιητοὺς πολίτας, ἀφετέον· ὁ δὲ πολίτης οὐ τῷ οἰκεῖν
που πολίτης ἐστίν· καὶ γὰρ μέτοικοι καὶ δοῦλοι κοι-
4 νωνοῦσι τῆς οἰκήσεως. οὐδ' οἱ τῶν δικαίων μετέχοντες
οὕτως ὥστε καὶ δίκην ὑπέχειν καὶ δικάζεσθαι· τοῦτο

10 γὰρ ὑπάρχει καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ συμβόλων κοινωνοῦσιν· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τούτοις ὑπάρχει. πολλαχοῦ μὲν οὖν οὐδὲ τούτων τελέως οἱ μέτοικοι μετέχουσιν, ἀλλὰ νέμειν ἀνάγκη προστάτην. διὸ ἀτελῶς πως μετέχουσι τῆς 5 τοιαύτης κοινωνίας· ἀλλὰ καθάπερ καὶ παῖδας τοὺς μήπω δι' ἡλικίαν ἐγγεγραμμένους καὶ τοὺς γέροντας 15 τοὺς ἀφειμένους, φατέον εἶναι μέν πως πολίτας, οὐχ ἁπλῶς δὲ λίαν ἀλλὰ προστιθέντας τοὺς μὲν ἀτελεῖς τοὺς δὲ παρηκμακότας ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον· οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει· δῆλον γὰρ τὸ λεγόμενον· ζητοῦμεν γὰρ τὸν ἁπλῶς πολίτην καὶ μηδὲν ἔχοντα τοιοῦτον ἔγκλημα 20 διορθώσεως δεόμενον, ἐπεὶ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀτίμων καὶ φυγάδων ἔστι τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ διαπορεῖν καὶ λύειν. πολίτης δ' ἁπλῶς οὐδενὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁρίζεται μᾶλλον 6 ἢ τῷ μετέχειν κρίσεως καὶ ἀρχῆς. τῶν δ' ἀρχῶν αἱ μέν εἰσι διῃρημέναι κατὰ χρόνον, ὥστ' ἐνίας μὲν ὅλως δὶς τὸν αὐτὸν οὐκ ἔξεστιν ἄρχειν, ἢ διὰ τινῶν ὡρισμέ- 25 νων χρόνων· ὁ δ' ἀόριστος, οἷον ὁ δικαστὴς καὶ ἐκκλησιαστής. τάχα μὲν οὖν ἂν φαίη τις οὐδ' ἄρχοντας 7 εἶναι τοὺς τοιούτους, οὐδὲ μετέχειν διὰ ταῦτ' ἀρχῆς· καίτοι γελοῖον τοὺς κυριωτάτους ἀποστερεῖν ἀρχῆς. ἀλλὰ διαφερέτω μηδέν· περὶ ὀνόματος γὰρ ὁ λόγος· 30 ἀνώνυμον γὰρ τὸ κοινὸν ἐπὶ δικαστοῦ καὶ ἐκκλησιαστοῦ, τί δεῖ ταῦτ' ἄμφω καλεῖν. ἔστω δὴ διορισμοῦ χάριν ἀόριστος ἀρχή. τίθεμεν δὴ πολίτας τοὺς οὕτω μετέ- 8 χοντας. ὁ μὲν οὖν μάλιστ' ἂν ἐφαρμόσας πολίτης ἐπὶ πάντας τοὺς λεγομένους πολίτας σχεδὸν τοιοῦτος ἐστίν·

δεῖ δὲ μὴ λανθάνειν ὅτι τῶν πραγμάτων ἐν οἷς τὰ ὑπο-
κείμενα διαφέρει τῷ εἴδει, καὶ τὸ μὲν αὐτῶν ἐστὶ πρῶ-
τον τὸ δὲ δεύτερον τὸ δ' ἐχόμενον, ἢ τὸ παράπαν οὐδέν 5
9 ἐστιν, ᾗ τοιαῦτα, τὸ κοινόν, ἢ γλίσχρως. τὰς δὲ πο-
λιτείας ὁρῶμεν εἴδει διαφερούσας ἀλλήλων, καὶ τὰς
μὲν ὑστέρας τὰς δὲ προτέρας οὔσας· τὰς γὰρ ἡμαρ-
τημένας καὶ παρεκβεβηκυίας ἀναγκαῖον ὑστέρας εἶναι
τῶν ἀναμαρτήτων. τὰς δὲ παρεκβεβηκυίας πῶς λέγομεν,
ὕστερον ἔσται φανερόν. ὥστε καὶ τὸν πολίτην ἕτερον 10
10 ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὸν καθ' ἑκάστην πολιτείαν. διόπερ ὁ
λεχθεὶς ἐν μὲν δημοκρατίᾳ μάλιστ' ἐστὶ πολίτης, ἐν
δὲ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐνδέχεται μέν, οὐ μὴν ἀναγκαῖον. ἐνίαις
γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι δῆμος, οὐδ' ἐκκλησίαν νομίζουσιν ἀλλὰ
συγκλήτους, καὶ τὰς δίκας δικάζουσι κατὰ μέρος, οἷον 15
ἐν Λακεδαίμονι τὰς τῶν συμβολαίων δικάζει τῶν ἐφόρων
ἄλλος ἄλλας, οἱ δὲ γέροντες τὰς φονικάς, ἑτέρα δ' ἴσως
1 ἀρχή τις ἑτέρας. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ Καρ-
χηδόνα· πάσας γὰρ ἀρχαί τινες κρίνουσι τὰς δίκας.
ἀλλ' ἔχει γὰρ διόρθωσιν ὁ τοῦ πολίτου διορισμός. ἐν
γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις πολιτείαις οὐχ ὁ ἀόριστος ἄρχων ἐκ- 20
κλησιαστής ἐστι καὶ δικαστής, ἀλλ' ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν
ὡρισμένος· τούτων γὰρ ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ τισὶν ἀποδέδοται τὸ
βουλεύεσθαι καὶ δικάζειν ἢ περὶ πάντων ἢ περὶ τινῶν.
2 τίς μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ὁ πολίτης, ἐκ τούτων φανερόν· ᾧ γὰρ
ἐξουσία κοινωνεῖν ἀρχῆς βουλευτικῆς ἢ κριτικῆς, πολί- 25
την ἤδη λέγομεν εἶναι ταύτης τῆς πόλεως, πόλιν δὲ
τὸ τῶν τοιούτων πλῆθος ἱκανὸν πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ζωῆς,

2 ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν. ὁρίζονται δὴ πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν πο- 1
λίτην τὸν ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πολιτῶν καὶ μὴ θατέρου μόνον,
30 οἷον πατρὸς ἢ μητρός· οἱ δὲ καὶ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ πλέον ζη-
τοῦσιν, οἷον ἐπὶ πάππους δύο ἢ τρεῖς ἢ πλείους. οὕτω
δὴ ὁριζομένων πολιτικῶς καὶ ταχέως, ἀποροῦσί τινες
τὸν τρίτον ἐκεῖνον ἢ τέταρτον, πῶς ἔσται πολίτης.
Γοργίας μὲν οὖν ὁ Λεοντῖνος, τὰ μὲν ἴσως ἀπορῶν τὰ 2
δ' εἰρωνευόμενος, ἔφη, καθάπερ ὅλμους εἶναι τοὺς ὑπὸ
τῶν ὁλμοποιῶν πεποιημένους, οὕτω καὶ Λαρισαίους
τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν δημιουργῶν πεποιημένους· εἶναι γάρ τινας
5 λαρισοποιούς. ἔστι δ' ἁπλοῦν· εἰ γὰρ μετεῖχον κατὰ 3
τὸν ῥηθέντα διορισμὸν τῆς πολιτείας, ἦσαν ἂν πολῖται·
καὶ γὰρ οὐ δυνατὸν ἐφαρμόττειν τὸ ἐκ πολίτου ἢ ἐκ
πολίτιδος ἐπὶ τῶν πρώτων οἰκησάντων ἢ κτισάντων.
ἀλλ' ἴσως ἐκεῖνοι μᾶλλον ἔχουσιν ἀπορίαν, ὅσοι μετέ-
10 σχον μεταβολῆς γενομένης πολιτείας, οἷον Ἀθήνησιν
ἐποίησε Κλεισθένης μετὰ τὴν τῶν τυράννων ἐκβολήν·
πολλοὺς γὰρ ἐφυλέτευσε ξένους καὶ δούλους ⟨καὶ⟩
μετοίκους. τὸ δ' ἀμφισβήτημα πρὸς τούτους ἐστὶν οὐ 4
τίς πολίτης, ἀλλὰ πότερον ἀδίκως ἢ δικαίως. καίτοι
1276 κἂν τοῦτό τις ἔτι προσαπορήσειεν, ἆρ' εἰ μὴ δικαίως
15 πολίτης, οὐ πολίτης, ὡς ταὐτὸ δυναμένου τοῦ τ' ἀδίκου
καὶ τοῦ ψευδοῦς. ἐπεὶ δ' ὁρῶμεν καὶ ἄρχοντάς τινας 5
ἀδίκως, οὓς ἄρχειν μὲν φήσομεν ἀλλ' οὐ δικαίως, ὁ
δὲ πολίτης ἀρχῇ τινὶ διωρισμένος ἐστίν (ὁ γὰρ κοινω-
νῶν τῆς τοιᾶσδε ἀρχῆς πολίτης ἐστίν, ὡς ἔφαμεν),
3 δῆλον ὅτι πολίτας μὲν εἶναι φατέον καὶ τούτους, περὶ 1

δὲ τοῦ δικαίως ἢ μὴ δικαίως συνάπτει πρὸς τὴν εἰρη- 20
μένην πρότερον ἀμφισβήτησιν. ἀποροῦσι γάρ τινες
πόθ' ἡ πόλις ἔπραξε καὶ πότε οὐχ ἡ πόλις, οἷον ὅταν
2 ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας ἢ τυραννίδος γένηται δημοκρατία. τότε
γὰρ οὔτε τὰ συμβόλαια ἔνιοι βούλονται διαλύειν, ὡς
οὐ τῆς πόλεως ἀλλὰ τοῦ τυράννου λαβόντος, οὔτ' ἄλλα 25
πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων, ὡς ἐνίας τῶν πολιτειῶν τῷ κρα-
τεῖν οὔσας, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον. εἴπερ οὖν
καὶ δημοκρατοῦνταί τινες κατὰ τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον,
ὁμοίως τῆς πόλεως φατέον εἶναι ταύτης τὰς τῆς πο-
λιτείας ταύτης πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἐκ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ 30
3 τῆς τυραννίδος. ἔοικε δ' οἰκεῖος ὁ λόγος εἶναι τῆς ἀπο-
ρίας ταύτης, πῶς ποτὲ χρὴ λέγειν τὴν πόλιν εἶναι τὴν
αὐτὴν ἢ μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀλλ' ἑτέραν. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐπιπο-
λαιοτάτη τῆς ἀπορίας ζήτησις περὶ τὸν τόπον καὶ τοὺς
ἀνθρώπους ἐστίν· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ διαζευχθῆναι τὸν τόπον
καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἕτερον τοὺς δ' ἕτερον
4 οἰκῆσαι τόπον. ταύτην μὲν οὖν πραοτέραν θετέον τὴν
ἀπορίαν· πολλαχῶς γὰρ τῆς πόλεως λεγομένης ἐστί 5
πως εὐμάρεια τῆς τοιαύτης ζητήσεως. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
τῶν τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον κατοικούντων ἀνθρώπων πότε
5 δεῖ νομίζειν μίαν εἶναι τὴν πόλιν. οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῖς
τείχεσιν· εἴη γὰρ ἂν Πελοποννήσῳ περιβαλεῖν ἓν τεῖ-
χος. τοιαύτη δ' ἴσως ἐστὶ καὶ Βαβυλὼν καὶ πᾶσα ἥτις 10
ἔχει περιγραφὴν μᾶλλον ἔθνους ἢ πόλεως· ἧς γέ φασιν
ἑαλωκυίας τρίτην ἡμέραν οὐκ αἰσθέσθαι τι μέρος τῆς
6 πόλεως. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν ταύτης τῆς ἀπορίας εἰς ἄλλον

καιρὸν χρήσιμος ἡ σκέψις· περὶ γὰρ μεγέθους τῆς πόλεως, τό τε πόσον καὶ πότερον ἔθνος ἐν ἢ πλείω
15 συμφέρει, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν τὸν πολιτικόν· ἀλλὰ τῶν αὐτῶν κατοικούντων τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον, πότερον ἕως ἂν ᾖ τὸ γένος ταὐτὸ τῶν κατοικούντων, τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι φατέον πόλιν, καίπερ ἀεὶ τῶν μὲν φθειρομένων τῶν δὲ γινομένων, ὥσπερ καὶ ποταμοὺς εἰώθαμεν λέγειν
20 τοὺς αὐτοὺς καὶ κρήνας τὰς αὐτάς, καίπερ ἀεὶ τοῦ μὲν ἐπιγινομένου νάματος τοῦ δ' ὑπεξιόντος, ἢ τοὺς μὲν ἀνθρώπους φατέον εἶναι τοὺς αὐτοὺς διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην αἰτίαν, τὴν δὲ πόλιν ἑτέραν; εἴπερ γάρ ἐστι κοινωνία 7 τις ἡ πόλις, ἔστι δὲ κοινωνία πολιτῶν, πολιτείας γινο-
25 μένης ἑτέρας τῷ εἴδει καὶ διαφερούσης τῆς πολιτείας ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι δόξειεν ἂν καὶ τὴν πόλιν εἶναι μὴ τὴν αὐτήν, ὥσπερ γε καὶ χορὸν ὁτὲ μὲν κωμικὸν ὁτὲ δὲ τραγικὸν ἕτερον εἶναί φαμεν, τῶν αὐτῶν πολλάκις ἀνθρώπων ὄντων. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πᾶσαν ἄλλην κοινωνίαν 8 καὶ σύνθεσιν ἑτέραν, ἂν εἶδος ἕτερον ᾖ τῆς συνθέσεως,
30 οἷον ἁρμονίαν τῶν αὐτῶν φθόγγων ἑτέραν εἶναι λέγομεν, ἂν ὁτὲ μὲν ᾖ Δώριος ὁτὲ δὲ Φρύγιος. εἰ δὴ τοῦτον ἔχει 9 τὸν τρόπον, φανερὸν ὅτι μάλιστα λεκτέον τὴν αὐτὴν πόλιν εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν βλέποντας· ὄνομα δὲ καλεῖν ἕτερον ἢ ταὐτὸν ἔξεστι καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν κατοικούντων αὐτὴν καὶ πάμπαν ἑτέρων ἀνθρώπων. εἰ δὲ δίκαιον διαλύειν ἢ μὴ διαλύειν, ὅταν εἰς ἑτέραν μεταβάλλῃ πολιτείαν ἡ πόλις, λόγος ἕτερος.

4 τῶν δὲ νῦν εἰρημένων ἐχόμενόν ἐστιν ἐπισκέψασθαι 1

πότερον τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρετὴν ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πολίτου σπουδαίου θετέον, ἢ μὴ τὴν αὐτήν. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ γε τοῦτο τυχεῖν δεῖ ζητήσεως, τὴν τοῦ πολίτου τύπῳ τινὶ πρῶτον ληπτέον. ὥσπερ οὖν ὁ πλωτὴρ εἷς τις τῶν
2 κοινωνῶν ἐστίν, οὕτω καὶ τὸν πολίτην φαμέν. τῶν 10 δὲ πλωτήρων καίπερ ἀνομοίων ὄντων τὴν δύναμιν (ὁ μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἐρέτης, ὁ δὲ κυβερνήτης, ὁ δὲ πρῳρεύς, ὁ δ' ἄλλην τιν' ἔχων τοιαύτην ἐπωνυμίαν) δῆλον ὡς ὁ μὲν ἀκριβέστατος ἑκάστου λόγος ἴδιος ἔσται τῆς ἀρετῆς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κοινός τις ἐφαρμόσει πᾶσιν. ἡ γὰρ σω- 15 τηρία τῆς ναυτιλίας ἔργον ἐστὶν αὐτῶν πάντων· τούτου
3 γὰρ ἕκαστος ὀρέγεται τῶν πλωτήρων. ὁμοίως τοίνυν καὶ τῶν πολιτῶν, καίπερ ἀνομοίων ὄντων, ἡ σωτηρία τῆς κοινωνίας ἔργον ἐστί, κοινωνία δ' ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτεία· διὸ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ πολίτου πρὸς τὴν 20 πολιτείαν. εἴπερ οὖν ἔστι πλείω πολιτείας εἴδη, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τοῦ σπουδαίου πολίτου μίαν ἀρετὴν εἶναι τὴν τελείαν· τὸν δ' ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα φαμὲν εἶναι
4 κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐνδέχεται πολίτην ὄντα σπουδαῖον μὴ κεκτῆσθαι τὴν ἀρετὴν καθ' ἣν σπου- δαῖος ἀνήρ, φανερόν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ κατ' ἄλλον 25 τρόπον ἔστι διαποροῦντας ἐπελθεῖν τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον
5 περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας. εἰ γὰρ ἀδύνατον ἐξ ἁπάν- των σπουδαίων ὄντων εἶναι πόλιν, δεῖ δ' ἕκαστον τὸ καθ' αὐτὸν ἔργον εὖ ποιεῖν, τοῦτο δ' ἀπ' ἀρετῆς· ἐπεὶ δ' ἀδύνατον ὁμοίους εἶναι πάντας τοὺς πολίτας, οὐκ ἂν 30 εἴη μία ἀρετὴ πολίτου καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ. τὴν μὲν 1277

γὰρ τοῦ σπουδαίου πολίτου δεῖ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχειν (οὕτω γὰρ ἀρίστην ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν πόλιν), τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀδύνατον, εἰ μὴ πάντας ἀναγκαῖον ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι τοὺς ἐν τῇ σπουδαίᾳ πόλει πολίτας. ἔτι 6 ἐπεὶ ἐξ ἀνομοίων ἡ πόλις, ὥσπερ ζῷον εὐθὺς ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχὴ ἐκ λόγου καὶ ὀρέξεως καὶ οἰκία ἐξ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς καὶ κτῆσις ἐκ δεσπότου καὶ δούλου, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ πόλις ἐξ ἁπάντων τε τούτων καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἐξ ἄλλων ἀνομοίων συνέστηκεν εἰδῶν, ἀνάγκη μὴ μίαν εἶναι τὴν τῶν πολιτῶν πάντων ἀρετήν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τῶν χορευτῶν κορυφαίου καὶ παραστάτου. διότι μὲν τοίνυν ἁπλῶς οὐχ ἡ αὐτή, 7 φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων· ἀλλ' ἆρα ἔσται τινὸς ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ πολίτου τε σπουδαίου καὶ ἀνδρὸς σπουδαίου; φαμὲν δὴ τὸν ἄρχοντα τὸν σπουδαῖον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ φρόνιμον, τὸν δὲ πολιτικὸν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι φρόνιμον. καὶ 8 τὴν παιδείαν δ' εὐθὺς ἑτέραν εἶναι λέγουσί τινες τοῦ ἄρχοντος, ὥσπερ καὶ φαίνονται οἱ τῶν βασιλέων υἱεῖς ἱππικὴν καὶ πολεμικὴν παιδευόμενοι, καὶ Εὐριπίδης φησὶ "μή μοι τὰ κόμψ', ἀλλ' ὧν πόλει δεῖ," ὡς οὖσάν τινα ἄρχοντος παιδείαν. εἰ δὲ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἄρχοντός 9 τε ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ, πολίτης δ' ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ ἀρχόμενος, οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ ἁπλῶς ἂν εἴη πολίτου καὶ ἀνδρός, τινὸς μέντοι πολίτου· οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ ἄρχοντος καὶ πολίτου, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἴσως Ἰάσων ἔφη πεινῆν ὅτε μὴ τυραννοῖ, ὡς οὐκ ἐπιστάμενος ἰδιώτης εἶναι. ἀλλὰ 10 μὴν ἐπαινεῖταί γε τὸ δύνασθαι ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι,

καὶ πολίτου δοκίμου ἡ ἀρετὴ εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι καὶ 25
ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι καλῶς. εἰ οὖν τὴν μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ
ἀνδρὸς τίθεμεν ἀρχικήν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ πολίτου ἄμφω, οὐκ
11 ἂν εἴη ἄμφω ἐπαινετὰ ὁμοίως. ἐπεὶ οὖν ποτὲ δοκεῖ
ἀμφότερα καὶ σὐ ταὐτὰ δεῖν τὸν ἄρχοντα μανθάνειν
καὶ τὸν ἀρχόμενον, τὸν δὲ πολίτην ἀμφότερ' ἐπίστασθαι 30
καὶ μετέχειν ἀμφοῖν, τοὐντεῦθεν ἂν κατίδοι τις. ἔστι
γὰρ ἀρχὴ δεσποτική· ταύτην δὲ τὴν περὶ τἀναγκαῖα
λέγομεν, ἃ ποιεῖν ἐπίστασθαι τὸν ἄρχοντ' οὐκ ἀναγ-
καῖον, ἀλλὰ χρῆσθαι μᾶλλον· θάτερον δὲ καὶ ἀνδρα-
12 ποδῶδες. λέγω δὲ θάτερον τὸ δύνασθαι καὶ ὑπηρετεῖν
τὰς διακονικὰς πράξεις. δούλου δ' εἴδη πλείω λέγομεν·
αἱ γὰρ ἐργασίαι πλείους. ὧν ἓν μέρος κατέχουσιν οἱ
χερνῆτες· οὗτοι δ' εἰσίν, ὥσπερ σημαίνει καὶ τοὔνομ' 5
αὐτούς, οἱ ζῶντες ἀπὸ τῶν χειρῶν, ἐν οἷς ὁ βάναυσος
τεχνίτης ἐστίν. διὸ παρ' ἐνίοις οὐ μετεῖχον οἱ δη-
μιουργοὶ τὸ παλαιὸν ἀρχῶν, πρὶν δῆμον γενέσθαι τὸν
13 ἔσχατον. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἔργα τῶν ἀρχομένων οὕτως οὐ
δεῖ τὸν ἀγαθὸν οὐδὲ τὸν πολιτικὸν οὐδὲ τὸν πολίτην 10
τὸν ἀγαθὸν μανθάνειν, εἰ μή ποτε χρείας χάριν αὐτῷ
πρὸς αὑτόν· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι τὸν μὲν
δεσπότην τὸν δὲ δοῦλον. ἀλλ' ἔστι τις ἀρχὴ καθ'
ἣν ἄρχει τῶν ὁμοίων τῷ γένει καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων.
14 ταύτην γὰρ λέγομεν εἶναι τὴν πολιτικὴν ἀρχήν, ἣν
δεῖ τὸν ἄρχοντα ἀρχόμενον μαθεῖν, οἷον ἱππαρχεῖν ἱπ- 15
παρχηθέντα, στρατηγεῖν στρατηγηθέντα καὶ ταξιαρχή-
σαντα καὶ λοχαγήσαντα. διὸ καὶ λέγεται καὶ τοῦτο κα-

λῶς, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν εὖ ἄρξαι μὴ ἀρχθέντα." τούτων δὲ 15
ἀρετὴ μὲν ἑτέρα, δεῖ δὲ τὸν πολίτην τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἐπίστασ-
20 θαι καὶ δύνασθαι καὶ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν, καὶ αὕτη ἀρετὴ
πολίτου, τὸ τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρχὴν ἐπίστασθαι ἐπ'
ἀμφότερα. καὶ ἀνδρὸς δὴ ἀγαθοῦ ἄμφω, καὶ εἰ ἕτερον 16
εἶδος σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἀρχικῆς· καὶ γὰρ
ἀρχομένου μὲν ἐλευθέρου δὲ δῆλον ὅτι οὐ μία ἂν εἴη
25 τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀρετή, οἷον δικαιοσύνη, ἀλλ' εἴδη ἔχουσα
καθ' ἃ ἄρξει καὶ ἄρξεται, ὥσπερ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς
ἑτέρα σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρία. δόξαι γὰρ ἂν εἶναι δει- 17
λὸς ἀνήρ, εἰ οὕτως ἀνδρεῖος εἴη ὥσπερ γυνὴ ἀνδρεία,
καὶ γυνὴ λάλος, εἰ οὕτω κοσμία εἴη ὥσπερ ὁ ἀνὴρ ὁ
ἀγαθός, ἐπεὶ καὶ οἰκονομία ἑτέρα ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός·
30 τοῦ μὲν γὰρ κτᾶσθαι τῆς δὲ φυλάττειν ἔργον ἐστίν.
ἡ δὲ φρόνησις ἄρχοντος ἴδιος ἀρετὴ μόνη· τὰς γὰρ
ἄλλας ἔοικεν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι κοινὰς καὶ τῶν ἀρχομένων
καὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων. ἀρχομένου δέ γε οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρετὴ 18
φρόνησις, ἀλλὰ δόξα ἀληθής· ὥσπερ αὐλοποιὸς γὰρ
ὁ ἀρχόμενος, ὁ δὲ ἄρχων αὐλητὴς ὁ χρώμενος.

πότερον μὲν οὖν ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ καὶ
5 πολίτου σπουδαίου ἢ ἑτέρα, καὶ πῶς ἡ αὐτὴ καὶ πῶς
5 ἑτέρα, φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων· περὶ δὲ τὸν πολίτην ἔτι 1
λείπεταί τις τῶν ἀποριῶν. ὡς ἀληθῶς γὰρ πότερον
πολίτης ἐστὶν ᾧ κοινωνεῖν ἔξεστιν ἀρχῆς, ἢ καὶ τοὺς
βαναύσους πολίτας θετέον; εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ τούτους
10 θετέον οἷς μὴ μέτεστιν ἀρχῶν, οὐχ οἷόν τε παντὸς
εἶναι πολίτου τὴν τοιαύτην ἀρετήν· οὗτος γὰρ πολίτης,

εἰ δὲ μηδεὶς τῶν τοιούτων πολίτης, ἐν τίνι μέρει θετέος
2 ἕκαστος; οὐδὲ γὰρ μέτοικος οὐδὲ ξένος. ἢ διά γε 1278
τοῦτον τὸν λόγον οὐδὲν φήσομεν συμβαίνειν ἄτοπον;
οὐδὲ γὰρ οἱ δοῦλοι τῶν εἰρημένων οὐδέν, οὐδ' οἱ ἀπε- 15
λεύθεροι. τοῦτο γὰρ ἀληθές, ὡς οὐ πάντας θετέον
πολίτας ὧν ἄνευ οὐκ ἂν εἴη πόλις, ἐπεὶ οὐδ' οἱ
παῖδες ὡσαύτως πολῖται καὶ οἱ ἄνδρες, ἀλλ' οἳ μὲν
ἁπλῶς οἳ δ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεως· πολῖται μὲν γάρ εἰσιν,
3 ἀλλ' ἀτελεῖς. ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις χρόνοις παρ'
ἐνίοις ἦν δοῦλον τὸ βάναυσον ἢ ξενικόν· διόπερ οἱ 20
πολλοὶ τοιοῦτοι καὶ νῦν. ἡ δὲ βελτίστη πόλις οὐ
ποιήσει βάναυσον πολίτην· εἰ δὲ καὶ οὗτος πολίτης,
ἀλλὰ πολίτου ἀρετὴν ἣν εἴπομεν λεκτέον οὐ παντός,
οὐδ' ἐλευθέρου μόνον, ἀλλ' ὅσοι τῶν ἔργων εἰσὶν ἀφει-
4 μένοι τῶν ἀναγκαίων. τῶν δ' ἀναγκαίων οἱ μὲν ἑνὶ
λειτουργοῦντες τὰ τοιαῦτα δοῦλοι, οἱ δὲ κοινοὶ βά- 25
ναυσοι καὶ θῆτες. φανερὸν δ' ἐντεῦθεν μικρὸν ἐπι-
σκεψαμένοις πῶς ἔχει περὶ αὐτῶν· αὐτὸ γὰρ φανὲν τὸ
5 λεχθὲν ποιεῖ δῆλον. ἐπεὶ γὰρ πλείους εἰσὶν αἱ πο-
λιτεῖαι, καὶ εἴδη πολίτου ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πλείω, καὶ
μάλιστα τοῦ ἀρχομένου πολίτου, ὥστ' ἐν μέν τινι 30
πολιτείᾳ τὸν βάναυσον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καὶ τὸν θῆτα
πολίτας, ἐν τισὶ δ' ἀδύνατον, οἷον εἴ τίς ἐστιν ἣν κα-
λοῦσιν ἀριστοκρατικὴν καὶ ἐν ᾗ κατ' ἀρετὴν αἱ τιμαὶ
δίδονται καὶ κατ' ἀξίαν· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τ' ἐπιτηδεῦσαι
6 τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς ζῶντα βίον βάναυσον ἢ θητικόν. ἐν
δὲ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις θῆτα μὲν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι πο-

λίτην (ἀπὸ τιμημάτων γὰρ μακρῶν αἱ μεθέξεις τῶν
5 ἀρχῶν), βάναυσον δ' ἐνδέχεται· πλουτοῦσι γὰρ καὶ
οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν τεχνιτῶν. ἐν Θήβαις δὲ νόμος ἦν τὸν 7
δέκα ἐτῶν μὴ ἀπεσχημένον τῆς ἀγορᾶς μὴ μετέχειν
ἀρχῆς. ἐν πολλαῖς δὲ πολιτείαις προσεφέλκεται καὶ
τῶν ξένων ὁ νόμος· ὁ γὰρ ἐκ πολίτιδος ἔν τισι δημο-
κρατίαις πολίτης ἐστίν. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἔχει
10 καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς νόθους παρὰ πολλοῖς. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' 8
ἐπεὶ δι' ἔνδειαν τῶν γνησίων πολιτῶν ποιοῦνται πο-
λίτας τοὺς τοιούτους (διὰ γὰρ ὀλιγανθρωπίαν οὕτω
χρῶνται τοῖς νόμοις), εὐποροῦντες δ' ὄχλου κατὰ μι-
κρὸν παραιροῦνται τοὺς ἐκ δούλου πρῶτον ἢ δούλης,
15 εἶτα τοὺς ἀπὸ γυναικῶν· τέλος δὲ μόνον τοὺς ἐξ ἀμ-
φοῖν ἀστῶν πολίτας ποιοῦσιν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἴδη πλείω 9
πολίτου, φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων, καὶ ὅτι λέγεται μάλιστα
πολίτης ὁ μετέχων τῶν τιμῶν, ὥσπερ καὶ Ὅμηρος
ἐποίησεν "ὡς εἴ τιν' ἀτίμητον μετανάστην·" ὥσπερ
μέτοικος γάρ ἐστιν ὁ τῶν τιμῶν μὴ μετέχων. ἀλλ'
20 ὅπου τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐπικεκρυμμένον ἐστίν, ἀπάτης χάριν
τῶν συνοικούντων ἐστίν.

πότερον μὲν οὖν ἑτέραν ἢ τὴν αὐτὴν θετέον καθ' ἣν 10
ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός ἐστι καὶ πολίτης σπουδαῖος, δῆλον ἐκ τῶν
εἰρημένων, ὅτι τινὸς μὲν πόλεως ὁ αὐτὸς τινὸς δ' ἕτερος,
κἀκείνης οὐ πᾶς ἀλλ' ὁ πολιτικὸς καὶ κύριος ἢ δυνάμενος
25 εἶναι κύριος, ἢ καθ' αὑτὸν ἢ μετ' ἄλλων, τῆς τῶν κοινῶν
6 ἐπιμελείας. ἐπεὶ δὲ ταῦτα διώρισται, τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα 1
σκεπτέον πότερον μίαν θετέον πολιτείαν ἢ πλείους, κἂν

εἰ πλείους, τίνες καὶ πόσαι, καὶ διαφοραὶ τίνες αὐτῶν
εἰσίν. ἔστι δὲ πολιτεία πόλεως τάξις τῶν τε ἄλλων
ἀρχῶν καὶ μάλιστα τῆς κυρίας πάντων. κύριον μὲν γὰρ 30
πανταχοῦ τὸ πολίτευμα τῆς πόλεως, πολίτευμα δ' ἐστὶν
2 ἡ πολιτεία. λέγω δ' οἷον ἐν μὲν ταῖς δημοκρατικαῖς
κύριος ὁ δῆμος, οἱ δ' ὀλίγοι τοὐναντίον ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρ-
χίαις· φαμὲν δὲ καὶ πολιτείαν ἑτέραν εἶναι τούτων. τὸν
αὐτὸν δὲ τοῦτον ἐροῦμεν λόγον καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
ὑποθετέον δὲ πρῶτον τίνος χάριν συνέστηκε πόλις, καὶ
τῆς ἀρχῆς εἴδη πόσα τῆς περὶ ἄνθρωπον καὶ τὴν κοι- 5
3 νωνίαν τῆς ζωῆς. εἴρηται δὴ καὶ κατὰ τοὺς πρώτους
λόγους, ἐν οἷς περὶ οἰκονομίας διωρίσθη καὶ δεσποτείας,
ὅτι φύσει μέν ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος ζῷον πολιτικόν, διὸ καὶ
μηδὲν δεόμενοι τῆς παρ' ἀλλήλων βοηθείας οὐκ ἔλαττον
ὀρέγονται τοῦ συζῆν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ κοινῇ συμ- 10
φέρον συνάγει, καθ' ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει μέρος ἑκάστῳ τοῦ
4 ζῆν καλῶς. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τέλος, καὶ
κοινῇ πᾶσι καὶ χωρίς· συνέρχονται δὲ καὶ τοῦ ζῆν
ἕνεκεν αὐτοῦ (ἴσως γὰρ ἔνεστί τι τοῦ καλοῦ μόριον),
καὶ συνέχουσι τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν καὶ κατὰ τὸ ζῆν
αὐτὸ μόνον, ἂν μὴ τοῖς χαλεποῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον ὑπερ- 15
5 βάλλῃ λίαν. δῆλον δ' ὡς καρτεροῦσι πολλὴν κακοπά-
θειαν οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γλιχόμενοι τοῦ ζῆν, ὡς
ἐνούσης τινὸς εὐημερίας ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ γλυκύτητος φυ-
σικῆς. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς τοὺς λεγομένους τρό-
πους ῥᾴδιον διελεῖν· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις 20
6 διοριζόμεθα περὶ αὐτῶν πολλάκις. ἡ μὲν γὰρ δεσποτεία,

καίπερ ὄντος κατ' ἀλήθειαν τῷ τε φύσει δούλῳ καὶ τῷ
φύσει δεσπότῃ ταὐτοῦ συμφέροντος, ὅμως ἄρχει πρὸς
τὸ τοῦ δεσπότου συμφέρον οὐδὲν ἧττον, πρὸς δὲ τὸ
τοῦ δούλου κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται φθειρο-
25 μένου τοῦ δούλου σώζεσθαι τὴν δεσποτείαν. ἡ δὲ 7
τέκνων ἀρχὴ καὶ γυναικὸς καὶ τῆς οἰκίας πάσης, ἣν δὴ
καλοῦμεν οἰκονομικήν, ἤτοι τῶν ἀρχομένων χάριν ἐστὶν
ἢ κοινοῦ τινὸς ἀμφοῖν, καθ' αὑτὸ μὲν τῶν ἀρχομένων,
1279 ὥσπερ ὁρῶμεν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας, οἷον ἰατρικὴν καὶ
30 γυμναστικήν, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ κἂν αὐτῶν εἶεν·
οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει τὸν παιδοτρίβην ἕνα τῶν γυμναζο-
μένων ἐνίοτ' εἶναι καὶ αὐτόν, ὥσπερ ὁ κυβερνήτης εἷς
ἐστὶν ἀεὶ τῶν πλωτήρων. ὁ μὲν οὖν παιδοτρίβης ἢ 8
κυβερνήτης σκοπεῖ τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων ἀγαθόν· ὅταν δὲ
τούτων εἷς γένηται καὶ αὐτός, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μετέχει
τῆς ὠφελείας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ πλωτήρ, ὁ δὲ τῶν γυμνα-
ζομένων εἷς γίνεται παιδοτρίβης ὤν. διὸ καὶ τὰς 9
5 πολιτικὰς ἀρχάς, ὅταν ᾖ κατ' ἰσότητα τῶν πολιτῶν
συνεστηκυῖα καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητα, κατὰ μέρος ἀξιοῦσιν
ἄρχειν, πρότερον μέν, ᾗ πέφυκεν, ἀξιοῦντες ἐν μέρει
λειτουργεῖν, καὶ σκοπεῖν τινὰ πάλιν τὸ αὑτοῦ ἀγαθόν,
ὥσπερ πρότερον αὐτὸς ἄρχων ἐσκόπει τὸ ἐκείνου συμ-
10 φέρον. νῦν δὲ διὰ τὰς ὠφελείας τὰς ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν 10
καὶ τὰς ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς βούλονται συνεχῶς ἄρχειν, οἷον εἰ
συνέβαινεν ὑγιαίνειν ἀεὶ τοῖς ἄρχουσι νοσακεροῖς οὖσιν·
καὶ γὰρ ἂν οὕτως ἴσως ἐδίωκον τὰς ἀρχάς. φανερὸν 11
τοίνυν ὡς ὅσαι μὲν πολιτεῖαι τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον σκο-

ποῦσιν, αὗται μὲν ὀρθαὶ τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι κατὰ τὸ 15
ἁπλῶς δίκαιον, ὅσαι δὲ τὸ σφέτερον μόνον τῶν ἀρχόν-
των, ἡμαρτημέναι πᾶσαι καὶ παρεκβάσεις τῶν ὀρθῶν
πολιτειῶν· δεσποτικαὶ γάρ, ἡ δὲ πόλις κοινωνία τῶν
ἐλευθέρων ἐστίν.

1 διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων ἐχόμενόν ἐστι τὰς πολιτείας 7
ἐπισκέψασθαι, πόσαι τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ τίνες εἰσί, καὶ 20
πρῶτον τὰς ὀρθὰς αὐτῶν· καὶ γὰρ αἱ περεκβάσεις
2 ἔσονται φανεραὶ τούτων διορισθεισῶν. ἐπεὶ δὲ πολιτεία
μὲν καὶ πολίτευμα σημαίνει ταὐτόν, πολίτευμα δ' ἐστὶ
τὸ κύριον τῶν πόλεων, ἀνάγκη δ' εἶναι κύριον ἢ ἕνα ἢ
ὀλίγους ἢ τοὺς πολλούς, ὅταν μὲν ὁ εἷς ἢ οἱ ὀλίγοι ἢ 25
οἱ πολλοὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν συμφέρον ἄρχωσι, ταύτας μὲν
ὀρθὰς ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὰς πολιτείας, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὸ
ἴδιον ἢ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἢ τῶν ὀλίγων ἢ τοῦ πλήθους παρεκ-
βάσεις· ἢ γὰρ οὐ πολίτας φατέον εἶναι τοὺς μετέχοντας,
3 ἢ δεῖ κοινωνεῖν τοῦ συμφέροντος. καλεῖν δ' εἰώθαμεν 30
τῶν μὲν μοναρχιῶν τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἀποβλέπουσαν
συμφέρον βασιλείαν, τὴν δὲ τῶν ὀλίγων μὲν πλειόνων
δ' ἑνὸς ἀριστοκρατίαν, ἢ διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄρχειν,
ἢ διὰ τὸ πρὸς τὸ ἄριστον τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς κοινωνοῦσιν
αὐτῆς· ὅταν δὲ τὸ πλῆθος πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύηται
συμφέρον, καλεῖται τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα πασῶν τῶν πολι-
4 τειῶν, πολιτεία. συμβαίνει δ' εὐλόγως· ἕνα μὲν γὰρ
διαφέρειν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἢ ὀλίγους ἐνδέχεται, πλείους δ' 5
ἤδη χαλεπὸν ἠκριβῶσθαι πρὸς πᾶσαν ἀρετήν, ἀλλὰ
μάλιστα τὴν πολεμικήν· αὕτη γὰρ ἐν πλήθει γίνεται

διόπερ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν πολιτείαν κυριώτατον τὸ προπολεμοῦν, καὶ μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς οἱ κεκτημένοι τὰ ὅπλα.
10 παρεκβάσεις δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων τυραννὶς μὲν βασιλείας, 5
ὀλιγαρχία δὲ ἀριστοκρατίας, δημοκρατία δὲ πολιτείας. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τυραννίς ἐστι μοναρχία πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τὸ τοῦ μοναρχοῦντος, ἡ δ' ὀλιγαρχία πρὸς τὸ τῶν εὐπόρων, ἡ δὲ δημοκρατία πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων·
15 πρὸς δὲ τὸ τῷ κοινῷ λυσιτελοῦν οὐδεμία αὐτῶν.

8 δεῖ δὲ μικρῷ διὰ μακροτέρων εἰπεῖν τίς ἑκάστη τού- 1
των τῶν πολιτειῶν ἐστίν· καὶ γὰρ ἔχει τινὰς ἀπορίας, τῷ δὲ περὶ ἑκάστην μέθοδον φιλοσοφοῦντι καὶ μὴ μόνον ἀποβλέποντι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν οἰκεῖόν ἐστι τὸ μὴ παρ-
20 ορᾶν μηδέ τι καταλείπειν, ἀλλὰ δηλοῦν τὴν περὶ ἕκαστον ἀλήθειαν. ἔστι δὲ τυραννὶς μὲν μοναρχία, καθάπερ εἴ- 2
ρηται, δεσποτικὴ τῆς πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας, ὀλιγαρχία δ' ὅταν ὦσι κύριοι τῆς πολιτείας οἱ τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντες, δημοκρατία δὲ τοὐναντίον ὅταν οἱ μὴ κεκτημένοι πλῆθος
25 οὐσίας ἀλλ' ἄποροι. πρώτη δ' ἀπορία πρὸς τὸν διο- 3
ρισμὸν ἐστίν. εἰ γὰρ εἶεν οἱ πλείους ὄντες εὔποροι κύριοι τῆς πόλεως, δημοκρατία δ' ἐστὶν ὅταν ᾖ κύριον τὸ πλῆθος, ὁμοίως δὲ πάλιν κἂν εἴ που συμβαίνει τοὺς ἀπόρους ἐλάττους μὲν εἶναι τῶν εὐπόρων, κρείττους δ'
30 ὄντας κυρίους εἶναι τῆς πολιτείας, ὅπου δ' ὀλίγον κύριον πλῆθος, ὀλιγαρχίαν εἶναί φασιν, οὐκ ἂν καλῶς δόξειεν διωρίσθαι περὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν. ἀλλὰ μὴν κἄν τις 4
συνθεὶς τῇ μὲν εὐπορίᾳ τὴν ὀλιγότητα τῇ δ' ἀπορίᾳ τὸ πλῆθος οὕτω προσαγορεύῃ τὰς πολιτείας, ὀλιγαρχίαν

μὲν ἐν ᾗ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἔχουσιν οἱ εὔποροι ὀλίγοι τὸ πλῆθος
ὄντες, δημοκρατίαν δὲ ἐν ᾗ οἱ ἄποροι πολλοὶ τὸ πλῆθος
ὄντες, ἄλλην ἀπορίαν ἔχει. τίνας γὰρ ἐροῦμεν τὰς ἄρτι 5
λεχθείσας πολιτείας, τὴν ἐν ᾗ πλείους οἱ εὔποροι καὶ
ἐν ᾗ ἐλάττους οἱ ἄποροι, κύριοι δ' ἑκάτεροι τῶν πολι-
τειῶν, εἴπερ μηδεμία ἄλλη πολιτεία παρὰ τὰς εἰρημένας
6 ἔστιν; ἔοικε τοίνυν ὁ λόγος ποιεῖν δῆλον ὅτι τὸ μὲν
ὀλίγους ἢ πολλοὺς εἶναι κυρίους συμβεβηκός ἐστιν, τὸ
μὲν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις τὸ δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις, διὰ τὸ 10
τοὺς μὲν εὐπόρους ὀλίγους, πολλοὺς δ' εἶναι τοὺς ἀπό-
ρους πανταχοῦ· διὸ καὶ οὐ συμβαίνει τὰς ῥηθείσας
7 αἰτίας γίνεσθαι διαφορᾶς. ᾧ δὲ διαφέρουσιν ἥ τε δη-
μοκρατία καὶ ἡ ὀλιγαρχία ἀλλήλων, πενία καὶ πλοῦ- 1280
τος ἐστίν. καὶ ἀναγκαῖον μέν, ὅπου ἂν ἄρχωσι διὰ 15
πλοῦτον ἄν τ' ἐλάττους ἄν τε πλείους, εἶναι ταύτην
8 ὀλιγαρχίαν, ὅπου δ' οἱ ἄποροι, δημοκρατίαν. ἀλλὰ
συμβαίνει, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, τοὺς μὲν ὀλίγους εἶναι
τοὺς δὲ πολλούς· εὐποροῦσι μὲν γὰρ ὀλίγοι, τῆς δ'
ἐλευθερίας μετέχουσι πάντες· δι' ἃς αἰτίας ἀμφισβη-
τοῦσιν ἀμφότεροι τῆς πολιτείας. 20

1 ληπτέον δὲ πρῶτον τίνας ὅρους λέγουσι τῆς ὀλιγαρ- 9
χίας καὶ δημοκρατίας, καὶ τί τὸ δίκαιον τό τε ὀλιγαρ-
χικὸν καὶ δημοκρατικόν. πάντες γὰρ ἅπτονται δικαίου
τινός, ἀλλὰ μέχρι τινὸς προέρχονται, καὶ λέγουσιν οὐ
πᾶν τὸ κυρίως δίκαιον. οἷον δοκεῖ ἴσον τὸ δίκαιον εἶ- 25
2 ναι, καὶ ἔστιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πᾶσιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἴσοις. καὶ
τὸ ἄνισον δοκεῖ δίκαιον εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ ἔστιν, ἀλλ' οὐ

πᾶσιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀνίσοις. οἱ δὲ τοῦτ' ἀφαιροῦσι, τὸ
οἷς, καὶ κρίνουσι κακῶς. τὸ δ' αἴτιον ὅτι περὶ αὐτῶν
30 ἡ κρίσις· σχεδὸν δ' οἱ πλεῖστοι φαῦλοι κριταὶ περὶ
τῶν οἰκείων. ὥστ' ἐπεὶ τὸ δίκαιον τισίν, καὶ διῄρηται 3
τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐπί τε τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ οἷς, κα-
θάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς, τὴν μὲν τοῦ
πράγματος ἰσότητα ὁμολογοῦσι, τὴν δὲ οἷς ἀμφισβη-
τοῦσι, μάλιστα μὲν διὰ τὸ λεχθὲν ἄρτι, διότι κρίνουσι
τὰ περὶ αὐτοὺς κακῶς, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ λέγειν
μέχρι τινὸς ἑκατέρους δίκαιόν τι νομίζουσι δίκαιον
5 λέγειν ἁπλῶς. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἂν κατά τι ἄνισοι ὦσιν, 4
οἷον χρήμασιν, ὅλως οἴονται ἄνισοι εἶναι, οἱ δ' ἂν κατά
τι ἴσοι, οἷον ἐλευθερίᾳ, ὅλως ἴσοι. τὸ δὲ κυριώτατον
οὐ λέγουσιν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ τῶν κτημάτων χάριν ἐκοινω-5
νησαν καὶ συνῆλθον, τοσοῦτον μετέχουσι τῆς πόλεως
10 ὅσον περ καὶ τῆς κτήσεως, ὥσθ' ὁ τῶν ὀλιγαρχικῶν
λόγος δόξειεν ἂν ἰσχύειν· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι δίκαιον ἴσον
μετέχειν τῶν ἑκατὸν μνῶν τὸν εἰσενέγκαντα μίαν μνᾶν
τῷ δόντι τὸ λοιπὸν πᾶν, οὔτε τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὔτε τῶν
ἐπιγινομένων. εἰ δὲ μήτε τοῦ ζῆν μόνον ἕνεκεν ἀλλὰ 6
μᾶλλον τοῦ εὖ ζῆν (καὶ γὰρ ἂν δούλων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
15 ζῴων ἦν πόλις· νῦν δ' οὐκ ἔστι διὰ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν
εὐδαιμονίας μηδὲ τοῦ ζῆν κατὰ προαίρεσιν), μήτε συμ-
μαχίας ἕνεκεν, ὅπως ὑπὸ μηδενὸς ἀδικῶνται, μήτε διὰ
τὰς ἀλλαγὰς καὶ τὴν χρῆσιν τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους· καὶ
γὰρ ἂν Τυρρηνοὶ καὶ Καρχηδόνιοι, καὶ πάντες οἷς ἔστι
20 σύμβολα πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ὡς μιᾶς ἂν πολῖται πόλεως

7 ἦσαν. εἰσὶ γοῦν αὐτοῖς συνθῆκαι περὶ τῶν εἰσαγωγίμων καὶ σύμβολα περὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν καὶ γραφαὶ περὶ συμμαχίας. ἀλλ' οὔτ' ἀρχαὶ πᾶσιν ἐπὶ τούτοις κοιναὶ καθεστᾶσιν, ἀλλ' ἕτεραι παρ' ἑκατέροις, οὔτε τοῦ ποίους τινὰς εἶναι δεῖ φροντίζουσιν ἄτεροι τοὺς ἑτέρους, οὐδ' 25 ὅπως μηδεὶς ἄδικος ἔσται τῶν ὑπὸ τὰς συνθήκας μηδὲ μοχθηρίαν ἕξει μηδεμίαν, ἀλλὰ μόνον ὅπως μηδὲν ἀδι-
8 κήσουσιν ἀλλήλους. περὶ δ' ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας πολιτικῆς διασκοποῦσιν ὅσοι φροντίζουσιν εὐνομίας. ᾗ καὶ φανερὸν ὅτι δεῖ περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελὲς εἶναι τῇ γ' ὡς ἀληθῶς ὀνομαζομένῃ πόλει, μὴ λόγου χάριν. γίνεται 30 γὰρ ἡ κοινωνία συμμαχία τῶν ἄλλων τόπῳ διαφέρουσα μόνον τῶν ἄπωθεν συμμάχων, καὶ ὁ νόμος συνθήκη, καὶ καθάπερ ἔφη Λυκόφρων ὁ σοφιστής, ἐγγυητὴς ἀλλήλοις τῶν δικαίων, ἀλλ' οὐχ οἷος ποιεῖν ἀγαθοὺς καὶ
9 δικαίους τοὺς πολίτας. ὅτι δὲ τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον, φανερόν. εἰ γάρ τις καὶ συνάγοι τοὺς τόπους εἰς ἕν, ὥστε ἅπτεσθαι τὴν Μεγαρέων πόλιν καὶ Κορινθίων 5 τοῖς τείχεσιν, ὅμως οὐ μία πόλις. οὐδ' εἰ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐπιγαμίας ποιήσαιντο· καίτοι τοῦτο τῶν ἰδίων
.0 ταῖς πόλεσι κοινωνημάτων ἐστίν. ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' εἴ τινες οἰκοῖεν χωρὶς μέν, μὴ μέντοι τοσοῦτον ἄπωθεν ὥστε μὴ κοινωνεῖν, ἀλλ' εἴησαν αὐτοῖς νόμοι τοῦ μὴ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀδικεῖν περὶ τὰς μεταδόσεις, οἷον εἰ ὁ 10 μὲν εἴη τέκτων ὁ δὲ γεωργὸς ὁ δὲ σκυτοτόμος ὁ δ' ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον, καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εἶεν μύριοι, μὴ μέντοι κοινωνοῖεν ἄλλου μηδενὸς ἢ τῶν τοιούτων, οἷον ἀλλαγῆς

καὶ συμμαχίας, οὐδ' οὕτω πω πόλις. διὰ τίνα δή ποτ' 11
15 αἰτίαν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ διὰ τὸ μὴ σύνεγγυς τῆς κοινωνίας.
εἰ γὰρ καὶ συνέλθοιεν οὕτω κοινωνοῦντες, ἕκαστος
μέντοι χρῷτο τῇ ἰδίᾳ οἰκίᾳ ὥσπερ πόλει καὶ σφίσιν
αὐτοῖς ὡς ἐπιμαχίας οὔσης βοηθοῦντες ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀδι-
κοῦντας μόνον, οὐδ' οὕτως ἂν εἶναι δόξειε πόλις τοῖς
ἀκριβῶς θεωροῦσιν, εἴπερ ὁμοίως ὁμιλοῖεν συνελθόντες
20 καὶ χωρίς. φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι ἡ πόλις οὐκ ἔστι κοι- 12
νωνία τόπου καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ τῆς
μνταδόσεως χάριν· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρ-
χειν, εἴπερ ἔσται πόλις, οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ὑπαρχόντων τού-
των ἁπάντων ἤδη πόλις, ἀλλ' ἡ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν κοινωνία
25 καὶ ταῖς οἰκίαις καὶ τοῖς γένεσι, ζωῆς τελείας χάριν
καὶ αὐτάρκους. οὐκ ἔσται μέντοι τοῦτο μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν 13
καὶ ἕνα κατοικούντων τόπον καὶ χρωμένων ἐπιγαμίαις.
διὸ κηδεῖαί τ' ἐγένοντο κατὰ τὰς πόλεις καὶ φρατρίαι
καὶ θυσίαι καὶ διαγωγαὶ τοῦ συζῆν. τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον
30 φιλίας ἔργον· ἡ γὰρ τοῦ συζῆν προαίρεσις φιλία.
1281 τέλος μὲν οὖν πόλεως τὸ εὖ ζῆν, ταῦτα δὲ τοῦ τέλους
χάριν. πόλις δὲ ἡ γενῶν καὶ κωμῶν κοινωνία ζωῆς 14
τελείας καὶ αὐτάρκους. τοῦτο δ' ἐστίν, ὡς φαμέν, τὸ
ζῆν εὐδαιμόνως καὶ καλῶς. τῶν καλῶν ἄρα πράξεων
χάριν θετέον εἶναι τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν, ἀλλ' οὐ
τοῦ συζῆν. διόπερ ὅσοι συμβάλλονται πλεῖστον εἰς 15
τὴν τοιαύτην κοινωνίαν, τούτοις τῆς πόλεως μέτεστι
5 πλεῖον ἢ τοῖς κατὰ μὲν ἐλευθερίαν καὶ γένος ἴσοις ἢ
μείζοσι κατὰ δὲ τὴν πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν ἀνίσοις, ἢ τοῖς

κατὰ πλοῦτον ὑπερέχουσι κατ' ἀρετὴν δ' ὑπερεχομένοις.

1 ὅτι μὲν οὖν πάντες οἱ περὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν ἀμφισβητοῦντες μέρος τι τοῦ δικαίου λέγουσι, φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων· ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν, τί δεῖ τὸ κύριον εἶναι τῆς πόλεως. ἢ γάρ τοι τὸ πλῆθος, ἢ τοὺς πλουσίους, ἢ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς, ἢ τὸν βέλτιστον ἕνα πάντων, ἢ τύραννον. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα πάντα ἔχειν φαίνεται δυσκολίαν. τί γάρ; ἂν οἱ πένητες διὰ τὸ πλείους εἶναι διανέμωνται τὰ τῶν πλουσίων, τοῦτ' οὐκ ἄδικον ἐστίν; ἔδοξε γὰρ νὴ Δία 15
2 τῷ κυρίῳ δικαίως. τὴν οὖν ἀδικίαν τί χρὴ λέγειν τὴν εσχάτην; πάλιν τε πάντων ληφθέντων, οἱ πλείους τὰ τῶν ἐλαττόνων ἂν διανέμωνται, φανερὸν ὅτι φθείρουσι τὴν πόλιν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐχ ἥ γ' ἀρετὴ φθείρει τὸ ἔχον αὐτήν, οὐδὲ τὸ δίκαιον πόλεως φθαρτικόν· ὥστε δῆλον 20
3 ὅτι καὶ τὸν νόμον τοῦτον οὐχ οἷόν τ' εἶναι δίκαιον. ἔτι καὶ τὰς πράξεις ὅσας ὁ τύραννος ἔπραξεν, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πάσας δικαίας· βιάζεται γὰρ ὢν κρείττων, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τοὺς πλουσίους. ἀλλ' ἄρα τοὺς ἐλάττους δίκαιον ἄρχειν καὶ τοὺς πλουσίους; ἂν οὖν κἀκεῖνοι ταὐτὰ ποιῶσι καὶ διαρπάζωσι καὶ τὰ κτήματα 25 ἀφαιρῶνται τοῦ πλήθους, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ δίκαιον; καὶ θά-
4 τερον ἄρα. ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν ὅτι πάντα φαῦλα καὶ οὐ δίκαια, φανερόν· ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς ἄρχειν δεῖ καὶ κυρίους εἶναι πάντων; οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη τοὺς ἄλλους ἀτίμους εἶναι πάντας, μὴ τιμωμένους ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἀρ- 30 χαῖς· τιμὰς γὰρ λέγομεν εἶναι τὰς ἀρχάς, ἀρχόντων

δ' ἀεὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοὺς ἄλλους ἀτίμους. ἀλλ' ἕνα τὸν σπουδαιότατον ἄρχειν βέλτιον; ἀλλ' ἔτι τοῦτο ὀλιγαρχικώτερον· οἱ γὰρ ἄτιμοι πλείονες. ἀλλ' ἴσως φαίη τις ἂν τὸ κύριον ὅλως ἄνθρωπον εἶναι ἀλλὰ μὴ νόμον φαῦλον, ἔχοντά γε τὰ συμβαίνοντα πάθη περὶ τὴν ψυχήν. ἂν οὖν ᾖ νόμος μὲν ὀλιγαρχικὸς δὲ
5 ἢ δημοκρατικός, τί διοίσει περὶ τῶν ἠπορημένων; συμ-
11 βήσεται γὰρ ὁμοίως τὰ λεχθέντα πρότερον. περὶ μὲν 1
οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ἔστω τις ἕτερος λόγος· ὅτι δὲ δεῖ κύριον εἶναι μᾶλλον τὸ πλῆθος ἢ τοὺς ἀρίστους μὲν ὀλίγους δέ, δόξειεν ἂν λύεσθαι καί τιν' ἔχειν ἀπορίαν,
10 τάχα δὲ κἂν ἀλήθειαν. τοὺς γὰρ πολλούς, ὧν ἕκαστός ἐστιν οὐ σπουδαῖος ἀνήρ, ὅμως ἐνδέχεται συνελθόντας εἶναι βελτίους ἐκείνων, οὐχ ὡς ἕκαστον ἀλλ' ὡς σύμπαντας, οἷον τὰ συμφορητὰ δεῖπνα τῶν ἐκ μιᾶς δαπάνης χορηγηθέντων· πολλῶν γὰρ ὄντων ἕκαστον μόριον ἔχειν ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως, καὶ γίνεσθαι συνελθόντας ὥσπερ
15 ἕνα ἄνθρωπον τὸ πλῆθος πολύποδα καὶ πολύχειρα καὶ πολλὰς ἔχοντ' αἰσθήσεις. οὕτω καὶ περὶ τὰ ἤθη καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν. διὸ καὶ κρίνουσιν ἄμεινον οἱ πολλοὶ 3
καὶ τὰ τῆς μουσικῆς ἔργα καὶ τὰ τῶν ποιητῶν· ἄλλο γὰρ ἄλλο τι μόριον, πάντα δὲ πάντες. ἀλλὰ τούτῳ 4
20 διαφέρουσιν οἱ σπουδαῖοι τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἑκάστου τῶν πολλῶν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν μὴ καλῶν τοὺς καλούς φασι καὶ τὰ γεγραμμένα διὰ τέχνης τῶν ἀληθινῶν, τῷ συνῆχθαι τὰ διεσπαρμένα χωρὶς εἰς ἕν, ἐπεὶ κεχωρισμένων γε κάλλιον ἔχειν τοῦ γεγραμμένου τοῦδε μὲν τὸν ὀφ-

5 θαλμὸν ἑτέρου δέ τινος ἕτερον μόριον. εἰ μὲν οὖν περὶ 25
πάντα δῆμον καὶ περὶ πᾶν πλῆθος ἐνδέχεται ταύτην
εἶναι τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν πολλῶν πρὸς τοὺς ὀλίγους
σπουδαίους, ἄδηλον· ἴσως δὲ νὴ Δία δῆλον ὅτι περὶ
ἐνίων ἀδύνατον. ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς κἂν ἐπὶ τῶν θηρίων ἁρ-
μόσειε λόγος. καίτοι τί διαφέρουσιν ἔνιοι τῶν θηρίων
ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν; ἀλλὰ περί τι πλῆθος οὐδὲν εἶναι κω- 30
6 λύει τὸ λεχθὲν ἀληθές. διὸ καὶ τὴν πρότερον εἰρημέ-
νην ἀπορίαν λύσειεν ἄν τις διὰ τούτων καὶ τὴν ἐχο-
μένην αὐτῆς, τίνων δεῖ κυρίους εἶναι τοὺς ἐλευθέρους
καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν. τοιοῦτοι δ' εἰσὶν ὅσοι
7 μήτε πλούσιοι μήτε ἀξίωμα ἔχουσιν ἀρετῆς μηδέν. τὸ
μὲν γὰρ μετέχειν αὐτοὺς τῶν ἀρχῶν τῶν μεγίστων οὐκ
ἀσφαλές (διά τε γὰρ ἀδικίαν καὶ δι' ἀφροσύνην τὰ 5
μὲν ἀδικεῖν ἂν τὰ δ' ἁμαρτάνειν αὐτούς), τὸ δὲ μὴ με-
ταδιδόναι μηδὲ μετέχειν φοβερόν· ὅταν γὰρ ἄτιμοι πολ-
λοὶ καὶ πένητες ὑπάρχωσι, πολεμίων ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι
8 πλήρη τὴν πόλιν ταύτην. λείπεται δὴ τοῦ βουλεύεσθαι
καὶ κρίνειν μετέχειν αὐτούς. διόπερ καὶ Σόλων καὶ τῶν
ἄλλων τινὲς νομοθετῶν τάττουσιν ἐπί τε τὰς ἀρχαι- 10
ρεσίας καὶ τὰς εὐθύνας τῶν ἀρχόντων, ἄρχειν δὲ κατὰ
9 μόνας οὐκ ἐῶσιν. πάντες μὲν γὰρ ἔχουσι συνελθόντες
ἱκανὴν αἴσθησιν, καὶ μιγνύμενοι τοῖς βελτίοσι τὰς πό-
λεις ὠφελοῦσιν, καθάπερ ἡ μὴ καθαρὰ τροφὴ μετὰ τῆς
καθαρᾶς τὴν πᾶσαν ποιεῖ χρησιμωτέραν τῆς ὀλίγης· 15
10 χωρὶς δ' ἕκαστος ἀτελὴς περὶ τὸ κρίνειν ἐστίν. ἔχει
δ' ἡ τάξις αὕτη τῆς πολιτείας ἀπορίαν πρώτην μὲν ὅτι

δόξειεν ἂν τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἶναι τὸ κρῖναι τίς ὀρθῶς ἰάτρευ-
κεν, οὗπερ καὶ τὸ ἰατρεῦσαι καὶ ποιῆσαι ὑγιᾶ τὸν κάμ-
νοντα τῆς νόσου τῆς παρούσης· οὗτος δ' ἐστὶν ἰατρός.
20 ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐμπειρίας καὶ
1282 τέχνας. ὥσπερ οὖν ἰατρὸν δεῖ διδόναι τὰς εὐθύνας ἐν
ἰατροῖς, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις. ἰατρὸς 11
δ' ὅ τε δημιουργὸς καὶ ὁ ἀρχιτεκτονικὸς καὶ τρίτος ὁ
πεπαιδευμένος περὶ τὴν τέχνην· εἰσὶ γάρ τινες τοι-
25 οῦτοι καὶ περὶ πάσας ὡς εἰπεῖν τὰς τέχνας, ἀποδίδο-
μεν δὲ τὸ κρίνειν οὐδὲν ἧττον τοῖς πεπαιδευμένοις ἢ
τοῖς εἰδόσιν. ἔπειτα καὶ περὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν τὸν αὐτὸν 12
ἂν δόξειεν ἔχειν τρόπον· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἑλέσθαι ὀρθῶς
τῶν εἰδότων ἔργον ἐστίν, οἷον γεωμέτρην τε τῶν γεω-
μετρικῶν καὶ κυβερνήτην τῶν κυβερνητικῶν. εἰ γὰρ καὶ
30 περὶ ἐνίων ἔργων καὶ τεχνῶν μετέχουσι καὶ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν
τινές, ἀλλ' οὔ τοι τῶν εἰδότων γε μᾶλλον. ὥστε κατὰ 13
μὲν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ πλῆθος ποιητέον
κύριον οὔτε τῶν ἀρχαιρεσιῶν οὔτε τῶν εὐθυνῶν. ἀλλ' 14
ἴσως οὐ πάντα ταῦτα λέγεται καλῶς διά τε τὸν πάλαι
λόγον, ἂν ᾖ τὸ πλῆθος μὴ λίαν ἀνδραποδῶδες (ἔσται
γὰρ ἕκαστος μὲν χείρων κριτὴς τῶν εἰδότων, ἅπαντες
5 δὲ συνελθόντες ἢ βελτίους ἢ οὐ χείρους), καὶ ὅτι
περὶ ἐνίων οὔτε μόνον ὁ ποιήσας οὔτ' ἄριστ' ἂν κρί-
νειεν, ὅσων τἄργα γινώσκουσι καὶ οἱ μὴ ἔχοντες τὴν
τέχνην, οἷον οἰκίαν οὐ μόνον ἐστὶ γνῶναι τοῦ ποιήσαν-
τος, ἀλλὰ καὶ βέλτιον ὁ χρώμενος αὐτῇ κρινεῖ (χρῆ-
ται δ' ὁ οἰκονόμος), καὶ πηδάλιον κυβερνήτης τέκτονος,

15 καὶ θοίνην ὁ δαιτυμὼν ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ μάγειρος. ταύτην 10
μὲν οὖν τὴν ἀπορίαν τάχα δόξειέν τις ἂν οὕτω λύειν
ἱκανῶς· ἄλλη δ' ἐστὶν ἐχομένη ταύτης. δοκεῖ γὰρ
ἄτοπον εἶναι τὸ μειζόνων εἶναι κυρίους τοὺς φαύλους
τῶν ἐπιεικῶν, αἱ δ' εὔθυναι καὶ αἱ τῶν ἀρχῶν αἱρέσεις
εἰσὶ μέγιστον· ἃς ἐν ἐνίαις πολιτείαις, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, 15
τοῖς δήμοις ἀποδιδόασιν· ἡ γὰρ ἐκκλησία κυρία πάν-
16 των τῶν τοιούτων ἐστίν. καίτοι τῆς μὲν ἐκκλησίας
μετέχουσι καὶ βουλεύουσι καὶ δικάζουσιν ἀπὸ μικρῶν
τιμημάτων καὶ τῆς τυχούσης ἡλικίας, ταμιεύουσι δὲ
καὶ στρατηγοῦσι καὶ τὰς μεγίστας ἀρχὰς ἄρχουσιν
ἀπὸ μεγάλων. ὁμοίως δή τις ἂν λύσειε καὶ ταύτην 20
17 τὴν ἀπορίαν· ἴσως γὰρ ἔχει καὶ ταῦτ' ὀρθῶς. οὐ
γὰρ ὁ δικαστὴς οὐδ' ὁ βουλευτὴς οὐδ' ὁ ἐκκλησιαστὴς
ἄρχων ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ δικαστήριον καὶ ἡ βουλὴ καὶ
ὁ δῆμος· τῶν δὲ ῥηθέντων ἕκαστος μόριόν ἐστι τούτ-
των. λέγω δὲ μόριον τὸν βουλευτὴν καὶ τὸν ἐκκλη- 25
18 σιαστὴν καὶ τὸν δικαστήν. ὥστε δικαίως κύριον μει-
ζόνων τὸ πλῆθος· ἐκ γὰρ πολλῶν ὁ δῆμος καὶ ἡ
βουλὴ καὶ τὸ δικαστήριον. καὶ τὸ τίμημα δὲ πλεῖον
τὸ πάντων τούτων ἢ τὸ τῶν καθ' ἕνα καὶ κατ' ὀλί-
19 γους μεγάλας ἀρχὰς ἀρχόντων. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν διω- 30
ρίσθω τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον· ἡ δὲ πρώτη λεχθεῖσα
ἀπορία ποιεῖ φανερὸν οὐδὲν οὕτως ἕτερον ὡς ὅτι δεῖ
τοὺς νόμους εἶναι κυρίους κειμένους ὀρθῶς, τὸν ἄρ-
χοντα δέ, ἄν τε εἷς ἄν τε πλείους ὦσι, περὶ τούτων
εἶναι κυρίους περὶ ὅσων ἐξαδυνατοῦσιν οἱ νόμοι λέγειν

ἀκριβῶς διὰ τὸ μὴ ῥᾴδιον εἶναι καθόλου δηλῶσαι περὶ πάντων. ὁποίους μέντοι τινὰς εἶναι δεῖ τοὺς 20
ὀρθῶς κειμένους νόμους, οὐδέν πω δῆλον, ἀλλ' ἔτι
5 μένει τὸ πάλαι διαπορηθέν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ καὶ ὁμοίως ταῖς πολιτείαις ἀνάγκη καὶ τοὺς νόμους φαύλους ἢ σπουδαίους εἶναι καὶ δικαίους ἢ ἀδίκους. πλὴν τοῦτό 21
γε φανερόν ὅτι δεῖ πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν κεῖσθαι τοὺς νόμους. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ τοῦτο, δῆλον ὅτι τοὺς μὲν κατὰ
10 τὰς ὀρθὰς πολιτείας ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι δικαίους τοὺς δὲ κατὰ τὰς παρεκβεβηκυίας οὐ δικαίους.

12 ἐπεὶ δ' ἐν πάσαις μὲν ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις καὶ τέχναις 1
ἀγαθὸν τὸ τέλος, μέγιστον δὲ καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τῇ κυριωτάτῃ πασῶν, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτικὴ δύναμις, ἔστι
15 δὲ πολιτικὸν ἀγαθὸν τὸ δίκαιον, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον, δοκεῖ δὲ πᾶσιν ἴσον τι τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ μέχρι γέ τινος ὁμολογοῦσι τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγοις, ἐν οἷς διώρισται περὶ τῶν ἠθικῶν· τί γὰρ καὶ τισὶ τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ δεῖν τοῖς ἴσοις ἴσον εἶναι
20 φασίν. ποίων δ' ἰσότης ἐστὶ καὶ ποίων ἀνισότης, 2
δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν· ἔχει γὰρ τοῦτ' ἀπορίαν καὶ φιλοσοφίαν πολιτικήν. ἴσως γὰρ ἂν φαίη τις κατὰ παντὸς ὑπεροχὴν ἀγαθοῦ δεῖν ἀνίσως νενεμῆσθαι τὰς ἀρχάς, εἰ πάντα τὰ λοιπὰ μηδὲν διαφέροιεν ἀλλ' ὅμοιοι τυγχάνοιεν ὄντες· τοῖς γὰρ διαφέρουσιν ἕτερον εἶναι
25 τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ τοῦτ' 3
ἀληθές, ἔσται καὶ κατὰ χρῶμα καὶ κατὰ μέγεθος καὶ καθ' ὁτιοῦν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πλεονεξία τις τῶν πολιτικῶν

4 δικαίων τοῖς ὑπερέχουσιν. ἢ τοῦτο ἐπιπόλαιον τὸ ψεῦ-
δος; φανερὸν δ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν καὶ δυνά-
μεων· τῶν γὰρ ὁμοίων αὐλητῶν τὴν τέχνην οὐ δοτέον 30
πλεονεξίαν τῶν αὐλῶν τοῖς εὐγενεστέροις· οὐδὲν γὰρ
αὐλήσουσι βέλτιον, δεῖ δὲ τῷ κατὰ τὸ ἔργον ὑπερέ-
χοντι διδόναι καὶ τῶν ὀργάνων τὴν ὑπεροχήν. εἰ δὲ
μήπω δῆλον τὸ λεγόμενον, ἔτι μᾶλλον αὐτὸ προαγα-
5 γοῦσιν ἔσται φανερόν. εἰ γὰρ εἴη τις ὑπερέχων μὲν
κατὰ τὴν αὐλητικήν, πολὺ δ' ἐλλείπων κατ' εὐγένειαν
ἢ κάλλος, εἰ καὶ μεῖζον ἕκαστον ἐκείνων ἀγαθόν ἐστι
τῆς αὐλητικῆς (λέγω δὲ τήν τ' εὐγένειαν καὶ τὸ κάλλος) 5
καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ὑπερέχουσι πλέον τῆς αὐλη-
τικῆς ἢ ἐκεῖνος κατὰ τὴν αὐλητικήν, ὅμως τούτῳ δοτέον 1283
τοὺς διαφέροντας τῶν αὐλῶν· δεῖ γὰρ εἰς τὸ ἔργον
συμβάλλεσθαι τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τοῦ πλούτου καὶ τῆς
6 εὐγενείας, συμβάλλονται δ' οὐδέν. ἔτι κατά γε τοῦ- 10
τον τὸν λόγον πᾶν ἀγαθὸν πρὸς πᾶν ἂν εἴη συμ-
βλητόν. εἰ γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸ τί μέγεθος, καὶ ὅλως ἂν
τὸ μέγεθος ἐνάμιλλον εἴη καὶ πρὸς πλοῦτον καὶ πρὸς
ἐλευθερίαν. ὥστ' εἰ πλεῖον ὁδὶ διαφέρει κατὰ μέ-
γεθος ἢ ὁδὶ κατ' ἀρετήν, καὶ πλεῖον ὑπερέχει ὅλως
ἀρετῆς μέγεθος, εἴη ἂν συμβλητὰ πάντα. τοσόνδε 15
γὰρ μέγεθος εἰ κρεῖττον τοσοῦδε, τοσόνδε δῆλον ὡς
7 ἴσον. ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦτ' ἀδύνατον, δῆλον ὡς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
πολιτικῶν εὐλόγως οὐ κατὰ πᾶσαν ἀνισότητ' ἀμφισ-
βητοῦσι τῶν ἀρχῶν. εἰ γὰρ οἱ μὲν βραδεῖς οἱ δὲ
ταχεῖς, οὐδὲν διὰ τοῦτο δεῖ τοὺς μὲν πλεῖον τοὺς δ'

20 ἔλαττον ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσιν ἡ τούτων
διαφορὰ λαμβάνει τὴν τιμήν. ἀλλ' ἐξ ὧν πόλις συν- 8
έστηκεν, ἐν τούτοις ἀναγκαῖον ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀμφισ-
βήτησιν. διόπερ εὐλόγως ἀντιποιοῦνται τῆς τιμῆς οἱ
εὐγενεῖς καὶ ἐλεύθεροι καὶ πλούσιοι. δεῖ γὰρ ἐλευ-
25 θέρους τ' εἶναι καὶ τίμημα φέροντας· οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἴη
πόλις ἐξ ἀπόρων πάντων, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐκ δούλων. ἀλλὰ 9
μὴν εἰ δεῖ τούτων, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς
πολεμικῆς ἀρετῆς· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄνευ τούτων οἰκεῖσθαι
πόλιν δυνατόν, πλὴν ἄνευ μὲν τῶν προτέρων ἀδύνατον
13 εἶναι πόλιν, ἄνευ δὲ τούτων οἰκεῖσθαι καλῶς. πρὸς 1
μὲν οὖν τὸ πόλιν εἶναι δόξειεν ἂν ἢ πάντα ἢ ἕνιά γε
τούτων ὀρθῶς ἀμφισβητεῖν, πρὸς μέντοι ζωὴν ἀγαθὴν
ἡ παιδεία καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ μάλιστα δικαίως ἂν ἀμφισβη-
τοίησαν, καθάπερ εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον. ἐπεὶ δ' οὔτε
πάντων ἴσον ἔχειν δεῖ τοὺς ἴσους ἕν τι μόνον ὄντας
οὔτε ἄνισον τοὺς ἀνίσους καθ' ἕν, ἀνάγκη πάσας εἶναι
τὰς τοιαύτας πολιτείας παρεκβάσεις. εἴρηται μὲν οὖν 2
5 καὶ πρότερον ὅτι διαμφισβητοῦσι τρόπον τινὰ δικαίως
πάντες, ἁπλῶς δ' οὐ πάντες δικαίως, οἱ πλούσιοι μὲν
ὅτι πλεῖον μέτεστι τῆς χώρας αὐτοῖς, ἡ δὲ χώρα κοινόν·
ἔτι πρὸς τὰ συμβόλαια πιστοὶ μᾶλλον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ
πλέον· οἱ δ' ἐλεύθεροι καὶ εὐγενεῖς ὡς ἐγγὺς ἀλλήλων·
10 πολῖται γὰρ μᾶλλον οἱ γενναιότεροι τῶν ἀγεννῶν, ἡ δ' 3
εὐγένεια παρ' ἑκάστοις οἶκοι τίμιος. ἔτι διότι βελ-
τίους εἰκὸς τοὺς ἐκ βελτιόνων· εὐγένεια γάρ ἐστιν
ἀρετὴ γένους. ὁμοίως δὴ φήσομεν δικαίως καὶ τὴν

ἀρετὴν ἀμφισβητεῖν· κοινωνικὴν γὰρ ἀρετὴν εἶναί φα-
μεν τὴν δικαιοσύνην, ᾗ πάσας ἀναγκαῖον ἀκολουθεῖν
4 τὰς ἄλλας. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ οἱ πλείους πρὸς τοὺς ἐλάτ- 15
τους· καὶ γὰρ κρείττους καὶ πλουσιώτεροι καὶ βελτίους
εἰσίν, ὡς λαμβανομένων τῶν πλειόνων πρὸς τοὺς ἐλάτ-
τους. ἆρ' οὖν εἰ πάντες εἶεν ἐν μιᾷ πόλει, λέγω δ'
οἷον οἵ τ' ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ πλούσιοι καὶ εὐγενεῖς, ἔτι δὲ
πλῆθος ἄλλο τι πολιτικόν, πότερον ἀμφισβήτησις ἔσται 20
5 τίνας ἄρχειν δεῖ, ἢ οὐκ ἔσται; καθ' ἑκάστην μὲν οὖν
πολιτείαν τῶν εἰρημένων ἀναμφισβήτητος ἡ κρίσις τίνας
ἄρχειν δεῖ· τοῖς γὰρ κυρίοις διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων, οἷον
ἢ μὲν τῷ διὰ πλουσίων ἢ δὲ τῷ διὰ τῶν σπουδαίων ἀν-
δρῶν εἶναι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἑκάστη τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον. 25
ἀλλ' ὅμως σκοποῦμεν, ὅταν περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ταὐθ' ὑπάρχῃ
6 χρόνον, πῶς διοριστέον. εἰ δὴ τὸν ἀριθμὸν εἶεν ὀλίγοι
πάμπαν οἱ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχοντες, τίνα δεῖ διελεῖν τὸν τρό-
πον; ἢ τὸ ὀλίγοι πρὸς τὸ ἔργον δεῖ σκοπεῖν, εἰ δυνατοὶ
διοικεῖν τὴν πόλιν ἢ τοσοῦτοι τὸ πλῆθος ὥστ' εἶναι
πόλιν ἐξ αὐτῶν; ἔστι δὲ ἀπορία τις πρὸς ἅπαντας τοὺς 30
7 διαμφισβητοῦντας περὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν τιμῶν. δόξαιεν
γὰρ ⟨ἂν⟩ οὐδὲν λέγειν δίκαιον οἱ διὰ τὸν πλοῦτον
ἀξιοῦντες ἄρχειν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ κατὰ γένος· δῆλον
γὰρ ὡς εἴ τις πάλιν εἷς πλουσιώτερος ἁπάντων ἐστί,
[δῆλον ὅτι] κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον τοῦτον ἄρχειν τὸν
ἕνα ἁπάντων δεήσει, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸν εὐγενείᾳ δια-
8 φέροντα τῶν ἀμφισβητούντων δι' ἐλευθερίαν. ταὐτὸ 5
δὲ τοῦτ' ἴσως συμβήσεται καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀριστοκρατίας

ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς· εἰ γάρ τις εἷς ἀμείνων ἀνὴρ εἴη τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι σπουδαίων ὄντων, τοῦτον εἶναι δεῖ κύριον κατὰ ταὐτὸ δίκαιον. οὐκοῦν εἰ καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εἶναί γε δεῖ κύριον διότι κρείττους εἰσὶ
10 τῶν ὀλίγων, κἂν εἷς ἢ πλείους μὲν τοῦ ἑνὸς ἐλάττους δὲ τῶν πολλῶν κρείττους ὦσι τῶν ἄλλων, τούτους ἂν δέοι κυρίους εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ πλῆθος. πάντα δὴ 9
ταῦτ' ἔοικε φανερὸν ποιεῖν ὅτι τούτων τῶν ὅρων οὐδεὶς ὀρθός ἐστι, καθ' ὃν ἀξιοῦσιν αὐτοὶ μὲν ἄρχειν τοὺς
15 δ' ἄλλους ὑπὸ σφῶν ἄρχεσθαι πάντας. καὶ γὰρ δὴ 10
καὶ πρὸς τοὺς κατ' ἀρετὴν ἀξιοῦντας κυρίους εἶναι τοῦ πολιτεύματος, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοὺς κατὰ πλοῦτον, ἔχοιεν ἂν λέγειν τὰ πλήθη λόγον τινὰ δίκαιον· οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει ποτὲ τὸ πλῆθος εἶναι βέλτιον τῶν ὀλίγων καὶ
20 πλουσιώτερον, οὐχ ὡς καθ' ἕκαστον ἀλλ' ὡς ἀθρόους. διὸ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀπορίαν, ἣν ζητοῦσι καὶ προβάλλουσί 11
τινες, ἐνδέχεται τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἀπαντᾶν. ἀποροῦσι γάρ τινες πότερον τῷ νομοθέτῃ νομοθετητέον, βουλομένῳ τίθεσθαι τοὺς ὀρθοτάτους νόμους, πρὸς τὸ τῶν βελτιόνων συμφέρον ἢ πρὸς τὸ τῶν πλειόνων, ὅταν συμ-
25 βαίνῃ τὸ λεχθέν. τὸ δ' ὀρθὸν ληπτέον ἴσως· τὸ δ' ἴσως 12
ὀρθὸν πρὸς τὸ τῆς πόλεως ὅλης συμφέρον καὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τὸ τῶν πολιτῶν. πολίτης δὲ κοινῇ μὲν ὁ μετέχων
1284 τοῦ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαί ἐστι, καθ' ἑκάστην δὲ πολιτείαν ἕτερος, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀρίστην ὁ δυνάμενος καὶ προαιρού-
30 μενος ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν πρὸς τὸν βίον τὸν κατ' ἀρετήν. εἰ δέ τίς ἐστιν εἷς τοσοῦτον διαφέρων κατ' 13

ἀρετῆς ὑπερβολήν, ἢ πλείους μὲν ἑνὸς μὴ μέντοι δυ-
νατοὶ πλήρωμα παρασχέσθαι πόλεως, ὥστε μὴ συμ-
βλητὴν εἶναι τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετὴν πάντων μηδὲ τὴν
δύναμιν αὐτῶν τὴν πολιτικὴν πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνων, εἰ
πλείους, εἰ δ' εἷς, τὴν ἐκείνου μόνον, οὐκέτι θετέον
τούτους μέρος πόλεως· ἀδικήσονται γὰρ ἀξιούμενοι τῶν 5
ἴσων, ἄνισοι τοσοῦτον κατ' ἀρετὴν ὄντες καὶ τὴν πολι-
τικὴν δύναμιν· ὥσπερ γὰρ θεὸν ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἰκὸς
14 εἶναι τὸν τοιοῦτον. ὅθεν δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὴν νομοθεσίαν
ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι περὶ τοὺς ἴσους καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῇ δυ-
νάμει. κατὰ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἔστι νόμος· αὐτοὶ γάρ
εἰσι νόμος. καὶ γὰρ γελοῖος ἂν εἴη νομοθετεῖν τις 10
πειρώμενος κατ' αὐτῶν· λέγοιεν γὰρ ἂν ἴσως ἅπερ
Ἀντισθένης ἔφη τοὺς λέοντας δημηγορούντων τῶν δα-
15 συπόδων καὶ τὸ ἴσον ἀξιούντων πάντας ἔχειν. διὸ
καὶ τίθενται τὸν ὀστρακισμὸν αἱ δημοκρατούμεναι πό-
λεις, διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην αἰτίαν· αὗται γὰρ δὴ δοκοῦσι 15
διώκειν τὴν ἰσότητα μάλιστα πάντων, ὥστε τοὺς δο-
κοῦντας ὑπερέχειν δυνάμει διὰ πλοῦτον ἢ πολυφιλίαν
ἤ τινα ἄλλην πολιτικὴν ἰσχὺν ὠστρακίζον καὶ μεθίσ-
16 τασαν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως χρόνους ὡρισμένους. μυθολο-
γεῖται δὲ καὶ τοὺς Ἀργοναύτας τὸν Ἡρακλέα κατα-
λιπεῖν διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν· οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλειν αὐτὸν ἄγειν 20
τὴν Ἀργὼ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων ὡς ὑπερβάλλοντα πολὺ
τῶν πλωτήρων. διὸ καὶ τοὺς ψέγοντας τὴν τυραννίδα
καὶ τὴν Περιάνδρου Θρασυβούλῳ συμβουλίαν οὐχ ἁπ-
17 λῶς οἰητέον ὀρθῶς ἐπιτιμᾶν. φασὶ γὰρ τὸν Περίανδρον

25 εἰπεῖν μὲν οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸν πεμφθέντα κήρυκα περὶ τῆς
συμβουλίας, ἀφαιροῦντα δὲ τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας τῶν στα-
χύων ὁμαλῦναι τὴν ἄρουραν· ὅθεν ἀγνοοῦντος μὲν τοῦ
κήρυκος τοῦ γινομένου τὴν αἰτίαν, ἀπαγγείλαντος δὲ
τὸ συμπεσόν, συννοῆσαι τὸν Θρασύβουλον ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς
30 ὑπερέχοντας ἄνδρας ἀναιρεῖν. τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ μόνον 18
συμφέρει τοῖς τυράννοις, οὐδὲ μόνον οἱ τύραννοι ποιοῦ-
σιν, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ τὰς
δημοκρατίας· ὁ γὰρ ὀστρακισμὸς τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν
τρόπον τινὰ τῷ κολούειν τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας καὶ φυγα-
δεύειν. τὸ δ' αὐτὸ καὶ περὶ τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὰ ἔθνη 19
ποιοῦσιν οἱ κύριοι τῆς δυνάμεως, οἷον Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν
περὶ Σαμίους καὶ Χίους καὶ Λεσβίους (ἐπεὶ γὰρ θᾶττον
5 ἐγκρατῶς ἔσχον τὴν ἀρχήν, ἐταπείνωσαν αὐτοὺς παρὰ
τὰς συνθήκας), ὁ δὲ Περσῶν βασιλεὺς Μήδους καὶ
Βαβυλωνίους καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τοὺς πεφρονηματισμένους
διὰ τὸ γενέσθαι ποτ' ἐπ' ἀρχῆς ἐπέκοπτε πολλάκις.
τὸ δὲ πρόβλημα καθόλου περὶ πάσας ἐστὶ τὰς πολι- 20
10 τείας, καὶ τὰς ὀρθάς· αἱ μὲν γὰρ παρεκβεβηκυῖαι πρὸς
τὸ ἴδιον ἀποσκοποῦσαι τοῦτο δρῶσιν, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ
περὶ τὰς τὸ κοινὸν ἀγαθὸν ἐπισκοπούσας τὸν αὐτὸν
ἔχει τρόπον. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχ- 21
νῶν καὶ ἐπιστημῶν· οὔτε γὰρ γραφεὺς ἐάσειεν ἂν τὸν
ὑπερβάλλοντα πόδα τῆς συμμετρίας ἔχειν τὸ ζῷον,
15 οὐδ' εἰ διαφέροι τὸ κάλλος, οὔτε ναυπηγὸς πρύμναν
ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τι μορίων τῶν τῆς νεώς· οὐδὲ δὴ χορο-
διδάσκαλος τὸν μεῖζον καὶ κάλλιον τοῦ παντὸς χοροῦ

2 φθεγγόμενον ἐάσει συγχορεύειν. ὥστε διὰ τοῦτο μὲν
οὐδὲν κωλύει τοὺς μονάρχους συμφωνεῖν ταῖς πόλεσιν,
εἰ τῆς οἰκείας ἀρχῆς ὠφελίμου ταῖς πόλεσιν οὔσης τοῦτο 20
δρῶσιν. διὸ κατὰ τὰς ὁμολογουμένας ὑπεροχὰς ἔχει τι
δίκαιον πολιτικὸν ὁ λόγος ὁ περὶ τὸν ὀστρακισμόν.
23 βέλτιον μὲν οὖν τὸν νομοθέτην ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὕτω συστῆσαι
τὴν πολιτείαν ὥστε μὴ δεῖσθαι τοιαύτης ἰατρείας· δεύ-
τερος δὲ πλοῦς, ἂν συμβῇ, πειρᾶσθαι τοιούτῳ τινὶ 25
διορθώματι διορθοῦν. ὅπερ οὐκ ἐγίνετο περὶ τὰς πό-
λεις· οὐ γὰρ ἔβλεπον πρὸς τὸ τῆς πολιτείας τῆς οἰ-
κείας συμφέρον, ἀλλὰ στασιαστικῶς ἐχρῶντο τοῖς ὀσ-
24 τρακισμοῖς. ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς παρεκβεβηκυίαις πολιτείαις
ὅτι μὲν ἰδίᾳ συμφέρει καὶ δίκαιόν ἐστι, φανερόν· ἴσως
δὲ καὶ ὅτι οὐχ ἁπλῶς δίκαιον, καὶ τοῦτο φανερόν. ἀλλ' 30
ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας ἔχει πολλὴν ἀπορίαν, οὐ κατὰ
τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν τὴν ὑπεροχήν, οἷον ἰσχύος καὶ πλού-
του καὶ πολυφιλίας, ἀλλ' ἄν τις γένηται διαφέρων κατ'
25 ἀρετήν, τί χρὴ ποιεῖν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ φαίεν ἂν δεῖν ἐκ-
βάλλειν καὶ μεθιστάναι τὸν τοιοῦτον. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ'
ἄρχειν γε τοῦ τοιούτου· παραπλήσιον γὰρ κἂν εἰ τοῦ
Διὸς ἄρχειν ἀξιοῖεν, μερίζοντες τὰς ἀρχάς. λείπεται 5
τοίνυν, ὅπερ ἔοικε πεφυκέναι, πείθεσθαι τῷ τοιούτῳ
πάντας ἀσμένως, ὥστε βασιλέας εἶναι τοὺς τοιούτους
ἀιδίους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν.

1 ἴσως δὲ καλῶς ἔχει μετὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους λόγους 14
μεταβῆναι καὶ σκέψασθαι περὶ βασιλείας· φαμὲν γὰρ
τῶν ὀρθῶν παλιτειῶν μίαν εἶναι ταύτην. σκεπτέον δὲ 10

πότερον συμφέρει τῇ μελλούσῃ καλῶς οἰκήσεσθαι καὶ πόλει καὶ χώρᾳ βασιλεύεσθαι, ἢ οὐ ἀλλ' ἄλλη τις πολιτεία μᾶλλον, ἢ τισὶ μὲν συμφέρει τισὶ δ' οὐ συμ-
1285 φέρει. δεῖ δὲ πρῶτον διελέσθαι πότερον ἐν τὸ γένος 2
15 ἐστὶν αὐτῆς ἢ πλείους ἔχει διαφοράς. ῥᾴδιον δὴ τοῦτό γε καταμαθεῖν, ὅτι πλείω τε γένη περιέχει καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ὁ τρόπος ἐστὶν οὐχ εἷς πασῶν. ἡ γὰρ ἐν τῇ Λακω- 3 νικῇ πολιτείᾳ δοκεῖ μὲν εἶναι βασιλεία μάλιστα τῶν κατὰ νόμον, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κυρία πάντων, ἀλλ' ὅταν ἐξ-
20 έλθῃ τὴν χώραν, ἡγεμών ἐστι τῶν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον· ἔτι δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς ἀποδέδοται τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ βασιλεία οἷον στρατηγία τις αὐτοκρά- 4 τωρ καὶ ἀίδιος ἐστίν· κτεῖναι γὰρ οὐ κύριος, εἰ μὴ [ἔν τινι βασιλείᾳ] καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἐν ταῖς πολεμικαῖς ἐξόδοις ἐν χειρὸς νόμῳ. δηλοῖ δ' Ὅμηρος·
25 ὁ γὰρ Ἀγαμέμνων κακῶς μὲν ἀκούων ἠνείχετο ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις, ἐξελθόντων δὲ καὶ κτεῖναι κύριος ἦν. λέγει 5 γοῦν "ὃν δέ κ' ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε μάχης, οὗ οἱ ἄρκιον ἐσσεῖται φυγέειν κύνας ἠδ' οἰωνούς· πὰρ γὰρ ἐμοὶ θάνατος." ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῦτ' εἶδος βασιλείας, στρατηγία
30 διὰ βίου· τούτων δ' αἱ μὲν κατὰ γένος εἰσὶν αἱ δ' αἱρεταί. παρὰ ταύτην δ' ἄλλο μοναρχίας εἶδος, οἷαι παρ' 6 ἐνίοις εἰσὶ βασιλεῖαι τῶν βαρβάρων. ἔχουσι δ' αὗται τὴν δύναμιν πᾶσαι παραπλησίαν τυραννικῇ, εἰσὶ δ' ὅμως κατὰ νόμον καὶ πατρικαί· διὰ γὰρ τὸ δουλικώτεροι εἶναι τὰ ἤθη φύσει οἱ μὲν βάρβαροι τῶν Ἑλλήνων οἱ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν τῶν περὶ τὴν Εὐρώπην, ὑπομένουσι

7 τὴν δεσποτικὴν ἀρχὴν οὐδὲν δυσχεραίνοντες. τυραν- 5
νικαὶ μὲν οὖν διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον εἰσίν, ἀσφαλεῖς δὲ διὰ
τὸ πάτριαι καὶ κατὰ νόμον εἶναι. καὶ ἡ φυλακὴ δὲ
βασιλικὴ καὶ οὐ τυραννικὴ διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν· οἱ
γὰρ πολῖται φυλάττουσιν ὅπλοις τοὺς βασιλεῖς, τοὺς
δὲ τυράννους ξενικόν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ νόμον καὶ ἑκόν-
των· οἱ δ' ἀκόντων ἄρχουσιν, ὥσθ' οἱ μὲν παρὰ τῶν 10
πολιτῶν οἱ δ' ἐπὶ τοὺς πολίτας ἔχουσι τὴν φυλακήν.
8 δύο μὲν οὖν εἴδη ταῦτα μοναρχίας, ἕτερον δ' ὅπερ ἦν
ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις Ἕλλησιν, οὓς καλοῦσιν αἰσυμνήτας.
ἔστι δὲ τοῦθ' ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν αἱρετὴ τυραννίς, δια-
φέρουσα δὲ τῆς βαρβαρικῆς οὐ τῷ μὴ κατὰ νόμον 15
9 ἀλλὰ τῷ μὴ πάτριος εἶναι μόνον. ἦρχον δ' οἱ μὲν
διὰ βίου τὴν ἀρχὴν ταύτην, οἱ δὲ μέχρι τινῶν ὡρισ-
μένων χρόνων ἢ πράξεων, οἷον εἵλοντό ποτε Μιτυλη-
ναῖοι Πιττακὸν πρὸς τοὺς φυγάδας ὧν προειστήκεσαν
10 Ἀντιμενίδης καὶ Ἀλκαῖος ὁ ποιητής. δηλοῖ δ' Ἀλκαῖος
ὅτι τύραννον εἵλοντο τὸν Πιττακὸν ἔν τινι τῶν σκολιῶν 20
μελῶν· ἐπιτιμᾷ γὰρ ὅτι τὸν κακοπάτριδα Πιττακὸν
πόλεως τᾶς ἀχόλω καὶ βαρυδαίμονος ἐστάσαντο τύ-
11 ραννον μέγ' ἐπαινέοντες ἀολλέες. αὗται μὲν οὖν εἰσί
τε καὶ ἦσαν διὰ μὲν τὸ τυραννικαὶ εἶναι δεσποτικαί,
διὰ δὲ τὸ αἱρεταὶ καὶ ἑκόντων βασιλικαί· τέταρτον δ' 25
εἶδος μοναρχίας βασιλικῆς αἱ κατὰ τοὺς ἡρωικοὺς χρο-
νους ἑκούσιαί τε καὶ πάτριαι γινόμεναι κατὰ νόμον.
12 διὰ γὰρ τὸ τοὺς πρώτους γενέσθαι τοῦ πλήθους εὐ-
εργέτας κατὰ τέχνας ἢ πόλεμον, ἢ διὰ τὸ συναγαγεῖν

ρίσαι χώραν, ἐγίνοντο βασιλεῖς ἑκόντων καὶ τοῖς
λαμβάνουσι πάτριοι. κύριοι δ' ἦσαν τῆς τε κατὰ
μον ἡγεμονίας καὶ τῶν θυσιῶν, ὅσαι μὴ ἱερατικαί,
πρὸς τούτοις τὰς δίκας ἔκρινον. τοῦτο δ' ἐποίουν
ν οὐκ ὀμνύοντες οἱ δ' ὀμνύοντες· ὁ δ' ὅρκος ἦν
κήπτρου ἐπανάτασις. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων 13
ον καὶ τὰ κατὰ πόλιν καὶ τὰ ἔνδημα καὶ τὰ ὑπερό-
συνεχῶς ἦρχον· ὕστερον δὲ τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν παριέν-
τῶν βασιλέων, τὰ δὲ τῶν ὄχλων παραιρουμένων,
ν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσι θυσίαι κατελείφθησαν τοῖς
λεῦσι μόνον, ὅπου δ' ἄξιον εἰπεῖν εἶναι βασιλείαν,
ῖς ὑπερορίοις τῶν πολεμικῶν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν μόνον

σιλείας μὲν οὖν εἴδη ταῦτα, τέτταρα τὸν ἀριθμόν, 14
μὲν ἡ περὶ τοὺς ἡρωικοὺς χρόνους (αὕτη δ' ἦν
ων μέν, ἐπὶ τισὶ δ' ὡρισμένοις· στρατηγὸς γὰρ
ὶ δικαστὴς ὁ βασιλεύς, καὶ τῶν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς
ς), δευτέρα δ' ἡ βαρβαρική (αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἐκ
ς ἀρχὴ δεσποτικὴ κατὰ νόμον), τρίτη δ' ἡν αἰ-
πτείαν προσαγορεύουσιν (αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν αἱρετὴ τυ-
ς), τετάρτη δ' ἡ Λακωνικὴ τούτων· αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν
πεῖν ἁπλῶς στρατηγία κατὰ γένος ἀίδιος. αὗται 15
οὖν τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων,
ον δ' εἶδος βασιλείας, ὅταν ᾖ πάντων κύριος εἷς
σπερ ἕκαστον ἔθνος καὶ πόλις ἑκάστη τῶν κοινῶν,
μένη κατὰ τὴν οἰκονομικήν· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ οἰκονο-
βασιλεία τις οἰκίας ἐστίν, οὕτως ἡ βασιλεία πό-

1 λεως καὶ ἔθνους ἑνὸς ἢ πλειόνων οἰκονομία. σχεδὸν δὴ 15
δύο ἐστὶν ὡς εἰπεῖν εἴδη βασιλείας περὶ ὧν σκεπτέον,
αὕτη τε καὶ ἡ Λακωνική. τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων αἱ πολλαὶ
μεταξὺ τούτων εἰσίν· ἐλαττόνων μὲν γὰρ κύριοι τῆς 25
2 παμβασιλείας, πλειόνων δ' εἰσὶ τῆς Λακωνικῆς. ὥστε
τὸ σκέμμα σχεδὸν περὶ δυοῖν ἐστίν, ἐν μὲν πότερον
συμφέρει ταῖς πόλεσι στρατηγὸν ἀίδιον εἶναι, καὶ τοῦ-
τον ἢ κατὰ γένος ἢ κατὰ μέρος, ἢ οὐ συμφέρει· ἐν δὲ 1286
πότερον ἕνα συμφέρει κύριον εἶναι πάντων, ἢ οὐ συμ- 30
φέρει. τὸ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῆς τοιαύτης στρατηγίας ἐπι-
σκοπεῖν νόμων ἔχει μᾶλλον εἶδος ἢ πολιτείας· ἐν ἁπά-
σαις γὰρ ἐνδέχεται γίνεσθαι τοῦτο ταῖς πολιτείαις·
3 ὥστ' ἀφείσθω τὴν πρώτην. ὁ δὲ λοιπὸς τρόπος τῆς
βασιλείας πολιτείας εἶδος ἐστίν, ὥστε περὶ τούτου δεῖ
θεωρῆσαι καὶ τὰς ἀπορίας ἐπιδραμεῖν τὰς ἐνούσας.
ἀρχὴ δ' ἐστὶ τῆς ζητήσεως αὕτη, πότερον συμφέρει
μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνδρὸς ἄρχεσθαι ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν 5
4 ἀρίστων νόμων. δοκοῦσι δὴ τοῖς νομίζουσι συμφέρειν
βασιλεύεσθαι τὸ καθόλου μόνον οἱ νόμοι λέγειν, ἀλλ'
οὐ πρὸς τὰ προσπίπτοντα ἐπιτάττειν, ὥστ' ἐν ὁποιαοῦν
τέχνῃ τὸ κατὰ γράμματ' ἄρχειν ἠλίθιον· καὶ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ
μετὰ τὴν τετρήμερον κινεῖν ἔξεστι τοῖς ἰατροῖς, ἐὰν δὲ 10
πρότερον, ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτοῦ κινδύνῳ. φανερὸν τοίνυν ὡς
οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ κατὰ γράμματα καὶ νόμους ἀρίστη πολιτεία
5 διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν. ἀλλὰ μὴν κἀκεῖνον δεῖ ὑπάρχειν
τὸν λόγον τὸν καθόλου τοῖς ἄρχουσιν· κρεῖττον δ' ᾧ
μὴ πρόσεστι τὸ παθητικὸν ὅλως ἢ ᾧ συμφυές. τῷ 15

μὲν οὖν νόμῳ τοῦτο οὐχ ὑπάρχει, ψυχὴν δ' ἀνθρωπίνην ἀνάγκη τοῦτ' ἔχειν πᾶσαν. ἀλλ' ἴσως ἂν φαίη τις ὡς ἀντὶ τούτου βουλεύσεται περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα κάλλιον. ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ἀνάγκη νομοθέτην αὐτὸν εἶναι, 6
δῆλον, καὶ κεῖσθαι νόμους, ἀλλὰ μὴ κυρίους ᾗ παρεκ-
20 βαίνουσιν, ἐπεὶ περὶ τῶν γ' ἄλλων εἶναι δεῖ κυρίους.
ὅσα δὲ μὴ δυνατὸν τὸν νόμον κρίνειν ἢ ὅλως ἢ εὖ, πότερον ἕνα τὸν ἄριστον δεῖ ἄρχειν ἢ πάντας; καὶ γὰρ 7
νῦν συνιόντες δικάζουσι καὶ βουλεύονται καὶ κρίνουσιν, αὗται δ' αἱ κρίσεις εἰσὶ πᾶσαι περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον.
25 καθ' ἕνα μὲν οὖν συμβαλλόμενος ὁστισοῦν ἴσως χείρων· ἀλλ' ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις ἐκ πολλῶν, ὥσπερ ἑστίασις συμφορητὸς καλλίων μιᾶς καὶ ἁπλῆς. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ κρίνει ἄμεινον ὄχλος πολλὰ ἢ εἷς ὁστισοῦν. ἔτι μᾶλλον 8
ἀδιάφθορον τὸ πολύ· καθάπερ ⟨γὰρ⟩ ὕδωρ τὸ πλεῖον, οὕτω καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ὀλίγων ἀδιαφθορώτερον· τοῦ δ'
30 ἑνὸς ὑπ' ὀργῆς κρατηθέντος ἤ τινος ἑτέρου πάθους τοιούτου ἀναγκαῖον διεφθάρθαι τὴν κρίσιν· ἐκεῖ δ' ἔργον ἅμα πάντας ὀργισθῆναι καὶ ἁμαρτεῖν. ἔστω δὲ τὸ 9
πλῆθος οἱ ἐλεύθεροι, μηδὲν παρὰ τὸν νόμον πράττοντες, ἀλλ' ἢ περὶ ὧν ἐκλείπειν ἀναγκαῖον αὐτόν. εἰ δὲ δὴ τοῦτο μὴ ῥᾴδιον ἐν πολλοῖς, ἀλλ' εἰ πλείους εἶεν ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἄνδρες καὶ πολῖται, πότερον ὁ εἷς
5 ἀδιαφθορώτερος ἄρχων, ἢ μᾶλλον οἱ πλείους μὲν τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἀγαθοὶ δὲ πάντες; ἢ δῆλον ὡς οἱ πλείους; ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν στασιάζουσιν ὁ δ' εἷς ἀστασίαστος. ἀλλὰ 10
πρὸς τοῦτ' ἀντιθετέον ἴσως ὅτι σπουδαῖοι τὴν ψυχήν,

ὥσπερ κἀκεῖνος ὁ εἷς. εἰ δὴ τὴν μὲν τῶν πλειόνων
ἀρχὴν ἀγαθῶν δ' ἀνδρῶν πάντων ἀριστοκρατίαν θετέον,
τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἑνὸς βασιλείαν, αἱρετώτερον ἂν εἴη ταῖς 10
πόλεσιν ἀριστοκρατία βασιλείας, καὶ μετὰ δυνάμεως
καὶ χωρὶς δυνάμεως οὔσης τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἂν ᾖ λαβεῖν
11 πλείους ὁμοίους. καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἴσως ἐβασιλεύοντο
πρότερον, ὅτι σπάνιον ἦν εὑρεῖν ἄνδρας πολὺ διαφέ-
ροντας κατ' ἀρετήν, ἄλλως τε καὶ τότε μικρὰς οἰκοῦν- 15
τας πόλεις. ἔτι δ' ἀπ' εὐεργεσίας καθίστασαν τοὺς
βασιλεῖς, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἔργον τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν. ἐπεὶ
δὲ συνέβαινε γίνεσθαι πολλοὺς ὁμοίους πρὸς ἀρετήν,
οὐκέτι ὑπέμενον ἀλλ' ἐζήτουν κοινόν τι καὶ πολιτείαν
12 καθίστασαν. ἐπεὶ δὲ χείρους γινόμενοι ἐχρηματίζοντο
ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν, ἐντεῦθέν ποθεν εὔλογον γενέσθαι τὰς 20
ὀλιγαρχίας· ἔντιμον γὰρ ἐποίησαν τὸν πλοῦτον. ἐκ
δὲ τούτων πρῶτον εἰς τυραννίδας μετέβαλον, ἐκ δὲ
τῶν τυραννίδων εἰς δημοκρατίαν· ἀεὶ γὰρ εἰς ἐλάττους
ἄγοντες δι' αἰσχροκέρδειαν ἰσχυρότερον τὸ πλῆθος κα-
τέστησαν, ὥστ' ἐπιθέσθαι καὶ γενέσθαι δημοκρατίας. 25
13 ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ μείζους εἶναι συμβέβηκε τὰς πόλεις, ἴσως
οὐδὲ ῥᾴδιον ἔτι γίνεσθαι πολιτείαν ἑτέραν παρὰ δημο-
κρατίαν. εἰ δὲ δή τις ἄριστον θείη τὸ βασιλεύεσθαι
ταῖς πόλεσιν, πῶς ἕξει τὰ περὶ τῶν τέκνων; πότερον
καὶ τὸ γένος δεῖ βασιλεύειν; ἀλλὰ γινομένων ὁποῖοί 30
14 τινες ἔτυχον, βλαβερόν. ἀλλ' οὐ παραδώσει κύριος ὢν
τοῖς τέκνοις; ἀλλ' οὐκέτι τοῦτο ῥᾴδιον πιστεῦσαι· χα-
λεπὸν γάρ, καὶ μείζονος ἀρετῆς ἢ κατ' ἀνθρωπίνην

φύσιν. ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν καὶ περὶ τῆς δυνάμεως, πότερον ἔχειν δεῖ τὸν μέλλοντα βασιλεύειν ἰσχύν τινα περὶ αὐτόν, ᾗ δυνήσεται βιάζεσθαι τοὺς μὴ βουλομένους πειθαρχεῖν, ἢ πῶς ἐνδέχεται τὴν ἀρχὴν διοικεῖν;
5 εἰ γὰρ καὶ κατὰ νόμον εἴη κύριος, μηδὲν πράττων κατὰ 15
τὴν αὑτοῦ βούλησιν παρὰ τὸν νόμον, ὅμως ἀναγκαῖον
ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ δύναμιν ᾗ φυλάξει τοὺς νόμους. τάχα 16
μὲν οὖν τὰ περὶ τὸν βασιλέα τὸν τοιοῦτον οὐ χαλεπὸν
διορίσαι· δεῖ γὰρ αὐτὸν μὲν ἔχειν ἰσχύν, εἶναι δὲ το-
10 σαύτην τὴν ἰσχὺν ὥστε ἑκάστου μὲν καὶ ἑνὸς καὶ συμ-
πλειόνων κρείττω τοῦ δὲ πλήθους ἥττω, καθάπερ οἵ
τ' ἀρχαῖοι τὰς φυλακὰς ἐδίδοσαν, ὅτε καθισταίη τινα
τῆς πόλεως ὃν ἐκάλουν αἰσυμνήτην ἢ τύραννον, καὶ
Διονυσίῳ τις, ὅτ' ᾔτει τοὺς φύλακας, συνεβούλευε τοῖς
Συρακουσίοις διδόναι τοσούτους τοὺς φύλακας.

16 περὶ δὲ τοῦ βασιλέως τοῦ κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ βούλησιν 1
1287 πάντα πράττοντος ὅ τε λόγος ἐφέστηκε νῦν καὶ ποιη-
τέον τὴν σκέψιν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ νόμον λεγόμενος
βασιλεὺς οὐκ ἔστιν εἶδος, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, πολιτείας·
ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ὑπάρχειν ἐνδέχεται στρατηγίαν ἀίδιον,
20 οἷον ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ καὶ ἀριστοκρατίᾳ, καὶ πολλοὶ ποι-
οῦσιν ἕνα κύριον τῆς διοικήσεως· τοιαύτη γὰρ ἀρχή
τις ἔστι καὶ περὶ Ἐπίδαμνον, καὶ περὶ Ὀποῦντα δὲ
κατά τι μέρος ἔλαττον. περὶ δὲ τῆς παμβασιλείας κα- 2
λουμένης, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ καθ' ἣν ἄρχει πάντων κατὰ τὴν
25 ἑαυτοῦ βούλησιν ὁ βασιλεύς, δοκεῖ δέ τισιν οὐδὲ κατὰ
φύσιν εἶναι τὸ κύριον ἕνα πάντων εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν,

ὅπου συνέστηκεν ἐξ ὁμοίων ἡ πόλις· τοῖς γὰρ ὁμοίοις φύσει τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀξίαν κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι, ὥστ' εἴπερ καὶ τὸ ἴσην ἔχειν τοὺς ἀνίσους τροφὴν ἢ ἐσθῆτα βλαβερὸν τοῖς σώμασιν, οὕ-
3 τως ἔχει καὶ τὸ περὶ τὰς τιμάς. ὁμοίως τοίνυν καὶ τὸ 30 ἄνισον τοὺς ἴσους· διόπερ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἄρχειν ἢ ἄρχεσθαι δίκαιον. καὶ τὸ ἀνὰ μέρος τοίνυν ὡσαύτως. τοῦτο δ' ἤδη νόμος· ἡ γὰρ τάξις νόμος. τὸν ἄρα νόμον ἄρχειν αἱρετώτερον μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν πολιτῶν ἕνα τινά.
4 κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ λόγον τοῦτον, κἂν εἴ τινας ἄρχειν βέλτιον, τούτους καταστατέον νομοφύλακας καὶ ὑπηρέτας τοῖς νόμοις· ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ εἶναί τινας ἀρχάς, 5 ἀλλ' οὐχ ἕνα τοῦτον εἶναί φασι δίκαιον ὁμοίων γε ὄντων πάντων. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅσα γε μὴ δοκεῖ δύνασθαι διορίζειν ὁ νόμος, οὐδ' ἄνθρωπος ἂν δύναιτο γνωρίζειν.
5 ἀλλ' ἐπίτηδες παιδεύσας ὁ νόμος ἐφίστησι τὰ λοιπὰ τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ γνώμῃ κρίνειν καὶ διοικεῖν τοὺς ἄρχοντας. ἔτι δ' ἐπανορθοῦσθαι δίδωσιν, ὅ τι ἂν δόξῃ πειρωμένοις 10 ἄμεινον εἶναι τῶν κειμένων. ὁ μὲν οὖν τὸν νόμον κελεύων ἄρχειν δοκεῖ κελεύειν ἄρχειν τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὸν νοῦν μόνους, ὁ δ' ἄνθρωπον κελεύων προστίθησι καὶ θηρίον· ἥ τε γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοιοῦτον, καὶ ὁ θυμὸς ἄρχοντας διαστρέφει καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄνδρας. διόπερ 15
6 ἄνευ ὀρέξεως νοῦς ὁ νόμος ἐστίν. τὸ δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν εἶναι δοκεῖ παράδειγμα ψεῦδος, ὅτι τὸ κατὰ γράμματα ἰατρεύεσθαι φαῦλον, ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱρετώτερον χρῆσθαι
7 τοῖς ἔχουσι τὰς τέχνας. οἱ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν διὰ φιλίαν

20 παρὰ τὸν λόγον ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἄρνυνται τὸν μισθὸν τοὺς κάμνοντας ὑγιάσαντες· οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἀρχαῖς πολλὰ πρὸς ἐπήρειαν καὶ χάριν εἰώθασι πράττειν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τοὺς ἰατροὺς ὅταν ὑποπτεύωσι πεισθέντας τοῖς ἐχθροῖς διαφθείρειν διὰ κέρδος, τότε τὴν ἐκ τῶν γραμμάτων θεραπείαν ζητήσαιεν ἂν μᾶλλον. ἀλλὰ 8
25 μὴν εἰσάγονταί γ' ἐφ' ἑαυτοὺς οἱ ἰατροὶ κάμνοντες ἄλλους ἰατροὺς καὶ οἱ παιδοτρίβαι γυμναζόμενοι παιδοτρίβας, ὡς οὐ δυνάμενοι κρίνειν τὸ ἀληθὲς διὰ τὸ κρίνειν περί τε οἰκείων καὶ ἐν πάθει ὄντες. ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι τὸ δίκαιον ζητοῦντες τὸ μέσον ζητοῦσιν·
30 ὁ γὰρ νόμος τὸ μέσον. ἔτι κυριώτεροι καὶ περὶ κυ- 9
ριωτέρων τῶν κατὰ γράμματα νόμων οἱ κατὰ τὰ ἔθη εἰσίν, ὥστε τῶν κατὰ γράμματα ἄνθρωπος ἄρχων ἀσφαλέστερος, ἀλλ' οὐ τῶν κατὰ τὸ ἔθος. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ῥᾴδιον ἐφορᾶν πολλὰ τὸν ἕνα· δεήσει ἄρα πλείονας εἶναι τοὺς ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καθισταμένους ἄρχοντας, ὥστε τί διαφέρει τοῦτο ἐξ ἀρχῆς εὐθὺς ὑπάρχειν ἢ τὸν ἕνα καταστῆσαι τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον; ἔτι, ὃ καὶ πρότερον 10
5 εἰρημένον ἐστίν, εἴπερ ὁ ἀνὴρ ὁ σπουδαῖος, διότι βελτίων, ἄρχειν δίκαιος, τοῦ δὲ ἑνὸς οἱ δύο ἀγαθοὶ βελτίους· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ "σύν τε δύ' ἐρχομένω" καὶ ἡ εὐχὴ τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος "τοιοῦτοι δέκα μοι συμφράδμονες." εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ νῦν περὶ ἐνίων αἱ ἀρχαὶ κύριαι κρίνειν,
10 ὥσπερ ὁ δικαστής, περὶ ὧν ὁ νόμος ἀδυνατεῖ διορίζειν, ἐπεὶ περὶ ὧν δυνατός, οὐδεὶς ἀμφισβητεῖ περὶ τούτων ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἄριστα ὁ νόμος ἄρξειε καὶ κρίνειεν. ἀλλ' 11

ἐπειδὴ τὰ μὲν ἐνδέχεται περιληφθῆναι τοῖς νόμοις τὰ δ' ἀδύνατα, ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἃ ποιεῖ διαπορεῖν καὶ ζητεῖν πότερον τὸν ἄριστον νόμον ἄρχειν αἱρετώτερον ἢ τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν ἄριστον. περὶ ὧν γὰρ βουλεύονται νομοθετῆσαι 15 τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστίν. οὐ τοίνυν τοῦτό γ' ἀντιλέγουσιν, ὡς οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἄνθρωπον εἶναι τὸν κρινοῦντα περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐχ ἕνα μόνον ἀλλὰ πολλούς. 12 κρίνει γὰρ ἕκαστος ἄρχων πεπαιδευμένος ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου καλῶς, ἄτοπον δ' ἴσως ἂν εἶναι δόξειεν εἰ βέλτιον ἴδοι 20 τις δυοῖν ὄμμασι καὶ δυσὶν ἀκοαῖς κρίνων, καὶ πράττων δυσὶ ποσὶ καὶ χερσίν, ἢ πολλοὶ πολλοῖς, ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν ὀφθαλμοὺς πολλοὺς οἱ μόναρχοι ποιοῦσιν αὐτῶν καὶ ὦτα καὶ χεῖρας καὶ πόδας. τοὺς γὰρ τῇ ἀρχῇ καὶ αὐτοῖς 13 φίλους ποιοῦνται συνάρχους. μὴ φίλοι μὲν οὖν ὄντες 25 οὐ ποιήσουσι κατὰ τὴν τοῦ μονάρχου προαίρεσιν· εἰ δὲ φίλοι κἀκείνου καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς, ὅ γε φίλος ἴσος καὶ ὅμοιος. ὥστ' εἰ τούτους οἴεται δεῖν ἄρχειν, τοὺς ἴσους καὶ ὁμοίους ἄρχειν οἴεται δεῖν ὁμοίως. ἃ μὲν οὖν οἱ διαμφισβητοῦντες πρὸς τὴν βασιλείαν λέγουσι, σχεδὸν 1 ταῦτ' ἐστίν. ἀλλ' ἴσως ταῦτ' ἐπὶ μὲν τινῶν ἔχει τὸν 17 τρόπον τοῦτον, ἐπὶ δὲ τινῶν οὐχ οὕτως. ἔστι γάρ τι φύσει δεσποστὸν καὶ ἄλλο βασιλευτὸν καὶ ἄλλο πολιτικὸν καὶ δίκαιον καὶ συμφέρον· τυραννικὸν δ' οὐκ ἔστι κατὰ φύσιν, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτειῶν ὅσαι παρεκ- 2 βάσεις εἰσίν· ταῦτα γὰρ γίνεται παρὰ φύσιν. ἀλλ' ἐκ 1288 τῶν εἰρημένων γε φανερὸν ὡς ἐν μὲν τοῖς ὁμοίοις καὶ ἴσοις οὔτε συμφέρον ἐστὶν οὔτε δίκαιον ἕνα κύριον εἶναι 5

πάντων, οὔτε μὴ νόμων ὄντων, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν ὡς ὄντα νόμον, οὔτε νόμων ὄντων, οὔτ' ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθῶν οὔτε μὴ ἀγαθῶν μὴ ἀγαθόν, οὐδ' ἂν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἀμείνων ᾖ, εἰ μὴ τρόπον τινά. τίς δ' ὁ τρόπος, λεκτέον· εἴρηται δέ πως 3
10 ἤδη καὶ πρότερον. πρῶτον δὲ διοριστέον τί τὸ βασιλευτὸν καὶ τί τὸ ἀριστοκρατικὸν καὶ τί τὸ πολιτικόν. βασιλευτὸν μὲν οὖν τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι πλῆθος ὃ πέφυκε 4 φέρειν γένος ὑπερέχον κατ' ἀρετὴν πρὸς ἡγεμονίαν πολιτικήν, ἀριστοκρατικὸν δὲ [πλῆθος ὃ πέφυκε φέρειν] πλῆθος ἄρχεσθαι δυνάμενον τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρχὴν
15 ὑπὸ τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἡγεμονικῶν πρὸς πολιτικὴν ἀρχήν, πολιτικὸν δὲ [πλῆθος ἐν ᾧ πέφυκε καὶ ἐν ἐγγίνεσθαι] πλῆθος πολεμικόν, δυνάμενον ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν κατὰ νόμον τὸν κατ' ἀξίαν διανέμοντα τοῖς εὐπόροις τὰς ἀρχάς. ὅταν οὖν ἢ γένος ὅλον ἢ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕνα τινὰ συμβῇ 5
20 διαφέροντα γενέσθαι κατ' ἀρετὴν τοσοῦτον, ὥσθ' ὑπερέχειν τὴν ἐκείνου τῆς τῶν ἄλλων πάντων, τότε δίκαιον τὸ γένος εἶναι τοῦτο βασιλικὸν καὶ κύριον πάντων καὶ βασιλέα τὸν ἕνα τοῦτον. καθάπερ γὰρ εἴρηται πρότερον, 6 οὐ μόνον οὕτως ἔχει κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον, ὃ προφέρειν εἰώ-
25 θασιν οἱ τὰς πολιτείας καθιστάντες, οἵ τε τὰς ἀριστοκρατικὰς καὶ οἱ τὰς ὀλιγαρχικὰς καὶ πάλιν οἱ τὰς δημοκρατικάς· πάντες γὰρ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν ἀξιοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ὑπεροχὴν οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ πρότερον λεχθέν. οὔτε γὰρ κτείνειν ἢ φυγαδεύειν οὐδ' ὀστρακίζειν 7
30 δή που τὸν τοιοῦτον πρέπον ἐστίν, οὔτ' ἀξιοῦν ἄρχεσθαι κατὰ μέρος· οὐ γὰρ πέφυκε τὸ μέρος ὑπερέχειν

τοῦ παντός, τῷ δὲ τηλικαύτην ὑπερβολὴν ἔχοντι τοῦτο συμβέβηκεν. ὥστε λείπεται μόνον τὸ πείθεσθαι τῷ τοιούτῳ καὶ κύριον εἶναι μὴ κατὰ μέρος τοῦτον ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς.

1 περὶ μὲν οὖν βασιλείας, τίνας ἔχει διαφοράς, καὶ πότερον οὐ συμφέρει ταῖς πόλεσιν ἢ συμφέρει, καὶ τίσι, καὶ πῶς, διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον. ἐπεὶ δὲ τρεῖς 18 φαμὲν εἶναι τὰς ὀρθὰς πολιτείας, τούτων δ' ἀναγκαῖον ἀρίστην εἶναι τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρίστων οἰκονομουμένην, τοιαύτη δ' ἐστὶν ἐν ᾗ συμβέβηκεν ἢ ἕνα τινὰ συμπάντων ἢ γένος ὅλον ἢ πλῆθος ὑπερέχον εἶναι κατ' ἀρετήν, τῶν μὲν ἄρχεσθαι ⟨καὶ ἄρχειν⟩ δυναμένων τῶν δ' ἄρχειν 10 πρὸς τὴν αἱρετωτάτην ζωήν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρώτοις ἐδείχθη λόγοις ὅτι τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναγκαῖον ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴν εἶναι καὶ πολίτου τῆς πόλεως τῆς ἀρίστης, φανερὸν ὅτι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀνήρ τε γίνεται σπουδαῖος καὶ πόλιν συστήσειεν ἄν τις ἀρισ- 15 τοκρατουμένην ἢ βασιλευομένην, ὥστ' ἔσται καὶ παιδεία καὶ ἔθη ταὐτὰ σχεδὸν τὰ ποιοῦντα σπουδαῖον 2 ἄνδρα καὶ τὰ ποιοῦντα πολιτικὸν καὶ βασιλικόν. διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων περὶ τῆς πολιτείας ἤδη πειρατέον λέγειν τῆς ἀρίστης, τίνα πέφυκε γίνεσθαι τρόπον καὶ καθίστασθαι πῶς [a]. 20

[a] De reliquorum librorum ordine v. L. Spengel (Abhandl. der. philosophisch-philologischen Classe der K. Bayerischen Akad. d. W. Band 5 p. 1—49).

ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Δ(Ζ).

Περὶ πολιτείας ἀρίστης τὸν μέλλοντα ποιήσασθαι 1
τὴν προσήκουσαν ζήτησιν ἀνάγκη διορίσασθαι πρῶτον
25 τίς αἱρετώτατος βίος. ἀδήλου γὰρ ὄντος τούτου καὶ τὴν
ἀρίστην ἀναγκαῖον ἄδηλον εἶναι πολιτείαν· ἄριστα γὰρ
πράττειν προσήκει τοὺς ἄριστα πολιτευομένους ἐκ τῶν
ὑπαρχόντων αὐτοῖς, ἐὰν μή τι γίνηται παράλογον. διὸ 2
δεῖ πρῶτον ὁμολογεῖσθαι τίς ὁ πᾶσιν ὡς εἰπεῖν αἱρετώ-
τατος βίος, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο πότερον κοινῇ καὶ χωρὶς
ὁ αὐτὸς ἢ ἕτερος. νομίσαντας οὖν ἱκανῶς πολλὰ λέ-
γεσθαι καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις περὶ τῆς
ἀρίστης ζωῆς, καὶ νῦν χρηστέον αὐτοῖς. ὡς ἀληθῶς 3
5 γὰρ πρός γε μίαν διαίρεσιν οὐδεὶς ἀμφισβητήσειεν
ἂν ὡς οὐ τριῶν οὐσῶν μερίδων, τῶν τε ἐκτὸς καὶ τῶν
ἐν τῷ σώματι καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, πάντα ταῦτα ὑπάρ-
χειν τοῖς μακαρίοις δεῖ. οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν φαίη μακάριον 4
τὸν μηθὲν μόριον ἔχοντα ἀνδρίας μηδὲ σωφροσύνης
10 μηδὲ δικαιοσύνης μηδὲ φρονήσεως, ἀλλὰ δεδιότα μὲν
τὰς παραπετομένας μυίας, ἀπεχόμενον δὲ μηθενός, ἂν
ἐπιθυμήσῃ τοῦ φαγεῖν ἢ πιεῖν, τῶν ἐσχάτων, ἕνεκα δὲ
τεταρτημορίου διαφθείροντα τοὺς φιλτάτους [φίλους],
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν οὕτως ἄφρονα καὶ

5 διεψευσμένον ὥσπερ τι παιδίον ἢ μαινόμενον. ἀλλὰ
ταῦτα μὲν λεγόμενα [ὥσπερ] πάντες ἂν συγχωρήσειαν, 15
διαφέρονται δ' ἐν τῷ ποσῷ καὶ ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς· τῆς μὲν
γὰρ ἀρετῆς ἔχειν ἱκανὸν εἶναι νομίζουσιν ὁποσονοῦν,
πλούτου δὲ καὶ χρημάτων καὶ δυνάμεως καὶ δόξης καὶ
πάντων τῶν τοιούτων εἰς ἄπειρον ζητοῦσι τὴν ὑπερ-
6 βολήν. ἡμεῖς δὲ αὐτοῖς ἐροῦμεν ὅτι ῥᾴδιον μὲν περὶ 20
τούτων καὶ διὰ τῶν ἔργων λαμβάνειν τὴν πίστιν, ὁρῶν-
τας ὅτι κτῶνται καὶ φυλάττουσιν οὐ τὰς ἀρετὰς τοῖς
ἐκτὸς ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνα ταύταις, καὶ τὸ ζῆν εὐδαιμόνως, εἴτ'
ἐν τῷ χαίρειν ἐστὶν εἴτ' ἐν ἀρετῇ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις εἴτ'
ἐν ἀμφοῖν, ὅτι μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει τοῖς τὸ ἦθος μὲν καὶ
τὴν διάνοιαν κεκοσμημένοις εἰς ὑπερβολήν, περὶ δὲ τὴν 25
ἔξω κτῆσιν τῶν ἀγαθῶν μετριάζουσιν, ἢ τοῖς ἐκεῖνα μὲν
κεκτημένοις πλείω τῶν χρησίμων, ἐν δὲ τούτοις ἐλλεί-
πουσιν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον σκοπουμένοις
7 εὐσύνοπτον ἐστίν. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐκτὸς ἔχει πέρας ὥσπερ
ὄργανόν τι· πᾶν δὲ τὸ χρήσιμόν ἐστιν, ὧν τὴν ὑπερ- 30
βολὴν ἢ βλάπτειν ἀνάγκαῖον ἢ μηθὲν ὄφελος εἶναι
αὐτῶν τοῖς ἔχουσιν. τῶν δὲ περὶ ψυχὴν ἕκαστον ἀγα-
θῶν, ὅσῳ περ ἂν ὑπερβάλλῃ, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον χρή-
σιμον [εἶναι], εἰ δεῖ καὶ τούτοις ἐπιλέγειν μὴ μόνον
8 τὸ καλὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον. ὅλως τε δῆλον ὡς
ἀκολουθεῖν φήσομεν τὴν διάθεσιν τὴν ἀρίστην ἑκάστου
πράγματος πρὸς ἄλληλα κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχήν, ἥνπερ
εἴληχε διάστασιν ὧν φαμὲν αὐτὰς εἶναι διαθέσεις ταύ- 5
ταις, ὥστ' εἴπερ ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τῆς κτήσεως καὶ τοῦ

σώματος τιμιώτερον καὶ ἁπλῶς καὶ ἡμῖν, ἀνάγκη καὶ
τὴν διάθεσιν τὴν ἀρίστην ἑκάστου ἀνάλογον τούτων
ἔχειν. ἔτι δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἕνεκεν ταῦτα πέφυκεν αἱρετὰ 9
10 καὶ δεῖ πάντας αἱρεῖσθαι τοὺς εὖ φρονοῦντας, ἀλλ'
οὐκ ἐκείνων ἕνεκεν τὴν ψυχήν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἑκάστῳ 10
τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἐπιβάλλει τοσοῦτον ὅσον περ ἀρετῆς
καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ τοῦ πράττειν κατὰ ταύτας, ἔστω
συνωμολογημένον ἡμῖν, μάρτυρι τῷ θεῷ χρωμένοις, ὃς
15 εὐδαίμων μέν ἐστι καὶ μακάριος, δι' οὐθὲν δὲ τῶν
ἐξωτερικῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀλλὰ δι' αὑτὸν αὐτὸς καὶ τῷ ποιός
τις εἶναι τὴν φύσιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὴν εὐτυχίαν τῆς εὐδαι-
μονίας διὰ ταῦτ' ἀναγκαῖον ἑτέραν εἶναι· τῶν μὲν γὰρ
ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν τῆς ψυχῆς αἴτιον ταὐτόματον καὶ ἡ τύχη,
δίκαιος δ' οὐδεὶς οὐδὲ σώφρων ἀπὸ τύχης οὐδὲ διὰ τὴν
20 τύχην ἐστίν. ἐχόμενον δ' ἐστὶ καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων 11
δεόμενον καὶ πόλιν εὐδαίμονα τὴν ἀρίστην εἶναι καὶ
πράττουσαν καλῶς. ἀδύνατον δὲ καλῶς πράττειν τὴν
μὴ τὰ καλὰ πράττουσαν· οὐθὲν δὲ καλὸν ἔργον οὔτ'
ἀνδρὸς οὔτε πόλεως χωρὶς ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως.
25 ἀνδρία δὲ πόλεως καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ φρόνησις ⟨καὶ 12
σωφροσύνη⟩ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν καὶ μορφήν, ὧν
μετασχὼν ἕκαστος τῶν ἀνθρώπων λέγεται ⟨ἀνδρεῖος
καὶ⟩ δίκαιος καὶ φρόνιμος καὶ σώφρων. ἀλλὰ γὰρ 13
ταῦτα μὲν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἔστω πεφροιμιασμένα τῷ λόγῳ
(οὔτε γὰρ μὴ θιγγάνειν αὐτῶν δυνατόν, οὔτε πάντας
30 τοὺς οἰκείους ἐπεξελθεῖν ἐνδέχεται λόγους· ἑτέρας γάρ
ἐστιν ἔργον σχολῆς ταῦτα)· νῦν δ' ὑποκείσθω τοσοῦτον,

ὅτι βίος μὲν ἄριστος, καὶ χωρὶς ἑκάστῳ καὶ κοινῇ ταῖς πόλεσιν, ὁ μετ' ἀρετῆς κεχορηγημένης ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον 1324
14 ὥστε μετέχειν τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεων. πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀμφισβητοῦντας, ἐάσαντας ἐπὶ τῆς νῦν μεθόδου, διασκεπτέον ὕστερον, εἴ τις τοῖς εἰρημένοις τυγχάνει μὴ πειθόμενος.

1 πότερον δὲ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι φατέον 2
ἑνός τε ἑκάστου τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ πόλεως ἢ μὴ τὴν αὐτήν, λοιπόν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν. φανερὸν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο·
2 πάντες γὰρ ἂν ὁμολογήσειαν εἶναι τὴν αὐτήν. ὅσοι γὰρ ἐν πλούτῳ τὸ ζῆν εὖ τίθενται ἐφ' ἑνός, οὗτοι καὶ τὴν πόλιν ὅλην, ἐάν ᾖ πλουσία, μακαρίζουσιν· ὅσοι τε τὸν 10 τυραννικὸν βίον μάλιστα τιμῶσιν, οὗτοι καὶ πόλιν τὴν πλείστων ἄρχουσαν εὐδαιμονεστάτην ἂν εἶναι φαῖεν· εἴ τέ τις τὸν ἕνα δι' ἀρετὴν ἀποδέχεται, καὶ πόλιν
3 εὐδαιμονεστέραν φήσει τὴν σπουδαιοτέραν. ἀλλὰ ταῦτ' ἤδη δύο ἐστὶν ἃ δεῖται σκέψεως, ἓν μὲν πότερος αἱρε- 15 τώτερος βίος, ὁ διὰ τοῦ συμπολιτεύεσθαι καὶ κοινωνεῖν πόλεως ἢ μᾶλλον ὁ ξενικὸς καὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας ἀπολελυμένος, ἔτι δὲ τίνα πολιτείαν θετέον καὶ ποίαν διάθεσιν πόλεως ἀρίστην, εἴτε πᾶσιν ὄντος αἱρετοῦ κοινωνεῖν πόλεως εἴτε καὶ τισὶ μὲν μὴ τοῖς δὲ πλείστοις.
4 ἐπεὶ δὲ τῆς πολιτικῆς διανοίας καὶ θεωρίας τοῦτ' ἐστὶν 20 ἔργον, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ περὶ ἕκαστον αἱρετόν, ἡμεῖς δὲ ταύτην προῃρήμεθα νῦν τὴν σκέψιν, ἐκεῖνο μὲν πάρεργον ἂν
5 εἴη τοῦτο δ' ἔργον τῆς μεθόδου ταύτης. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πολιτείαν ἀρίστην ταύτην καθ' ἣν τάξιν

25 κἂν ὁστισοῦν ἄριστα πράττοι καὶ ζῴη μακαρίως, φανερόν ἐστιν· ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ παρ' αὐτῶν τῶν ὁμολογούντων τὸν μετ' ἀρετῆς εἶναι βίον αἱρετώτατον, πότερον ὁ πολιτικὸς καὶ πρακτικὸς βίος αἱρετὸς ἢ μᾶλλον ὁ πάντων τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀπολελυμένος, οἷον θεωρητικός τις, ὃν
30 μόνον τινές φασιν εἶναι φιλόσοφον. σχεδὸν γὰρ τούτους τοὺς δύο βίους τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ φιλοτιμότατοι πρὸς ἀρετὴν φαίνονται προαιρούμενοι, καὶ τῶν πρότερον καὶ τῶν νῦν· λέγω δὲ δύο τόν τε πολιτικὸν καὶ τὸν φιλόσοφον. διαφέρει δὲ οὐ μικρὸν ποτέρως ἔχει τὸ ἀληθές· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τόν τε εὖ φρονοῦντα πρὸς τὸν βελτίω σκοπὸν συντάττεσθαι καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἕκαστον καὶ κοινῇ τὴν πολιτείαν. νομίζουσι δ' οἱ μὲν τὸ τῶν
5 πέλας ἄρχειν δεσποτικῶς μὲν γινόμενον μετ' ἀδικίας τινὸς εἶναι τῆς μεγίστης, πολιτικῶς δὲ τὸ μὲν ἄδικον οὐκ ἔχειν, ἐμπόδιον δὲ ἔχειν τῇ περὶ αὐτὸν εὐημερίᾳ. τούτων δ' ὥσπερ ἐξ ἐναντίας ἕτεροι τυγχάνουσι δοξάζοντες· μόνον γὰρ ἀνδρὸς τὸν πρακτικὸν εἶναι βίον καὶ
10 πολιτικόν· ἐφ' ἑκάστης γὰρ ἀρετῆς οὐκ εἶναι πράξεις μᾶλλον τοῖς ἰδιώταις ἢ τοῖς τὰ κοινὰ πράττουσι καὶ πολιτευομένοις. οἱ μὲν οὖν οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, οἱ δὲ τὸν δεσποτικὸν καὶ τυραννικὸν τρόπον τῆς πολιτείας εἶναι μόνον εὐδαίμονα φασίν. παρ' ἐνίοις δὲ καὶ τῆς πολι-
15 τείας οὗτος ὅρος τῶν νόμων, ὅπως δεσπόζωσι τῶν πέλας. διὸ καὶ τῶν πλείστων νομίμων χύδην ὡς εἰπεῖν κειμένων παρὰ τοῖς πλείστοις, ὅμως εἴ πού τι πρὸς ἓν οἱ νόμοι βλέπουσι, τοῦ κρατεῖν στοχάζονται πάντες, ὥσπερ

ἐν Λακεδαίμονι καὶ Κρήτῃ πρὸς τοὺς πολέμους συντέτακται σχεδὸν ἥ τε παιδεία καὶ τὸ τῶν νόμων πλῆθος.
Ὅ ἔτι δ' ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσι πᾶσι τοῖς δυναμένοις πλεονεκτεῖν ἡ 20
τοιαύτη τετίμηται δύναμις, οἷον ἐν Σκύθαις καὶ Πέρσαις καὶ Θρᾳξὶ καὶ Κελτοῖς. ἐν ἐνίοις γὰρ καὶ νόμοι τινὲς εἰσὶ παροξύνοντες πρὸς τὴν ἀρετὴν ταύτην, καθάπερ ἐν Καρχηδόνι φασὶ τὸν ἐκ τῶν κρίκων κόσμον λαμβάνειν
11 ὅσας ἂν στρατεύσωνται στρατείας. ἦν δέ ποτε καὶ περὶ 25
Μακεδονίαν νόμος τὸν μηθένα ἀπεκταγκότα πολέμιον ἄνδρα περιεζῶσθαι τὴν φορβειάν· ἐν δὲ Σκύθαις οὐκ ἐξῆν πίνειν ἐν ἑορτῇ τινὶ σκύφον περιφερόμενον τῷ μηθένα ἀπεκταγκότι πολέμιον. ἐν δὲ τοῖς Ἴβηρσιν, ἔθνει πολεμικῷ, τοσούτους τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὀβελίσκους 30
καταπηγνύουσι περὶ τὸν τάφον ὅσους ἂν διαφθείρῃ
12 τῶν πολεμίων. καὶ ἕτερα δὴ παρ' ἑτέροις ἔστι τοιαῦτα πολλά, τὰ μὲν νόμοις κατειλημμένα τὰ δὲ ἔθεσίν. καίτοι δόξειεν ἂν ἄγαν ἄτοπον ἴσως εἶναι τοῖς βουλομένοις ἐπισκοπεῖν, εἰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἔργον τοῦ πολιτικοῦ, τὸ δύνασθαι θεωρεῖν ὅπως ἄρχῃ καὶ δεσπόζῃ
13 τῶν πλησίον καὶ βουλομένων καὶ μὴ βουλομένων. πῶς γὰρ ἂν εἴη τοῦτο πολιτικὸν ἢ νομοθετικόν, ὅ γε μηδὲ 5 νόμιμον ἐστίν; οὐ νόμιμον δὲ τὸ μὴ μόνον δικαίως ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀδίκως ἄρχειν, κρατεῖν δ' ἔστι καὶ μὴ δικαίως. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιστήμαις τοῦτο ὁρῶμεν· οὔτε γὰρ τοῦ ἰατροῦ οὔτε τοῦ κυβερνήτου ἔργον ἐστὶ τὸ ἢ πεῖσαι ἢ βιάσασθαι τοῦ μὲν τοὺς θεραπευομένους 10
14 τοῦ δὲ τοὺς πλωτῆρας, ἀλλ' ἐοίκασιν οἱ πολλοὶ τὴν

δεσποτικὴν πολιτικὴν οἴεσθαι εἶναι, καὶ ὅπερ αὐτοῖς
ἕκαστοι οὔ φασιν εἶναι δίκαιον οὐδὲ συμφέρον, τοῦτ'
οὐκ αἰσχύνονται πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἀσκοῦντες· αὐτοὶ
μὲν γὰρ παρ' αὐτοῖς τὸ δικαίως ἄρχειν ζητοῦσι, πρὸς δὲ
15 τοὺς ἄλλους οὐδὲν μέλει τῶν δικαίων. ἄτοπον δὲ εἰ μὴ 15
φύσει τὸ μὲν δεσπόζον ἐστὶ τὸ δὲ οὐ δεσπόζον, ὥστε
εἴπερ ἔχει τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, οὐ δεῖ πάντων πειρᾶσθαι
δεσπόζειν, ἀλλὰ τῶν δεσποστῶν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ θηρεύειν
ἐπὶ θοίνην ἢ θυσίαν ἀνθρώπους, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς τοῦτο
20 θηρευτόν· ἔστι δὲ θηρευτὸν ὃ ἂν ἄγριον ᾖ ἐδεστὸν ζῷον.
1325 ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴη γ' ἂν καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὴν μία πόλις εὐδαίμων, 16
ἡ πολιτεύεται δῆλον ὅτι καλῶς, εἴπερ ἐνδέχεται πόλιν
οἰκεῖσθαί που καθ' ἑαυτὴν νόμοις χρωμένην σπουδαίοις,
ἧς τῆς πολιτείας ἡ σύνταξις οὐ πρὸς πόλεμον οὐδὲ
25 πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν ἔσται τῶν πολεμίων· μηδὲν γὰρ ὑπαρ-
χέτω τοιοῦτον. δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι πάσας τὰς πρὸς τὸν 17
πόλεμον ἐπιμελείας καλὰς μὲν θετέον, οὐχ ὡς τέλος
δὲ πάντων ἀκρότατον, ἀλλ' ἐκείνου χάριν ταύτας. τοῦ
δὲ νομοθέτου τοῦ σπουδαίου ἐστὶ τὸ θεάσασθαι πόλιν
καὶ γένος ἀνθρώπων καὶ πᾶσαν ἄλλην κοινωνίαν, ζωῆς
30 ἀγαθῆς πῶς μεθέξουσι καὶ τῆς ἐνδεχομένης αὐτοῖς εὐδαι-
μονίας. διοίσει μέντοι τῶν ταττομένων ἔνια νομίμων 18
καὶ τοῦτο τῆς νομοθετικῆς ἐστὶν ἰδεῖν, ἐάν τινες ὑπάρ-
χωσι γειτνιῶντες, ποῖα πρὸς ποίους ἀσκητέον ἢ πῶς
τοῖς καθήκουσι πρὸς ἑκάστους χρηστέον. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο
μὲν κἂν ὕστερον τύχοι τῆς προσηκούσης σκέψεως, πρὸς
3 τί τέλος δεῖ τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν συντείνειν· πρὸς δὲ 1

τοὺς ὁμολογοῦντας μὲν τὸν μετ' ἀρετῆς εἶναι βίον 5
αἱρετώτατον, διαφερομένους δὲ περὶ τῆς χρήσεως αὐ-
τοῦ, λεκτέον ἡμῖν πρὸς ἀμφοτέρους αὐτούς (οἱ μὲν γὰρ
ἀποδοκιμάζουσι τὰς πολιτικὰς ἀρχάς, νομίζοντες τόν
τε τοῦ ἐλευθέρου βίον ἕτερόν τινα εἶναι τοῦ πολιτικοῦ
καὶ πάντων αἱρετώτατον, οἱ δὲ τοῦτον ἄριστον· ἀδύνατον 10
γὰρ τὸν μηθὲν πράττοντα πράττειν εὖ, τὴν δ' εὐπραγίαν
καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι ταὐτόν) ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἀμφότεροι
λέγουσιν ὀρθῶς τὰ δ' οὐκ ὀρθῶς, οἱ μὲν ὅτι ὁ τοῦ
2 ἐλευθέρου βίος τοῦ δεσποτικοῦ ἀμείνων. τοῦτο γὰρ
ἀληθές· οὐθὲν γὰρ τό γε δούλῳ, ᾗ δοῦλος, χρῆσθαι
σεμνόν· ἡ γὰρ ἐπίταξις ἡ περὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων οὐδενὸς 15
μετέχει τῶν καλῶν. τὸ μέντοι νομίζειν πᾶσαν ἀρχὴν
εἶναι δεσποτείαν οὐκ ὀρθόν· οὐ γὰρ ἔλαττον διέστηκεν ἡ
τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρχὴ τῆς τῶν δούλων ἢ αὐτὸ τὸ φύσει
ἐλεύθερον τοῦ φύσει δούλου. διώρισται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν
3 ἱκανῶς ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις. τὸ δὲ μᾶλλον ἐπαινεῖν 20
τὸ ἀπρακτεῖν τοῦ πράττειν οὐκ ἀληθές· ἡ γὰρ εὐδαιμο-
νία πρᾶξις ἐστίν. ἔτι δὲ πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν τέλος ἔχου-
σιν αἱ τῶν δικαίων καὶ σωφρόνων πράξεις. καίτοι τάχ' ἂν
ὑπολάβοι τις τούτων οὕτω διωρισμένων ὅτι τὸ κύριον
εἶναι πάντων ἄριστον· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν πλείστων καὶ καλ- 25
4 λίστων κύριος εἴη πράξεων. ὥστε οὐ δεῖ τὸν δυνάμενον
ἄρχειν παριέναι τῷ πλησίον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀφαιρεῖσθαι,
καὶ μήτε πατέρα παίδων μήτε παῖδας πατρὸς μήθ' ὅλως
φίλον φίλου μηθένα ὑπολογεῖν μηδὲ πρὸς τοῦτο φροντί-
ζειν· τὸ γὰρ ἄριστον αἱρετώτατον, τὸ δ' εὖ πράττειν 30

ἄριστον. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ἀληθῶς ἴσως λέγουσιν, εἴπερ
ὑπάρξει τοῖς ἀποστεροῦσι καὶ βιαζομένοις τὸ τῶν ὄντων
αἱρετώτατον. ἀλλ' ἴσως οὐχ οἷόν τε ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλ' 5
ὑποτίθενται τοῦτο ψεῦδος· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι καλὰς τὰς πρά-
ξεις ἐνδέχεται εἶναι τῷ μὴ διαφέροντι τοσοῦτον ὅσον
ἀνὴρ γυναικὸς ἢ πατὴρ τέκνων ἢ δεσπότης δούλων.
ὥστε ὁ παραβαίνων οὐθὲν ἂν τηλικοῦτον κατορθώσειεν
5 ὕστερον ὅσον ἤδη παρεκβέβηκε τῆς ἀρετῆς. τοῖς γὰρ
ὁμοίοις τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐν τῷ μέρει· τοῦτο γὰρ
ἴσον καὶ ὅμοιον. τὸ δὲ μὴ ἴσον τοῖς ἴσοις καὶ τὸ μὴ 6
ὅμοιον τοῖς ὁμοίοις παρὰ φύσιν· οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν παρὰ
φύσιν καλόν. διὸ κἂν ἄλλος τις ᾖ κρείττων κατ' ἀρετὴν
10 καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν τὴν πρακτικὴν τῶν ἀρίστων, τούτῳ
καλὸν ἀκολουθεῖν καὶ τούτῳ πείθεσθαι δίκαιον. δεῖ δ' 7
οὐ μόνον ἀρετὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ δύναμιν ὑπάρχειν, καθ' ἣν
ἔσται πρακτικός. ἀλλ' εἰ ταῦτα λέγεται καλῶς καὶ τὴν
εὐδαιμονίαν εὐπραγίαν θετέον, καὶ κοινῇ πάσης πόλεως
15 ἂν εἴη καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον ἄριστος βίος ὁ πρακτικός.
ἀλλὰ τὸν πρακτικὸν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πρὸς ἑτέρους, 8
καθάπερ οἴονταί τινες, οὐδὲ τὰς διανοίας εἶναι μόνας
ταύτας πρακτικὰς τὰς τῶν ἀποβαινόντων χάριν γινο-
μένας ἐκ τοῦ πράττειν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον τὰς αὐτο-
τελεῖς καὶ τὰς αὐτῶν ἕνεκεν θεωρίας καὶ διανοήσεις·
20 ἡ γὰρ εὐπραξία τέλος, ὥστε καὶ πρᾶξίς τις· μάλιστα δὲ
καὶ πράττειν λέγομεν κυρίως καὶ τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν πρά-
ξεων τοὺς ταῖς διανοίαις ἀρχιτέκτονας. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' 9
ἀπρακτεῖν ἀναγκαῖον τὰς καθ' αὑτὰς πόλεις ἱδρυμένας

καὶ ζῆν οὕτω προῃρημένας· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ κατὰ μέρη καὶ
τοῦτο συμβαίνειν· πολλαὶ γὰρ κοινωνίαι πρὸς ἄλληλα 25
10 τοῖς μέρεσι τῆς πόλεως εἰσίν. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο ὑπάρ-
χει καὶ καθ' ἑνὸς ὁτουοῦν τῶν ἀνθρώπων· σχολῇ γὰρ ἂν
ὁ θεὸς ἔχοι καλῶς καὶ πᾶς ὁ κόσμος, οἷς οὐκ εἰσὶν
ἐξωτερικαὶ πράξεις παρὰ τὰς οἰκείας τὰς αὐτῶν.

ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὸν αὐτὸν βίον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὸν ἄρι- 30
στον ἑκάστῳ τε τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ κοινῇ ταῖς πόλεσι
1 [καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις], φανερόν ἐστιν· ἐπεὶ δὲ πεφροι- 4
μίασται τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα περὶ αὐτῶν [καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας
πολιτείας ἡμῖν τεθεώρηται πρότερον], ἀρχὴ τῶν λοιπῶν
εἰπεῖν πρῶτον ποίας τινὰς δεῖ τὰς ὑποθέσεις εἶναι περὶ
2 τῆς μελλούσης κατ' εὐχὴν συνεστάναι πόλεως. οὐ γὰρ 5
οἷόν τε πολιτείαν γενέσθαι τὴν ἀρίστην ἄνευ συμμέτρου
χορηγίας. διὸ δεῖ πολλὰ προϋποτεθεῖσθαι καθάπερ εὐ-
χομένους, εἶναι μέντοι μηθὲν τούτων ἀδύνατον. λέγω
3 δὲ οἷον περί τε πλήθους πολιτῶν καὶ χώρας. ὥσπερ
γὰρ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δημιουργοῖς, οἷον ὑφάντῃ καὶ ναυ- 1326
πηγῷ, δεῖ τὴν ὕλην ὑπάρχειν ἐπιτηδείαν οὖσαν πρὸς 10
τὴν ἐργασίαν (ὅσῳ γὰρ ἂν αὐτὴ τυγχάνῃ παρεσκευασ-
μένη βέλτιον, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ γινόμενον ὑπὸ τῆς τέχνης
εἶναι κάλλιον), οὕτω καὶ τῷ πολιτικῷ καὶ τῷ νομοθέτῃ
δεῖ τὴν οἰκείαν ὕλην ὑπάρχειν ἐπιτηδείως ἔχουσαν.
4 ἔστι δὲ πολιτικῆς χορηγίας πρῶτον τό τε πλῆθος τῶν 15
ἀνθρώπων, πόσους τε καὶ ποίους τινὰς ὑπάρχειν δεῖ
φύσει, καὶ κατὰ τὴν χώραν ὡσαύτως, πόσην τε εἶναι
καὶ ποίαν τινὰ ταύτην. οἴονται μὲν οὖν οἱ πλεῖστοι

προσήκειν μεγάλην εἶναι τὴν εὐδαίμονα πόλιν· εἰ δὲ
τοῦτ' ἀληθές, ἀγνοοῦσι ποία μεγάλη καὶ ποία μικρὰ
20 πόλις. κατ' ἀριθμοῦ γὰρ πλῆθος τῶν ἐνοικούντων κρί- 5
νουσι τὴν μεγάλην, δεῖ δὲ μᾶλλον μὴ εἰς τὸ πλῆθος
εἰς δὲ δύναμιν ἀποβλέπειν. ἔστι γάρ τι καὶ πόλεως
ἔργον, ὥστε τὴν δυναμένην τοῦτο μάλιστ' ἀποτελεῖν,
ταύτην οἰητέον εἶναι μεγίστην, οἷον Ἱπποκράτην οὐκ
25 ἄνθρωπον ἀλλ' ἰατρὸν εἶναι μείζω φήσειεν ἄν τις τοῦ
διαφέροντος κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ σώματος. οὐ μὴν 6
ἀλλὰ κἂν εἰ δεῖ κρίνειν πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος ἀποβλέποντας,
οὐ κατὰ τὸ τυχὸν πλῆθος τοῦτο ποιητέον (ἀναγκαῖον
γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἴσως ὑπάρχειν καὶ δούλων ἀριθμὸν
πολλῶν καὶ μετοίκων καὶ ξένων), ἀλλ' ὅσοι πόλεώς
30 εἰσι μέρος καὶ ἐξ ὧν συνίσταται πόλις οἰκείων μορίων·
ἡ γὰρ τούτων ὑπεροχὴ τοῦ πλήθους μεγάλης πόλεως
σημεῖον, ἐξ ἧς δὲ βάναυσοι μὲν ἐξέρχονται πολλοὶ τὸν
ἀριθμὸν ὁπλῖται δὲ ὀλίγοι, ταύτην ἀδύνατον εἶναι με-
γάλην· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν μεγάλη τε πόλις καὶ πολυάνθρω-
πος. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τοῦτό γε ἐκ τῶν ἔργων φανερὸν ὅτι 7
χαλεπόν, ἴσως δ' ἀδύνατον, εὐνομεῖσθαι τὴν λίαν πο-
5 λυάνθρωπον. τῶν γοῦν δοκουσῶν πολιτεύεσθαι καλῶς
οὐδεμίαν ὁρῶμεν οὖσαν ἀνειμένην πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος.
τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον καὶ διὰ τῆς τῶν λόγων πίστεως. ὅ τε 8
γὰρ νόμος τάξις τίς ἐστι, καὶ τὴν εὐνομίαν ἀναγκαῖον
εὐταξίαν εἶναι, ὁ δὲ λίαν ὑπερβάλλων ἀριθμὸς οὐ δύ-
10 ναται μετέχειν τάξεως· θείας γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο δυνάμεως
ἔργον, ἥτις καὶ τόδε συνέχει τὸ πᾶν, ἐπεὶ τό γε καλὸν

9 ἐν πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει εἴωθε γίνεσθαι. διὸ καὶ πόλιν
ἧς μετὰ μεγέθους ὁ λεχθεὶς ὅρος ὑπάρχει, ταύτην εἶναι
καλλίστην ἀναγκαῖον. ἀλλ' ἔστι τι καὶ πόλεσι με-
γέθους μέτρον, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων, ζῴων
10 φυτῶν ὀργάνων. καὶ γὰρ τούτων ἕκαστον οὔτε λίαν 15
μικρὸν οὔτε κατὰ μέγεθος ὑπερβάλλον ἕξει τὴν αὐτοῦ
δύναμιν, ἀλλ' ὁτὲ μὲν ὅλως ἐστερημένον ἔσται τῆς
φύσεως ὁτὲ δὲ φαύλως ἔχον, οἷον πλοῖον σπιθαμαῖον
μὲν οὐκ ἔσται πλοῖον ὅλως, οὐδὲ δυοῖν σταδίοιν, εἰς
δέ τι μέγεθος ἐλθὸν ὁτὲ μὲν διὰ σμικρότητα φαύλην 20
ποιήσει τὴν ναυτιλίαν, ὁτὲ δὲ διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολήν.
11 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πόλις ἡ μὲν ἐξ ὀλίγων λίαν οὐκ αὐ-
τάρκης (ἡ δὲ πόλις αὔταρκες), ἡ δὲ ἐκ πολλῶν ἄγαν
ἐν τοῖς μὲν ἀναγκαίοις αὐτάρκης, ὥσπερ ἔθνος, ἀλλ'
οὐ πόλις· πολιτείαν γὰρ οὐ ῥᾴδιον ὑπάρχειν· τίς γὰρ
στρατηγὸς ἔσται τοῦ λίαν ὑπερβάλλοντος πλήθους, 25
ἢ τίς κῆρυξ μὴ Στεντόρειος; διὸ πρώτην μὲν εἶναι
πόλιν ἀναγκαῖον τὴν ἐκ τοσούτου πλήθους ὃ πρῶτον
πλῆθος αὔταρκες πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν πο-
12 λιτικὴν κοινωνίαν. ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ τὴν ταύτης ὑπερ-
βάλλουσαν κατὰ πλῆθος εἶναι [μείζω] πόλιν· ἀλλὰ
τοῦτ' οὐκ ἔστιν, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, ἀόριστον. τίς δ' ἐσ- 30
τὶν ὁ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς ὅρος, ἐκ τῶν ἔργων ἰδεῖν ῥᾴδιον.
εἰσὶ γὰρ αἱ πράξεις τῆς πόλεως τῶν μὲν ἀρχόντων
τῶν δ' ἀρχομένων, ἄρχοντος δ' ἐπίταξις καὶ κρίσις
13 ἔργον. πρὸς δὲ τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ
πρὸς τὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς διανέμειν κατ' ἀξίαν ἀναγκαῖον

γνωρίζειν ἀλλήλους, ποῖοί τινές εἰσι, τοὺς πολίτας,
5 ὡς ὅπου τοῦτο μὴ συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι, φαύλως ἀνάγκη
γίνεσθαι τὰ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς κρίσεις· περὶ
ἀμφότερα γὰρ οὐ δίκαιον αὐτοσχεδιάζειν, ὅπερ ἐν τῇ
πολυανθρωπίᾳ τῇ λίαν ὑπάρχει φανερῶς. ἔτι δὲ ξέ- 14
νοις καὶ μετοίκοις ῥᾴδιον μεταλαμβάνειν τῆς πολιτείας·
οὐ γὰρ χαλεπὸν τὸ λανθάνειν διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τοῦ
10 πλήθους. δῆλον τοίνυν ὡς οὗτός ἐστι πόλεως ὅρος
ἄριστος, ἡ μεγίστη τοῦ πλήθους ὑπερβολὴ πρὸς αὐ-
τάρκειαν ζωῆς εὐσύνοπτος.

περὶ μὲν οὖν μεγέθους πόλεως διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον
5 τοῦτον, παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τῆς χώρας ἔχει. 1
περὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ποίαν τινά, δῆλον ὅτι τὴν αὐταρ-
15 κεστάτην πᾶς τις ἂν ἐπαινέσειεν. τοιαύτην δ' ἀναγ-
καῖον εἶναι τὴν παντοφόρον· τὸ γὰρ πάντα ὑπάρχειν
καὶ δεῖσθαι μηθενὸς αὔταρκες. πλήθει δὲ καὶ μεγέθει
τοσαύτην ὥστε δύνασθαι τοὺς οἰκοῦντας ζῆν σχολά-
ζοντας ἐλευθερίως ἅμα καὶ σωφρόνως. τοῦτον δὲ τὸν 2
20 ὅρον εἰ καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς λέγομεν, ὕστερον ἐπισκεπ-
τέον ἀκριβέστερον, ὅταν ὅλως περὶ κτήσεως καὶ τῆς
περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν εὐπορίας συμβαίνῃ ποιεῖσθαι μνείαν,
πῶς δεῖ καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν αὐτήν·
πολλαὶ γὰρ περὶ τὴν σκέψιν ταύτην εἰσὶν ἀμφισβητή-
25 σεις διὰ τοὺς ἕλκοντας ἐφ' ἑκατέραν τοῦ βίου τὴν
ὑπερβολήν, τοὺς μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν γλισχρότητα τοὺς δὲ
ἐπὶ τὴν τρυφήν. τὸ δ' εἶδος τῆς χώρας οὐ χαλεπὸν 3
εἰπεῖν, δεῖ δ' ἔνια πείθεσθαι καὶ τοῖς περὶ τὴν στρα-

τηγίαν ἐμπείροις, ὅτι χρὴ μὲν τοῖς πολεμίοις εἶναι δυσέμβολον αὐτοῖς δ' εὐέξοδον. ἔτι δ' ὥσπερ τὸ 1327
πλῆθος τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων εὐσύνοπτον ἔφαμεν εἶναι 30
δεῖν, οὕτω καὶ τὴν χώραν· τὸ δ' εὐσύνοπτον τὸ εὐβοήθητον εἶναι τὴν χώραν ἐστίν. τῆς δὲ πόλεως τὴν θέσιν εἰ χρὴ ποιεῖν κατ' εὐχήν, πρός τε τὴν θάλατταν προσήκει κεῖσθαι καλῶς πρός τε τὴν χώραν.
4 εἷς μὲν ὁ λεχθεὶς ὅρος· δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς τὰς ἐκβοηθείας κοινὴν εἶναι τῶν τόπων ἁπάντων· ὁ δὲ λοιπὸς πρὸς τὰς τῶν γινομένων καρπῶν παραπομπάς. ἔτι δὲ τῆς περὶ ξύλα ὕλης, κἂν εἴ τινα ἄλλην ἐργασίαν ἡ χώρα τυγχάνοι 5
κεκτημένη τοιαύτην, εὐπαρακόμιστον.

1 περὶ δὲ τῆς πρὸς τὴν θάλατταν κοινωνίας, πότερον 6
ὠφέλιμος ταῖς εὐνομουμέναις πόλεσιν ἢ βλαβερά, πολλοὶ τυγχάνουσιν ἀμφισβητοῦντες· τό τε γὰρ ἐπιξενοῦσθαί τινας ἐν ἄλλοις τεθραμμένους νόμοις ἀσύμφορον 10
εἶναί φασι πρὸς τὴν εὐνομίαν, καὶ τὴν πολυανθρωπίαν· γίνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ χρῆσθαι τῇ θαλάσσῃ διαπέμποντας καὶ δεχομένους ἐμπόρων πλῆθος, ὑπεναντίαν δ'
2 εἶναι πρὸς τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι καλῶς. ὅτι μὲν οὖν, εἰ ταῦτα μὴ συμβαίνει, βέλτιον καὶ πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν καὶ 15
πρὸς εὐπορίαν τῶν ἀναγκαίων μετέχειν τὴν πόλιν καὶ
3 τὴν χώραν τῆς θαλάττης, οὐκ ἄδηλον. καὶ γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ῥᾷον φέρειν τοὺς πολέμους εὐβοηθήτους εἶναι δεῖ κατ' ἀμφότερα τοὺς σωθησομένους, καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν· καὶ πρὸς τὸ βλάψαι τοὺς ἐπιτιθεμένους, 20
εἰ μὴ κατ' ἄμφω δυνατόν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ θάτερον ὑπάρξει

μᾶλλον ἀμφοτέρων μετέχουσιν. ὅσα τ' ἂν μὴ τυγχάνῃ 4
παρ' αὐτοῖς ὄντα, δέξασθαι ταῦτα καὶ τὰ πλεονάζοντα
τῶν γινομένων ἐκπέμψασθαι τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐστίν· αὕτη
γὰρ ἐμπορικήν, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῖς ἄλλοις δεῖ εἶναι τὴν πόλιν.
25 οἱ δὲ παρέχοντες σφᾶς αὐτοὺς πᾶσιν ἀγορὰν προσόδου
χάριν ταῦτα πράττουσιν· ἣν δὲ μὴ δεῖ πόλιν τοιαύτης
μετέχειν πλεονεξίας, οὐδ' ἐμπόριον δεῖ κεκτῆσθαι τοι-
οῦτον. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ νῦν ὁρῶμεν πολλαῖς ὑπάρχειν καὶ 5
χώραις καὶ πόλεσιν ἐπίνεια καὶ λιμένας εὐφυῶς κείμενα
30 πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, ὥστε μήτε τὸ αὐτὸ νέμειν ἄστυ μήτε
πόρρω λίαν, ἀλλὰ κρατεῖσθαι τείχεσι καὶ τοιούτοις ἄλ-
λοις ἐρύμασι, φανερὸν ὡς εἰ μὲν ἀγαθόν τι συμβαίνει
γίνεσθαι διὰ τῆς κοινωνίας αὐτῶν, ὑπάρξει τῇ πόλει
τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθόν, εἰ δέ τι βλαβερόν, φυλάξασθαι ῥᾴδιον
τοῖς νόμοις φράζοντας καὶ διορίζοντας τίνας οὐ δεῖ καὶ
τίνας ἐπιμίσγεσθαι δεῖ πρὸς ἀλλήλους. περὶ δὲ τῆς 6
5 ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως, ὅτι μὲν βέλτιστον ὑπάρχειν μέχρι
τινὸς πλήθους, οὐκ ἄδηλον· οὐ γὰρ μόνον αὐτοῖς ἀλλὰ
καὶ τῶν πλησίον τισὶ δεῖ καὶ φοβεροὺς εἶναι καὶ δύ-
νασθαι βοηθεῖν, ὥσπερ κατὰ γῆν, καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν.
περὶ δὲ πλήθους ἤδη καὶ μεγέθους τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης 7
πρὸς τὸν βίον ἀποσκεπτέον τῆς πόλεως· εἰ μὲν γὰρ
10 ἡγεμονικὸν καὶ πολεμικὸν ζήσεται βίον, ἀναγκαῖον καὶ
ταύτην τὴν δύναμιν ὑπάρχειν πρὸς τὰς πράξεις σύμ-
μετρον. τὴν δὲ πολυανθρωπίαν τὴν γινομένην περὶ
τὸν ναυτικὸν ὄχλον οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν ταῖς πό-
λεσιν· οὐθὲν γὰρ αὐτοὺς μέρος εἶναι δεῖ τῆς πόλεως.

8 τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιβατικὸν ἐλεύθερον καὶ τῶν πεζευόντων 15
ἐστίν, ὃ κύριόν ἐστι καὶ κρατεῖ τῆς ναυτιλίας· πλήθους
δὲ ὑπάρχοντος περιοίκων καὶ τῶν τὴν χώραν γεωργούν-
των, ἀφθονίαν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καὶ ναυτῶν. ὁρῶμεν δὲ
καὶ τοῦτο καὶ νῦν ὑπάρχον τισίν, οἷον τῇ πόλει τῶν
Ἡρακλεωτῶν· πολλὰς γὰρ ἐκπληροῦσι τριήρεις κεκτη-
μένοι τῷ μεγέθει πόλιν ἑτέρων ἐμμελεστέραν. 20
9 περὶ μὲν οὖν χώρας καὶ λιμένων [καὶ πόλεων] καὶ
θαλάττης καὶ περὶ τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως ἔστω διω-
1 ρισμένον τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον· περὶ δὲ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ 7
πλήθους, τίνα μὲν ὅρον ὑπάρχειν χρή, πρότερον εἴπο-
μεν, ποίους δέ τινας τὴν φύσιν εἶναι δεῖ, νῦν λέγωμεν. 25
σχεδὸν δὴ κατανοήσειεν ἄν τις τοῦτό γε, βλέψας ἐπί
τε τὰς πόλεις τὰς εὐδοκιμούσας τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ πρὸς
2 πᾶσαν τὴν οἰκουμένην, ὡς διείληπται τοῖς ἔθνεσιν. τὰ
μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ψυχροῖς τόποις ἔθνη καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν
Εὐρώπην θυμοῦ μέν ἐστι πλήρη, διανοίας δὲ ἐνδεέστερα 30
καὶ τέχνης· διόπερ ἐλεύθερα μὲν διατελεῖ μᾶλλον, ἀπο-
λίτευτα δὲ καὶ τῶν πλησίον ἄρχειν οὐ δυνάμενα. τὰ
δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν διανοητικὰ μὲν καὶ τεχνικὰ τὴν
ψυχήν, ἄθυμα δέ· διόπερ ἀρχόμενα καὶ δουλεύοντα
3 διατελεῖ. τὸ δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων γένος ὥσπερ μεσεύει
κατὰ τοὺς τόπους, οὕτως ἀμφοῖν μετέχει· καὶ γὰρ ἔν-
θυμον καὶ διανοητικόν ἐστιν· διόπερ ἐλεύθερόν τε δια-
τελεῖ καὶ βέλτιστα πολιτευόμενον καὶ δυνάμενον ἄρχειν 5
4 πάντων, μιᾶς τυγχάνον πολιτείας. τὴν αὐτὴν δ' ἔχει
διαφορὰν καὶ τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἔθνη καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα·

τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔχει τὴν φύσιν μονόκωλον, τὰ δὲ εὖ κέ-
κραται πρὸς ἀμφοτέρας τὰς δυνάμεις ταύτας. φανερὸν
10 τοίνυν ὅτι δεῖ διανοητικούς τε εἶναι καὶ θυμοειδεῖς τὴν
φύσιν τοὺς μέλλοντας εὐαγώγους ἔσεσθαι τῷ νομο-
θέτῃ πρὸς τὴν ἀρετήν. ὅπερ γάρ φασί τινες δεῖν ὑπάρ- 5
χειν τοῖς φύλαξι, τὸ φιλητικοὺς μὲν εἶναι τῶν γνωρί-
1328 μων πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀγνῶτας ἀγρίους, ὁ θυμός ἐστιν ὁ
ποιῶν τὸ φιλητικόν· αὕτη γάρ ἐστιν ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς δύ-
15 ναμις ᾗ φιλοῦμεν. σημεῖον δέ· πρὸς γὰρ τοὺς συνήθεις καὶ φίλους ὁ θυμὸς αἴρεται μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τοὺς ἀγνῶτας, ὀλιγωρεῖσθαι νομίσας. διὸ καὶ Ἀρχίλοχος 6
προσηκόντως τοῖς φίλοις ἐγκαλῶν διαλέγεται πρὸς τὸν θυμόν· "οὐ γὰρ δὴ περὶ φίλων ἀπάγχεο." καὶ τὸ
20 ἄρχον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐλεύθερον ἀπὸ τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης ὑπάρχει πᾶσιν· ἀρχικὸν γὰρ καὶ ἀήττητον ὁ θυμός. οὐ καλῶς δ' ἔχει λέγειν χαλεποὺς εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς ἀγ- 7
νῶτας· πρὸς οὐθένα γὰρ εἶναι χρὴ τοιοῦτον, οὐδ' εἰσὶν οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι τὴν φύσιν ἄγριοι, πλὴν πρὸς τοὺς
25 ἀδικοῦντας. τοῦτο δὲ μᾶλλον ἔτι πρὸς τοὺς συνήθεις πάσχουσιν, ὅπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, ἂν ἀδικεῖσθαι νομίσωσιν. καὶ τοῦτο συμβαίνει κατὰ λόγον· παρ' οἷς 8
γὰρ ὀφείλεσθαι δεῖν τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ὑπολαμβάνουσι, πρὸς τῷ βλάβει καὶ ταύτης ἀποστερεῖσθαι νομίζουσιν· ὅθεν εἴρηται "χαλεποὶ γὰρ πόλεμοι ἀδελφῶν" καὶ "οἵ
30 τοι πέρα στέρξαντες, οἳ δὲ καὶ πέρα μισοῦσιν."

περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πολιτευομένων, πόσους τε ὑπάρ- 9
χειν δεῖ καὶ ποίους τινὰς τὴν φύσιν, ἔτι δὲ τὴν χώραν

πόσην τέ τινα καὶ ποίαν τινά, διώρισται σχεδόν· οὐ γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀκρίβειαν δεῖ ζητεῖν διά τε τῶν λόγων
1 καὶ τῶν γινομένων διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως. ἐπεὶ δ' ὥσπερ 8
τῶν ἄλλων τῶν κατὰ φύσιν συνεστώτων οὐ ταὐτά ἐστι μόρια τῆς ὅλης συστάσεως ὧν ἄνευ τὸ ὅλον οὐκ ἂν 5
εἴη, δῆλον ὡς οὐδὲ πόλεως μέρη θετέον ὅσα ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν, οὐδ' ἄλλης κοινωνίας οὐδεμιᾶς
2 ἐξ ἧς ἕν τι τὸ γένος. ἓν γάρ τι καὶ κοινὸν εἶναι δεῖ καὶ ταὐτὸ τοῖς κοινωνοῖς, ἄν τε ἴσον ἄν τε ἄνισον μετα- 10
3 λαμβάνωσιν, οἷον εἴτε τροφὴ τοῦτό ἐστιν εἴτε χώρας πλῆθος εἴτ' ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων ἐστίν. ὅταν δ' ᾖ τὸ μὲν τούτου ἕνεκεν τὸ δ' οὗ ἕνεκεν, οὐθὲν ἕν γε τούτοις κοινὸν ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ μὲν ποιῆσαι τῷ δὲ λαβεῖν· λέγω δ' οἷον ὀργάνῳ τε παντὶ πρὸς τὸ γινόμενον ἔργον καὶ τοῖς δημιουργοῖς· οἰκίᾳ γὰρ πρὸς οἰκοδόμον οὐθέν ἐστιν ὃ γίνεται κοινόν, ἀλλ' ἔστι τῆς οἰκίας χάριν ἡ τῶν οἰ- 15
4 κοδόμων τέχνη. διὸ κτήσεως μὲν δεῖ ταῖς πόλεσιν, οὐδὲν δ' ἐστὶν ἡ κτῆσις μέρος τῆς πόλεως. πολλὰ δ' ἔμψυχα μέρη τῆς κτήσεως ἐστίν. ἡ δὲ πόλις κοινωνία τίς ἐστι τῶν ὁμοίων, ἕνεκεν δὲ ζωῆς τῆς ἐνδεχομένης
5 ἀρίστης. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν εὐδαιμονία τὸ ἄριστον, αὕτη δὲ 20 ἀρετῆς ἐνέργεια καὶ χρῆσίς τις τέλειος, συμβέβηκε δὲ οὕτως ὥστε τοὺς μὲν ἐνδέχεσθαι μετέχειν αὐτῆς τοὺς δὲ μικρὸν ἢ μηδέν, δῆλον ὡς τοῦτ' αἴτιον τοῦ γίνεσθαι πόλεως εἴδη καὶ διαφορὰς καὶ πολιτείας πλείους· ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον καὶ δι' ἄλλων ἕκαστοι τοῦτο θηρεύοντες 25 τούς τε βίους ἑτέρους ποιοῦνται καὶ τὰς πολιτείας.

ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ καὶ πόσα ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ὧν ἄνευ πόλις 6
οὐκ ἂν εἴη· καὶ γὰρ ἃ λέγομεν εἶναι μέρη πόλεως, ἐν
τούτοις ἂν εἴη ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν. ληπτέον τοίνυν
τῶν ἔργων τὸν ἀριθμόν· ἐκ τούτων γὰρ ἔσται δῆλον.
πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ὑπάρχειν δεῖ τροφήν, ἔπειτα τέχνας 7
(πολλῶν γὰρ ὀργάνων δεῖται τὸ ζῆν), τρίτον δὲ ὅπλα
(τοὺς γὰρ κοινωνοῦντας ἀναγκαῖον καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχειν
ὅπλα πρός τε τὴν ἀρχήν, τῶν ἀπειθούντων χάριν, καὶ
πρὸς τοὺς ἔξωθεν ἀδικεῖν ἐπιχειροῦντας), ἔτι χρημάτων
τινὰ εὐπορίαν, ὅπως ἔχωσι καὶ πρὸς τὰς καθ' αὑτοὺς
χρείας καὶ πρὸς ⟨τὰς⟩ πολεμικάς, πέμπτον δὲ καὶ
πρῶτον τὴν περὶ τὸ θεῖον ἐπιμέλειαν, ἣν καλοῦσιν
ἱερατείαν, ἕκτον δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ πάντων ἀναγκαιό-
τατον κρίσιν περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων καὶ τῶν δικαίων
τῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἔργα ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ὧν 8
δεῖται πᾶσα πόλις ὡς εἰπεῖν. ἡ γὰρ πόλις πλῆθός
ἐστιν οὐ τὸ τυχὸν ἀλλὰ πρὸς ζωὴν αὔταρκες, ὡς φα-
μέν· ἐὰν δέ τι τυγχάνῃ τούτων ἐκλεῖπον, ἀδύνατον ἁπ-
λῶς αὐτάρκη τὴν κοινωνίαν εἶναι ταύτην. ἀνάγκη τοί- 9
νυν κατὰ τὰς ἐργασίας ταύτας συνεστάναι πόλιν. δεῖ
ἄρα γεωργῶν τ' εἶναι πλῆθος, οἳ παρασκευάσουσι τὴν
τροφήν, καὶ τεχνίτας, καὶ τὸ μάχιμον, καὶ τὸ εὔπορον,
καὶ ἱερεῖς, καὶ κριτὰς τῶν δικαίων καὶ συμφερόντων.

9 διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων λοιπὸν σκέψασθαι πότερον 1
πᾶσι κοινωνητέον πάντων τούτων (ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τοὺς
αὐτοὺς ἅπαντας εἶναι καὶ γεωργοὺς καὶ τεχνίτας καὶ
τοὺς βουλευομένους καὶ δικάζοντας) ἢ καθ' ἕκαστον

ἔργον τῶν εἰρημένων ἄλλους ὑποθετέον, ἢ τὰ μὲν ἴδια 20
τὰ δὲ κοινὰ τούτων ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστίν. οὐκ ἐν πάσῃ δὲ
2 τοῦτο πολιτείᾳ. καθάπερ γὰρ εἴπομεν, ἐνδέχεται καὶ
πάντας κοινωνεῖν πάντων καὶ μὴ πάντας πάντων ἀλλὰ
τινὰς τινῶν. ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ ποιεῖ τὰς πολιτείας ἑτέρας·
ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις μετέχουσι πάντες πάντων, 25
3 ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις τοὐναντίον. ἐπεὶ δὲ τυγχάνομεν
σκοποῦντες περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ
καθ' ἣν ἡ πόλις ἂν εἴη μάλιστ' εὐδαίμων, τὴν δ' εὐ-
δαιμονίαν ὅτι χωρὶς ἀρετῆς ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν εἴρηται
πρότερον, φανερὸν ἔκ τούτων ὡς ἐν τῇ κάλλιστα πολι- 30
τευομένῃ πόλει καὶ τῇ κεκτημένῃ δικαίους ἄνδρας ἁπλῶς,
ἀλλὰ μὴ πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, οὔτε βάναυσον βίον οὔτ'
ἀγοραῖον δεῖ ζῆν τοὺς πολίτας· ἀγεννὴς γὰρ ὁ τοιοῦτος
4 βίος καὶ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ὑπεναντίος. οὐδὲ δὴ γεωργοὺς 1329
εἶναι τοὺς μέλλοντας ἔσεσθαι· δεῖ γὰρ σχολῆς καὶ
πρὸς τὴν γένεσιν τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ πρὸς τὰς πράξεις τὰς
πολιτικάς. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ πολεμικὸν καὶ τὸ βουλευό- 5
μενον περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων καὶ κρῖνον περὶ τῶν δι-
καίων ἐνυπάρχει καὶ μέρη φαίνεται τῆς πόλεως μάλιστα
ὄντα, πότερον ἕτερα ⟨ἑτέροις⟩ καὶ ταῦτα θετέον ἢ τοῖς
5 αὐτοῖς ἀποδοτέον ἄμφω; φανερὸν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο, διότι
τρόπον μέν τινα τοῖς αὐτοῖς τρόπον δέ τινα καὶ ἑτέροις.
ᾗ μὲν γὰρ ἑτέρας ἀκμῆς ἑκάτερον τῶν ἔργων, καὶ τὸ 10
μὲν δεῖται φρονήσεως τὸ δὲ δυνάμεως, ἑτέροις· ᾗ δὲ
τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστὶ τοὺς δυναμένους βιάζεσθαι καὶ κω-
λύειν, τούτους ὑπομένειν ἀρχομένους ἀεί, ταύτῃ δὲ

τοῖς αὐτοῖς· οἱ γὰρ τῶν ὅπλων κύριοι καὶ μένειν ἢ
μὴ μένειν κύριοι τὴν πολιτείαν. λείπεται τοίνυν τοῖς 6
15 αὐτοῖς μὲν ἀμφοτέροις ἀποδιδόναι τὴν πολιτείαν ταύ-
την, μὴ ἅμα δέ, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ πέφυκεν ἡ μὲν δύναμις
ἐν νεωτέροις, ἡ δέ φρόνησις ἐν πρεσβυτέροις ἐστίν.
οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἀμφοῖν νενεμῆσθαι συμφέρει καὶ δίκαιον
εἶναι· ἔχει γὰρ αὕτη ἡ διαίρεσις τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν. ἀλλὰ 7
20 μὴν καὶ τὰς κτήσεις δεῖ εἶναι περὶ τούτους· ἀναγκαῖον
γὰρ εὐπορίαν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς πολίταις, πολῖται δὲ οὗτοι.
τὸ γὰρ βάναυσον οὐ μετέχει τῆς πόλεως, οὐδ' ἄλλο
οὐθὲν γένος ὃ μὴ τῆς ἀρετῆς δημιουργόν ἐστιν. τοῦτο
δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῆς ὑποθέσεως· τὸ μὲν γὰρ εὐδαιμονεῖν
25 ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν μετὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς, εὐδαίμονα δὲ πόλιν
οὐκ εἰς μέρος τι βλέψαντας δεῖ λέγειν αὐτῆς, ἀλλ' εἰς
πάντας τοὺς πολίτας. φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι δεῖ τὰς κτή- 8
σεις εἶναι τούτων, εἴπερ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοὺς γεωργοὺς
δούλους ἢ βαρβάρους ἢ περιοίκους. λοιπὸν δ' ἐκ τῶν
30 καταριθμηθέντων τὸ τῶν ἱερέων γένος. φανερὰ δὲ καὶ
ἡ τούτων τάξις. οὔτε γὰρ γεωργὸν οὔτε βάναυσον ἱε- 9
ρέα καταστατέον· ὑπὸ γὰρ τῶν πολιτῶν πρέπει τι-
μᾶσθαι τοὺς θεούς· ἐπεὶ δὲ διῄρηται τὸ πολιτικὸν εἰς
δύο μέρη, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τό τε ὁπλιτικὸν καὶ τὸ βουλευ-
τικόν, πρέπει δὲ τήν τε θεραπείαν ἀποδιδόναι τοῖς θεοῖς
καὶ τὴν ἀνάπαυσιν ἔχειν περὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς διὰ τὸν
χρόνον ἀπειρηκότας, τούτους ἂν εἴη ταῖς ἱερωσύναις
ἀποδοτέον.

κ ὧν μὲν τοίνυν ἄνευ πόλις οὐ συνίσταται καὶ ὅσα 10

μέρη πόλεως, εἴρηται. γεωργοὶ μὲν γὰρ καὶ τεχνῖται καὶ πᾶν τὸ θητικὸν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν ταῖς πόλεσιν, μέρη δὲ τῆς πόλεως τό τε ὁπλιτικὸν καὶ βουλευτικόν. καὶ κεχώρισται δὴ τούτων ἕκαστον, τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ τὸ δὲ
10 κατὰ μέρος. ἔοικε δ' οὐ νῦν οὐδὲ νεωστὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι 10
γνώριμον τοῖς περὶ πολιτείας φιλοσοφοῦσιν, ὅτι δεῖ, διῃρῆσθαι χωρὶς κατὰ γένη τὴν πόλιν καὶ τό τε μάχιμον ἕτερον εἶναι καὶ τὸ γεωργοῦν· ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ τε γὰρ ἔχει τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ἔτι καὶ νῦν, τά τε περὶ τὴν Κρήτην, τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ Αἴγυπτον Σεσώστριος, ὡς 15
φασίν, οὕτω νομοθετήσαντος, Μίνω δὲ τὰ περὶ Κρή-
2 την. ἀρχαία δ' ἔοικεν εἶναι καὶ τῶν συσσιτίων ἡ τάξις, τὰ μὲν περὶ Κρήτην γενόμενα περὶ τὴν Μίνω βασιλείαν, τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἰταλίαν πολλῷ παλαιότερα τούτων.
3 φασὶ γὰρ οἱ λόγιοι τῶν ἐκεῖ κατοικούντων Ἰταλόν τινα γενέσθαι βασιλέα τῆς Οἰνωτρίας, ἀφ' οὗ τό τε ὄνομα 20
μεταβαλόντας Ἰταλοὺς ἀντ' Οἰνωτρῶν κληθῆναι καὶ τὴν ἀκτὴν ταύτην τῆς Εὐρώπης Ἰταλίαν τοὔνομα λαβεῖν, ὅση τετύχηκεν ἐντὸς οὖσα τοῦ κόλπου τοῦ Σκυλλητικοῦ καὶ τοῦ Λαμητικοῦ· ἀπέχει γὰρ ταῦτα ἀπ' ἀλλήλων
4 ὁδὸν ἡμισείας ἡμέρας. τοῦτον δὴ λέγουσι τὸν Ἰταλὸν 25
νομάδας τοὺς Οἰνωτροὺς ὄντας ποιῆσαι γεωργούς, καὶ νόμους ἄλλους τε αὐτοῖς θέσθαι καὶ τὰ συσσίτια καταστῆσαι πρῶτον, διὸ καὶ νῦν ἔτι τῶν ἀπ' ἐκείνου τινὲς
5 χρῶνται τοῖς συσσιτίοις καὶ τῶν νόμων ἐνίοις. ᾤκουν δὲ τὸ μὲν πρὸς τὴν Τυρρηνίαν Ὀπικοὶ καὶ πρότερον 30
καὶ νῦν καλούμενοι τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν Αὔσονες, τὸ δὲ πρὸς

τὴν Ἰαπυγίαν καὶ τὸν Ἰόνιον Χῶνες, τὴν καλουμένην
Σιρῖτιν· ἦσαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Χῶνες Οἰνωτροὶ τὸ γένος. ἡ 6
μὲν οὖν τῶν συσσιτίων τάξις ἐντεῦθεν γέγονε πρῶτον,
ὁ δὲ χωρισμὸς ὁ κατὰ γένος τοῦ πολιτικοῦ πλήθους
ἐξ Αἰγύπτου· πολὺ γὰρ ὑπερτείνει τοῖς χρόνοις τὴν
Μίνω βασιλείαν ἡ Σεσώστριος. σχεδὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ 7
5 τὰ ἄλλα δεῖ νομίζειν εὑρῆσθαι πολλάκις ἐν τῷ πολλῷ
χρόνῳ, μᾶλλον δ' ἀπειράκις· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖα τὴν
χρείαν διδάσκειν εἰκὸς αὐτήν, τὰ δ' εἰς εὐσχημοσύνην
καὶ περιουσίαν ὑπαρχόντων ἤδη τούτων εὔλογον λαμ-
βάνειν τὴν αὔξησιν. ὥστε καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας
10 οἴεσθαι δεῖ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχειν τρόπον. ὅτι δὲ πάντα ἀρ- 8
χαῖα, σημεῖον τὰ περὶ Αἴγυπτον ἐστίν· οὗτοι γὰρ ἀρ-
χαιότατοι μὲν δυκοῦσιν εἶναι, νόμων δὲ τετυχήκασι
καὶ τάξεως πολιτικῆς. διὸ δεῖ τοῖς μὲν εὑρημένοις
ἱκανῶς χρῆσθαι, τὰ δὲ παραλελειμμένα πειρᾶσθαι
ζητεῖν.
15 ὅτι μὲν οὖν δεῖ τὴν χώραν εἶναι τῶν ὅπλα κεκτη- 9
μένων καὶ τῶν τῆς πολιτείας μετεχόντων, εἴρηται πρό-
τερον, καὶ διότι τοὺς γεωργοῦντας αὐτῶν ἑτέρους εἶναι
δεῖ, καὶ πόσην τινὰ χρὴ καὶ ποίαν εἶναι τὴν χώραν·
περὶ δὲ τῆς διανομῆς καὶ τῶν γεωργούντων, τίνας καὶ
1330 ποίους εἶναι χρή, λεκτέον πρῶτον, ἐπειδὴ οὔτε κοινὴν
20 φαμεν εἶναι δεῖν τὴν κτῆσιν, ὥσπερ τινὲς εἰρήκασιν,
ἀλλὰ τῇ χρήσει φιλικῶς γινομένην κοινήν, οὔτ' ἀπο-
ρεῖν οὐθένα τῶν πολιτῶν τροφῆς. περὶ συσσιτίων τε 10
συνδοκεῖ πᾶσι χρήσιμον εἶναι ταῖς εὖ κατεσκευασμέναις

πόλεσιν ὑπάρχειν· δι' ἣν δ' αἰτίαν συνδοκεῖ καὶ ἡμῖν, 25
τερον ἐροῦμεν. δεῖ δὲ τούτων κοινωνεῖν πάντας τοὺς
Ζ λίτας, οὐ ῥᾴδιον δὲ τοὺς ἀπόρους ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων τε
σφέρειν τὸ συντεταγμένον καὶ διοικεῖν τὴν ἄλλην οἰ-
κίαν. ἔτι δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς δαπανήματα κοινὰ
11 πάσης τῆς πόλεως ἐστίν. ἀναγκαῖον τοίνυν εἰς δύὸ
μέρη διῃρῆσθαι τὴν χώραν, καὶ τὴν μὲν εἶναι κοινὴν 30
τὴν δὲ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν, καὶ τούτων ἑκατέραν διῃρῆσθαι
δίχα πάλιν, τῆς μὲν κοινῆς τὸ μὲν ἕτερον μέρος εἰς
τὰς πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς λειτουργίας τὸ δὲ ἕτερον εἰς τὴν
τῶν συσσιτίων δαπάνην, τῆς δὲ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν τὸ ἕτερον
μέρος τὸ πρὸς τὰς ἐσχατιάς, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ πρὸς τὴν
πόλιν, ἵνα δύο κλήρων ἑκάστῳ νεμηθέντων ἀμφοτέρων
τῶν τόπων πάντες μετέχωσιν· τό τε γὰρ ἴσον οὕτως 5
ἔχει καὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πρὸς τοὺς ἀστυγείτονας πο-
12 λέμους ὁμονοητικώτερον. ὅπου γὰρ μὴ τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν
τρόπον, οἳ μὲν ὀλιγωροῦσι τῆς πρὸς τοὺς ὁμόρους ἔχ-
θρας, οἳ δὲ λίαν φροντίζουσι καὶ παρὰ τὸ καλόν, διὸ
παρ' ἐνίοις νόμος ἐστὶ τοὺς γειτνιῶντας τοῖς ὁμόροις
μὴ συμμετέχειν βουλῆς τῶν πρὸς αὐτοὺς πολέμων, ὡς 10
διὰ τὸ ἴδιον οὐκ ἂν δυναμένους βουλεύσασθαι καλῶς.
13 τὴν μὲν οὖν χώραν ἀνάγκη διῃρῆσθαι τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον
διὰ τὰς προειρημένας αἰτίας· τοὺς δὲ γεωργήσοντας
μάλιστα μέν, εἰ δεῖ κατ' εὐχήν, δούλους εἶναι, μήτε
ὁμοφύλων πάντων μήτε θυμοειδῶν (οὕτω γὰρ ἂν πρός 15
τε τὴν ἐργασίαν εἶεν χρήσιμοι καὶ πρὸς τὸ μηδὲν νεω-
τερίζειν ἀσφαλεῖς), δεύτερον δὲ βαρβάρους περιοίκους

τὴν Ἰαπυγίαν καὶ τὸν Ἰόνιον Χῶνες, τὴν καλουμένην
Σιρῖτιν· ἦσαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Χῶνες Οἰνωτροὶ τὸ γένος. ἡ 6
μὲν οὖν τῶν συσσιτίων τάξις ἐντεῦθεν γέγονε πρῶτον,
ὁ δὲ χωρισμὸς ὁ κατὰ γένος τοῦ πολιτικοῦ πλήθους
ἐξ Αἰγύπτου· πολὺ γὰρ ὑπερτείνει τοῖς χρόνοις τὴν
Μίνω βασιλείαν ἡ Σεσώστριος. σχεδὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ 7
5 τὰ ἄλλα δεῖ νομίζειν εὑρῆσθαι πολλάκις ἐν τῷ πολλῷ
χρόνῳ, μᾶλλον δ' ἀπειράκις· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖα τὴν
χρείαν διδάσκειν εἰκὸς αὐτήν, τὰ δ' εἰς εὐσχημοσύνην
καὶ περιουσίαν ὑπαρχόντων ἤδη τούτων εὔλογον λαμ-
βάνειν τὴν αὔξησιν. ὥστε καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας
10 οἴεσθαι δεῖ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχειν τρόπον. ὅτι δὲ πάντα ἀρ- 8
χαῖα, σημεῖον τὰ περὶ Αἴγυπτον ἐστίν· οὗτοι γὰρ ἀρ-
χαιότατοι μὲν δυκοῦσιν εἶναι, νόμων δὲ τετυχήκασι
καὶ τάξεως πολιτικῆς. διὸ δεῖ τοῖς μὲν εὑρημένοις
ἱκανῶς χρῆσθαι, τὰ δὲ παραλελειμμένα πειρᾶσθαι
ζητεῖν.
15 ὅτι μὲν οὖν δεῖ τὴν χώραν εἶναι τῶν ὅπλα κεκτη- 9
μένων καὶ τῶν τῆς πολιτείας μετεχόντων, εἴρηται πρό-
τερον, καὶ διότι τοὺς γεωργοῦντας αὐτῶν ἑτέρους εἶναι
δεῖ, καὶ πόσην τινὰ χρὴ καὶ ποίαν εἶναι τὴν χώραν·
περὶ δὲ τῆς διανομῆς καὶ τῶν γεωργούντων, τίνας καὶ
1330 ποίους εἶναι χρή, λεκτέον πρῶτον, ἐπειδὴ οὔτε κοινὴν
20 φαμεν εἶναι δεῖν τὴν κτῆσιν, ὥσπερ τινὲς εἰρήκασιν,
ἀλλὰ τῇ χρήσει φιλικῶς γινομένην κοινήν, οὔτ' ἀπο-
ρεῖν οὐθένα τῶν πολιτῶν τροφῆς. περὶ συσσιτίων τε 10
συνδοκεῖ πᾶσι χρήσιμον εἶναι ταῖς εὖ κατεσκευασμέναις

πόλεσιν ὑπάρχειν· δι' ἣν δ' αἰτίαν συνδοκεῖ καὶ ἡμῖν, 25
ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν. δεῖ δὲ τούτων κοινωνεῖν πάντας τοὺς
πολίτας, οὐ ῥᾴδιον δὲ τοὺς ἀπόρους ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων τε
εἰσφέρειν τὸ συντεταγμένον καὶ διοικεῖν τὴν ἄλλην οἰ-
κίαν. ἔτι δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς δαπανήματα κοινὰ
11 πάσης τῆς πόλεως ἐστίν. ἀναγκαῖον τοίνυν εἰς δύο
μέρη διῃρῆσθαι τὴν χώραν, καὶ τὴν μὲν εἶναι κοινὴν 30
τὴν δὲ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν, καὶ τούτων ἑκατέραν διῃρῆσθαι
δίχα πάλιν, τῆς μὲν κοινῆς τὸ μὲν ἕτερον μέρος εἰς
τὰς πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς λειτουργίας τὸ δὲ ἕτερον εἰς τὴν
τῶν συσσιτίων δαπάνην, τῆς δὲ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν τὸ ἕτερον
μέρος τὸ πρὸς τὰς ἐσχατιάς, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ πρὸς τὴν
πόλιν, ἵνα δύο κλήρων ἑκάστῳ νεμηθέντων ἀμφοτέρων
τῶν τόπων πάντες μετέχωσιν· τό τε γὰρ ἴσον οὕτως 5
ἔχει καὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πρὸς τοὺς ἀστυγείτονας πο-
12 λέμους ὁμονοητικώτερον. ὅπου γὰρ μὴ τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν
τρόπον, οἳ μὲν ὀλιγωροῦσι τῆς πρὸς τοὺς ὁμόρους ἔχ-
θρας, οἳ δὲ λίαν φροντίζουσι καὶ παρὰ τὸ καλόν, διὸ
παρ' ἐνίοις νόμος ἐστὶ τοὺς γειτνιῶνταις τοῖς ὁμόροις
μὴ συμμετέχειν βουλῆς τῶν πρὸς αὐτοὺς πολέμων, ὡς 10
διὰ τὸ ἴδιον οὐκ ἂν δυναμένους βουλεύσασθαι καλῶς.
13 τὴν μὲν οὖν χώραν ἀνάγκη διῃρῆσθαι τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον
διὰ τὰς προειρημένας αἰτίας· τοὺς δὲ γεωργήσοντας
μάλιστα μέν, εἰ δεῖ κατ' εὐχήν, δούλους εἶναι, μήτε
ὁμοφύλων πάντων μήτε θυμοειδῶν (οὕτω γὰρ ἂν πρός 15
τε τὴν ἐργασίαν εἶεν χρήσιμοι καὶ πρὸς τὸ μηδὲν νεω-
τερίζειν ἀσφαλεῖς), δεύτερον δὲ βαρβάρους περιοίκους

παραπλησίους τοῖς εἰρημένοις τὴν φύσιν. τούτων δὲ 14
τοὺς μὲν ἰδίους ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις εἶναι τῶν κεκτημένων τὰς
οὐσίας, τοὺς δ' ἐπὶ τῇ κοινῇ γῇ κοινούς. τίνα δὲ δεῖ
20 τρόπον χρῆσθαι δούλοις, καὶ διότι βέλτιον πᾶσι τοῖς
δούλοις ἆθλον προκεῖσθαι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, ὕστερον
ἐροῦμεν.

11 τὴν δὲ πόλιν ὅτι μὲν δεῖ κοινὴν εἶναι τῆς ἠπείρου τε 1
καὶ τῆς θαλάσσης καὶ τῆς χώρας ἁπάσης ὁμοίως ἐκ
τῶν ἐνδεχομένων, εἴρηται πρότερον· αὐτῆς δὲ πρὸς
25 αὐτὴν [εἶναι] τὴν θέσιν εὔχεσθαι δεῖ κατατυγχάνειν
πρὸς τέτταρα βλέποντας, πρῶτον μέν, ὡς ἀναγκαῖον,
πρὸς ὑγίειαν. αἵ τε γὰρ πρὸς ἕω τὴν ἔγκλισιν ἔχουσαι 2
καὶ πρὸς τὰ πνεύματα τὰ πνέοντα ἀπὸ τῆς ἀνατολῆς
ὑγιεινότεραι, δεύτερον δὲ κατὰ βορέαν· εὐχείμεροι γὰρ
30 αὗται μᾶλλον. τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν πρός τε τὰς πολιτικὰς
πράξεις καὶ πολεμικὰς καλῶς ἔχειν. πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὰς 3
πολεμικὰς αὐτοῖς μὲν εὐέξοδον εἶναι χρή, τοῖς δ' ἐναν-
τίοις δυσπρόσοδον καὶ δυσπερίληπτον, ὑδάτων τε καὶ
ναμάτων μάλιστα μὲν ὑπάρχειν πλῆθος οἰκεῖον, εἰ δὲ
μή, τοῦτό γ' εὑρῆσθαι διὰ τοῦ κατασκευάζειν ὑποδοχὰς
ὀμβρίοις ὕδασιν ἀφθόνους καὶ μεγάλας, ὥστε μηδέποτε
5 ἐπιλείπειν εἰργομένους τῆς χώρας διὰ πόλεμον. ἐπεὶ 4
δὲ δεῖ περὶ ὑγιείας φροντίζειν τῶν ἐνοικούντων, τοῦτο
δ' ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ κεῖσθαι τὸν τόπον ἔν τε τοιούτῳ καὶ
πρὸς τοιοῦτον καλῶς, δεύτερον δὲ ὕδασιν ὑγιεινοῖς
χρῆσθαι, καὶ τούτου τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἔχειν μὴ παρέρ-
γως. οἷς γὰρ πλείστοις χρώμεθα πρὸς τὸ σῶμα καὶ

πλειστάκις, ταῦτα πλεῖστον συμβάλλεται πρὸς τὴν 10
ὑγίειαν· ἡ δὲ τῶν ὑδάτων καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος δύναμις
5 τοιαύτην ἔχει τὴν φύσιν. διόπερ ἐν ταῖς εὖ φρονούσαις δεῖ διωρίσθαι πόλεσιν, ἐὰν μὴ πάνθ' ὅμοια μήτ' ἀφθονία τοιούτων ᾖ ναμάτων, χωρὶς τά τε εἰς τροφὴν ὕδατα καὶ τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἄλλην χρείαν. περὶ δὲ τόπων 15
τῶν ἐρυμνῶν, οὐ πάσαις ὁμοίως ἔχει τὸ συμφέρον ταῖς πολιτείαις· οἷον ἀκρόπολις ὀλιγαρχικὸν καὶ μοναρχικόν, δημοκρατικὸν δ' ὁμαλότης, ἀριστοκρατικὸν
6 δ' οὐδέτερον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἰσχυροὶ τόποι πλείους. ἡ δὲ τῶν ἰδίων οἰκήσεων διάθεσις ἡδίων μὲν νομίζεται καὶ χρησιμωτέρα πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας πράξεις, ἂν εὔτομος 20
ᾖ καὶ κατὰ τὸν νεώτερον καὶ τὸν Ἱπποδάμειον τρόπον, πρὸς δὲ τὰς πολεμικὰς ἀσφαλείας τοὐναντίον, ὡς εἶχον κατὰ τὸν ἀρχαῖον χρόνον· δυσέξοδος γὰρ ἐκείνη τοῖς
7 ξενικοῖς καὶ δυσεξερεύνητος τοῖς ἐπιτιθεμένοις. διὸ δεῖ τούτων ἀμφοτέρων μετέχειν (ἐνδέχεται γάρ, ἄν τις 25
οὕτω κατασκευάζῃ καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς γεωργοῖς ἃς καλοῦσί τινες τῶν ἀμπέλων συστάδας) καὶ τὴν μὲν ὅλην μὴ ποιεῖν πόλιν εὔτομον, κατὰ μέρη δὲ καὶ τόπους· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν καὶ κόσμον ἕξει καλῶς.
8 περὶ δὲ τειχῶν, οἱ μὴ φάσκοντες δεῖν ἔχειν τὰς τῆς 30
ἀρετῆς ἀντιποιουμένας πόλεις λίαν ἀρχαίως ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, καὶ ταῦθ' ὁρῶντες ἐλεγχομένας ἔργῳ τὰς
9 ἐκείνως καλλωπισαμένας. ἔστι δὲ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ὁμοίους καὶ μὴ πολὺ τῷ πλήθει διαφέροντας οὐ καλὸν τὸ πειρᾶσθαι σώζεσθαι διὰ τῆς τῶν τειχῶν ἐρυμνότητος·

ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ συμβαίνει καὶ ἐνδέχεται πλείω τὴν ὑπεροχὴν γίνεσθαι τῶν ἐπιόντων καὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης καὶ
5 τῆς ἐν τοῖς ὀλίγοις ἀρετῆς, εἰ δεῖ σώζεσθαι καὶ μὴ πάσχειν κακῶς μηδὲ ὑβρίζεσθαι, τὴν ἀσφαλεστάτην
1331 ἐρυμνότητα τῶν τειχῶν οἰητέον εἶναι πολεμικωτάτην, ἄλλως τε καὶ νῦν εὑρημένων τῶν περὶ τὰ βέλη καὶ τὰς μηχανὰς εἰς ἀκρίβειαν πρὸς τὰς πολιορκίας. ὅμοιον 10
10 γὰρ τὸ τείχη μὴ περιβάλλειν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀξιοῦν καὶ τὸ τὴν χώραν εὐέμβολον ζητεῖν καὶ περιαιρεῖν τοὺς ὀρεινοὺς τόπους· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ταῖς οἰκήσεσι ταῖς ἰδίαις μὴ περιβάλλειν τοίχους ὡς ἀνάνδρων ἐσομένων τῶν κατοικούντων. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τοῦτό γε δεῖ λαν- 11
θάνειν, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν περιβεβλημένοις τείχη περὶ τὴν
15 πόλιν ἔξεστιν ἀμφοτέρως χρῆσθαι ταῖς πόλεσιν, καὶ ὡς ἐχούσαις τείχη καὶ ὡς μὴ ἐχούσαις, τοῖς δὲ μὴ κεκτημένοις οὐκ ἔξεστιν. εἰ δὴ τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον, οὐχ ὅτι τείχη μόνον περιβλητέον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων ἐπιμελητέον, ὅπως καὶ πρὸς κόσμον ἔχῃ τῇ πόλει πρε-
20 πόντως καὶ πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς χρείας, τάς τε ἄλλας καὶ τὰς νῦν ἐπεξευρημένας. ὥσπερ γὰρ τοῖς ἐπιτιθε- 12
μένοις ἐπιμελές ἐστι δι' ὧν τρόπων πλεονεκτήσουσιν, οὕτω τὰ μὲν εὕρηται τὰ δὲ δεῖ ζητεῖν καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ τοὺς φυλαττομένους· ἀρχὴν γὰρ οὐδ' ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἐπιτίθεσθαι τοῖς εὖ παρεσκευασμένοις.

12 ἐπεὶ δὲ δεῖ τὸ μὲν πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν ἐν συσσιτίοις 1
κατανενεμῆσθαι, τὰ δὲ τείχη διειλῆφθαι φυλακτηρίοις καὶ πύργοις κατὰ τόπους ἐπικαίρους, δῆλον ὡς αὐτὰ

προκαλεῖται παρασκευάζειν ἔνια τῶν συσσιτίων ἐν τού-
2 τοις τοῖς φυλακτηρίοις. καὶ τῦτα μὲν δὴ τοῦτον ἄν
τις διακοσμήσειε τὸν τρόπον, τὰς δὲ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπο- 30
δεδομένας οἰκήσεις καὶ τὰ κυριώτατα τῶν ἀρχείων συσ-
σίτια ἁρμόττει τόπον ἐπιτήδειόν τε ἔχειν καὶ τὸν αὐτόν,
ὅσα μὴ τῶν ἱερῶν ὁ νόμος ἀφορίζει χωρὶς ἤ τι μαν-
3 τεῖον ἄλλο πυθόχρηστον. εἴη δ' ἂν τοιοῦτος ὁ τόπος
ὅστις ἐπιφάνειάν τε ἔχει πρὸς τὴν τῆς ἀρετῆς θέσιν
ἱκανῶς καὶ πρὸς τὰ γειτνιῶντα μέρη τῆς πόλεως ἐρυμ-
νοτέρως. πρέπει δ' ὑπὸ μὲν τοῦτον τὸν τόπον τοιαύτης 5
ἀγορᾶς εἶναι κατασκευὴν οἵαν καὶ περὶ Θετταλίαν νο-
4 μίζουσιν, ἣν ἐλευθέραν καλοῦσιν. αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἣν
δεῖ καθαρὰν εἶναι τῶν ὠνίων πάντων, καὶ μήτε βά-
ναυσον μήτε γεωργὸν μήτ' ἄλλον μηδένα τοιοῦτον
παραβάλλειν μὴ καλούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων. εἴη
δ' ἂν εὔχαρις ὁ τόπος, εἰ καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια τῶν πρεσ- 10
5 βυτέρων ἔχοι τὴν τάξιν ἐνταῦθα. πρέπει γὰρ διῃρῆ-
σθαι κατὰ τὰς ἡλικίας καὶ τοῦτον τὸν κόσμον, καὶ παρὰ
μὲν τοῖς νεωτέροις ἄρχοντάς τινας διατρίβειν, τοὺς δὲ
πρεσβυτέρους παρὰ τοῖς ἄρχουσιν. ἡ γὰρ ἐν ὀφθαλ-
μοῖς τῶν ἀρχόντων παρουσία μάλιστα ἐμποιεῖ τὴν ἀλη- 15
6 θινὴν αἰδῶ καὶ τὸν τῶν ἐλευθέρων φόβον. τὴν δὲ τῶν
ὠνίων ἀγορὰν ἑτέραν τε δεῖ ταύτης εἶναι καὶ χωρίς,
ἔχουσαν τόπον εὐσυνάγωγον τοῖς τε ἀπὸ τῆς θαλάττης
πεμπομένοις καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας πᾶσιν. ἐπεὶ δὲ
τὸ πλῆθος διαιρεῖται τῆς πόλεως εἰς ἱερεῖς ⟨καὶ⟩ εἰς
ἄρχοντας, πρέπει καὶ τῶν ἱερέων συσσίτια περὶ τὴν 20

ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ συμβαίνει καὶ ἐνδέχεται πλείω τὴν ὑπεροχὴν γίνεσθαι τῶν ἐπιόντων καὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης καὶ
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15 πόλιν ἔξεστιν ἀμφοτέρως χρῆσθαι ταῖς πόλεσιν, καὶ ὡς ἐχούσαις τείχη καὶ ὡς μὴ ἐχούσαις, τοῖς δὲ μὴ κεκτημένοις οὐκ ἔξεστιν. εἰ δὴ τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον, οὐχ ὅτι τείχη μόνον περιβλητέον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων ἐπιμελητέον, ὅπως καὶ πρὸς κόσμον ἔχῃ τῇ πόλει πρε-
20 πόντως καὶ πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς χρείας, τάς τε ἄλλας καὶ τὰς νῦν ἐπεξευρημένας. ὥσπερ γὰρ τοῖς ἐπιτιθε- 12
μένοις ἐπιμελές ἐστι δι' ὧν τρόπων πλεονεκτήσουσιν, οὕτω τὰ μὲν εὕρηται τὰ δὲ δεῖ ζητεῖν καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ τοὺς φυλαττομένους· ἀρχὴν γὰρ οὐδ' ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἐπιτίθεσθαι τοῖς εὖ παρεσκευασμένοις.

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τις διακοσμήσειε τὸν τρόπον, τὰς δὲ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπο- 30
δεδομένας οἰκήσεις καὶ τὰ κυριώτατα τῶν ἀρχείων συσ-
σίτια ἁρμόττει τόπον ἐπιτήδειόν τε ἔχειν καὶ τὸν αὐτόν,
ὅσα μὴ τῶν ἱερῶν ὁ νόμος ἀφορίζει χωρὶς ἤ τι μαν-
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ἱκανῶς καὶ πρὸς τὰ γειτνιῶντα μέρη τῆς πόλεως ἐρυμ-
νοτέρως. πρέπει δ' ὑπὸ μὲν τοῦτον τὸν τόπον τοιαύτης 5
ἀγορᾶς εἶναι κατασκευὴν οἵαν καὶ περὶ Θετταλίαν νο-
4 μίζουσιν, ἣν ἐλευθέραν καλοῦσιν. αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἣν
δεῖ καθαρὰν εἶναι τῶν ὠνίων πάντων, καὶ μήτε βά-
ναυσον μήτε γεωργὸν μήτ' ἄλλον μηδένα τοιοῦτον
παραβάλλειν μὴ καλούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων. εἴη
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5 βυτέρων ἔχοι τὴν τάξιν ἐνταῦθα. πρέπει γὰρ διῃρῆ-
σθαι κατὰ τὰς ἡλικίας καὶ τοῦτον τὸν κόσμον, καὶ παρὰ
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6 θινὴν αἰδῶ καὶ τὸν τῶν ἐλευθέρων φόβον. τὴν δὲ τῶν
ὠνίων ἀγορὰν ἑτέραν τε δεῖ ταύτης εἶναι καὶ χωρίς,
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πεμπομένοις καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας πᾶσιν. ἐπεὶ δὲ
τὸ πλῆθος διαιρεῖται τῆς πόλεως εἰς ἱερεῖς ⟨καὶ⟩ εἰς
ἄρχοντας, πρέπει καὶ τῶν ἱερέων συσσίτια περὶ τὴν 20

τῶν ἱερῶν οἰκοδομημάτων ἔχειν τὴν τάξιν. τῶν δ' 7
ἀρχείων ὅσα περὶ τὰ συμβόλαια ποιεῖται τὴν ἐπι-
μέλειαν, περί τε γραφὰς δικῶν καὶ τὰς κλήσεις καὶ
τὴν ἄλλην τὴν τοιαύτην διοίκησιν, ἔτι δὲ περὶ τὴν
25 ἀγορανομίαν καὶ τὴν καλουμένην ἀστυνομίαν, πρὸς
ἀγορᾷ μὲν δεῖ καὶ συνόδῳ τινὶ κοινῇ κατεσκευάσθαι,
τοιοῦτος δ' ὁ περὶ τὴν ἀναγκαίαν ἀγοράν ἐστι τόπος·
ἐνσχολάζειν μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἄνω τίθεμεν, ταύτην δὲ πρὸς
τὰς ἀναγκαίας πράξεις. νενεμῆσθαι δὲ χρὴ τὴν εἰρη- 8
μένην τάξιν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν χώραν· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ τοῖς
30 ἄρχουσιν, οὓς καλοῦσιν οἱ μὲν ὑλωροὺς οἱ δὲ ἀγρο-
νόμους, καὶ φυλακτήρια καὶ συσσίτια πρὸς φυλακὴν
ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν, ἔτι δὲ ἱερὰ κατὰ τὴν χώραν εἶναι
νενεμημένα, τὰ μὲν θεοῖς τὰ δὲ ἥρωσιν.

ἀλλὰ τὸ διατρίβειν νῦν ἀκριβολογουμένους καὶ λέ- 9
γοντας περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἀργόν ἐστιν. οὐ γὰρ χα-
λεπόν ἐστι τὰ τοιαῦτα νοῆσαι, ἀλλὰ ποιῆσαι μᾶλλον·
τὸ μὲν γὰρ λέγειν εὐχῆς ἔργον ἐστί, τὸ δὲ συμβῆναι
τύχης. διὸ περὶ μὲν τῶν τοιούτων τό γε ἐπὶ πλεῖον
13 ἀφείσθω τὰ νῦν, περὶ δὲ τῆς πολιτείας αὐτῆς, ἐκ 1
τίνων καὶ [ἐκ] ποίων δεῖ συνεστάναι τὴν μέλλουσαν
ἔσεσθαι πόλιν μακαρίαν καὶ πολιτεύσεσθαι καλῶς, λεκ-
τέον. ἐπεὶ δὲ δύ' ἐστὶν ἐν οἷς γίνεται τὸ εὖ πᾶσι, 2
19 τούτοιν δ' ἐστὶν ἓν μὲν ἐν τῷ τὸν σκοπὸν κεῖσθαι καὶ
τὸ τέλος τῶν πράξεων ὀρθῶς, ἓν δὲ τὰς πρὸς τὸ τέλος
φερούσας πράξεις εὑρίσκειν· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ
διαφωνεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ συμφωνεῖν· ἐνίοτε γὰρ ὁ μὲν

σκοπὸς ἔκκειται καλῶς, ἐν δὲ τῷ πράττειν τοῦ τυχεῖν
αὐτοῦ διαμαρτάνουσιν· ἐνίοτε δὲ τῶν μὲν πρὸς τὸ τέλος
πάντων ἐπιτυγχάνουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ τέλος ἔθεντο φαῦλον· 15
ὁτὲ δὲ ἑκατέρου διαμαρτάνουσιν, οἷον περὶ ἰατρικήν·
οὔτε γὰρ ποιόν τι δεῖ τὸ ὑγιαῖνον εἶναι σῶμα κρίνου-
σιν ἐνίοτε καλῶς, οὔτε πρὸς τὸν ὑποκείμενον αὐτοῖς ὅρον
τυγχάνουσι τῶν ποιητικῶν· δεῖ δ' ἐν ταῖς τέχναις καὶ
ἐπιστήμαις ταῦτα ἀμφότερα κρατεῖσθαι, τὸ τέλος καὶ 20
3 τὰς εἰς τὸ τέλος πράξεις. ὅτι μὲν οὖν τοῦ τ' εὖ ζῆν
καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἐφίενται πάντες, φανερόν. ἀλλὰ
τούτων τοῖς μὲν ἐξουσία τυγχάνειν, τοῖς δὲ οὔ, διά
τινα τύχην ἢ φύσιν· δεῖται γὰρ καὶ χορηγίας τινὸς τὸ 1332
ζῆν καλῶς, τούτου δὲ ἐλάττονος μὲν τοῖς ἄμεινον δια- 25
4 κειμένοις, πλείονος δὲ τοῖς χεῖρον. οἱ δ' εὐθὺς οὐκ ὀρ-
θῶς ζητοῦσι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, ἐξουσίας ὑπαρχούσης.
ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ προκείμενόν ἐστι τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν
ἰδεῖν, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ καθ' ἣν ἄριστ' ἂν πολιτεύοιτο
πόλις, ἄριστα δ' ἂν πολιτεύοιτο καθ' ἣν εὐδαιμονεῖν
μάλιστα ἐνδέχεται τὴν πόλιν, δῆλον ὅτι τὴν εὐδαι- 30
5 μονίαν δεῖ, τί ἐστι, μὴ λανθάνειν. φαμὲν δὲ καὶ ἐν
τοῖς ἠθικοῖς, εἴ τι τῶν λόγων ἐκείνων ὄφελος, ἐνέρ-
γειαν εἶναι καὶ χρῆσιν ἀρετῆς τελείαν, καὶ ταύτην οὐκ
6 ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς. λέγω δ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεως τὰ
ἀναγκαῖα, τὸ δ' ἁπλῶς τὸ καλῶς· οἷον τὰ περὶ τὰς δι-
καίας πράξεις αἱ δίκαιαι τιμωρίαι καὶ κολάσεις ἀπ' ἀρε-
τῆς μέν εἰσιν, ἀναγκαῖαι δέ, καὶ τὸ καλῶς ἀναγκαίως
ἔχουσιν (αἱρετώτερον μὲν γὰρ μηθενὸς δεῖσθαι τῶν τοι- 5

ούτων μήτε τὸν ἄνδρα μήτε τὴν πόλιν), αἱ δ' ἐπὶ τὰ τιμὰς καὶ τὰς εὐπορίας ἁπλῶς εἰσὶ κάλλισται πράξεις τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἕτερον κακοῦ τινὸς ἀναίρεσις ἐστίν, αἱ τοι- 7
αῦται δὲ πράξεις τοὐναντίον· κατασκευαὶ γὰρ ἀγαθῶν
10 εἰσὶ καὶ γεννήσεις. χρήσαιτο δ' ἂν ὁ σπουδαῖος ἀνὴρ καὶ πενίᾳ καὶ νόσῳ καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τύχαις ταῖς φαύλαις καλῶς· ἀλλὰ τὸ μακάριον ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἐστίν. καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο διώρισται κατὰ τοὺς ἠθικοὺς λόγους, ὅτι τοιοῦτός ἐστιν ὁ σπουδαῖος, ᾧ διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀγαθά
15 ἐστι τὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθά. δῆλον δ' ὅτι καὶ τὰς χρήσεις 8
ἀναγκαῖον σπουδαίας καὶ καλὰς εἶναι ταύτας ἁπλῶς. διὸ καὶ νομίζουσιν ἄνθρωποι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας αἴτια τὰ ἐκτὸς εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὥσπερ εἰ τοῦ κιθαρίζειν λαμπρὸν καὶ καλῶς αἰτιῷτό τις τὴν λύραν μᾶλλον τῆς τέχνης· ἀναγκαῖον τοίνυν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων τὰ μὲν ὑπάρ-
20 χειν, τὰ δὲ παρασκευάσαι τὸν νομοθέτην. διὸ κατ' 9
εὐχὴν εὐχόμεθα τὴν τῆς πόλεως σύστασιν, ὧν ἡ τύχη κυρία· κυρίαν γὰρ αὐτὴν ὑπάρχειν τίθεμεν· τὸ δὲ σπουδαίαν εἶναι τὴν πόλιν οὐκέτι τύχης ἔργον ἀλλ' ἐπιστήμης καὶ προαιρέσεως. ἀλλὰ μὴν σπουδαία πόλις ἐστὶ
25 τῷ τοὺς πολίτας τοὺς μετέχοντας τῆς πολιτείας εἶναι σπουδαίους· ἡμῖν δὲ πάντες οἱ πολῖται μετέχουσι τῆς πολιτείας. τοῦτ' ἄρα σκεπτέον, πῶς ἀνὴρ γίνεται σπου- 10
δαῖος. καὶ γὰρ εἰ πάντας ἐνδέχεται σπουδαίους εἶναι, μὴ καθ' ἕκαστον δὲ τῶν πολιτῶν, οὕτως αἱρετώτερον·
30 ἀκολουθεῖ γὰρ τῷ καθ' ἕκαστον καὶ τὸ πάντας. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγαθοί γε καὶ σπουδαῖοι γίνονται διὰ τριῶν. τὰ 11

τρία δὲ ταῦτά ἐστι φύσις ἔθος λόγος. καὶ γὰρ φῦναι
δεῖ πρῶτον, οἷον ἄνθρωπον ἀλλὰ μὴ τῶν ἄλλων τι
ζῴων, εἶτα καὶ ποιόν τινα τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχήν.
ἔνιά τε οὐθὲν ὄφελος φῦναι· τὰ γὰρ ἔθη μεταβαλεῖν
ποιεῖ· ἔνια γάρ ἐστι διὰ τῆς φύσεως ἐπαμφοτερίζοντα
2 διὰ τῶν ἐθῶν ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον καὶ τὸ βέλτιον. τὰ μὲν οὖν
ἄλλα τῶν ζῴων μάλιστα μὲν τῇ φύσει ζῇ, μικρὰ 5
δ' ἔνια καὶ τοῖς ἔθεσιν, ἄνθρωπος δὲ καὶ λόγῳ· μόνον
γὰρ ἔχει λόγον. ὥστε δεῖ ταῦτα συμφωνεῖν ἀλλήλοις·
πολλὰ γὰρ παρὰ τοὺς ἐθισμοὺς καὶ τὴν φύσιν πράτ-
τουσι διὰ τὸν λόγον, ἐὰν πεισθῶσιν ἄλλως ἔχειν βέλ-
3 τιον. τὴν μὲν τοίνυν οἵους εἶναι δεῖ τοὺς μέλλοντας 10
εὐχειρώτους ἔσεσθαι τῷ νομοθέτῃ, διωρίσμεθα πρό-
τερον, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἔργον ἤδη παιδείας· τὰ μὲν γὰρ
ἐθιζόμενοι μανθάνουσι, τὰ δ' ἀκούοντες.

1 ἐπεὶ δὲ πᾶσα πολιτικὴ κοινωνία συνέστηκεν ἐξ ἀρ- 14
χόντων καὶ ἀρχομένων, τοῦτο δὴ σκεπτέον, εἰ ἑτέρους
εἶναι δεῖ τοὺς ἄρχοντας καὶ τοὺς ἀρχομένους ἢ τοὺς 15
αὐτοὺς διὰ βίου· δῆλον γὰρ ὡς ἀκολουθεῖν δεήσει καὶ
2 τὴν παιδείαν κατὰ τὴν διαίρεσιν ταύτην. εἰ μὲν τοίνυν
εἴησαν τοσοῦτον διαφέροντες ἄτεροι τῶν ἄλλων ὅσον
τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἥρωας ἡγούμεθα τῶν ἀνθρώπων
διαφέρειν, εὐθὺς πρῶτον κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πολλὴν ἔχοντας 20
ὑπερβολήν, εἶτα κατὰ τὴν ψυχήν, ὥστε ἀναμφισβή-
τητον εἶναι καὶ φανερὰν τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῖς ἀρχομένοις
τὴν τῶν ἀρχόντων, δῆλον ὅτι βέλτιον ἀεὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς
3 τοὺς μὲν ἄρχειν τοὺς δ' ἄρχεσθαι καθάπαξ. ἐπεὶ δὲ

25 τοῦτ' οὐ ῥᾴδιον λαβεῖν οὐδ' ἔστιν ὥσπερ ἐν Ἰνδοῖς
φησὶ Σκύλαξ εἶναι τοὺς βασιλέας τοσοῦτον διαφέ-
ροντας τῶν ἀρχομένων, φανερὸν ὅτι διὰ πολλὰς αἰτίας
ἀναγκαῖον πάντας ὁμοίως κοινωνεῖν τοῦ κατὰ μέρος
ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι. τό τε γὰρ ἴσον ταὐτὸν τοῖς
ὁμοίοις, καὶ χαλεπὸν μένειν τὴν πολιτείαν τὴν συνεσ-
30 τηκυῖαν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον. μετὰ γὰρ τῶν ἀρχομένων 4
ὑπάρχουσι νεωτερίζειν βουλόμενοι πάντες οἱ κατὰ τὴν
χώραν· τοσούτους τε εἶναι τοὺς ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι τὸ
πλῆθος ὥστ' εἶναι κρείττους πάντων τούτων, ἕν τι
τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστίν. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι γε δεῖ τοὺς ἄρ-
χοντας διαφέρειν τῶν ἀρχομένων, ἀναμφισβήτητον.
πῶς οὖν ταῦτ' ἔσται καὶ πῶς μεθέξουσι, δεῖ σκέψασ-
θαι τὸν νομοθέτην. εἴρηται δὲ πρότερον περὶ αὐτοῦ. 5
5 ἡ γὰρ φύσις δέδωκε τὴν αἵρεσιν, ποιήσασα αὐτῷ τῷ
γένει ταὐτὸν τὸ μὲν νεώτερον τὸ δὲ πρεσβύτερον, ὧν
τοῖς μὲν ἄρχεσθαι πρέπει τοῖς δ' ἄρχειν. ἀγανακτεῖ
δὲ οὐδεὶς καθ' ἡλικίαν ἀρχόμενος, οὐδὲ νομίζει εἶναι
κρείττων, ἄλλως τε καὶ μέλλων ἀντιλαμβάνειν τοῦτον
10 τὸν ἔρανον, ὅταν τύχῃ τῆς ἱκνουμένης ἡλικίας. ἔστι 6
μὲν ἄρα ὡς τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι φατέον,
1333 ἔστι δὲ ὡς ἑτέρους. ὥστε καὶ τὴν παιδείαν ἔστι μὲν
ὡς τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναγκαῖον, ἔστι δ' ὡς ἑτέραν εἶναι. τόν
τε γὰρ μέλλοντα καλῶς ἄρχειν ἀρχθῆναί φασι δεῖν
15 πρῶτον. ἔστι δ' ἀρχή, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις εἴρη-
ται λόγοις, ἡ μὲν τοῦ ἄρχοντος χάριν ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἀρχο-
μένου. τούτων δὲ τὴν μὲν δεσποτικὴν εἶναί φαμεν, 7

τὴν δὲ τῶν ἐλευθέρων. διαφέρει δ' ἔνια τῶν ἐπιτατ-
μένων οὐ τοῖς ἔργοις ἀλλὰ τῷ τίνος ἕνεκα. διὸ πολλὰ
τῶν εἶναι δοκούντων διακονικῶν ἔργων καὶ τῶν νέων
τοῖς ἐλευθέροις καλὸν διακονεῖν· πρὸς γὰρ τὸ καλὸν καὶ 20
τὸ μὴ καλὸν οὐχ οὕτω διαφέρουσιν αἱ πράξεις καθ'
αὐτὰς ὡς ἐν τῷ τέλει καὶ τῷ τίνος ἕνεκεν. ἐπεὶ δὲ
πολίτου καὶ ἄρχοντος τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρετὴν εἶναί φαμεν
καὶ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνδρός, τὸν δ' αὐτὸν ἀρχόμενόν τε
δεῖν γίνεσθαι πρότερον καὶ ἄρχοντα ὕστερον, τοῦτ' 25
ἂν εἴη τῷ νομοθέτῃ πραγματευτέον, ὅπως ἄνδρες ἀγα-
θοὶ γίνωνται, καὶ διὰ τίνων ἐπιτηδευμάτων, καὶ τί τὸ
τέλος τῆς ἀρίστης ζωῆς. διῄρηται δὲ δύο μέρη τῆς
ψυχῆς, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἔχει λόγον καθ' αὑτό, τὸ δ' οὐκ
ἔχει μὲν καθ' αὑτό, λόγῳ δ' ὑπακούειν δυνάμενον. ὧν
φαμὲν τὰς ἀρετὰς εἶναι καθ' ἃς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς λέγεται 30
πως. τούτων δ' ἐν ποτέρῳ μᾶλλον τὸ τέλος, τοῖς
μὲν οὕτω διαιροῦσιν ὡς ἡμεῖς φαμὲν οὐκ ἄδηλον πῶς
λεκτέον. ἀεὶ γὰρ τὸ χεῖρον τοῦ βελτίονός ἐστιν
ἕνεκεν, καὶ τοῦτο φανερὸν ὁμοίως ἔν τε τοῖς κατὰ τέχ-
νην καὶ τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν, βέλτιον δὲ τὸ λόγον ἔχον.
διῄρηταί τε διχῇ, καθ' ὅνπερ εἰώθαμεν τρόπον διαιρεῖν·
ὁ μὲν γὰρ πρακτικός ἐστι λόγος ὁ δὲ θεωρητικός. 5
ὡσαύτως οὖν ἀνάγκη διῃρῆσθαι καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος
δῆλον ὅτι, καὶ τὰς πράξεις δ' ἀνάλογον ἐροῦμεν ἔχειν,
καὶ δεῖ τὰς τοῦ φύσει βελτίονος αἱρετωτέρας εἶναι τοῖς
δυναμένοις τυγχάνειν ἢ πασῶν ἢ τοῖν δυοῖν· ἀεὶ γὰρ
ἑκάστῳ τοῦθ' αἱρετώτατον οὗ τυχεῖν ἔστιν ἀκροτάτου.

10 διῄρηται δὲ καὶ πᾶς ὁ βίος εἰς ἀσχολίαν καὶ εἰς σχο- 12
λὴν καὶ πόλεμον καὶ εἰρήνην, καὶ τῶν πρακτῶν τὰ
μὲν εἰς τὰ ἀναγκαῖα καὶ χρήσιμα τὰ δὲ εἰς τὰ καλά.
περὶ ὧν ἀνάγκη τὴν αὐτὴν αἵρεσιν εἶναι καὶ τοῖς τῆς 13
ψυχῆς μέρεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν αὐτῶν, πόλεμον μὲν
15 εἰρήνης χάριν, ἀσχολίαν δὲ σχολῆς, τὰ δ' ἀναγκαῖα
καὶ χρήσιμα τῶν καλῶν ἕνεκεν. πρὸς πάντα μὲν τοί-
νυν τῷ πολιτικῷ βλέποντι νομοθετητέον, καὶ κατὰ τὰ
μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ κατὰ τὰς πράξεις αὐτῶν, μᾶλλον
δὲ πρὸς τὰ βελτίω καὶ τὰ τέλη. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον 14
καὶ περὶ τοὺς βίους καὶ τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων διαιρέσεις·
20 δεῖ μὲν γὰρ ἀσχολεῖν δύνασθαι καὶ πολεμεῖν, μᾶλλον
δ' εἰρήνην ἄγειν καὶ σχολάζειν· καὶ τἀναγκαῖα καὶ τὰ
χρήσιμα δὲ πράττειν, τὰ δὲ καλὰ δεῖ μᾶλλον. ὥστε
πρὸς τούτους τοὺς σκοποὺς καὶ παῖδας ἔτι ὄντας παι-
δευτέον καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἡλικίας, ὅσαι δέονται παιδείας.
25 οἱ δὲ νῦν ἄριστα δοκοῦντες πολιτεύεσθαι τῶν Ἑλλή- 15
νων, καὶ τῶν νομοθετῶν οἱ ταύτας καταστήσαντες τὰς
πολιτείας, οὔτε πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον τέλος φαίνονται συν-
τάξαντες τὰ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας οὔτε πρὸς πάσας τὰς
ἀρετὰς τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὴν παιδείαν, ἀλλὰ φορτικῶς
30 ἀπέκλιναν πρὸς τὰς χρησίμους εἶναι δοκούσας καὶ πλε-
ονεκτικωτέρας. παραπλησίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ τῶν ὕσ- 16
τερόν τινες γραψάντων ἀπεφήναντο τὴν αὐτὴν δόξαν·
ἐπαινοῦντες γὰρ τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείαν ἄγανται
τοῦ νομοθέτου τὸν σκοπόν, ὅτι πάντα πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν
καὶ πρὸς πόλεμον ἐνομοθέτησεν· ἃ καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον

17 ἐστὶν εὐέλεγκτα καὶ τοῖς ἔργοις ἐξελήλεγκται νῦν. ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων ζητοῦσι τῶν πολλῶν δεσπόζειν, ὅτι πολλὴ χορηγία γίνεται τῶν εὐτυ- 5
χημάτων, οὕτω καὶ Θίβρων ἀγάμενος φαίνεται τὸν τῶν Λακώνων νομοθέτην, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστος τῶν γραφόντων περὶ ⟨τῆς⟩ πολιτείας αὐτῶν, ὅτι διὰ τὸ γεγυμ-
18 νάσθαι πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους πολλῶν ἦρχον. καίτοι δῆλον ὡς ἐπειδὴ νῦν γε οὐκέτι ὑπάρχει τοῖς Λάκωσι τὸ 10
ἄρχειν, οὐκ εὐδαίμονες, οὐδ' ὁ νομοθέτης ἀγαθός. ἔτι δὲ τοῦτο γελοῖον, εἰ μένοντες ἐν τοῖς νόμοις αὐτοῦ, καὶ μηδενὸς ἐμποδίζοντος πρὸς τὸ χρῆσθαι τοῖς νόμοις,
19 ἀποβεβλήκασι τὸ ζῆν καλῶς. οὐκ ὀρθῶς δ' ὑπολαμβάνουσιν οὐδὲ περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἣν δεῖ τιμῶντα φαίνεσ- 15
θαι τὸν νομοθέτην· τοῦ γὰρ δεσποτικῶς ἄρχειν ἡ τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρχὴ καλλίων καὶ μᾶλλον μετ' ἀρετῆς. ἔτι δ' οὐ διὰ τοῦτο δεῖ τὴν πόλιν εὐδαίμονα νομίζειν καὶ τὸν νομοθέτην ἐπαινεῖν, ὅτι κρατεῖν ἤσκησεν ἐπὶ τῷ τῶν πέλας ἄρχειν· ταῦτα γὰρ μεγάλην ἔχει βλάβην.
20 δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι καὶ τῶν πολιτῶν τῷ δυναμένῳ τοῦτο 20
πειρατέον διώκειν, ὅπως δύνηται τῆς οἰκείας πόλεως ἄρχειν· ὅπερ ἐγκαλοῦσιν οἱ Λάκωνες Παυσανίᾳ τῷ βασιλεῖ, καίπερ ἔχοντι τηλικαύτην τιμήν. οὔτε δὴ πολιτικὸς τῶν τοιούτων λόγων καὶ νόμων οὐθεὶς οὔτε
21 ὠφέλιμος οὔτε ἀληθής ἐστιν. ταὐτὰ γὰρ ἄριστα καὶ 25
ἰδίᾳ καὶ κοινῇ τὸν νομοθέτην ἐμποιεῖν δεῖ [ταῦτα] ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων. τήν τε τῶν πολεμικῶν ἄσκησιν οὐ τούτου χάριν δεῖ μελετᾶν, ἵνα καταδουλώσων-

ται τοὺς ἀναξίους, ἀλλ' ἵνα πρῶτον μὲν αὐτοὶ μὴ δου-
λεύσωσιν ἑτέροις, ἔπειτα ὅπως ζητῶσι τὴν ἡγεμονίαν
30 τῆς ὠφελείας ἕνεκα τῶν ἀρχομένων, ἀλλὰ μὴ πάντων
1334 δεσποτείας· τρίτον δὲ τὸ δεσπόζειν τῶν ἀξίων δου-
λεύειν. ὅτι δὲ δεῖ τὸν νομοθέτην μᾶλλον σπουδάζειν 21
ὅπως καὶ τὴν περὶ τὰ πολεμικὰ καὶ τὴν ἄλλην νομο-
θεσίαν τοῦ σχολάζειν ἕνεκεν τάξῃ καὶ τῆς εἰρήνης, μαρ-
τυρεῖ τὰ γινόμενα τοῖς λόγοις· αἱ γὰρ πλεῖσται τῶν
τοιούτων πόλεων πολεμοῦσαι μὲν σώζονται, κατακτη-
5 σάμεναι δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀπόλλυνται. τὴν γὰρ βαφὴν
ἀφιᾶσιν, ὥσπερ ὁ σίδηρος, εἰρήνην ἄγοντες. αἴτιος
δ' ὁ νομοθέτης οὐ παιδεύσας δύνασθαι σχολάζειν.

15 ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τέλος εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ κοινῇ καὶ 1
ἰδίᾳ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ὅρον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι
10 τῷ τε ἀρίστῳ ἀνδρὶ καὶ τῇ ἀρίστῃ πολιτείᾳ, φανερὸν
ὅτι δεῖ τὰς εἰς τὴν σχολὴν ἀρετὰς ὑπάρχειν· τέλος γάρ,
ὥσπερ εἴρηται πολλάκις, εἰρήνη μὲν πολέμου σχολὴ δ'
ἀσχολίας. χρήσιμοι δὲ τῶν ἀρετῶν εἰσὶ πρὸς τὴν 2
σχολὴν καὶ διαγωγήν, ὧν τε ἐν τῇ σχολῇ τὸ ἔργον καὶ
15 ὧν ἐν τῇ ἀσχολίᾳ. δεῖ γὰρ πολλὰ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὑπάρ-
χειν, ὅπως ἐξῇ σχολάζειν. διὸ σώφρονα τὴν πόλιν
εἶναι προσήκει καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ καρτερικήν· κατὰ γὰρ
τὴν παροιμίαν, οὐ σχολὴ δούλοις, οἱ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενοι
κινδυνεύειν ἀνδρείως δοῦλοι τῶν ἐπιόντων εἰσίν. ἀνδρίας 3
20 μὲν οὖν καὶ καρτερίας δεῖ πρὸς τὴν ἀσχολίαν, φιλοσο-
φίας δὲ πρὸς τὴν σχολήν, σωφροσύνης δὲ καὶ δικαιο-
σύνης ἐν ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς χρόνοις, καὶ μᾶλλον εἰρήνην

ἄγουσι και σχολάζουσιν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ πόλεμος ἀναγκάζει δικαίους εἶναι καὶ σωφρονεῖν, ἡ δὲ τῆς εὐτυχίας ἀπόλαυσις καὶ τὸ σχολάζειν μετ' εἰρήνης ὑβριστὰς ποιεῖ 25
4 μᾶλλον. πολλῆς οὖν δεῖ δικαιοσύνης καὶ πολλῆς σωφροσύνης τοὺς ἄριστα δοκοῦντας πράττειν καὶ πάντων τῶν μακαριζομένων ἀπολαύοντας, οἷον εἴ τινές εἰσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ ποιηταί φασιν, ἐν μακάρων νήσοις· μάλιστα γὰρ οὗτοι δεήσονται φιλοσοφίας καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης, ὅσῳ μᾶλλον σχολάζουσιν ἐν ἀφθονίᾳ τῶν τοιούτων ἀγα- 30
5 θῶν. διότι μὲν οὖν τὴν μέλλουσαν εὐδαιμονήσειν καὶ σπουδαίαν ἔσεσθαι πόλιν τούτων δεῖ τῶν ἀρετῶν μετέχειν, φανερόν. αἰσχροῦ γὰρ ὄντος μὴ δύνασθαι χρῆσθαι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, ἔτι μᾶλλον μὴ δύνασθαι ἐν τῷ σχολάζειν χρῆσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀσχολοῦντας μὲν καὶ πολεμοῦντας φαίνεσθαι ἀγαθούς, εἰρήνην δ' ἄγοντας καὶ σχολάζοντας
6 ἀνδραποδώδεις. διὸ δεῖ μὴ καθάπερ ἡ Λακεδαιμονίων 5 πόλις τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀσκεῖν. ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ οὐ ταύτῃ διαφέρουσι τῶν ἄλλων, τῷ μὴ νομίζειν ταὐτὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἀλλὰ τῷ γίνεσθαι ταῦτα μᾶλλον διά τινος ἀρετῆς. ἐπεὶ δὲ μείζω τε ἀγαθὰ ταῦτα, καὶ τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν τὴν τούτων ἢ τὴν τῶν ἀρε- 10 τῶν, καὶ ὅτι δι' αὐτήν, φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων, πῶς δὲ καὶ
7 διὰ τίνων ἔσται, τοῦτο δὴ θεωρητέον. τυγχάνομεν δὴ διῃρημένοι πρότερον ὅτι φύσεως καὶ ἔθους καὶ λόγου δεῖ. τούτων δὲ ποίους μέν τινας εἶναι χρὴ τὴν φύσιν, διώρισται πρότερον, λοιπὸν δὲ θεωρῆσαι πότερον παιδευτέοι τῷ λόγῳ πρότερον ἢ τοῖς ἔθεσιν. ταῦτα γὰρ 15

δεῖ πρὸς ἄλληλα συμφωνεῖν συμφωνίαν τὴν ἀρίστην· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ διημαρτηκέναι [καὶ] τὸν λόγον τῆς βελτίστης ὑποθέσεως, καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐθῶν ὁμοίως ἦχθαι. φανερὸν δὴ τοῦτό γε πρῶτον μέν, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλ- 8
20 λοις, ὡς ἡ γένεσις ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ τέλος ἀπό τινος ἀρχῆς ἄλλου τέλους. ὁ δὲ λόγος ἡμῖν καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῆς φύσεως τέλος, ὥστε πρὸς τούτους τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἐθῶν δεῖ παρασκευάζειν μελέτην. ἔπειτα ὥσπερ 9 ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμα δύ' ἐστίν, οὕτω καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ὁρῶμεν
25 δύο μέρη, τό τε ἄλογον καὶ τὸ λόγον ἔχον, καὶ τὰς ἕξεις τὰς τούτων δύο τὸν ἀριθμόν, ὧν τὸ μέν ἐστιν ὄρεξις τὸ δὲ νοῦς. ὥσπερ δὲ τὸ σῶμα πρότερον τῇ γενέσει τῆς ψυχῆς, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἄλογον τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος. φα- 10 νερὸν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο· θυμὸς γὰρ καὶ βούλησις, ἔτι δὲ
30 ἐπιθυμία καὶ γενομένοις εὐθὺς ὑπάρχει τοῖς παιδίοις, ὁ δὲ λογισμὸς καὶ ὁ νοῦς προϊοῦσιν ἐγγίνεσθαι πέφυκεν. διὸ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦ σώματος τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι προτέραν ἢ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἔπειτα τὴν τῆς ὀρέξεως, ἕνεκα μέντοι τοῦ νοῦ τὴν τῆς ὀρέξεως, τὴν δὲ τοῦ σώματος τῆς ψυχῆς.

16 εἴπερ οὖν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τὸν νομοθέτην ὁρᾶν δεῖ ὅπως 1
βέλτιστα τὰ σώματα γένηται τῶν τρεφομένων, πρῶτον
5 μὲν ἐπιμελητέον περὶ τὴν σύζευξιν, πότε καὶ ποίους τινὰς ὄντας χρὴ ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὴν γαμικὴν ὁμιλίαν. δεῖ δ' ἀποβλέποντα νομοθετεῖν ταύτην τὴν 2
κοινωνίαν πρὸς αὐτούς τε καὶ τὸν τοῦ ζῆν χρόνον, ἵνα συγκαταβαίνωσι ταῖς ἡλικίαις ἐπὶ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν καὶ

μὴ διαφωνῶσιν αἱ δυνάμεις τοῦ μὲν ἔτι δυναμένου γεν- 10
νᾶν τῆς δὲ μὴ δυναμένης, ἢ ταύτης μὲν τοῦ δ' ἀνδρὸς
μή· ταῦτα γὰρ ποιεῖ καὶ στάσεις πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ
διαφοράς. ἔπειτα καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν τέκνων διαδοχήν.
3 δεῖ γὰρ οὔτε λίαν ὑπολείπεσθαι ταῖς ἡλικίαις τὰ τέκνα
τῶν πατέρων (ἀνόνητος γὰρ τοῖς μὲν πρεσβυτέροις ἡ 15
χάρις παρὰ τῶν τέκνων, ἡ δὲ παρὰ τῶν πατέρων βοή- 1335
θεια τοῖς τέκνοις) οὔτε λίαν πάρεγγυς εἶναι. πολλὴν
γὰρ ἔχει δυσχέρειαν· ἥ τε γὰρ αἰδὼς ἧττον ὑπάρχει
τοῖς τοιούτοις ὥσπερ ἡλικιώταις, καὶ περὶ τὴν οἰκονο-
4 μίαν ἐγκληματικὸν τὸ πάρεγγυς. ἔτι δ', ὅθεν ἀρχόμενοι
δεῦρο μετέβημεν, ὅπως τὰ σώματα τῶν γεννωμένων 20
ὑπάρχῃ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ νομοθέτου βούλησιν. σχεδὸν δὴ
5 πάντα ταῦτα συμβαίνει κατὰ μίαν ἐπιμέλειαν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ
ὥρισται τέλος τῆς γεννήσεως ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον εἰπεῖν
ἀνδράσι μὲν ὁ τῶν ἑβδομήκοντα ἐτῶν ἀριθμὸς ἔσχατος,
πεντήκοντα δὲ γυναιξίν, δεῖ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς συζεύξεως 25
κατὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν εἰς τοὺς χρόνους καταβαίνειν τούτους.
6 ἔστι δ' ὁ τῶν νέων συνδυασμὸς φαῦλος πρὸς τεκνο-
ποιίαν· ἐν γὰρ πᾶσι ζῴοις ἀτελῆ τὰ τῶν νέων ἔκγονα
καὶ θηλυτόκα μᾶλλον καὶ μικρὰ τὴν μορφήν, ὥστ' ἀναγ-
καῖον ταὐτὸ τοῦτο συμβαίνειν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. 30
τεκμήριον δέ· ἐν ὅσαις γὰρ τῶν πόλεων ἐπιχωριάζει
τὸ νέους συζευγνύναι καὶ νέας, ἀτελεῖς καὶ μικροὶ τὰ
7 σώματα εἰσίν. ἔτι δὲ ἐν τοῖς τόκοις αἱ νέαι πονοῦσί τε
μᾶλλον καὶ διαφθείρονται πλείους· διὸ καὶ τὸν χρησμὸν
γενέσθαι τινές φασι διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν τοῖς Τροιζη-

νίοις, ὡς πολλῶν διαφθειρομένων διὰ τὸ γαμίσκεσθαι
τὰς νεωτέρας, ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὴν τῶν καρπῶν κομιδήν.
5 ἔτι δὲ καὶ πρὸς σωφροσύνην συμφέρει τὰς ἐκδόσεις 8
ποιεῖσθαι πρεσβυτέραις· ἀκολαστότεραι γὰρ εἶναι δο-
κοῦσι νέαι χρησάμεναι ταῖς συνουσίαις. καὶ τὰ τῶν
ἀρρένων δὲ σώματα βλάπτεσθαι δοκεῖ πρὸς τὴν αὔξη-
σιν, ἐὰν ἔτι τοῦ σώματος αὐξανομένου ποιῶνται τὴν συ-
10 νουσίαν· καὶ γὰρ τούτου τις ὡρισμένος χρόνος, ὃν οὐχ
ὑπερβαίνει πληθῦον ἔτι. διὸ τὰς μὲν ἁρμόττει περὶ τὴν 9
τῶν ὀκτωκαίδεκα ἐτῶν ἡλικίαν συζευγνύναι, τοὺς δ' ἑπτὰ
καὶ τριάκοντα, ἢ μικρόν· ἐν τοσούτῳ γὰρ ἀκμάζουσί τε
τοῖς σώμασι σύζευξις ἔσται, καὶ πρὸς τὴν παῦλαν τῆς
15 τεκνοποιίας συγκαταβήσεται τοῖς χρόνοις εὐκαίρως. ἔτι 10
δὲ ἡ διαδοχὴ τῶν τέκνων τοῖς μὲν ἀρχομένης ἔσται τῆς
ἀκμῆς, ἐὰν γίνηται κατὰ λόγον εὐθὺς ἡ γένεσις, τοῖς δὲ
ἤδη καταλελυμένης τῆς ἡλικίας πρὸς τὸν τῶν ἑβδομή-
κοντα ἐτῶν ἀριθμόν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ πότε δεῖ ποιεῖ-
20 σθαι τὴν σύζευξιν, εἴρηται, τοῖς δὲ περὶ τὴν ὥραν χρό-
νοις ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ χρῶνται καλῶς καὶ νῦν, ὁρίσαντες
χειμῶνος τὴν συνουσίαν ποιεῖσθαι ταύτην. δεῖ δὴ καὶ 11
αὐτοὺς ἤδη θεωρεῖν πρὸς τὴν τεκνοποιίαν τά τε παρὰ
τῶν ἰατρῶν λεγόμενα καὶ τὰ παρὰ τῶν φυσικῶν· οἵ τε
25 γὰρ ἰατροὶ τοὺς καιροὺς τῶν σωμάτων ἱκανῶς λέγουσι,
καὶ περὶ τῶν πνευμάτων οἱ φυσικοί, τὰ βόρεια τῶν νο-
τίων ἐπαινοῦντες μᾶλλον. ποίων δὲ τινῶν τῶν σωμάτων 12
ὑπαρχόντων μάλιστ' ἂν ὄφελος εἴη τοῖς γεννωμένοις,
ἐπιστήσασι μὲν μᾶλλον λεκτέον ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς παι-

δονομίας, τύπῳ δὲ ἱκανὸν εἰπεῖν καὶ νῦν. οὔτε γὰρ ἡ
τῶν ἀθλητῶν χρήσιμος ἕξις πρὸς πολιτικὴν εὐεξίαν 30
οὐδὲ πρὸς ὑγίειαν καὶ τεκνοποιίαν, οὔτε ἡ θεραπευτικὴ
3 καὶ κακοπονητικὴ λίαν, ἀλλ' ἡ μέση τούτων. πεπονη-
μένην μὲν οὖν ἔχειν δεῖ τὴν ἕξιν, πεπονημένην δὲ πό-
νοις μὴ βιαίοις, μηδὲ πρὸς ἓν μόνον, ὥσπερ ἡ τῶν ἀθ-
λητῶν ἕξις, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰς τῶν ἐλευθερίων πράξεις.
ὁμοίως δὲ δεῖ ταῦτα ὑπάρχειν ἀνδράσι καὶ γυναιξίν.
14 χρὴ δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐγκύους ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν σωμάτων, μὴ 5
ῥαθυμούσας μηδ' ἀραιᾷ τροφῇ χρωμένας. τοῦτο δὲ ῥᾴ-
διον τῷ νομοθέτῃ ποιῆσαι προστάξαντι καθ' ἡμέραν
τινὰ ποιεῖσθαι πορείαν πρὸς θεῶν ἀποθεραπείαν τῶν
εἰληχότων τὴν περὶ τῆς γενέσεως τιμήν. τὴν μέντοι
διάνοιαν τοὐναντίον τῶν σωμάτων ῥαθυμοτέρως ἁρμόττει 10
διάγειν· ἀπολαύοντα γὰρ φαίνεται τὰ γεννώμενα τῆς
15 ἐχούσης ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ φυόμενα τῆς γῆς. περὶ δὲ ἀπο-
θέσεως καὶ τροφῆς τῶν γινομένων, ἔστω νόμος μηδὲν
πεπηρωμένον τρέφειν, διὰ δὲ πλῆθος τέκνων, ἐὰν ἡ
τάξις τῶν ἐθῶν κωλύῃ, μηδὲν ἀποτίθεσθαι τῶν γινομέ-
νων· ὥρισται γὰρ δὴ τῆς τεκνοποιίας τὸ πλῆθος. ἐὰν 15
δέ τισι γίνηται παρὰ ταῦτα συνδυασθέντων, πρὶν αἴσ-
θησιν ἐγγενέσθαι καὶ ζωήν, ἐμποιεῖσθαι δεῖ τὴν ἄμβλω-
σιν· τὸ γὰρ ὅσιον καὶ τὸ μὴ διωρισμένον τῇ αἰσθήσει
16 καὶ τῷ ζῆν ἔσται. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ μὲν ἀρχὴ τῆς ἡλικίας ἀνδρὶ
καὶ γυναικὶ διώρισται, πότε ἅρχεσθαι χρὴ τῆς συζεύ- 20
ξεως, καὶ πόσον χρόνον λειτουργεῖν ἁρμόττει πρὸς τεκ-
νοποιίαν ὡρίσθω· τὰ γὰρ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἔκγονα, καθ-

ὑπερ τὰ τῶν νεωτέρων, ἀτελῆ γίνεται καὶ τοῖς σώμασι
καὶ ταῖς διανοίαις, τὰ δὲ τῶν γεγηρακότων ἀσθενῆ. διὸ 17
25 κατὰ τὴν τῆς διανοίας ἀκμήν· αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς
πλείστοις ἥνπερ τῶν ποιητῶν τινὲς εἰρήκασιν οἱ με-
τροῦντες ταῖς ἑβδομάσι τὴν ἡλικίαν, περὶ τὸν χρόνον
τὸν τῶν πεντήκοντα ἐτῶν. ὥστε τέτταρσιν ἢ πέντε ἔτε-
σιν ὑπερβάλλοντα τὴν ἡλικίαν ταύτην ἀφεῖσθαι δεῖ τῆς
30 εἰς τὸ φανερὸν γεννήσεως· τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ὑγιείας χάριν
ἤ τινος ἄλλης τοιαύτης αἰτίας φαίνεσθαι δεῖ ποιουμέ-
νους τὴν ὁμιλίαν. περὶ δὲ τῆς πρὸς ἄλλην ἢ πρὸς 18
ἄλλον, ἔστω μὲν ἁπλῶς μὴ καλὸν ἁπτόμενον φαίνεσθαι
1336 μηδαμῇ μηδαμῶς, ὅταν ᾖ καὶ προσαγορευθῇ πόσις, περὶ
δὲ τὸν χρόνον τὸν τῆς τεκνοποιίας ἐάν τις φαίνηται τοι-
οῦτόν τι δρῶν, ἀτιμίᾳ ζημιούσθω πρεπούσῃ πρὸς τὴν
ἁμαρτίαν.

17 γενομένων δὲ τῶν τέκνων οἴεσθαι μεγάλην εἶναι δια- 1
φορὰν πρὸς τὴν τῶν σωμάτων δύναμιν τὴν τροφήν,
ὁποία τις ἂν ᾖ. φαίνεται δὲ διά τε τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων
ἐπισκοποῦσι, καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐθνῶν οἷς ἐπιμελές ἐστιν
εἰσάγειν τὴν πολεμικὴν ἕξιν, ἡ τοῦ γάλακτος πληθύ-
10 ουσα τροφὴ μάλιστ' οἰκεία τοῖς σώμασιν· ἀοινοτέρα δὲ
διὰ τὰ νοσήματα. ἔτι δὲ καὶ κινήσεις ὅσας ἐνδέχεται 2
ποιεῖσθαι τηλικούτων συμφέρει. πρὸς δὲ τὸ μὴ δια-
στρέφεσθαι τὰ μέλη δι' ἀπαλότητα χρῶνται καὶ νῦν
ἔνια τῶν ἐθνῶν ὀργάνοις τισὶ μηχανικοῖς, ἃ τὸ σῶμα
15 ποιεῖ τῶν τοιούτων ἀστραβές. συμφέρει δ' εὐθὺς καὶ
πρὸς τὰ ψύχη συνεθίζειν ἐκ μικρῶν παίδων· τοῦτο γὰρ

καὶ πρὸς ὑγίειαν καὶ πρὸς πολεμικὰς πράξεις εὐχρη-
3 στότατον. διὸ παρὰ πολλοῖς ἐστὶ τῶν βαρβάρων ἔθος
τοῖς μὲν εἰς ποταμὸν ἀποβάπτειν τὰ γινόμενα ψυχρόν,
τοῖς δὲ σκέπασμα μικρὸν ἀμπίσχειν, οἷον Κελτοῖς. 20
πάντα γὰρ ὅσα δυνατὸν ἐθίζειν, εὐθὺς ἀρχομένῳ βέλτιον
μὲν ἐθίζειν, ἐκ προσαγωγῆς δ' ἐθίζειν· εὐφυὴς δ' ἡ τῶν
παίδων ἕξις διὰ θερμότητα πρὸς τὴν τῶν ψυχρῶν ἄσ-
4 κησιν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τὴν πρώτην συμφέρει ποιεῖσθαι
τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν τοιαύτην τε καὶ τὴν ταύτῃ παραπλησίαν· 25
τὴν δ' ἐχομένην ταύτης ἡλικίαν μέχρι πέντε ἐτῶν, ἣν
οὔτε πω πρὸς μάθησιν καλῶς ἔχει προσάγειν οὐδεμίαν
οὔτε πρὸς ἀναγκαίους πόνους, ὅπως μὴ τὴν αὔξησιν
ἐμποδίζωσιν, δεῖ τοσαύτης τυγχάνειν κινήσεως ὥστε
διαφεύγειν τὴν ἀργίαν τῶν σωμάτων· ἣν χρὴ παρα-
σκευάζειν καὶ δι' ἄλλων πράξεων καὶ διὰ τῆς παιδιᾶς. 30
5 δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰς παιδιὰς εἶναι μήτε ἀνελευθέρους μήτε
ἐπιπόνους μήτε ἀνειμένας. καὶ περὶ λόγων δὲ καὶ μύθων,
ποίους τινὰς ἀκούειν δεῖ τοὺς τηλικούτους, ἐπιμελὲς
ἔστω τοῖς ἄρχουσιν οὓς καλοῦσι παιδονόμους. πάντα
γὰρ δεῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα προοδοποιεῖν πρὸς τὰς ὕστερον δια-
τριβάς· διὸ τὰς παιδιὰς εἶναι δεῖ τὰς πολλὰς μιμήσεις
6 τῶν ὕστερον σπουδαζομένων. τὰς δὲ διατάσεις τῶν 5
παίδων καὶ κλαυθμοὺς οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀπαγορεύουσιν οἱ
κωλύοντες ἐν τοῖς νόμοις· συμφέρουσι γὰρ πρὸς αὔ-
ξησιν. γίνεται γὰρ τρόπον τινὰ γυμνασία τοῖς σώμασιν·
ἡ γὰρ τοῦ πνεύματος κάθεξις ποιεῖ τὴν ἰσχὺν τοῖς
πονοῦσιν, ὃ συμβαίνει καὶ τοῖς παιδίοις διατεινομένοις,

10 ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ τοῖς παιδονόμοις τὴν τούτων διαγωγὴν 7
τήν τ' ἄλλην, καὶ ὅπως ὅτι ἥκιστα μετὰ δούλων ἔσται.
ταύτην γὰρ τὴν ἡλικίαν, καὶ μέχρι τῶν ἑπτὰ ἐτῶν,
ἀναγκαῖον οἴκοι τὴν τροφὴν ἔχειν. εὔλογον οὖν ἀπελ-
αύνειν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀκουσμάτων καὶ τῶν ὁραμάτων τῶν
15 ἀνελευθέρων καὶ τηλικούτους ὄντας. ὅλως μὲν οὖν 8
αἰσχρολογίαν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, εἴπερ ἄλλο τι, δεῖ τὸν
νομοθέτην ἐξορίζειν· ἐκ τοῦ γὰρ εὐχερῶς λέγειν ὁτιοῦν
τῶν αἰσχρῶν γίνεται καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν σύνεγγυς. μάλιστα
μὲν οὖν ἐκ τῶν νέων, ὅπως μήτε λέγωσι μήτε ἀκούωσι
20 μηδὲν τοιοῦτον. ἐὰν δέ τις φαίνηταί τι λέγων ἢ πράτ- 9
των τῶν ἀπηγορευμένων, τὸν μὲν ἐλεύθερον μήπω δὲ
κατακλίσεως ἠξιωμένον ἐν τοῖς συσσιτίοις ἀτιμίαις
κολάζειν καὶ πληγαῖς, τὸν δὲ πρεσβύτερον τῆς ἡλικίας
ταύτης ἀτιμίαις ἀνελευθέροις ἀνδραποδωδίας χάριν.
25 ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ λέγειν τι τῶν τοιούτων ἐξορίζομεν, φανερὸν
ὅτι καὶ τὸ θεωρεῖν ἢ γραφὰς ἢ λόγους ἀσχήμονας.
ἐπιμελὲς μὲν οὖν ἔστω τοῖς ἄρχουσι μηθὲν μήτε ἄγαλμα 10
μήτε γραφὴν εἶναι τοιούτων πράξεων μίμησιν, εἰ μὴ
παρά τισι θεοῖς τοιούτοις οἷς καὶ τὸν τωθασμὸν ἀποδί-
δωσιν ὁ νόμος· πρὸς δὲ τούτους ἀφίησιν ὁ νόμος τοὺς
30 ἔχοντας ἡλικίαν πλέον προήκουσαν καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν καὶ
τέκνων καὶ γυναικῶν τιμαλφεῖν τοὺς θεούς. τοὺς δὲ 11
νεωτέρους οὔτ' ἰάμβων οὔτε κωμῳδίας θεατὰς νομο-
θετητέον, πρὶν ἢ τὴν ἡλικίαν λάβωσιν ἐν ᾗ καὶ κατα-
κλίσεως ὑπάρξει κοινωνεῖν ἤδη καὶ μέθης καὶ τῆς ἀπὸ
τῶν τοιούτων γινομένης βλάβης ἀπαθοῖς ἡ παιδεία ποιή-

12 σει πάντας. νῦν μὲν οὖν τούτων ἐν παραδρομῇ πεποιή-
μεθα τὸν λόγον· ὕστερον δ' ἐπιστήσαντας δεῖ διορίσαι 5
μᾶλλον, εἴτε μὴ δεῖ πρῶτον εἴτε δεῖ διαπορήσαντας, καὶ
πῶς δεῖ· κατὰ δὲ τὸν παρόντα καιρὸν ἐμνήσθημεν ὡς
13 ἀναγκαῖον. ἴσως γὰρ οὐ κακῶς ἔλεγε τὸ τοιοῦτον Θεό-
δωρος ὁ τῆς τραγῳδίας ὑποκριτής· οὐθενὶ γὰρ πώποτε
παρῆκεν ἑαυτοῦ προεισάγειν, οὐδὲ τῶν εὐτελῶν ὑπο- 10
κριτῶν, ὡς οἰκειουμένων τῶν θεατῶν ταῖς πρώταις ἀκοαῖς.
συμβαίνει δὲ ταὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων
ὁμιλίας καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων· πάντα γὰρ στέρ-
14 γομεν τὰ πρῶτα μᾶλλον. διὸ δεῖ τοῖς νέοις πάντα ποιεῖν
ξένα τὰ φαῦλα, μάλιστα δ' αὐτῶν ὅσα ἔχει ἡ μοχθηρίαν 15
ἢ δυσμένειαν. διελθόντων δὲ τῶν πέντε ἐτῶν τὰ δύο
μέχρι τῶν ἑπτὰ δεῖ θεωροὺς ἤδη γίνεσθαι τῶν μαθήσεων
15 ἃς δεήσει μανθάνειν αὐτούς. δύο δ' εἰσὶν ἡλικίαι πρὸς
ἃς ἀναγκαῖον διῃρῆσθαι τὴν παιδείαν, μετὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν
ἑπτὰ μέχρι ἥβης καὶ πάλιν μετὰ τὴν ἀφ' ἥβης μέχρι
τῶν ἑνὸς καὶ εἴκοσιν ἐτῶν. οἱ γὰρ ταῖς ἑβδομάσι διαι- 20
ροῦντες τὰς ἡλικίας ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ λέγουσιν οὐ κακῶς, 1337
δεῖ δὲ τῇ διαιρέσει τῆς φύσεως ἐπακολουθεῖν· πᾶσα
γὰρ τέχνη καὶ παιδεία τὸ προσλεῖπον βούλεται τῆς
16 φύσεως ἀναπληροῦν. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν σκεπτέον εἰ ποιη-
τέον τάξιν τινὰ περὶ τοὺς παῖδας, ἔπειτα πότερον συμ- 25
φέρει κοινῇ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν αὐτῶν ἢ κατ' ἴδιον
τρόπον (ὃ γίνεται καὶ νῦν ἐν ταῖς πλείσταις τῶν πόλεων),
τρίτον δὲ ποίαν τινὰ δεῖ ταύτην.

SUMMARY OF BOOK I.

CHAP I. Introductory statement of the method to be pursued.

CHAP. II. About the family, the village, and the state. The factors which enter into the composition of these several communities.

CHAPS. III.—VII. Of the family. Of the relation of master and slave, which is said to be founded on the natural distinctions existing between men.

CHAPS. VIII.—X. The slave being a kind of possession, possessions generally are considered, and the art of acquiring them. The question is raised, whether the acquisition of wealth is the same as the art of household management (*οἰκονομία*), or a part of it, or subservient to it. This leads to a farther analysis of the different kinds of gain. Finally, it is determined that *οἰκονομία* has only to do with using the materials furnished to it by nature, and acquired by man.

CHAP. XI. contains some practical applications of the art of gain, more amusing than instructive.

CHAPS. XII., XIII., take up the family again,—the relation of the woman to the man, of the child to the father, of the slave to his master. The question is discussed, whether a slave is capable of virtue, and how far.

We see that Ethics, Politics, and Political Economy are here all mixed up together. The Sciences were not separated distinctly in Aristotle's time. Nevertheless,

the treatise is particularly interesting, touching, as it does, on so many topics that occupy a prominent place in modern thought, such as the origin of society, and of language, the relations of civilized and barbarous races, the subjection of women, and the condition of the working-classes. It is true that Aristotle cannot teach us much on these questions, which had not arisen in his time; but yet it is instructive to see that the germs of them were even then present, and we can form some idea of how he would have treated them.

Thus the Politics have more points of contact with modern thought than the Ethics, though the latter have long been regarded as the more important treatise from an educational point of view, chiefly from an erroneous opinion that an idea of duty or moral obligation is contained in them, and that the study of them is useful, not only as of the earliest systematic attempt to construct a theory of morals, but also as tending to teach habits of morality. Sir Alexander Grant has shewn that the interest of the Ethics is for us mainly historical. "We look back on it as on an ancient building shining in the fresh light of an Athenian morning."

NOTES TO BOOK I.

N.B.—Double inverted commas [" "] indicate, except in the case of quotations from other authors, the *paraphrase* of a passage. Single inverted commas [' '] denote the *translation* of a portion of the text.

CHAP. I. "Everything which men do is done for the sake of what appears to be good. Every association is formed for some good end. A city is an association of the highest kind, embracing all others under it; therefore, a state, or city, aims at the highest good of all. Some think there is no difference of kind between a citizen of a free state and a king with absolute power and a manager of a household and a master of a few slaves, but that the difference is one of degree only. But that this is not really the case, will be seen by applying our usual method of investigation to the present case. That method consists in resolving every conception into its component parts. Let us, then, proceed to analyse the constituent parts of a state."

§ 1. Cf. the beginning of the Ethics: *πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος, ὁμοίως δὲ πρᾶξίς τε καὶ προαίρεσις, ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ· διὸ καλῶς ἀπεφήναντο τἀγαθόν, οὗ πάντ' ἐφίεται.*

§ 2. *ὅσοι μὲν οὖν οἴονται.* The allusion is to Plato, Politicus, p. 259 C. *οὐκοῦν, ὃ νῦν δὴ διεσκοπούμεθα, φανερὸν ὡς ἐπιστήμη μία περὶ πάντ' ἐστι ταῦτα. ταύτην*

δὲ εἴτε βασιλικὴν εἴτε πολιτικὴν εἴτε οἰκονομικήν τις ὀνομάζει, μηδὲν αὐτῷ διαφερόμεθα.

πολιτικόν. A difficult word to translate; 'statesman' seems to come nearest to it.

§ 3. κατὰ τὴν ὑφηγημένην μέθοδον, 'in accordance with the method which has been pointed out.' Cf. Ar. Eth. II. vii. 9: νῦν δὲ περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν λέγομεν κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον. ὑφηγεῖσθαι is usually a deponent verb, and means 'to guide.' So editors generally take it here, and in the Ethics. But the word is undoubtedly used passively in ch. xiii. 6 of this book (καὶ τοῦτο εὐθὺς ὑφήγηται περὶ τὴν ψύχην), and it seems probable that it is also used passively here, and not in an active sense, as 'that which has hitherto guided us.'

τὸ λεγόμενον, 'this point,' 'the question.' This method is explained in the following sentence as analytical,—resolving a complex idea into its constituent parts, until the primary elements are arrived at, which are not susceptible of any further analysis. Translate the next sentence: 'As in other investigations it is necessary to divide a compound into the simple elements, that is, the smallest parts of the whole; so also, by considering the parts of which a state is composed, we shall see better how they differ from one another, and whether it is possible to obtain a scientific conception about each of them.'

CHAP. I. § 1—7. "The simplest kind of union is where two combine, as male and female. Here there is also ruler and ruled, the male ruling, the female ruled.

And there is the natural distinction also of slave and master; though in barbarous tribes these two relations co-exist in the same persons. The wife is there the slave of the husband, and the latter is himself a slave, as Euripides says. The first and simplest household, however, consists of these two simple relations, whether co-existing in the same persons, or whether the slave is separate. Then a community of several households is a village. And the government here is monarchical, just as the master of a household is the king of it. This is the Cyclopian form of government, and that which is also attributed by men to the gods. The gods are all related to each other, like the members of a village community; for we attribute to the gods the lives of men, just as we liken their forms to those of men."

§ 2. It is worth while to notice how thoroughly, here and elsewhere, Aristotle is biassed in the principles he lays down, by the current state of feeling in Greece in his time. The inferiority of women and slaves is regarded as an axiom. Plato is very different. He rises above his age, and is suggestive to all time. Aristotle is interesting to the student of social science, as the petrified remains of a by-gone epoch are interesting to the geologist. The Politics is a treatise based on a state of society which has completely passed away. But, as has been said, it is more modern than the Ethics.

§ 3. *οἷον χαλκοτύποι τὴν δελφικὴν μάχαιραν.* A knife, that is, like that used by the Delphians for sacrifice and for culinary purposes. The Delphians, like the Acarna-

nians, Ætolians, and other western Hellenes, were much less civilized than the eastern states. Cf. a remark of Darwin "On the Origin of Species," chap. v. p. 118, 6th ed.: "As long as the same part has to perform diversified work, we can see why it should remain variable, that is, why natural selection should not have preserved or rejected each little deviation of form so carefully, as when the part has to serve some one special purpose. In the same way that a knife which has to cut all sorts of things may be of almost any shape; whilst a tool for some particular purpose must be of some particular shape."

§ 4. *φασὶν οἱ ποιηταί.* Eur. Iph. Aul. 1401.

§ 5. *Ἡσίοδος.* Dies et Opera, l. 405.

οὓς Χαρώνδας, 'whom Charondas calls sharers in the same meal-tub, and Epimenides the Cretan, sharers in the same crib.' Charondas was a lawgiver of Catana, who legislated for his own and the other cities of Chalcidian origin, in Sicily and Italy, about B.C. 500. Epimenides visited Athens about B.C. 596, being invited to undertake the purification of the city, which had been polluted by the murder of Cylon.

§ 6. *ἐκ βασιλευομένων,* 'for unions were formed of those who were governed by kings.'

§ 7. *λέγει Ὅμηρος.* Homer says this of the Cyclopes. Odys. ix. 114; cf. Eth. X. x. 18.

τοὺς βίους τῶν θεῶν. One of the few passages where Aristotle speaks of the gods. The attitude he assumes

towards the popular opinions, here, as elsewhere, is neutral. Cf. ch. v. 10, where he says the images of the gods are in the form of the noblest men.

§ 8 to end. "A community, consisting of several villages, is a city, and is self-sufficient, the end being to live well; the city is a natural organization, for it is the end, or final cause, of the other communities. Homer scouts the 'cityless' man. It is plain that man is a social animal, and adapted to live in cities. For nature does nothing in vain, and she has given reason to man, distinguishing him from the other animals, which have only inarticulate voices, which serve to intimate pleasure and pain. But reason (λόγος, speech) serves to point out the expedient and the hurtful, good and evil, the just and the unjust. The city is prior in thought and in nature to the house or the individual; for the whole is anterior to the part. A hand has no meaning, nor a foot, apart from the body to which it belongs, except metaphorically speaking. (2.) It is prior in conception, because it is self-sufficient, and the parts are not. Now an individual, who is self-sufficient, is less or more than human, a beast or a god. All men, then, have a natural tendency to associate in cities. But the being who first brought them together was a great benefactor to his species. For as man, when perfectly developed, is the best of all animals; so, when isolated, and apart from law and justice, he is the worst. Armed injustice is most dangerous. Man grows in intelligence and virtue, having thus arms which may, however, be put to the opposite uses for which they were intended.

Justice, which is another name for virtue, is the virtue of a citizen; it is the order of a political community; it is the decision of what is just."

§ 8. πάσης ἔχουσα πέρας, 'having the limit of perfect self-sufficiency,' i.e. being perfect and self-sufficient.

γινομένη μὲν οὖν τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκεν, 'in its original stage formed for the purpose of bare existence, but its final cause being life in the fullest sense.' Cf. III. vi. 3, 4.

§ 9. ἀφρήτωρ, ἀθέμιστος, ἀνέστιος. Il. ix. 63.

§ 10. ἅτε περ ἄζυξ ὢν ὥσπερ ἐν πεττοῖς, 'like a rover in the game of draughts.' We do not know all the rules of the game; but it would seem that in one mode of it a single piece used to take all the rest, as in the game of fox and geese.

οὐθὲν μάτην ἡ φύσις τοιεῖ. Cf. c. viii. 12. Aristotle here, as elsewhere, argues teleologically, or from the design displayed in nature. "Man is a social animal, more so than bees or other gregarious animals, for he is gifted with reason and articulate speech. For what end was this gift bestowed upon him, unless that he might live the life of a citizen with his fellows?" The principle here laid down has been much objected to, and attention has been called, on the other hand, to the waste everywhere displayed in creation, as, for instance, to the fact that out of the many thousands of eggs in the roe of a herring, comparatively few turn into fish, and to such phenomena in certain animals, as rudimentary organs, which have no use. But even on the mechanical or evolutional theory of creation, it might still be

true to say that nature does nothing in vain. Matter is absolutely indestructible. The wasted roe of the herring does not, indeed, go to form young herrings, but it serves some other purpose in the economy of the universe. Aristotle, however, goes farther than this. He says that everything in nature is done with a design to a particular end. He has no idea of God as the intelligent author of creation, but he attributes to nature a conscious formative tendency. His point of view is anterior to, and almost midway between, the modern teleological and dualistic conception of the universe on the one hand, and the mechanical, monistic theory on the other. Aristotle has been much blamed for the narrowness of his views, and the one-sided manner in which he regarded nature and man. But the truth is, as Professor Haeckel ("History of Creation," vol. i. p. 76, English edition) points out, "he was the greatest and only truly great naturalist of antiquity and the Middle Ages. In his works on Zoology, now only partially remaining, traces are found of a theory of natural development. He assumes, as a matter of certainty, that spontaneous generation was the natural manner in which lower organic creatures came into existence." A clear anticipation of the latest modern theory founded on much wider observation than Aristotle could possibly lay claim to!

πάσης μελίττης καὶ παντὸς ἀγελαίου ζῴου. The recent investigations of Sir John Lubbock into the habits of bees and ants, shew how far inferior to the reason of man is the instinct of these animals, which has ex-

cited such admiration, from its apparent resemblance to reason.

§§ 11, 12. Here, again, whatever the primary origin of speech may have been, there is no doubt that Aristotle has once and for all laid down the broad distinction between the inarticulate cries of animals, and the articulate speech of man; though it may be quite true that the languages of some of the lowest tribes of men are hardly to be distinguished from the cries of animals, just as their mental faculties and affections seem scarcely more developed than, for instance, those of a dog.

§ 13. *πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ μέρους*, i.e. in conception. In point of time the family is prior to the state. Cf. Eth. VIII. xii. 7. *πρότερον καὶ ἀναγκαιότερον οἰκία πόλεως.*

ὁμωνύμως, 'equivocally.' *ὁμώνυμα*, 'equivocal terms.'

τῷ ἔργῳ καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, 'by their effect and power.'

§ 15. *ὁ δὲ πρῶτος συστήσας.* Possibly Aristotle is here alluding to Theseus, the mythical founder of Athens. In all probability, the formation of cities or states has been an exceedingly gradual process, not to be attributed to any one man.

§ 16. *ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ὅπλα ἔχων.* 'And man is born armed for wisdom and virtue; he may, however, use his arms for the very opposite purpose for which they were intended.'

CHAP. III. "Since every state is made up of households, we must explain what are the parts of which the

household consists. It is composed of freemen and slaves, of husband and wife, of parents and children. Some, again, make the science of wealth (χρηματιστική) identical with household economy (οἰκονομία), while others make it the chief part of it. First, then, as to the relation of master and slave, is this one established by nature or by convention (νόμῳ)? If the distinction is a conventional one only, then slavery is unjust." The question of slavery is discussed in the four succeeding chapters.

§ 4. καθάπερ εἴπομεν ἀρχόμενοι. Chap. i. 2.

διόπερ οὐδὲ δίκαιον· βίαιον γάρ. 'Wherefore it is unjust; for it is a relation resting on force.'

CHAP. IV. "Possession is a part of the house, and the art of acquiring possessions is a part of household management. Now, since every art must have its instruments, as the pilot, for instance, has a rudder as an instrument without life, and the man at the prow as an instrument with life, the thing possessed is an instrument for life, and possessions are a number of such instruments. If each instrument could do what it is told, like the works of Dædalus, or the tripods of Hephaistos in Homer, there would be no need of slaves. The former are instruments of production, but an object of possession is an instrument of action, and is for use. Such a possession is a slave, who has to do menial services relating to action (πρᾶξις). Again, a possession is a part, and a part is not only part of a whole, but it belongs to the whole of which it is a part. So the slave is not only the slave of a master, but he be-

longs to his master. Hence he is a natural slave, who, being a man, belongs to another by nature, that is, is the possession of another. And by possession is meant an instrument existing apart from the owner, and capable of action."

§ 1. ὥσπερ δέ. If δὲ is the right reading here, it might serve to introduce the apodosis of the sentence. But this is harsh. It is better to take ἐπεὶ οὖν as equivalent to 'now,' and translate δὲ, 'and further.' τῶν οἰκονομικῶν, 'so also there must be instruments belonging to household management.' The apodosis, answering to ἐπεὶ, does not really come till οὕτω καὶ in § 2. Cf. ch. xii. 1.

§ 3. ὁ ποιητής. Hom. Il. xviii. 376.

§ 4. ποίησις, πρᾶξις. These terms are constantly opposed to each other by Aristotle. The first means mechanical production. The making of a garment out of wool is ποίησις. Πρᾶξις is the action of a rational being. The weaver, in so far as he weaves at the command of his master, is engaged in πρᾶξις; in so far as he merely guides the shuttle, and considered in reference to the work produced, he is engaged in ποίησις.

CHAP. V. "That slavery is natural is proved by the analogy of the whole of nature. In all things which consist of parts making up a whole, there is a governing principle, and something which is governed. So in living creatures there is soul and body; the soul governs, the body is governed. Where the body governs the soul, the nature of the living creature (ζῶον) is corrupt and contrary to nature. So in the soul itself the

appetitive part is governed by the intellect and reason. So, again, in respect to men and animals, the tame animals are superior to the wild ones, and man is superior to the tame ones. So the male is superior to the female. Those, then, who are as far removed from others as body is from soul, or beast from man, are slaves by nature. The slave has a perception of reason, but does not possess it; the animals have no perception at all of reason, but are subservient to passion. So nature makes some bodies slavish, and others free; but this does not hold universally. Some have the bodies of free men; others only the minds, while their bodies are slavish. In the case of marked differences, as where one man is so far superior to another in body, as the statues of the gods are to ordinary men, we should say at once that the latter ought to be the slave of the former. But in the case of the mind it is not so easy to see the difference. But still it exists, and there are slaves who are born so."

§ 2. *βελτίων ἡ ἀρχή*, 'and always, the better those who obey are, the better is the rule, as that over a man is better than that over a beast.'

§ 3. *εἴτε ἐκ συνεχῶν εἴτε ἐκ διῃρημένων.* Aristotle regards quantity as divided into continuous and divisible. Anything in visible form, is *συνεχής*, as a geometrical figure; numbers are divisible (*διῃρημένοι*). Cf. Eth. II. vi. 4, *ἐν παντὶ δὴ συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῷ ἔστι λαβεῖν τὸ μὲν πλεῖον τὸ δ' ἔλαττον τὸ δ' ἴσον.* Cf. also Categories, vi. 1, *τοῦ δὲ πόσου τὸ μὲν ἐστι διωρισμένον, τὸ δὲ συνεχές.—Ἔστι δὲ διωρισμένον οἷον ἀριθμὸς καὶ λόγος,*

συνεχές δὲ οἷον γραμμὴ, ἐπιφάνεια, σῶμα, ἔτι δὲ παρὰ ταῦτα χρόνος καὶ τόπος (quoted by Grant on the above passage from the Ethics).

§ 4. *καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς μὴ μετέχουσι ζωῆς*, 'for in things also which do not partake of life there is a law reigning, as of harmony.' So we talk of a law of beauty and proportion. In music, too, which depends on the intervals of sounds (*διῃρημένον*), there is a dominant chord, and a key-note.

ἐξωτερικωτέρας. 'This perhaps belongs to a field of investigation outside our limits at present.' The word *ἐξωτερικὸς* is here used by Aristotle in a different sense from that which it bears in *οἱ ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι*, where it means 'popular.'

§ 6. *νοῦς—ὄρεξις*. The former is the higher part of the *ψυχή*, the intellect; the latter denotes the desires and appetites, answering to what is called lower down, *τὸ παθητικὸν μόριον* of the soul.

τὸ δ' ἐξ ἴσου ἀνάπαλιν, 'but where they are equal or the reverse is the case.'

§ 9. *αἰσθάνεσθαι*. The slave only partakes of reason so far as to have a perception of it, but not actually to have it. That is, he can obey orders, and understand what is said to him.

ἡ χρεία παραλλάττει μικρόν, 'their use differs but little.'

§ 10. *ὅσον αἱ τῶν θεῶν εἰκόνες*, 'as the images of the gods surpass the forms of ordinary men.' Cf. ch. iii. 7.

CHAP. VI. In this chapter the question is argued, Whether might is right. In one sense οὐκ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς ἡ βία, but Aristotle cannot admit that it is right for Greeks to be enslaved. "Others deny this, and say that slaves are slaves only by law or convention. Undoubtedly there are such slaves, slaves who have become so by conquest. Is might then right? Is the slave who is made so by conquest rightly a slave? It depends on whether the war was just or not. If it was, then the conquered are justly slaves; if not, then they are so unjustly. Barbarians captured in war are justly made slaves, because war against them is just, and they are slaves by nature; but captives of noble birth ought never to be enslaved. In fine, there is a natural distinction of slave and free. Moreover, the interest of the slave is the same as that of his master, for he is a part of his master, and belongs to him."

§ 1. ἐν ᾧ. Bernays reads ἐφ' ᾧ, 'on condition that,' and omits φασίν.

§ 2. 'Many, then, of those who are versed in laws dispute this claim and indict it, like an orator, for illegality; saying that it is a monstrous idea, for him who is compelled, to be the slave and subject of him who is able to compel him, and who is stronger in might.'

γράφονται παρανόμων, 'bring a γραφὴ παρανόμων against this plea.' See Smith's Classical Dictionary.

§ 3. ἐναλλάττειν, 'alternate,' 'incline now to one side, now to the other.' τυγχάνουσα χορηγίας, 'when supplied with external means.'

§§ 4, 5. 'For this reason, some think justice is benevolence, while others think this very thing is just, the rule of the stronger; for, setting aside these two views, there is neither any strength nor power of conviction in the other arguments, which maintain that that which is better in point of excellence ought not to rule and be master. And altogether some maintaining, as they think, a sort of justice (inasmuch as the law is a sort of justice), hold slavery, as the result of war, to be just, while, at the same time, they deny it,' i.e. facts compel them to deny it, as he proceeds to shew.

§ 6. *ἀνάγκη γὰρ εἶναι.* 'For it is necessary to say that there are certain classes of men, some of whom are always slaves, and others never.'

§ 7. *αὐτοὺς μὲν γάρ.* Supply as the nominative, *Ἕλληνες.* *ἁπλῶς* absolutely, under all circumstances; *οὐχ ἁπλῶς* under certain limitations.

Θεοδέκτου. Theodectes was a tragic poet, in the time of Philip of Macedon.

§ 8. *ἡ δὲ φύσις βούλεται.* Aristotle, it seems, was well aware of the tendency in nature to reversion.

§ 9. 'It is clear, then, that this difference of opinion has some rational foundation, and that there are and are not some by nature slaves, and others free; and that in certain men there is such a distinction, for some of whom it is expedient and just to be slaves, and for others to be masters; and that the one should be ruled, and the other rule, according to the rule which

they are by nature fitted to exercise, that is, as a master rules his slaves.' Aristotle means to say, that it does not always happen, where we find slavery existing, that the slaves are all naturally slaves, and the free naturally free; for war, or other causes, may have caused these relations between them; but there *is* a natural distinction. Some are born to be slaves, others to rule and be masters. Some editions omit *οὐκ* before *εἰσιν οἱ μὲν*, but this destroys the sense. Bekker, in his earlier editions omits *καὶ εἰσὶ*. Then it will be, 'And not *all* are, some by nature slaves, &c.'

CHAP. VII. "Each relation has a science of its own, though a master is not so called by virtue of his scientific knowledge. The science of a master differs from that of a slave. At Syracuse, a slave taught menial offices to boys for pay. Such branches of knowledge as cookery, for example, may thus be taught. The science of the master consists in using slaves, and knowing how to command them. So, to save themselves trouble, those who have the means keep a steward to manage their household affairs, while they engage in politics or philosophy. There is also the art of acquiring slaves (*κτητικὴ*), which is a branch of war or hunting."

§ 1. *οὐ δὲ πᾶσαι ἀλλήλαις αἱ ἀρχαί;* 'nor are all kinds of government like one another.'

§ 2. *ὁ μὲν οὖν δεσπότης.* 'The master, then, is not so called according to knowledge, but on account of his being of a certain character.' Plato held that he was so

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food and clothing and other purposes. It is a general principle, that nature does nothing in vain, and it follows from this, that all things are ordained for the sake of man, as the highest in the scale of beings. Therefore even war and the kidnapping of men for slaves is natural, for it is to provide for the wants of man. All this, then, is the real wealth of nations, *κτητική* proper, a branch of *οἰκονομική*. *χρηματιστική*, then, in this sense is a part of *οἰκονομική*."

§ 1. *τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον.* Cf. I. i. 3.

The first question is whether *χρηματιστική* is the same as, a part of, or subservient to, *οἰκονομική*, and if subservient, whether as furnishing the instruments for it, or the matter. As, for instance, the art of making shuttles provides the instruments of the art of weaving, the art of smelting copper provides the matter for the art of statue-making. By matter is meant the base substance (*τὸ ὑποκειμένον*), out of which the work is finished, as wool in the case of the weaver, bronze in that of the statuary. (1.) *χρηματιστική* is not identical with *οἰκονομική*, for it is the business of the one to provide the material, of the other to use the materials when provided. (2.) Is it a part of it, or distinct from it? This question is solved in this and the following chapters, by shewing that there are two kinds of *χρηματιστική*; one *κτητική*, concerned with providing the natural wants of men, and this is a part of *οἰκονομική*, or rather according to the distinction laid down at the beginning of the chapter, it is subservient to it, in the sense of furnishing the matter (*ὕλην*). The other kind is *χρηματισ-*

called, by virtue of knowledge, and not from his moral character. See the argument about the ruler in the first book of the Republic.

§ 8. δοῦλος πρὸ δούλου. A line from the comic poet, Philemon the elder.

§ 9. ἡ δὲ κτητική, 'the art of acquiring slaves,' a branch of ἡ κτητικὴ generally. οἷον ἡ δικαία, 'I mean the just way of doing so.'

CHAP. VIII. "We pass on to speak of the acquisition of property generally (κτητικὴ). Is the money-getting art (χρηματιστικὴ) identical with that of household management (οἰκονομικὴ), or is it a part of it? It is not identical with it, for it is the business of the former to acquire wealth, of the latter to use it. Then is it a part of it, or quite distinct from it? There are many parts of the art of getting wealth, corresponding to the various modes of life. The animals have various means of livelihood; some are carnivorous, others herbivorous, others omnivorous. So with men: some lead a pastoral life, others a life of husbandry, others are fishermen, others hunters, others robbers. Some lead lives that are combinations of these in various ways. These are all the natural modes of acquiring wealth. It is a continuation of the process of nature. Nature feeds the young in the womb of the mother, or in the egg, and after they are born, they are fed by the mother. So, in the case of full-grown beings, the plants are for the sake of animals, and these for the sake of man; the tame ones for use and food, most of the wild ones for

food and clothing and other purposes. It is a general principle, that nature does nothing in vain, and it follows from this, that all things are ordained for the sake of man, as the highest in the scale of beings. Therefore even war and the kidnapping of men for slaves is natural, for it is to provide for the wants of man. All this, then, is the real wealth of nations, κτητική proper, a branch of οἰκονομική. χρηματιστική, then, in this sense is a part of οἰκονομική."

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τικὴ proper, the art of acquiring money, as a means of exchange, *μεταβλητικὴ*; and this is quite distinct from *οἰκονομικὴ*, but may be regarded as subservient to it, as furnishing instruments (*ὄργανα*) for it.

§ 3. *ἡ δὲ κτῆσις.* *δὲ* marks the apodosis of the sentence. After *ὥστε πρῶτον* supply *σκεπτέον* or *θεωρητέον*.

§ 5. *τὴν αἵρεσιν τὴν τούτων*, 'the free selection of these kinds of food,' i.e. of live animals and herbage. Bernays reads *κατὰ τὴν* for *καὶ τὴν*, and he is probably right.

§ 6. *ἀναγκαίου δ' ὄντος μεταβάλλειν.* 'And it being necessary for the cattle to change on account of their pastures, the owners also are compelled to follow with them, pursuing as it were a living husbandry.'

§ 8. *οἱ μὲν οὖν βίοι.* 'These, then, are about all the different kinds of life which have a natural occupation, and do not procure food by means of exchange and trade;—the life of the herdsman, the farmer, the freebooter, the fisherman, and the hunter; but others combining two or more of these modes of life together live pleasantly, filling up the poorest mode of life, where it falls short of being self-sufficient; as, for instance, some are herdsmen at the same time, and freebooters, others farmers and hunters.' It seems to us strange that Aristotle should class *λῃστεία*, or robbery, among the natural modes of livelihood; but it is not more strange than his regarding slavery as a natural institution. In the earliest historical times of Greece, robbery was regarded as a regular and legitimate occupation. Cf. Thuc. I. 5, who also (I. 11) classes robbery and agriculture together (*ἄνευ λῃστείας καὶ γεωργίας*).

§ 10. *καὶ γὰρ κατά.* 'For in the first stage of reproduction some animals bring forth with their offspring as much food as to be sufficient, until the young can find food for itself, for instance, all animals which produce worms or lay eggs. But all those which bring forth their young alive, have food in themselves for their offspring up to a certain time,—the nature of what is called milk.' The principle of classification which Aristotle here adopts, as in his works on Zoology, is now rejected by Zoologists as comparatively unimportant, viz., that founded on the mode in which animals give birth to their young. Moreover it is not correct. Animals should be divided into oviparous and viviparous. The vermipara are really oviparous. The use of the microscope had not revealed to Aristotle the fact that the eggs of insects are similar in character to those of fish, reptiles, and birds; that is, every egg has a yolk and a germ-cell, the yolk serving as nutriment to the germ. He was also not aware that in vivipara, the embryo is developed from an ovum, similar in its main characteristics to the egg of the ovipara. For Aristotle's distinction between *σκώληξ*, and *ᾠόν*, cf. Hist. Anim., I. v. 3. *Καλεῖται δ' ᾠὸν μὲν τῶν κυημάτων τελείων, ἐξ οὗ γίνεται τὸ γινόμενον ζῷον, ἐκ μορίου τὴν ἀρχήν, τὸ δ' ἄλλο τροφὴ τῷ γινομένῳ ἐστίν. σκώληξ δ' ἐστιν ἐξ οὗ ὅλου ὅλον γίνεται τὸ ζῷον, διαρθρουμένου καὶ αὐξανομένου τοῦ κυήματος.* Cf. also De Gen. Anim., II. i. 9.

§ 11. *καὶ γενομένοις,* 'after they are born also.' Some editors propose to omit these words, but there is no necessity. Nature feeds the embryo; and then, after

the young are born, there is provision made by nature for their food, plants for the sake of animals, animals (for one another and) for man. But for the refutation of these teleological arguments see Darwin, Huxley, Haeckel, Wallace, passim.

§ 12. *εἰ οὖν ἡ φύσις.* Neither the premiss, nor the conclusion of this argument are true. The whole of nature is pervaded with imperfection and futility, as well as with the adaptation of means to ends. For instance, says Darwin, ("Origin of Species," p. 163, sixth Edition),—"The correction for the aberration of light is said by Müller not to be perfect even in that most perfect organ the human eye." Then the doctrine of the conclusion, that all things have been made for man, though very satisfying to man's vanity, and though made by Aristotle the basis of his strange theory about slavery, is really a most monstrous one, pardonable in a Greek, with his limited experience of the world and its inhabitants, but utterly inadmissible now, though still upheld by many. Mr. Wallace in a fine passage of his work on the Malay Archipelago (vol. ii. pp. 223, 224), after describing a specimen of the King Bird of Paradise obtained by him, points out the utter want of connexion between such creatures and man. He concludes thus: "All living things were *not* made for man. Many of them have no relation to him. The cycle of their existence has gone on independently of his, and is disturbed or broken by every advance in man's intellectual development; and their happiness and enjoyments, their loves and hates, their struggles

for existence, their vigorous life and early death, would seem to be immediately related to their own well-being and perpetuation alone, limited only by the equal well-being and perpetuation of the numberless other organisms with which each is more or less intimately connected."

§ 13. ὃ δεῖ ἤτοι ὑπάρχειν. 'So that there must either be ready in the first instance, or household management must provide that there be ready, a store of those things which are necessary for life, and useful for a city or domestic community.' ὃ refers to what is acquired by κτητικὴ, it is the accusative before ὑπάρχειν. The nominative to ὑπάρχῃ is ταῦτα, to be supplied from ὧν; αὐτὴν refers to κτητική.

§ 14. Evil, said Pythagoras, is ἄπειρον, infinite; good is πεπερασμένον, finite. These terms were absorbed into the general contents of Greek Philosophy. Aristotle has a sort of instinctive dread of the ἄπειρον. His doctrine of every science having an end, which is also the good it aims at, is traceable to the Pythagorean notions of number through the influence of language. He constantly speaks of the necessity of a series stopping somewhere; otherwise, he says, εἰς ἄπειρον ἥξει. Cf. Eth. I. ii. 1, III. iii. 16. True wealth is finite, the limit being that which enables a man or a state to live independently (αὐτάρκεια πρὸς ἀγαθὴν ζωήν). Wealth is only an instrument, a means to an end. The end is τὸ εὖ ζῆν. The wealth of households, or of nations, is a number of instruments belonging to the household or the state.

CHAP. IX. "But there is besides, another kind of κτητική, which is properly called χρηματιστική, which is not natural, but comes by experience and art, (δι' ἐμπειρίας τινὸς καὶ τέχνης). Its origin is this: a thing has two kinds of value, value in use, value in exchange. A pair of shoes can be worn, and thus they have a value in use; or they can be exchanged for something else, and thus have a value in exchange. When goods are simply exchanged for each other, an art called μεταβλητική (barter) is called into exercise, which is neither contrary to nature, nor a part of money-making. But from it proceeds καπηλική, retail trade. To facilitate exchange, money was invented. At first it was measured and weighed, then stamped with a mark of its value. The object of καπηλική is to make gain of money by exchange. But the money thus gained has no use in itself; for, like Midas, a man might starve in the midst of gold. There is no limit to this kind of fictitious wealth; it goes on increasing *ad infinitum*. The acquisition of money is to this art, what health is to the healing art. But there is a limit to οἰκονομική, the object of which is to provide the means of life. Many, however, mistake χρηματιστική for οἰκονομική, and continue to amass wealth without end. The reason is, that they strive to live, but not to live well. And they use all the arts, not for their proper end, but as subsidiary to gaining money."

§ 1. διὰ τὴν γειτνίασιν, 'on account of its close connexion with it.'

§ 2. ἀμφότεραι δὲ καθ' αὑτὸ μὲν, 'both are absolute, but not in the same manner.'

§ 4. *ἐστι γὰρ ἡ μεταβλητικὴ.* 'For the art of exchange is applicable to all things, beginning at first from the natural state of things, by reason of men having more of some things and less of others than is sufficient?'

§ 5. *οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν.* 'For, in the first instance, they shared all things the same, but afterwards, when they were separated, they shared many things again that were different. And of these it was necessary to make exchanges, according to their wants, by barter, as many barbarous nations even now do.' Bernays proposes unnecessarily to insert *ἕτεροι* before *ἑτέρων.*

§ 7. *ἐκ μέντοι ταύτης.* 'From this, however, the other (*χρηματιστικὴ*) naturally followed. For depending more for their supplies on countries abroad, by importing those things in which they were deficient, and exporting those things of which they had a superabundance, of necessity they had recourse to the use of money.'

§ 8. *ὃ τῶν χρησίμων αὐτὸ ὄν,* 'which being itself useful, was convenient for the ordinary purposes of life.' Aristotle here seems to recognise the intrinsic value of money. Nor is § 11 inconsistent with this, for he is there speaking of the views held by others. Nevertheless, he did not know the cause of the value of money, viz. the cost of its production. Nor did he see that money when accumulated represents capital, available for the production of future wealth. Failing to see this, he did not see why interest should be paid for the use of money.

§ 9. δι' ἐμπειρίας ἤδη τεχνικώτερον. Cf. 1, δι' ἐμπειρίας τινὸς καὶ τέχνης γίνεται μᾶλλον.

§ 10. δοκεῖ. Here, as elsewhere, this word denotes, not Aristotle's own opinion, but that of others, a received opinion. That it is not his own is proved, because he holds that there is one kind of χρηματιστική, which is natural and proper, and he has himself defined wealth to be πλῆθος ὀργάνων πολιτικῶν καὶ οἰκονομικῶν. Here he mentions the opinion of those who defined it as πλῆθος νομίσματος. But it is another kind of χρηματιστική which is concerned with this, viz. καπηλική.

§ 11. ὅτὲ δὲ πάλιν. 'Again, sometimes money is thought to be worthless and purely conventional, and in no way natural, because, if those who used it altered their standard, it would be worth nothing, nor is it useful for anything that is necessary; and one who is rich in money will often be in want of necessary food.' After τὸν Μίδαν ἐκεῖνον supply ἀπολέσθαι. Aristotle might have insisted more strongly on the intrinsic value of money, which is not affected by any alteration of standard, but only by the raising or lowering of the cost of its production, or the greater or less amount of labour expended in producing it.

διὰ τὴν ἀπληστίαν τῆς εὐχῆς, 'through inability to satisfy his craving.'

§ 12. κατὰ φύσιν goes with χρηματιστικῇ, as well as with πλοῦτος.

ἡ δὲ καπηλικὴ ποιητικὴ χρημάτων. The truth is, that trade no more produces money than any other occupa-

tion does. Money can only be produced by labour. The retail-trader makes money precisely as the farmer does. His profit is the reward he gets for the labour he expends in tying-up parcels, and weighing and measuring, and for the capital he invests in his business. But it was impossible for the ancient mind (and herein Aristotle is no whit in advance of his age) to get rid of their notions of trade being *βάναυσος*, and fit only for slaves, who were necessary evils.

οὐ πάντως ἀλλ' ἢ, 'not in every way, but by the exchange of money.' The *ἢ* is redundant.

§ 13. All this about *χρηματιστική* seems absurd now-a-days. There is no such thing as an art of getting money, and to compare it to medicine, or any other art, is to compare what does not exist with what does. The faculty of accumulating money is one inherent in some men, and is quite independent of the profession or calling each follows. Plato here, as in nearly all other cases, has really much juster notions of political economy than Aristotle. In his first book of the Republic, though he speaks of *χρηματιστικὴ* as a distinct art, which of course it is not, he says that it is always associated with some other art.

§ 15. *ἐπαλλάττει γὰρ ἡ χρῆσις*. 'For the two uses of the money-making art being concerned with the same thing, viz. money, run into one another. For both alike use property, but not in the same way. The end of one is different, but the end of the other is the increase of money.' For *τῆς αὐτῆς χρήσεως κτῆσις*, Bernays pro-

poses to read *τῆς αὐτῆς κτήσεως χρῆσις*. This, at first, seems tempting, but there is no necessity for the change. The rendering given above seems to express the meaning.

§ 16. *τὸ ἕτερον εἶδος*, i.e. *καπηλική*.

§ 17. *τῶν δυναμέων*, 'the arts;' a common use of the word in Aristotle.

§ 18. *ὡς τοῦτο τέλος ὄν*, i.e. to make money. *ἀπαντᾶν*, 'contribute,' like so many paths meeting at a point.

δι' αἰτίαν τίνα, i.e. for purposes of exchange. *αὐτῆς* and *αὐτὴ* refer to *ἡ μὴ ἀναγκαία χρηματιστική*.

CHAP. X. "The question raised in Chapter viii. has now been answered. The money-getting art, i.e. the natural kind, is not identical with, or a part of, economics, but is subsidiary to it; in fact, it is pre-supposed. Nature supplies food, which has to be won. The economist uses it, when won; just as the weaver has not to produce wool, but to use it. As to the non-necessary *χρηματιστική*, there is one branch to be especially condemned, usury. It is, as it were, breeding incestuous offspring. *Τόκος*, interest, is *νόμισμα νομίσματος*."

§ 1. *τὸ ἀποροῦμενον ἐξ ἀρχῆς*. Ch. viii. 1.

ἀλλὰ δεῖ, 'but we must rather pre-suppose the existence of wealth.' *γῆν ἢ θάλατταν* are in apposition to *τροφήν*.

§ 3. *Ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστι μέν*. 'But since, in one way, it is the duty of the economist and the ruler to see also about health, and not in another way, but rather it is the duty

of the physician; so also in one way it is the duty of the economist to see about wealth, and in another way not, but rather it is the duty of that art which is subservient to it. And above all, as has been stated before, this must be furnished beforehand by nature.'

παντὶ γὰρ ἐξ οὗ γίνεται; 'for everything which is born is fed by that which remains over from that from which it is engendered,' cf. ch. viii. 10. In the case of mammals this *τροφὴ* is milk; in the case of oviparous animals the vitelline matter of the egg furnishes the *τροφὴ*.

§ 4. One difficulty in this and the two preceding chapters is, that Aristotle is constantly using the same word in two different meanings. Thus we have been told that *χρηματιστικὴ* is different from *οἰκονομικὴ*; but there are two kinds of *χρηματιστικὴ*, one of which is subservient to *οἰκονομικὴ*, and is, therefore, here called *οἰκονομικὴ*, that is, of or belonging to *ἡ οἰκονομικὴ τέχνη*. Again, here *μεταβλητικὴ* is used as equivalent to *καπηλικὴ*, but ch. ix. 6, it is opposed to it. There it is used as a noun, the art of exchange. Here it is an adjective, agreeing with *χρηματιστικὴ*, the art of money-making, which has to do with exchange. One branch of this is *ὀβολοστατικὴ*, usury; which Aristotle says, 'is most reasonably hated, because the acquisition of money is derived from money itself, and is not applied to that for which it was in the first instance invented,' i.e. the purposes of lawful exchange. As has been before remarked, Aristotle had no conception of money as capital which is accumulated for reproduction. It is almost amusing to see how absurdly he is carried away

by the word τόκος. He might just as well find fault with the farmer for saving some of his corn for seed for next year's harvest, as blame the financier for lending money at interest. The whole range of a Greek's ideas, his knowledge of other languages, of other countries besides his own petty world, was so narrow, that we cannot expect to learn anything from him in such sciences as politics and political economy. But it is interesting to trace the dawn of such enquiries, and to see whence many of the terms we now use first took their origin.

CHAP. XI. contains the divisions of χρηματιστική, and a practical application of the theory of economics. "There are various branches of οἰκονομική χρηματιστική, such as the care of horses, oxen, sheep; husbandry, plough-land, orchards, and vineyards; bee-keeping, rearing of fish and poultry. Under the head of μεταβλητική χρηματιστική come, 1. ἐμπορία, commerce, subdivided into (α) ναυκληρία, shipowning; (β) φορτηγία, the carrying trade; (γ) παράστασις, the sale of goods in shops. 2. τοκισμὸς (= ὀβολοστατική), usury. 3. μισθαρνία, service for hire. This last is subdivided into 1. βάναυσοι τέχναι, mechanical arts; 2. ἄτεχνοι, slavish arts, those which are useful for the body only. There is a third kind of χρηματιστική, intermediate between the first two, viz., timber-cutting and mining, of which there are various sorts. But details of this kind must be left to specialists, like Chares of Paros, and Apollodorus of Lemnos. It will be sufficient to shew the practical use of theoretical knowledge on such subjects as in

the story of Thales and the olive-presses, or the Sicilian who bought up all the iron in Syracuse, and netted 100 per cent. on the sale. These stories shew how advantageous it may be for a state to establish a monopoly to aid its finances. Some statesmen make finance their sole study."

§ 1. *πάντα δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα.* 'But though all such questions admit of being treated freely, theoretically, yet their practical application is limited by circumstances. Now the practical parts of *χρηματιστική* are, first of all, for one to be experienced with regard to stock.' It is hopeless to get a word to translate *χρηματιστική.* 'The art of gain,' 'art of making money,' 'science of finance,' are all unsatisfactory. It is best to keep to the Greek; there is no expression in English corresponding to it. The three previous chapters have explained what it really means.

§ 2. *ψιλῆς τε καὶ πεφυτευμένης,* 'plough-land and land planted with olives or vines.' *ἀφ' ὅσων ἐστι,* 'all those from which it is possible to derive assistance,' i.e. which are useful to man. For this use of *βοηθεία,* cf. ch. ix. 7.

§ 3. *οἰκειοτάτης,* opposed to *ξενικωτέρας* (cf. ix. 7), 'in the strictest sense of the term.'

ναυκληρία, φορτηγία; the difference between these terms is that the *ναύκληρος* owns the vessel and the cargo, the *φορτηγὸς* owns the vessel only, and conveys the goods of the merchant. Both share the risks

of the sea. *παράστασις*, retail trade, is safer, but less profitable, at all events than *ναυκληρία*.

§ 4. *ὅσα ἀπὸ γῆς*. Bernays reads *οὖσα* for *ὅσα*. If *ὅσα* be retained, supply *τούτων*, 'having to do with those things which come from the earth, and with the productions of the earth, which are not to be enjoyed as fruits, but are useful.'

§ 5. *χρήσιμον μὲν πρὸς τὰς ἐργασίας*, 'may be useful for the various occupations, but it is tiresome to dwell on it.'

§ 6. This paragraph is a piece of rhetorical writing very unlike the usual style of Aristotle. When he gets on the subject of either money-lending or the mechanical arts, he almost seems to lose his head.

§ 7. *τὰ λεγόμενα σποράδην*, 'the scattered anecdotes of the ways in which some men have succeeded in making money.' One wonders whether Aristotle related these stories seriously. Certainly they are worthy of the contracted notions he entertained of the nature and use of money.

§ 8. *κατανόημά τι χρηματιστικόν*, 'a happy thought for raising money.'

εὐπορήσαντα χρημάτων ὀλίγων, 'having been successful in some small ventures, he gave earnest-money for all the olive-presses in Miletus and Chios, hiring them for a small sum, inasmuch as no one was bidding against him.'

§ 10. It is a curious thing to see a philosopher like

Aristotle upholding what would now be considered one of the last resources of a rotten government, viz., monopolies. It is the worst and most expensive way of taxing the people.

§ 11. *οὐ πολλὴν ποιήσας ὑπερβολὴν*, 'not raising the price much: but still, on fifty talents he received a hundred,' i.e. he cleared a hundred per cent.

§ 12. *Διονύσιος*, the elder, tyrant of Syracuse, B.C. 406—367.

ὅραμα, 'discovery.' Bernays proposes *εὕρημα* unnecessarily.

CHAP. XII. "Of the three parts of economy, one, that treating of the relation between master and slave, has been already discussed. There remains, 1. the relation between father and child (*πατρική*), 2. The relation between husband and wife (*γαμική*). The former may be compared to the rule of a king over his subjects (*βασιλικῶς*), the latter to that of a magistrate in a free state over his fellow-citizens (*πολιτικῶς*). The main difference in the latter case is this, that in a free state the magistrates hold office for a time only, and then others are appointed, and the rulers and the ruled mutually take each other's place, whereas the woman is always subject to the man. In the free state, the holder of office is only distinguished by outward symbols. And apropos of this is the story of Amasis and the foot-bath: he made an image of it, and commanded his subjects to worship it. This shews that the commonest things may become the badges of authority and power, though the substance remains unchanged."

§ 1. ἐπεὶ δὲ. This is one of those long sentences of Aristotle's which begin with ἐπεί, 'since,' and never finish. The apodosis does not come till the beginning of the next chapter. Cf. ch. iv. 1. Translate, 'now then there are.'

πολιτικῶς, 'as in a constitutional state,' 'as in a republic.'

εἰ μή που συνέστηκε παρὰ φύσιν, 'except where an unnatural state of things exists.'

§ 2. ἐξ ἴσον γὰρ εἶναι βούλεται. 'For the intention is, that they should be equal by nature and not differ. But, nevertheless, when one rules, and the other is ruled, it is required that there should be a difference in outward appearance, form of speech, and other marks of honour.' βούλεται, ζητεῖ are here used impersonally. Cf. III. vi. 4.

Ἄμασις εἶπε. Herod. ii. 172.

§ 3. φύσει γὰρ τὸν βασιλέα. 'For the king must be superior naturally, but by birth he must be the same.'

CHAP. XIII. "Economy, then, is more concerned with the various relations of men to each other, than with the acquisition of wealth, and it has more to do with the free than with slaves. Now comes in a question with regard to slaves. Is a slave capable of virtue? If he is, how does he differ from a free man? If he is not, how is he a man? There is the same difficulty with respect to women and children, and generally with

respect to those who rule, and those who are ruled. The virtues of women are not the same as those of men, or at least they are not exercised in the same manner, and those of children are imperfect. So a slave must have virtue, but not of the same kind as the free man. The slave has not the power of deliberation; the woman has it, but it needs authority and confirmation (ἄκυρον). In the child it is undeveloped (ἀτελές). The slave is for use, and therefore only needs just so much virtue as not to fail in the performance of his duties. Have mechanics virtue? They often fall short in their work, anyhow, through vice. The mechanic is farther removed from virtue than the slave. The latter shares the life of the free man. Not so the mechanic. The master then is the cause of virtue in the slave, but this is effected not by instructing him how to do his work, but by admonishing him to do it. As to the virtue of men and women, parents and children, the consideration of this must be postponed till farther on."

§ 1. τὴν τῆς κτήσεως, 'the excellence of possessions.'

§ 2. ἕξεων, 'states of mind.'

§ 5. φανερὸν τοίνυν. 'It is plain then that both (the ruler and the ruled) must partake of virtue, but there are differences in this, as there are differences in the various classes of those, who are by nature formed to obey.' There is a different kind of virtue for the slave, the woman, the child.

§ 6. καὶ τοῦτο εὐθὺς ὑφήγηται. 'And this has been laid down at the outset in the case of the soul.' (Cf. chap.

v. 6). 'For in this there is by nature a ruling principle, and something which is ruled, and of these two we say there is a distinct virtue, as of that which has reason and of the irrational. It is evident then that it is the same in other things also; so that by nature most things are divided into those which rule, and those which are ruled.'

§ 8. *Διὸ τὸν μὲν ἄρχοντα.* 'Therefore the ruler ought to have perfect moral virtue (for the work belongs absolutely to the supreme designer, and reason is supreme), and of the rest each must have as much as falls to his share.' That is, moral virtue implies the exercise of reason. In the Ethics the virtues are said to be developed *κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον.*

§ 9. *καθάπερ φέρετο Σωκράτης.* In Plato's Republic, Bk. V. Here, as elsewhere, Plato is the truer philosopher. His theory of the equality of men and women seems indeed prophetical of many of the changes now going on in society. It may be quite true that men's faculties are superior to those of women, just as some races of men are undoubtedly superior to others; but as nearly all civilized nations have agreed to abolish slavery, it would seem that the day is not far distant when the subjection of women will also cease.

§ 10. *καθόλου γὰρ οἱ λέγοντες.* Here, again, the allusion is to Plato; cf. Meno, p. 71, B.—p. 73, C., where virtue is said to be a whole, and not to consist of a number of separate virtues.

§ 11. *ὁ ποιητής.* Soph. Aj., 293.

ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ παῖς ἀτελής. 'But since the child is undeveloped, it is evident that his virtue also is not independent, but is in relation to the fully-developed and guiding parent.'

§ 12. ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις. Aristotle would make the mechanic lower even than the slave. The latter has at least the privilege of associating with his master. If Aristotle could be alive now, how he would stand amazed at the political power of the artisan in the present day! But it is only since the time of the French Revolution, that the brotherhood of men and the nobility of labour has become fully recognised, though St. Paul announced it.

§ 13. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ δοῦλος. 'For while the slave shares the life of his master, the artisan stands further aloof, and only attains to virtue in so far as his state is that of a slave. For the mechanical artisan has a kind of distinct slavery. And, while the slave falls under one of the natural divisions of mankind, no shoemaker or other artisan does.' It is difficult to say, which has had the most injurious effect on mankind, the logic of Aristotle, or these vulgar notions of caste. The one paralysed men's intellect and delayed the advance of the inductive philosophy, the other helped to harden their hearts against justice and humanity.

§ 14. φανερὸν τοίνυν. 'It is evident, then, that the master ought to be the cause of such virtue in the slave, and not one who merely acts the master by teaching him his work. Therefore they are wrong who forbid speaking to slaves, and who say, one should only set them their task. For slaves ought to be admonished more than children.'

τὴν διδασκαλικὴν τῶν ἔργων. Cf. ch. vii. 2. To teach slaves was a slave's duty. Bernays reads *τὸν* before *τήν.*

οἱ λέγοντες. The allusion here again is to Plato in the Republic.

§ 15. *ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰς πολιτείας,* 'must be discussed in dealing with the different forms of government.'

§ 16. *ἐν ἄλλοις,* in Books IV(VII.), V(VIII.).

SUMMARY OF BOOK III.

THIS book passes on from the consideration of the family to that of the state, and the different forms of government.

CHAPS. I., II. Definition of a citizen.

CHAP. III. What is a city?

CHAP. IV. Is the excellence of a good man and a good citizen the same?

CHAP. V. Considers those classes in the state, the members of which are not entitled to be called citizens.

CHAPS. VI., VII. The various kinds of constitution which exist, whether normal or abnormal, are distinguished.

CHAP. VIII. A discussion of points which bring out into stronger relief the difference between oligarchy and democracy.

CHAP. IX. Discusses the claims of the various parties in the state to have the chief share in the government.

CHAPS. X., XI. The government of the many is to be preferred to that of the few, or of one man, with certain exceptions.

CHAPS. XII., XIII. Apparently a separate treatise, which has been incorporated into the main work, on justice or the good of the state. The advantage of ostracism as a safeguard of the constitution is pointed out.

CHAPS. XIV., XV. The five different kinds of monarchy,

which are shewn to be ultimately resolvable into two, viz. constitutional and absolute monarchy. Whether it is best to be governed by the best man or by the best laws, and by one man or by many. The transition from monarchy to democracy. The king's body-guard.

CHAPS. XVI., XVII. A comparison of absolute monarchy with government vested in the hands of the multitude ruling by law. The superiority of the latter generally is shewn. A man of transcendent genius and virtue is however an exception, and where he is found, he ought always to rule.

CHAP. XVIII. Recapitulation.

It cannot fail to be seen, that the work as we have it is imperfect. It is full of repetitions and contradictions, which make it often hard to discern what Aristotle's precise opinion was on many points. But in spite of this, as we read on, we find our conceptions gradually growing clearer, and gaps getting filled up. As Aristotle tells us himself in the Ethics, his method is that of a painter, who in a few bold strokes gives us the outline of a picture, and then goes back and fills in the details, sometimes rubbing out a line, sometimes adding one, and always deepening the contrast of light and shadow. But, like many good pictures, this one remains unfinished.

NOTES TO BOOK III.

CHAP. I. "What is a city? An aggregation of citizens. What is a citizen? He differs according to the kind of city of which he is a member, as it is a democracy, for instance, or an oligarchy. Adopted citizens must be excluded. Residence does not make a citizen. For then metœcs and slaves would be included. Nor does citizenship consist in the right to sue and be sued in the courts of the city. For those who are connected with a city by treaty (*ἀπὸ συμβόλων*) would be included. These last functions, however, partake of the nature of citizenship, but those who hold them are imperfect citizens, like children and the very old. A full citizen is defined by his sharing judicial and executive power (*τῷ μετέχειν κρίσεως καὶ ἀρχῆς*). There are different forms of government, some right, others erroneous. The definition just given will apply to a citizen in all of them, if we correct it so far as to say, that a citizen is one who has power given him by the constitution to share in deliberative or judicial government (*ᾧ ἐξουσία κοινωνεῖν ἀρχῆς βουλευτικῆς ἢ κριτικῆς*). A city is an aggregate of such citizens, large enough for independence of life."

§ 1. *νῦν γὰρ ἀμφισβητοῦσιν.* 'For now there is a difference of opinion.'

τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ. 'And we see that the statesman and the legislator's whole concern is for the city. And

the constitution is a sort of arrangement of those who dwell in the city.'

§ 3. *ποιητοὺς πολίτας*, 'adopted citizens;' *μέτοικοι*, translated by Grote 'resident aliens,' those who lived in a city, pursuing some occupation there, but not admitted to the rights of citizenship. They were best known at Athens.

§ 4. *τοῖς ἀπὸ συμβόλων κοινωνοῦσιν*, 'those who share the rights of citizenship by virtue of treaties.' *Σύμβολα* were treaties between independent states, whereby they agreed that the citizens of one state should, in disputed points arising out of their commercial dealings, sue and be sued in the courts of another. They were so called from the (*σύμβολα*) tokens, which were exchanged in ratification of the treaty. Such treaties existed between Athens and her independent allies. Cf. Thuc. I. 77. 1. *καὶ ἐλασσούμενοι γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ξυμβολαίαις πρὸς τοὺς ξυμμάχους δίκαις καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις νόμοις ποιήσαντες τὰς κρίσεις φιλοδικεῖν φιλοῦμεν.*

πολλαχοῦ, as at Athens.

προστάτην, 'patron.' A metœc had to be represented by an Athenian citizen in a law-court. He could not bring an action in his own person. Cf. Soph. Œ. R. 411. *ὥστ' οὐ Κρέοντος προστάτου γεγράψομαι.*

§ 5. *ἐγγεγραμμένους*, 'enrolled' in the *κατάλογος*, or list of full citizens.

ἀφειμένους, discharged from the obligation to serve as soldiers, 'struck off the roll.'

παρηκμακότας, 'disqualified by age.'

τὸ λεγόμενον, 'the meaning is plain.' (Cf. I. i. 8.) 'For we are seeking him who is absolutely a citizen, and one who is liable to no such objection, implying need of correction.'

§ 6. τῶν δ' ἀρχῶν. 'And of magistracies some are limited in duration, so that some may not be held by the same man twice at all, or only at certain definite intervals. Others again are unlimited, as, for instance, the office of a judge, or member of the assembly.'

§ 7. τοὺς κυριωτάτους, 'those who have the most absolute power.'

ἀνώνυμον γὰρ τὸ κοινόν. 'For there is no term jointly applicable to the dicast and ecclesiast, by which we can name them both.'

§ 8. ὁ μὲν οὖν μάλιστ' ἂν ἐφαρμόσας. 'Such then is the description of a citizen, which is most applicable to all the kinds of citizens that are mentioned. But it must not be forgotten, that of those things in which the instances given differ in kind, and one of them is first, another second, and another third, there is either no common term at all embracing them, or it is only applicable in a restricted sense. And we see the actual forms of constitution of a state differing in kind from one another, and some of them posterior, while others are anterior. For those that are erroneous, and that deviate from the true type, must be posterior to those which are free from error.'

§ 9. *ὕστερον ἔσται φανερόν.* Ch. vii. 5.

§ 10. *ἐνίαις γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι δῆμος.* 'For some have no commune, nor do they have an ordinary assembly, but only deputies extraordinarily convened.'

τὰς τῶν συμβολαίων, 'civil processes.'

ἐφόρων, the council of five, executive magistrates in civil matters.

οἱ γέροντες, the senate of twenty members, or twenty-two including the kings. For the Spartan constitution see II. ix.

§ 11. *περὶ Καρχήδονα*; cf. II. xi. 7.

ταῖς ἄλλοις πολιτείαις, i.e. other than democracies.

ὁ ἀόριστος ἄρχων, 'he whose office is unlimited in point of time.'

ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ὡρισμένος, 'one whose term of office is strictly defined.' In a democracy, all the citizens are members of the popular assembly, and serve as judges all their lives; but in oligarchies and aristocracies, only those citizens exercise the above functions who are appointed to them, and then only for certain definite periods of time.

§ 12. *ἱκανὸν πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ζωῆς,* 'sufficient for independence of life.' That is, there must not be too few of those who have power to deliberate and judge, but enough to give the life of the state and its citizens free

play. In Nic. Ethics, I. vii. 7, Aristotle defines *αὐταρκής* as *ὃ μονούμενον αἱρετὸν ποιεῖ τὸν βίον καὶ μηδενὸς ἐνδεᾶ*, and he says, that one man by himself is not *αὐταρκής*. He must have wife, children, friends, and fellow-citizens; his life must be invested with certain surroundings, or it will cease to be human. Moreover, it is implied that the life must be *κατ' ἀρετὴν*, in accordance with the law of excellence. Cf. ch. i. 12, of this book.

CHAP. II. "A citizen, say some, must be one whose parents are both citizens. Some add grand-parents, or great-grand-parents. But there must be a limit in this. Indeed, it cannot apply to the first founders of a city at all. Again, when a constitution is changed, as Cleisthenes changed that of the Athenians, are the newly-drafted, citizens? Are they so justly or unjustly? They are at all events citizens."

§ 1. *τοῦτ' ἐπὶ πλέον ζητοῦσιν*, 'seek to extend this farther.' *πολιτικῶς· καὶ ταχέως*, 'in an ordinary and cursory way.' But the correction of Bernays, *ταχέως* for *ταχέως*, 'roughly, in outline,' appears almost certain. *τρίτον ἐκεῖνον*, cf. for the reverse of this, the slave of three generations, Soph. Œd. Tyr. 1162. *οὐδ' ἂν εἰ τρίτης ἐγὼ μητρὸς φανῶ τρίδουλος.*

§ 2. *Γοργίας μὲν οὖν ὁ Λεοντῖνος.* 'Gorgias of Leontini then, partly, perhaps, raising a question, and partly speaking ironically, said that, as mortars were those which were made by mortar-makers, so also Larissæans were those who were made by the burgomasters. For there were, he said, at Larissa certain persons called

Larissa-makers (kettle-makers).' Gorgias, the sophist of Leontini, after whom one of Plato's dialogues is named, resided once at Larissa, in Thessaly.

§ 8. *μετεῖχον*, the nominative is to be supplied from *τρίτον ἐκεῖνον ἢ τέταρτον. τὸν ῥηθέντα διορισμόν*, i.e. in ch. i. 12.

Κλεισθένης, i.e. in B.C. 509, when the Peisistratidæ were expelled.

δούλους καὶ μετοίκους. The *καὶ* is supplied conjecturally by Bekker in his second edition. Bernays retains the old reading, *δούλους μετοίκους*, 'slaves who had been enfranchised, and attained to the status of metœcs, or private citizens, without the right of voting,' like the Neodamodes at Sparta. In his edition of the so-called letters of Heracleitus, p. 155, he says they are equivalent to *ἀπελεύθεροι*, and that *δοῦλοι μέτοικοι* are here opposed to *ξένοι μέτοικοι*, a combination, which occurs in Soph. Œd. Tyr. 452, *ξένος λόγῳ μέτοικος, εἶτα δ' ἐγγενὴς φανήσεται Θηβαῖος*, and Ar. Eq. 347. *εἶκου δικαίδιον εἶτας εὖ κατὰ ξένου μετοίκου.* Here the *μετοίκους* must be taken as going both with *ξένους* and *δούλους*, 'metœcs from amongst the strangers and slaves.'

CHAP. III. "Whether these ought justly to be called citizens or not, leads us back to the question as to what constitutes a city? It is not extent of walls; for the Peloponnesus might be surrounded by wall, but it would not be a city. Babylon is not a city, for part of it did not know that the rest was captured for three days. Is a city the same, the same people inhabiting it, or no-

ther the same race, as a river is the same, so long as it is fed from the same sources? It is change of constitution which changes a city, just as a chorus is changed from tragic to comic; though it is composed of the same men, it is different. So a harmony is different if the notes, though the same, are differently arranged, as in the Dorian or Phrygian measure."

§ 1. *τὴν εἰρημένην πρότερον ἀμφισβήτησιν*, i.e. in ch. i. 1.

§ 2. *τὰ συμβόλαια διαλύειν*, 'to fulfil their contracts.' This question was brought to a practical issue after the close of the civil war in America. The United States Government rightly declined to recognise the Confederate States' bonds.

λαβόντος, 'as though the tyrant and not the city has received the benefit.'

κατὰ τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, i.e. when the government is established by conquest, and not with a view to the common interest of the citizens. The forcible establishment of democracy at Samos by Pericles would be a case in point. Thuc. I. 115.

§§ 3—5. "The question as to when the state is the same or not, occurs when citizens of the same state live in different places. But since the word *πόλις* is used in different senses, meaning sometimes a city and sometimes a state, it is plain that place has nothing to do with it. (Sparta, for instance, was a collection of scattered villages, but was always reckoned as one *πόλις*.) On the other hand, the men may all dwell in one place,

as in Peloponnesus, supposing it were surrounded by a wall, or in Babylon. But Babylon should be rather called a nation (ἔθνος) than a city (πόλις)."

§ 5. ἧς γέ φασιν ἑαλωκυίας, cf. Her. i. 191, where, however, the precise time is not mentioned.

§§ 6, 7. εἰς ἄλλον καιρόν. This point is discussed in Book IV(VII.), iv.

"Another point to be considered is, whether the city is the same, as long as the same race inhabits it, though one generation dies and another takes its place, just as a river or a spring is the same, though the water is always changing. The answer to this is that the city is the same, so long as the constitution is the same; different, when the constitution is changed. This is shewn by the parallel instance of the chorus of a play. Whether the *name* of the city is changed or not, makes no difference." We cannot draw the line hard-and-fast as Aristotle here does. England would still be England, if a republic were established to-morrow instead of a monarchy. But the effect of government makes itself felt in time. Alsace and Lorraine became more or less French through being under French rule for a long period, though the people were still of the German race, and spoke the German language.

CHAP. IV. In this chapter, the question is discussed whether the excellence of a good man and a good citizen is the same. It is shewn that "the one differs from the other, (1.) from the example of a ship, in which all the crew have not the same function, but yet all have to look

to the safety of the ship. So in a state, all the citizens, though differing, have to look to the safety of the state. And this depends on the constitution. So the virtue of the citizen varies according to the constitution; but the virtue of the individual is always the same. (2.) The same conclusion may be arrived at by a consideration of the best constitution. In this, every citizen must perform his work well; but it does not therefore follow that all the citizens are good men. (3.) A city is a compound whole, consisting of many parts, each of which has its peculiar excellence, just as an animal consists of soul and body, or soul of reason and desire. The excellence of all the citizens, then, cannot be the same, any more than of all the members of a chorus. But in one particular case there will be identity of excellence, viz. in the case of the ruler, whose peculiar excellence is wisdom (*φρόνησις*), which is also the excellence of the good man. But the ordinary citizen is one who is able both to rule and to obey. The rule of a citizen over his fellow-citizens is different from that of a master over his slave. The master need not know how to do the thing which he commands, but only how to avail himself of his slave's services. It is slavish to labour at menial employments; but the citizen must learn to rule by obeying. He must pass through both stages, and to each there will correspond a different kind of virtue. Just so, the virtue of a man differs from that of a woman. Wisdom is the virtue of the ruler, true opinion of him who obeys." The whole of this discussion tends to shew how closely

interwoven politics were with ethics in Aristotle's time. The individual is merged in the citizen still, but he is gradually getting to be regarded apart, and by himself.

§ 1. ἐχόμενόν ἐστιν, 'the next point is.' τυχεῖν δεῖ ζητήσεως, 'if this point is to obtain an investigation.' ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πολίτου σπουδαίου, 'a good man and a worthy citizen.' There is no opposition between ἀγαθὸς and σπουδαῖος, they are nearly identical.

§ 2. τὴν δύναμιν, 'in their functions.' Δύναμις is used in many senses in Aristotle. 1. It is opposed to ἐνέργεια, as potentiality to actuality. Thus the statue exists potentially (δυνάμει) in the block of marble from which it is hewn. When it is hewn, it is a statue, ἐνεργείᾳ. 2. It is opposed to ἕξις, as a faculty to a permanent state. Thus we have a δύναμις of sight, and also of doing moral actions. By constantly doing actions in a certain way (ἐνεργοῦντες), by exercising our faculties, we develope a certain ἕξις, or permanent state, which may be either good or bad. 3. It is almost equivalent to τέχνη, as in this passage. 4. It means 'power,' as in IV(VII). xi. 4. ἡ δὲ τῶν ὑδάτων καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος δύναμις τοιαύτην ἔχει τὴν φύσιν.

δῆλον ὡς ὁ μὲν ἀκριβέστατος, 'it is evident that the most exact description of the excellence of each will be peculiar to each, but there will be likewise a common description applying to all alike.'

§ 3. πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν, 'will be dependent on the constitution,'

μίαν εἶναι τὴν τελείαν, 'it is not possible that there should be one single, the perfect excellence.'

§ 4. *ἐπελθεῖν τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον*, 'however, we may also investigate the same question in another way, by proceeding to the discussion of the best form of constitution.' This introduces the *second* argument mentioned above.

§ 5. *ἐπεὶ δ' ἀδύνατον*. The *δὲ* marks the apodosis, and must be omitted in translation. Bernays proposes *ἐπειδή*, for which there is no occasion.

§ 6. The *third* argument begins here. *κορυφαίου καὶ παραστάτου*, 'the leader of the chorus and the man that stands next to him.'

§ 7. *ἀλλ' ἆρ' ἔσται τινὸς*, 'will there then be *any* case in which.' *τινὸς* is masculine, in apposition to *πολίτου καὶ ἀνδρός*.

§ 8. *εὐθύς*, 'from the first.' *Εὐριπίδης*. The words quoted are from the Æolus. The full lines are:—

μή μοι τὰ κομψὰ ποικίλοι γενοίατο,
ἀλλ' ὧν πόλει δεῖ, μεγάλα βουλεύοιντ' ἀεί.

§ 9. *καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἴσως*, 'and for this reason perhaps Jason said he was famished, when he was not tyrant, because he did not know how to be a private citizen.' Jason was tyrant of Pheræ, in Thessaly, B.C. 375.

§ 10. *εἶναι*, dependent on some word like *δοκεῖ* to be supplied from *ἐπαινεῖται*. Bernays proposes to insert *δοκεῖ* before *δοκίμου*.

ἄμφω, i.e. that of ruling and obeying.

§ 11. *ἐπεὶ οὖν ποτὲ δοκεῖ ἀμφότερα,* 'since, then, there seems to be room for both sometimes.' There seems no reason here for altering the text. Bernays proposes *ἄμφω ἕτερα* for *ἀμφότερα,* and Susemihl *ἀποδέχεσθαι δεῖ* for *ποτε δοκεῖ. τοὐντεῦθεν,* 'what comes next.' He now proceeds to point out the difference between *ἀρχὴ δεσποτικὴ* and *ἀρχὴ πολιτικήν.*

ἃ ποιεῖν ἐπίστασθαι, cf. I. vii. 2—4.

§ 12. *ὁ βάναυσος τεχνίτης,* 'the vulgar artisan.' *οἱ δημιουργοί,* 'operatives.'

πρὶν δῆμον γενέσθαι τὸν ἔσχατον, 'before democracy was introduced in its extreme form.' There was perhaps, after all, some reason for Aristotle's dislike and dread of the operative classes. In his time they were totally uneducated, and were ignorant probably of reading and writing. At the present day, the ordinary artisan with his newspaper is quite as capable of judging on political matters, as the average, educated Athenian citizen. Aristotle seems here almost to identify the slave and the mechanic, though in I. xiii. he points out the distinction between them. Cf. also ch. v. 3. of this book.

§ 13. *οὕτως* is the emphatic word here. 'The good man then must not learn the works of those who are governed in this way (i.e. as slaves), nor must the statesman, nor the good citizen, except sometimes for the sake of his own personal needs, because, in this case, the relation of master and slave no longer exists.'

§ 14. The rule of a citizen over his fellow-citizens is learned first by obeying, just as a man learns to be a general by beginning as a private soldier, and passing through the various stages of promotion. The ἀρχὴ δεσποτικὴ has been shewn, on the contrary, to consist merely in issuing orders, and does not in the least imply a knowledge how to execute them.

§ 15. ἐπ' ἀμφότερα, 'on both sides,' i.e. as ruler and ruled.

§ 16. καὶ ἀνδρὸς δὴ ἀγαθοῦ ἄμφω. 'And both belong to the good man, and if there is a distinct kind of temperance and justice belonging to a ruler, it will belong to the good man. For in the case of one who is ruled, though free, it is evident that there cannot be one and the same virtue, as for instance justice, for the good man, as for the ruler; but it will vary, according as one is a ruler or ruled, just as the temperance and courage of a man and woman are different.' Bernays translates καὶ εἰ, 'although,' as if it were εἰ καί. He also proposes to insert ἄρχοντος καὶ before ἀρχομένου, but this, again, is not necessary to the sense, though it might make it clearer.

§ 17. κοσμία=σώφρων. Cf. Eth. II. viii. 8, where κοσμιότης is used as synonymous with σωφροσύνη.

ἡ δὲ φρόνησις. Of the four cardinal virtues, Wisdom, Courage, Temperance, Justice, the first alone is said to be peculiar to the ruler. In this Aristotle agrees with Plato in the Republic. But with Plato, the Guardians or Rulers are a distinct class. In Eth. VI. v. 5, Pericles is given as an example of the φρόνιμος.

§ 18. ὁ δ' ἄρχων αὐλητὴς ὁ χρώμενος; 'but the ruler is the flute-player, who uses the instrument.'

CHAP. V. "Is the base mechanic to be reckoned a citizen? For he is not a resident alien nor a foreigner. But neither is a slave or a freedman, and they are not citizens. We need not call those citizens, without whom the city cannot exist. Children are imperfect citizens. The base mechanic will not be a citizen in the best state. For the good citizen will be exempt from drudgery. But the mechanic may be a citizen in an oligarchy or timocracy, where citizens are reckoned by their wealth, and not by virtue and moral worth. In Thebes, no one could hold office, who had not kept aloof from trade for ten years. In some states foreigners are included among the citizens. In some democracies, he is a citizen whose mother is a citizen. In others, bastards are citizens. But, as population increases, the children of slaves on the father's or mother's side are excluded, and only those are admitted, who are descended from citizens on both sides. It is only then in an aristocracy that the good man and the good citizen will be the same, and even then, it is only in the ruler that the two will be identical."

§ 1. τῶν ἀποριῶν. These are questions or objections started. Cf. Grant's Arist. Eth., vol. i. p. 380, "They are a mode of testing some general definition, by bringing forward apparent exceptions to it; they are merely an intellectual instrument for obtaining clearness of conception." Again, p. 395, "Whatever use Aristotle

may make of his ἀπορίαι, of appeals to language and experience, of the authority of the many and the few, these are only means of testing, correcting, illustrating, and amplifying his conceptions, and not the source from whence they spring."

οὐχ οἷόν τε παντὸς εἶναι πολίτου, 'it is not possible that every citizen can have such virtue as we have described, i.e. which is found in ruling and being ruled by turns; for this man is a citizen,' (and yet he does not rule).

§ 2. Ἢ διά γε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον, 'Or shall we deny that there is any absurdity in this? For slaves do not come under the above-mentioned classes, (i.e. μέτοικοι and ξένοι,) nor freedmen, and yet they are necessary elements in the state.'

οἱ δ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, 'the others only provisionally.'

§ 3. ὅσοι τῶν ἔργων εἰσὶν ἀφειμένοι τῶν ἀναγκαίων, 'as many as are released from tasks of drudgery.'

§ 4. τῶν δ' ἀναγκαίων, 'and with respect to tasks of drudgery.' The construction of this genitive is awkward. Bernays proposes τῶν ἄλλων. But one sees that, beginning the sentence with an intention of dividing the tasks, the writer changes and divides those who execute them into two classes.

οἱ μὲν ἑνὶ λειτουργοῦντες, cf. I. xiii. 13. ὁ γὰρ βάναυσος τεχνίτης ἀφωρισμένην τινὰ ἔχει δουλείαν. Here λειτουργοῦντες is not used in its technical sense of performing a service to the state, such as the trierarchy or choragia, but in a more general sense of 'serving.'

αὐτὸ γὰρ φανὲν, 'for what has been said previously makes it plain at first sight.' The reference is to chap. i. 9.

§ 5. *ἐν μέν τινι πολιτείᾳ*, at Athens, for instance. The fourth class under the Solonian constitution was called *θῆτες*. These were admitted to the full rights of citizenship by the constitution of Cleisthenes.

οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τ' ἐπιτηδεῦσαι τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς. In I. xiii. he has discussed the question how far a slave is capable of *ἀρετή*.

§ 6. *ἀπὸ τιμημάτων γὰρ μακρῶν*, 'for there a right to participate in the government depends on a high property qualification.'

§ 7. *ἐν Θήβαις δὲ νόμος ἦν*. At Rome, a law was introduced by Q. Claudius, tribune of the people, between the first and second Punic wars, that no senator or senator's son should have a merchant-ship of more than 300 amphoræ burden. Cf. Liv. xxi. 63.

προσεφέλκεται καὶ τῶν ξένων, 'obtrudes even strangers into the rights of citizenship.' *τῶν ξένων*, the partitive genitive.

§ 8. *τοὺς ἀπὸ γυναικῶν*, 'those who are citizens on the mother's side only.'

παραιροῦνται, 'exclude.'

§ 9. *Ὅμηρος ἐποίησεν*, Il. ix. 648. Achilles said that Agamemnon treated him 'as a settler without civic rights.'

ἀλλ' ὅπου τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐπικεκρυμμένον ἐστι. 'But where this disqualification is kept in the background, it is for the sake of deceiving those who are dwelling in the same city.' It is not clear what reference is intended here. A case in point would be that of the assembly of 5,000 under the government of the Four Hundred at Athens, towards the close of the Peloponnesian war, B.C. 411. The main body of the citizens was virtually disfranchised, but the oligarchical government deceived them, by always saying they were going to summon them to the assembly, while no one knew who was, and who was not included in the 5,000. Cf. Thuc. viii. 92, 11. ἐπεκρύπτοντο γὰρ ὅμως ἔτι τῶν πεντακισχιλίων τῷ ὀνόματι, μὴ ἄντικρυς δῆμον ὄστις βούλεται ἄρχειν ὀνομάζειν, φοβούμενοι μὴ τῷ ὄντι ὦσι καὶ πρὸς τινὰ εἰπὼν τίς τι ἀγνοίᾳ σφαλῇ. καὶ οἱ τετρακόσιοι διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἤθελον τοὺς πεντακισχιλίους, οὔτε εἶναι οὔτε μὴ ὄντας δήλους εἶναι, τὸ μὲν καταστῆσαι μετόχους τοσούτους ἄντικρυς ἂν δῆμον ἡγούμενοι, τὸ δ' αὖ ἀφανὲς φόβον ἐς ἀλλήλους παρέξειν. It is clear, at all events, that the reference cannot be to deceiving the metœcs, for surely there could be no doubt as to their status. There is just a question whether it may not refer to the metœcs concealing their condition and passing themselves off as citizens. Cf. IV(VII). iv. 14. ἔτι δὲ ξένοις καὶ μετοίκοις ῥᾴδιον μεταλαμβάνειν τῆς πολιτείας· οὐ γὰρ χαλεπὸν τὸ λανθάνειν διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τοῦ πλήθους. But this refers to a very large state. No one would pretend that this could be the case in any actual state in Greece, such as Athens. And it is not easy to see what the point of the remark would be.

But to speak of an oligarchical clique keeping their fellow-citizens in the dark as to their practical disfranchisement, is an allusion to an artifice actually employed, once at least, in the course of Grecian history.

§ 10. *τινὸς μὲν πόλεως*, i.e. in an aristocracy. *κἀκεῖνος*, 'and there,' i.e. in an aristocracy, 'not every one, but the statesman, and he who controls, or is able to control, either by himself or with the aid of others, the management of public affairs.'

CHAP. VI. He now proceeds to discuss the various kinds of constitution, first defining what is meant by the constitution, which is determined by the governing body in the state. This leads him, by the way, to consider first the object for which the state exists. "This is *τὸ ζῆν καλῶς*, or the ideal life, though bare existence is sweet, and the maintenance of it is a sufficient cause to draw men together. In the first place, then, there is a distinction in the various kinds of constitution, analogous to the difference between *δεσποτεία*, the relation of master and slave, and *οἰκονομική*, the relation of father to child, or husband to wife. The master rules the slave, mainly for his own benefit, only incidentally for the slave's benefit, that is, for the sake of preserving a valuable piece of property. But the manager of a household rules it for the common benefit of the household, including himself incidentally; just as the trainer and the pilot look to the interest of those who are under them, while incidentally they share in the benefit derived from their art. Constitutions, then, according to this analogy, may be divided into those in

which the ruling body looks to the interest of those over whom it rules, and those in which it looks solely to its own interest. The former are called *ὀρθαί*, right; the latter, *ἡμαρτημέναι*, wrong, or *παρεκβάσεις*, abnormal forms." Aristotle takes occasion to mention, incidentally, the tendency, in his time, of public men to seek office for the sake of emolument.

§ 1. *τῆς κυρίας πάντων*, 'the sovereign power of all.' *τὸ πολίτευμα*, 'the body politic.'

§ 2. *τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τοῦτον ἐροῦμεν λόγον*, 'and we shall speak of the rest also in the same manner, with reference, that is, to the sovereign power.'

καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς εἴδη πόσα, 'and how many kinds of government there are relating to man in his social intercourse,'—that is, excluding *οἰκονομία* and *δισποτεία*. Bernays proposes to read *κατὰ* instead of *καὶ* before *κοινωνίαν*; and as the words are often confused in the MSS., it is not unlikely, though by no means certain that he is right.

§ 3. *κατὰ τοὺς πρώτους λόγους*, cf. I. ii. 10.

τῆς παρ' ἀλλήλων βοηθείας. As has been said in a previous note, Plato, in his Republic, says that the supply of their mutual wants first drew men together; and the analogy of other gregarious animals would rather seem to shew it. To say that men live together in cities because they are naturally social animals seems very like arguing in a circle, though Aristotle tries, in Book I. ii., to prove it teleologically. But speculation on this point is comparatively idle, until

more light has been thrown on the early history of the human race. At all events, in what follows, Aristotle admits that the sense of a common interest helps to draw and keep men together. And, on the other hand, Plato's description of the house-builder, the shoemaker, the farmer, and the weaver, laying their heads together to form a state, is absurd, and was probably never intended to be serious.

καθ' ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει μέρος ἑκάστῳ, 'just in proportion as each attains to the ideal life.' *τὸ συμφέρον* is always classed by Aristotle with *τὸ καλόν*. The more men become penetrated with an enlightened sense of the public interest, the nearer they are to attaining the ideal of *τὸ ζῆν καλῶς*.

§ 4. *συνέρχονται δὲ καὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκεν αὐτοῦ*. cf. I. i. 8. *γινομένη μὲν οὖν τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκεν, οὖσα δε τοῦ εὖ ζῆν*.

ἴσως γὰρ ἔνεστί τι τοῦ καλοῦ μόριον, 'for perhaps there is an element of the beautiful in this,' i.e. in bare existence.

ἂν μὴ τοῖς χαλεποῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον ὑπερβάλλῃ λίαν, 'unless the hardships of life be too burdensome.' *ὑπερβάλλῃ* is used impersonally, or with an ellipse of *τις*, as frequently in Aristotle. Cf. I. xii. 2.

§ 5. *ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις*. For a full discussion on these, see Appendix B. vol. i. of Grant's Ethics. Summing up, he says, "That Aristotle always uses the phrase generically, in a sense capable of including both his own, not strictly scientific writings, and also the informal and dialectical discussions of other men.

In Pol. III. vi. 5. he indicates by it the results arrived at by the extra-scholastic discussions and theories of the day." Translate, 'in the popular treatises.'

§ 6. *κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς*, 'incidentally.'

§ 9, 10. *Διὸ καὶ τὰς πολιτικὰς ἀρχάς.* 'Wherefore also, when the constitution is founded on the equality of the citizens and identity of rights, they require that the public offices of the state shall be held in rotation, in the first instance, as the nature of the case implies, requiring that they should discharge public burdens in turns, and that some one should in turn look after their interests, as formerly they themselves, when in office, looked after his. But now, owing to the emoluments derived from the public funds, and those of office, men wish to retain office permanently, just as if it were the case that the magistrates, even if of sickly constitution, were always in good health while in office. For then perhaps they might run after office.' Cf. Plat. Rep. I. p. 347. *ἐπεὶ κινδυνεύει, πόλις ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν εἰ γένοιτο, περιμαχητὸν ἂν ἦν τὸ μὴ ἄρχειν, ὥσπερ νυνὶ τὸ ἄρχειν, καὶ ἐνταῦθ' ἂν καταφανὲς γενέσθαι ὅτι τῷ ὄντι ἀληθινὸς ἄρχων οὐ πέφυκε τὸ αὑτοῦ συμφέρον σκοπεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ τὸ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ· ὥστε πᾶς ἂν ὁ γιγνώσκων τὸ ὠφελεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἕλοιτο ὑπ' ἄλλου ἢ ἄλλον ὠφελῶν πράγματα ἔχειν.*

Chap. VII. "The right constitutions are monarchy, aristocracy, and republic. The first is so called, because one, the king, rules supreme for the common benefit of all. An aristocracy is that in which a few

govern, and is so called because it is government exercised by the best men, or directed to what is best for the city. In a republic, all the citizens share in the government for the good of all. But, since it is difficult for all to attain to perfect excellence, and excellence in the art of war is alone within the reach of all, in a republic the sovereign body means all who are capable of bearing arms, and these form the host, who are ready to fight for their country. There are three abnormal forms of constitution, corresponding to these three, viz. tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy. In none of these is the common interest of all aimed at, but the tyrant aims at his own good, oligarchy aims at the good of the rich, and democracy at the good of the poor." An earlier treatise of Aristotle's on the different forms of government is found in Eth. VIII. x. The chief points of difference are that he puts *τιμοκρατία* instead of *πολιτεία*, though he says that timocracy is often called *πολιτεία*, and he makes monarchy the best form of government.

§ 2. *πολιτεία μὲν καὶ πολίτευμα*, 'the constitution and the body politic.'

τὸ κύριον, 'the sovereign power in the states.'

ἢ γὰρ οὐ πολίτας. 'For either we must say in these cases, that those who are (nominally) members of the constitution are not citizens (since their interests are not consulted), or else, if they are, they ought to share in the benefit of government.' Bernays reads *τοὺς μὴ μετέχοντας*, i.e. 'those members of the state

whose interests are not cared for.' But the necessity of this alteration of the text is obviated by the above rendering.

§ 3. *βασιλείαν*, 'kingdom.' *μοναρχία* includes both *βασιλεία* and *τυραννίς*. But it is generally more convenient to translate *βασιλεία*, 'monarchy,' as the term more usually opposed to aristocracy.

πολιτεία, 'constitutional government,' 'republic.' The latter on the whole is preferable. In the party politics of America, Republican is opposed to Democrat, and a similar opposition may be maintained here in translating, though, of course, not in the same sense exactly. Yet it was pretty well shewn in the American Civil War, that the Republicans looked to the good of the country generally, the Democrats to that of a class only.

§ 4. *συμβαίνει δ' εὐλόγως.* 'And it naturally follows that in this state, excellence in the art of war is the chief thing. For though it is possible for one man or a few to excel in virtue, it becomes difficult for all to attain perfection in every virtue. But perfection in war is what is mostly attainable: for valour is found in the mass of men. Therefore, in this constitution, the host (*τὸ προπολεμοῦν*) is Sovereign Paramount, and all who possess (i.e. can bear) arms are members of the state.'

CHAP. VIII. Two *ἀπορίαι* are introduced for the purpose of fixing more clearly the distinction between oligarchy and democracy. The first is: "If the majority, being

rich, are masters of the state, will it be a democracy? or, *vice versa*, if the minority, being poor, are masters, will it be an oligarchy? Will not the definitions given above need correction?" The second is: "If the definitions be corrected, and we define oligarchy as the government of the *few*, who are *rich*, and democracy as the government of the *many*, who are *poor*, how shall we do in case of there being states, in which, the rich form the majority, and the poor the minority?" These ἀπορίαι are solved by the remark, that the relative numbers of the governing body in the state is an incidental circumstance. "Poverty and wealth constitute the essential difference between democracy and oligarchy. Though, as a matter of fact, it always happens that the poor are many and the rich few."

§ 2. δεσποτικὴ τῆς πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας, 'introducing the relation of master and slave into the community of the state.'

§ 3. οὐκ ἂν καλῶς δόξειεν διωρίσθαι. 'It would appear that the constitutions have not been well defined.'

§§ 6—8. Cf. VI(IV). iv. 1—6, for a fuller treatment of the distinctions between an oligarchy and a democracy.

διὸ καὶ οὐ συμβαίνει. 'Wherefore also it follows, that the above-mentioned causes, viz. the relative numbers of the governing body in each state, are the real causes of the difference.'

§ 8. ἀμφισβητοῦσιν ἀμφότεροι. 'And these are the grounds (viz. riches and liberty), on which both parties,

the Oligarchs and the Democrats, base their claim to the chief power in the state.'

CHAP. IX. contains a discussion of the claims of the different parties in the state to power. "What does justice consist in? It is different in an oligarchy from what it is in a democracy. Some say it consists in equality, but not of all, only of those who are equal. Others say that it consists in inequality, but not of all, only of those who are unequal. The fact is, men are bad judges of themselves. Some think, if they are unequal in some respects, as in money, they are unequal in all. These are the oligarchs. Others, again, think, if they are equal in some respects, as in liberty, they are equal in all. These are the democrats. But the object for which men unite together in cities, is not for getting money only, or for mere living, but for living well; nor for aid against external enemies, nor for purposes of exchange and trade, (for then the Tyrrhennians and Carthaginians, and all who are united by treaties, would be members of one state;) but all who are anxious for good government regard virtue and vice in the state. In a true state the citizens are their own allies, and the law is their treaty, guaranteeing their rights to them, as Lycophron the Sophist said. No mere community of place makes a city, as if Corinth were to be joined to Megara; nor does right of intermarriage between two cities make them one. Nor would it be a city, if 10,000 men were to unite together for supplying each other's wants, or to secure each other against injury. These things indeed are necessary conditions,

but they do not constitute a city. They are means to the end, not the end itself, which is the communion of houses and families in living well for the sake of a perfect and self-sufficient life. Hence those who are merely equal or superior in liberty, or by birth, do not necessarily contribute most to the community, unless they also excel in virtue. Nor can superiority in wealth give superiority in citizenship, if there is inferiority in virtue." For this chapter, cf. Eth. V. iii., which Grant says (vol. ii. p. 109,) was probably taken from it, "though an interpolated reference (*καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς* § 3,) gives the passage in the Politics a fallacious appearance of having been written later, and of having accepted conclusions from the present book." One can see that this chapter is a rough sketch. There is a great deal of repetition, and want of compression, and carelessness of expression.

§ 1. *λέγουσιν οὐ πᾶν.* 'They do not describe the whole of what is properly called justice.'

§ 2. *οἱ δὲ τοῦτ' ἀφαιροῦσι.* 'But they use the relative term in an abstract sense, and thereby judge wrongly.'

§ 3. *ὥστ' ἐπεὶ τὸ δίκαιον τισίν.* 'So that, since justice is relative to certain persons, and a proportionate distribution is made both in respect of things and persons, the parties agree as to the equality of the things, but they differ as to that of the persons concerned, chiefly for the reason mentioned just now, that they judge badly concerning themselves; and in the second place also, because they each have justice on their side up

to a certain point in what they say, they think they say what is absolutely just.' In Eth. V. iii. this is more fully explained. Justice, or rather 'distributive justice,' as it is there called, consists in the four terms of a proportion, two persons and two things. "If A and B be persons, C and D lots to be divided, then as A is to B, so must C be to D. And a just distribution will produce the result that A and C will be to B and D in the same ratio as A was to B originally. In other words, distributive justice consists in the distribution of property, honours, &c. in the state, according to the merits of each citizen." (Grant, Eth., vol. ii. p. 108.)

The reference in *καθάπερ εἴρηται* is, however, as has been said, interpolated. The fifth book of the Ethics was probably not the work of Aristotle, but of Eudemus, and was written after the Politics.

§ 4. *οἱ μὲν γάρ.* Cf. Eth. V. iii. 7.

τὸ δὲ κυριώτατον, 'but they do not state the gist of the matter.'

§ 5. *οὔτε τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς,* 'neither in the case of the original founders of the state, nor in that of their successors.' The genitive is partitive, and refers both to *τὸν εἰσενέγκαντα* and to *τῷ δόντι.*

§ 6. The apodosis to this sentence does not come till § 8. The construction is broken by the parenthesis beginning at *καὶ γάρ.*

τὸ μὴ μετέχειν εὐδαιμονίας. The slave is incapable of happiness and life according to a fixed purpose. Cf. Eth.

X. vi. 8. εὐδαιμονίας δ' οὐδεὶς ἀνδραποδῳ μεταδίδωσιν, εἰ μὴ καὶ βίου.

Τυρρηνοὶ καὶ Καρχηδόνιοι. The Carthaginians had commercial treaties not only with the Etruscans, in league with whom they fought the battle of Himera against Gelon in B.C. 480, but also with the Romans in the early days of the Republic.

σύμβολα, cf. ch. i. 4.

§ 7. γραφαί, 'written documents.'

ἀλλ' οὔτ' ἀρχαί. 'But neither are these common boards of arbitration established for all to decide these questions, but each state has a different set of officers, nor does one state concern itself with the moral character of another, or try to prevent any of those who are included in the treaty from being unjust or guilty of any vice; their sole object is to secure one another from mutual injury.'

§ 8. ᾗ καὶ φανερὸν. This is the real apodosis of the sentence beginning at εἰ δὲ μήτε in § 6.

μὴ λόγου χάριν, 'one which is not so merely in name.'

τῶν ἄπωθεν συμμάχων explains τῶν ἄλλων. One would rather have expected συμμαχιῶν, which Bernays proposes. But evidently the words were put in as an afterthought, without consideration as to their strict grammatical coherence with the former part of the sentence.

Λυκόφρων ὁ σοφιστής. Vahlen, in Rhein. Mus. xxi. p. 143, sqq., shews by various quotations that such a person existed somewhere about the time of Aristotle,

or rather before, and that he is not to be confounded with one Lycophron, tyrant of Pheræ, who is also mentioned by Aristotle in the Rhetoric.

§ 9. *ὅτι δὲ τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον*, i.e. that the true object of the state is to make good citizens.

τῶν ἰδίων κοινωνημάτων, 'one of the characteristic modes of communion between cities.'

§ 10. *οἷον εἰ ὁ μὲν εἴη τέκτων.* The allusion here is to Plat. Rep., Book II., p. 369 D.

τὸ πλῆθος εἶεν μύριοι. The number of the state in Plato's Laws.

§ 11. *σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ὡς ἐπιμαχίας*, 'assisting one another as if only a defensive alliance existed between them.'

εἴπερ ὁμοίως ὁμιλοῖεν, 'if they regulated the terms of their intercourse in the same manner, when united, as when separated.'

§ 12. *ταῦτα μὲν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν*, 'these indeed are necessary conditions, if a city is to be. It does not however follow that, where all these conditions are found, there is a city, the essence of which is communion in well-living both for houses and families, for the sake of perfect and independent existence.'

§ 13. *κηδεῖαι*, 'connexions by marriage;' *φρατρίαι*, 'guilds;' *διαγωγαὶ τοῦ συζῆν*, 'pastimes of social life.'

τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον φιλίας ἔργον. Cf. Eth. VIII. v. 5.

ἡ τοῦ συζῆν προαίρεσις, 'the deliberate choosing to

live together.' Aristotle contrasts this, the object of friendship, with the end of the state.

CHAP. X. "What ought to be the governing body in the state? the multitude, or the rich, or the good, or the best individual, or a tyrant? If the poor, that is, the many, divide the property of the rich, is not that injustice? It is as bad as the rule of a tyrant. So the few, if in power, may rob the poor, and that is equally unjust. Again, if the good are supreme, it follows that many are excluded from office (ἄτιμοι). If one, the best of all, is supreme, there are more ἄτιμοι. What then, if we were to say that the law should be supreme? But the law may reflect the character of the governing body in the state, and be more or less bad." In this and the following chapter a number of such ἀπορίαι are discussed. The main conclusion is that the rule of the many is to be preferred to that of the few or the one, with certain exceptions, however, to be afterwards pointed out.

§ 1. ἔχειν δυσπολίαν, 'to present difficulty.'

ἔδοξε γὰρ νὴ Δία, 'for it is the pleasure forsooth of the sovereign power, and therefore just.'

§ 2. τὴν οὖν ἀδικίαν. 'What, then, are we to say is the height of injustice, if this is not?'

πάλιν τε πάντων ληφθέντων. 'And, again, if *all* are taken,' i.e. are included in τὸ κύριον. Cf. xiii. 4, ὡς λαμβανομένων, τῶν πλειόνων πρὸς τοὺς ἐλάττους. ἆρ' οὖν εἰ πάντες εἶεν ἐν μιᾷ πόλει; κ.τ.λ. Bernays translates, 'and again when all has been taken from the rich.' This is manifestly wrong.

§ 3. *καὶ θάτερον ἄρα.* 'Then it would be right in the other case also.'

§ 5. *ἀλλ' ἴσως φαίη τις ἄν.* 'But perhaps some one will say that for any human being at all to be supreme, and not the law, is bad, man being liable to the passions which are found in the soul.'

τὰ συμβαίνοντα πάθη, i.e. *ἐπιθυμία* and *θυμὸς* mainly. Cf. ch. xvi. 5. *ἥ τε γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοιοῦτον, καὶ ὁ θυμὸς ἄρχοντας διαστρέφει καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄνδρας.*

συμβήσεται γὰρ ὅμοιως. 'For the consequences will be the same as those which have been mentioned before,' i.e. injustice and ruin to the state.

CHAP. XI. "On the whole, it is best for the *many* to govern. For their collective wisdom will be greatest, as a feast to which all contribute their share is better than one provided at the expense of one man. Therefore the many are also the best judges of music and poetry. The good men are like good pictures; many scattered good points are brought together in one. But we must draw a line somewhere, or the same argument would apply to brutes; and some men are no better than brutes. Granting, then, that the many should rule, of what matters should they be entitled to have the control? Solon allowed all the citizens to vote at the election of magistrates, and to audit the public accounts, but not to hold office themselves. All united can do good, just as unclean food mixed with pure is better than a very little of the purest food. Then there is the

question whether, for instance, the same men are to judge whether the physician has done his business well, and also to do the business of the physician. The question of technical knowledge here comes in. But a man need not have technical knowledge to pass judgment on results. A cook is not the best judge of a good dinner, but the man who eats it. Again, too, the argument comes in, that the collective wisdom of the multitude is at least as good as that of the few, who have scientific knowledge. Then the question as to the election of officers, and the auditing of accounts, being really the most important of all offices, and yet that it should be discharged by men of small means, who have only a small stake in the country, may be solved by the consideration that though the wealth of the individual electors may be small, yet their collective wealth is very large. The great thing is to have good laws, and where the laws do not accurately define, let the governing body, be they few or many, determine. What are really good laws is a question not decided. But in the *ὀρθαὶ πολιτείαι* they will be good, in the *παρεκβάσεις* they will be bad."

§ 1. *περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων.* The question of the supremacy of the law is discussed in ch. xvi. 3—5, and more briefly in § 19 of this chapter.

δόξειεν ἂν λύεσθαι, 'would seem to be a point ready to be settled, and, though it presents some difficulty, yet perhaps it may be true.' Bernays proposes to read *εὐπορίαν.*

§ 2. *οἷον τὰ συμφορητὰ δεῖπνα*, 'just as dinners where each man contributes his share (i.e. *ἔρανοι*) are better than those supplied at the cost of one man.' Cf. ch. xv. 7. *ὥσπερ ἑστίασις συμφορητὸς καλλίων μιᾶς καὶ ἁπλῆς.*

καὶ γίνεσθαι συνελθόντας. 'And they must become, the mass of them, like one man, many-footed, and many-handed, and having many organs of sense.'

§ 4. *ἀλλὰ τούτῳ διαφέρουσιν.* 'But herein lies the difference between good men and each individual of the multitude, (just as also they say, that the beautiful differ from those who are not beautiful, and, in painting, works of art from real objects,) viz. in the fact that good points which are usually found scattered and apart are here united together, since, when considered separately, it may happen that one man's eye is better than that of the painting, and some other member of some one else.' Art, then, according to Aristotle, idealizes; and so it ought, if it is to refine and elevate the mind of man.

§ 5. The emphatic words here are *πάντα*, *πᾶν*, *ἑνίων*, and *περί τι πλῆθος*. Cf. § 14. *ἂν ᾖ τὸ πλῆθος μὴ λίαν ἀνδραποδῶδες.* If the average of *ἀρετή* and *φρόνησις* in the multitude, falls below a certain point, then the many are not better than the few good men for holding the sovereign power in the state. The line must be drawn somewhere, or brutes would have to be included in the governing body; for some men are no better than brutes. This is Aristotle's view. The modern democratical spirit would say: "Educate the people, and

let all have a share in the government. If there are any who by their crimes shew themelves unworthy of the privileges of citizens, let them be punished, and let their liberty be restrained, until they have shewn themselves capable of reformation."

§ 6. *τὴν πρότερον εἰρημένην ἀπορίαν*, i.e. whether the mass of the citizens should have the chief power in the state.

τίνων κυρίους, 'of what matters they should have the control.'

τοιοῦτοι. 'And under these I mean to include all who are neither wealthy nor entitled to consideration for moral worth.'

§ 8. *κατὰ μόνας*, sc. *ὁδούς*, 'alone.'

§ 9. *ἀτελὴς*, 'incompetent.'

§§ 10—14. An objection to the multitude being allowed to vote at elections and audit accounts, is stated and answered. The objection is taken from the analogy of the art of medicine. There it would be said, that the proper person to judge whether a physician has applied right remedies to a disease, is a physician. To this Aristotle replies, (i) that the term 'physician' is used in three different senses, (1) the ordinary practitioner, or apothecary, who sells drugs, (2) the scientifically-trained physician, (3) the man of general, well-educated intelligence; and that the latter is as well qualified to form a judgment on the result of a case, as the physician, whose technical knowledge is far greater.

(ii) With regard to the election of magistrates, if it is argued that men who have special knowledge in such matters ought to elect, just as a geometrician is the best judge of geometry, and that the multitude ought not to have a voice in such matters, the answer is (1) that the many united are not worse judges than those who have knowledge, though each individually may be a worse judge; (2) that in the case of the various arts it is not the maker, but the user who is the best judge of a production.

§ 10. ἡ τάξις αὕτη, i.e. the Solonian.

§ 12. τῶν ἰδιωτῶν, 'the laity,' opposed to οἱ εἰδότες and = οἱ πεπαιδευμένοι.

§§ 15—18. Another objection is that "it is absurd for the bad, that is, the many, to have the chief control of the most important matters in the state, such as election of magistrates and auditing of accounts, and not the good, that is, the minority. In some states, (Athens, for instance,) these functions are assigned to the popular assembly, which is composed partly of men of small wealth and inexperienced." This objection is met by the reply that (1) the magistrates elected, such as the judges, the members of the council, and the generals, are only representatives of the main body of the citizens. They are parts of the whole, and therefore subordinate to the whole; and (2) the collective wealth of the electors is greater than that of the persons elected to the highest offices. These objections represent the current traditional feeling of cultivated Greece, as we

find it expressed in such poets as Theognis, who 'uses the terms ἀγαθοὶ and ἐσθλοὶ to designate his own party, the nobles, while the commons are called κακοὶ and δειλοί.' (Grant, Eth., vol. i. p. 92.) So the nobles would be the rich, the commons the poor (ἀπὸ μικρῶν τιμημάτων). Aristotle meets the objectors on their own ground.

§ 16. τῆς τυχούσης ἡλικίας, 'of ordinary age,' i.e. not having the experience of years.

ἴσως γὰρ ἔχει καὶ ταῦτ' ὀρθῶς. 'For perhaps this is quite right as it is,' viz. that high offices should be held by men of wealth and experience.

§ 19. ἡ δὲ πρώτη λεχθεῖσα ἀπορία, x. 1. τί δεῖ τὸ κύριον τῆς πολιτείας.

§ 20. τὸ πάλαι διαπορηθέν, x. 5.

Chaps. XII., XIII. These chapters, observes Bernays in a note (p. 172) of his translation, bear all the marks of an independent treatise, which has been incorporated into the work by a later editor. The same points are discussed as in the three preceding chapters, and also partly in the two following ones. But they have a value of their own, chiefly from the remarks upon Ostracism in ch. xiii. The obvious repetitions in these chapters, have been softened down by interpolated expressions, such as καθάπερ εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον, xiii. 1, (cf. xiii. 2). The beginning of the fourteenth chapter is closely connected with the end of the eleventh, but there is no connection between the thirteenth and fourteenth.

CHAP. XII. "Justice, or the common interest of all, is the good of the state. This justice consists in equality, but equality between whom or as to what is the question. It will not do to say that honours and offices should be distributed to men according to any advantage they may possess. For then those who exceed in beauty or stature, would have a larger share of privileges, which is absurd. If flute-players are equal in skill, there ought to be no advantage in flutes to those who are better born. Good birth and wealth do not make a man a better flute-player. It is impossible for things so utterly different to be compared. The same principle will apply in politics. The claim to share in the honours of the state should rest on some reasonable ground, such as freedom of birth and the possession of property. A city can no more consist of men entirely without means, than it can of slaves. Moreover, in order to be governed well, it will need justice and valour in war."

§ 1. *ἐπεὶ δ' ἐν πάσαις μέν.* This looks like the beginning of a treatise: cf. I. i. 1. This sentence begins with the Aristotelian *ἐπεί.* The apodosis never comes; but after a long parenthesis, which lasts all through this chapter, a fresh departure is taken, ch. xiii. 2. Translate, 'Now in all sciences and arts,' &c.

ἐν οἷς διώρισται περὶ τῶν ἠθικῶν. Cf. ix. 3, and the note there.

§ 2. *ἔχει γὰρ τοῦτ' ἀπορίαν.* 'For this is a difficult question, and involves an appeal to political philosophy.'

τοῖς γὰρ διαφέρουσιν. 'For to those who differ in any respect there will be a difference in what is just and proper.'

§ 4. *ἢ τοῦτο ἐπιπόλαιον τὸ ψεῦδος.* 'Or is not the falsehood of this apparent even on a superficial examination?'

δυναμέων, 'arts.' Cf. note on iv. 2.

τῶν γὰρ ὁμοίων αὐλητῶν. 'For we ought not to give an advantage in flutes to the more nobly born of those flute-players who are equal in their art. For they will play none the better for the advantage of high birth. But the best instruments should be given to the best players. And if our meaning is not yet clear, it will be still more plain, if we bring it forward more.'

προαγαγοῦσιν is a term used in perspective for bringing part of a picture from the background into the foreground, by shading and filling in the outlines. Cf. Eth. I. vii. 17. *δεῖ γὰρ ἴσως ὑποτυπῶσαι πρῶτον, εἶθ' ὕστερον ἀναγράψαι. δόξειε δ' ἂν παντὸς εἶναι προαγαγεῖν καὶ διαρθρῶσαι τὰ καλῶς ἔχοντα τῇ περιγραφῇ.*

§ 5. *καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν.* 'And they (that is, birth and beauty) in proportion excel flute-playing more than he excels in flute-playing; yet the best flutes ought to be given to him. For the excess both of wealth and birth ought to contribute to the success of the performance otherwise, whereas in point of fact they contribute nothing.' Two arguments are used to prove that it is absurd for one who has advantage in one kind of good, such as birth or beauty, to have the superiority in other

things, which have nothing whatever to do with any such exceptional advantage. (1) Such exceptional advantages ought to enable their possessor to turn out superior work in any art, such as flute-playing, for example. But as a matter of fact they do not. (2) § 6. If this were the case, all kinds of good would be commensurable. We should have to compare the relative magnitude of physical, moral, and intellectual qualities, and strike a balance, which is absurd.

§ 6. *εἰ γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸ τὶ μέγεθος.* The only way of solving the difficulty of this passage satisfactorily, is to adopt Bernays' reading, *εἰ καὶ πλεῖον ὑπερέχει ὅλως ἀρετὴ μεγέθους, εἴη ἂν συμβλητά,* omitting *πάντα.* Translate: 'For if any kind of greatness predominate, then greatness generally may be brought into competition with either wealth or free birth. So that, if one man excels more in (bodily) greatness than another in virtue, even though virtue generally has the advantage over (bodily) greatness, these two might be compared. For if a certain amount of such greatness is worth more than a certain (small) amount of virtue, it is evident that there must be a certain amount which is equal to it. But since it is impossible for things so utterly different to be commensurable, it is evident that there is good reason why in politics claims to offices cannot be based on every kind of inequality.'

§ 7. *λαμβάνει τὴν τιμήν,* 'receives its value.'

§ 8. *ἀλλ' ἐξ ὧν πόλις συνέστηκεν.* 'But it is necessary

(in politics) for all claims to be based on those elements of which the state consists.'

τίμημα φέροντας, 'tax-payers.

§ 9. *πλὴν ἄνευ μὲν τῶν προτέρων*. Cf. I. ii. 8. *γινομένη μὲν οὖν τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκεν, οὖσα δὲ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν*.

CHAP. XIII. "The best ground on which to claim the right to govern, is virtue, though wealth, good birth, or numbers may be to a certain extent a claim. There is some justice, in fact, in all the claims which are advanced. But the result, on the whole, is that no superiority in any one point can give any set of men the right to govern all the rest always. All who are not disqualified, should rule and be ruled in turns. The legislator must govern for the good of the whole, not of a class merely. But suppose there is a man of transcendent genius or virtue, or several such, in a state, like a god or gods among men. For such there is no law; they are themselves the law. They are like the lions, when the hares claimed that all should have equal rights, as Antisthenes said. Ostracism was devised in democracies, to banish all such as excel in power, through wealth, or friends, or any other political influence. So, according to the story, the Argonauts left Heracles behind: he was too big a man for them. To this, also, points the story of Periander, tyrant of Corinth, who, by cutting off the heads of the tallest stalks of wheat, indicated to Thrasybulus of Samos, through the herald, that he must cut off the most prominent men in the state. So the Athenians humbled the dependent states, Samos, Chios,

Lesbos, when they thought them rivals to their power. So, too, the king of the Persians used to cut short the Medes and Babylonians. So too, in art, a painter will not allow one limb, however beautiful, to exceed the proper proportion; nor a shipwright the stern, or any other part of the ship; nor will a chorus-trainer allow any one who is much above the average to sing in his chorus. Ostracism then may be justified in this way. But it would be better for a legislator to arrange his constitution so that it should not need such a safeguard. In the παρεκβάσεις it is expedient, if not absolutely just. But in the best state, it is not right thus to banish a man who excels in virtue; nor ought such a man to be subject to the rule of others; it would be like ruling Zeus. All should obey such a one gladly. He ought to be perpetual king in a state." Here, we are reminded of Plato, who in his Republic looks forward to a time when philosophers will be kings, and kings philosophers. No doubt Aristotle was thinking of his patron Alexander. Neither he nor Plato had any faith in democracy, though he argues repeatedly in this book, that the rule of the many is to be preferred to that of the few. If he had had faith in his own principles, he would not have wavered so as he does here. He might have looked forward to a time, when education, and the diffusion of liberty, and the abolition of privilege and caste, would tend more and more to equalize men, when men of genius, as they are called, would become more and more exceptional, and democracy become actually, and not merely in theory, the best government for mankind.

§ 1. καθάπερ εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον, ix. 14, 15.

§ 2. εἴρηται μὲν οὖν, ix. 1.

πολῖται γὰρ μᾶλλον. 'For, if the free-born are all citizens, yet the nobler are in a fuller sense citizens than the low-born, and each state honours its own nobles.'

§ 3. High birth has two claims: (1) that the nobly born are citizens by virtue of a long train of ancestors who have been citizens, (2) because it is to be presumed that those whose parents were superior will be themselves superior. Unfortunately, this is a law which has too many exceptions to be safe to act upon always in politics.

κοινωνικὴν, 'displayed in the relations of man to man.'

ἢ πάσας ἀναγκαῖον. Cf. Eth. V. i. 15. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἀρετή μέν ἐστι τέλεία, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερόν. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πολλάκις κρατίστη τῶν ἀρετῶν εἶναι δοκεῖ ἡ δικαιοσύνη, καὶ οὔθ' ἕσπερος οὔθ' ἑῷος οὕτω θαυμαστός· καὶ παροιμιαζόμενοι φάμεν, ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ συνλήβδην πᾶσ' ἀρετὴ ἔνι.

§ 4. ὃς λαμβανομένων τῶν πολλῶν, cf. x. 2. πάλιν τε πάντων ληφθέντων. The claims of the majority to rule are discussed. "If the good, the noble, and the rich, constitute the majority, there can be no doubt as to who should rule; just as in the various kinds of constitution there is no doubt as to those with whom the sovereign power resides."

§ 5. εἰρημένων, in ch. vii.

§§ 5, 6. "But supposing these three classes are all found together in a state, and that they only constitute a minority, how are we to decide? If they can carry on the government, and are numerous enough to form a state, they ought to rule."

§§ 7—11. "None of these various claims to rule, whether separate or combined, will bear examination. For, on the same principle, if one man was richer, or more nobly born, or superior in virtue to all the rest of the citizens, he ought to rule. But the majority of the citizens will always be able to say that their collective wealth and virtue is greater than that of the few. So wherever this is the case, the majority ought to rule, and the legislator ought to enact laws for the good, not of the rich, or the good, or the noble, but of the people generally."

§ 11. *ὅταν συμβαίνῃ τὸ λεχθέν*, when the people taken collectively are better than the few.

§ 12. *τὸ δ' ὀρθὸν λεπτέον ἴσως.* 'Right must be taken in the sense of equality; and that which is right equally has reference to the interest of the whole state, and the common weal of the citizens.' *τὸ δ' ὀρθὸν*, cf. § 1. *δόξειεν ἂν ἢ πάντα ἢ ἔνιά γε τούτων ὀρθῶς ἀμφισβητεῖν.* Then follows the definition of a citizen, which is different from the one given in ch. i. 6.

§§ 13—25. "Great men are exceptional altogether, but they have been badly treated by democracies, who have ostracized them."

§ 13. *πλήρωμα παρασχέσθαι πόλεως*, 'to make up the complement of a city.'

§ 14. *καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῇ δυνάμει*, 'both in birth and natural capacity.'

αὐτοὶ γάρ εἰσι νόμος. Cf. Rom. ii. 14. 'These having not the law are a law unto themselves.' The parallelism of the words is remarkable.

'*Αντισθένης*, the Cynic, a pupil of Socrates. 'Where are your claws?' said the lions to the hares. (Congreve.)

§ 16. *οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλειν*, 'for the Argo refused to take him, because he was much bigger (and heavier) than the other passengers.'

Περιάνδρου Θρασυβούλῳ. Herod. v. 92, where, however, it is Periander who applies to Thrasybulus for advice.

§ 19. *Σαμίους.* Thuc. I. 116, 117. *Χίους καὶ Λεσβίους.* Thuc. III. 10.

θᾶττον ἐγκρατῶς = *τάχιστα ἐγκρατεστέρως.*

ὁ δὲ Περσῶν βασιλεὺς. 'And the king of the Persians used often to reduce the Medes and Babylonians and others, who were conceited because they had once been in power.'

§§ 20—22. 'The principle is of general application in all kinds of constitutions, whether normal or abnormal, in monarchies as well as republics. Just as in the arts

and sciences, nothing is allowed to violate proportion and symmetry.'

§ 22. *ὥστε διὰ τοῦτο μέν.* 'So that there is nothing in this custom to prevent single rulers being in harmony with states, if, their own rule being advantageous to the states, they do this,' i.e. banish citizens who are too prominent.

τὰς ὁμολογουμένας ὑπεροχὰς, those mentioned in § 15, and again in § 24, viz. wealth, many friends, and power.

§ 23. *δεύτερος δὲ πλοῦς*, 'the next best thing is.' A nautical metaphor. To sail is best: where you cannot sail, you must row. Cf. Eth. II. ix. 4. *κατὰ τὸν δεύτερόν φασι πλοῦν τὰ ἐλάχιστα ληπτέον τῶν κακῶν.*

στασιαστικῶς ἐχρῶντο τοῖς ὀστρακισμοῖς. Aristotle probably here means to condemn the ostracism of such men as Themistocles, Aristides, and Cimon. But, as Grote observes, these were by no means extreme cases of abuse, but were rather instances of the legitimate use of ostracism as a safeguard of the constitution, which in a Greek state was always in a condition of unstable equilibrium. Like all other institutions at Athens, it wore itself out. After the ostracism of Hyperbolus, who is mentioned in the eighth book of Thucydides, and ridiculed by Aristophanes, it was felt that machinery which could be applied to get rid of such a worthless man, must have sunk from its original function, and it was never employed again.

§ 24. *ἰδίᾳ συμφέρει καὶ δίκαιον*, 'is in a particular sense expedient and just.'

οὐχ ἁπλῶς. Bernays rejects *οὐχ*. 'In the *παρεκβάσεις* ostracism is not only just according to the principle of the constitution, but just generally.' One does not however see how the form of constitution can affect the justice of the principle. And so Bekker's reading, which is that of the MSS., must be right.

τῆς ἀριστῆς πολιτείας, to be distinguished from *ἀριστοκρατία*.

§ 25. *μεθιστάναι*, 'cause him to withdraw' 'displace.'

μερίζοντες τὰς ἀρχάς, 'distributing the offices to the citizens in turns.'

CHAP. XIV. "Before discussing whether or no in all cases monarchy is the best form of government, we must distinguish between the different kinds of monarchy. (1.) There is the kind, like that at Sparta, where the king is supreme in war and in matters of religion. But he has not the power of life and death, except in time of war, during a campaign. This kind is equivalent to *στρατηγία διὰ βίου*. In some instances it is hereditary, in others elective. (2.) That of the barbarian kings: their power is hereditary and regulated by law. They have a body-guard of citizens, not of mercenaries, like tyrants. They rule their subjects with their consent, not against their will like tyrants. (3.) The *αἰσυμνῆται* in Greece. They were elected, and not hereditary. But their power was absolute, like

that of a *τύραννος*. Such was Pittacus of Mitylene. They were elected for life, or for a definite period. (4.) The heroic monarchy, where the king reigned with the free consent of the citizens, by hereditary right, and according to law. He also performed sacrifices, except those appropriated to the priests. He also judged causes. He carried a sceptre, and swore by it as the emblem of authority. In later times he was stript of much of his power, only retaining the right of offering sacrifice and the command of the army in war. (5.) Patriarchal government (*οἰκονομική*), *κύριος εἰς πάντων*. This is also called *παμβασιλεία* (absolute monarchy)."

§ 1. *μετὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους λόγους*, after the digression upon justice in the state, and, finally, the mention of kings at the end of the last chapter.

ἄλλη τις πολιτεία = *ἡ ἀρίστη πολιτεία*, described in IV(VII).

§ 2. *τῆς ἀρχῆς ὁ τρόπος*, 'the form of government is not the same in the case of all.'

§ 3. *μάλιστα τῶν κατὰ νόμον*, 'most of all a constitutional monarchy.'

ἐξέλθῃ, sc. *ὁ βασιλεύς*.

§ 4. *οἷον στρατηγία τις*, 'a sort of generalship with absolute power, and perpetual.' Bekker reads *αὐτοκρατόρων* in the Oxford Edition. This would be 'in the hands of men who have absolute power.'

ἔν τινι βασιλείᾳ. These words are placed in brackets by Bekker in his last edition. If retained, they must

mean 'in certain kingdoms,' such as the Spartan. But it would be better to read with Bernays ἔν τινι, 'in certain cases.'

ἐν χειοὸς νόμῳ, 'while engaged in action,' 'in actual battle.'

δηλοῖ δ' Ὅμηρος. Iliad II. 391.

§ 5. οὔ οἱ ἄρκιον, 'he shall have nothing to rely on, no hope of escape.'

§ 6. δυσχεραίνοντες, 'with an ill grace.'

§ 8. οὐ τῷ μὴ κατὰ νόμον, 'not in being independent of law, but only in not being hereditary.'

§ 9. πράξεων, 'objects.'

§ 10. σκολιῶν μελῶν, 'banquet-songs,' 'roundelays.' The origin of the term is uncertain. See Liddell and Scott, s. v.

τὸν κακοπάτριδα. 'They made the low-born Pittacus tyrant of the meek and ill-fated city, highly commending him all with one consent.'

§ 11. αἱ κατὰ τοὺς ἡρωικοὺς χρόνους. These were the ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς γέρασι πατρικαὶ βασιλείαι, mentioned by Thucydides I. 13.

§ 12. εὐεργέτας. Cf. xv. 11, ἔτι δ' ἀπ' εὐεργεσίας καθίστασαν τοὺς βασιλεῖς.

διὰ τὸ συναγαγεῖν, 'by collecting the citizens together,' as Theseus did at Athens.

πορίσαι χώραν, 'gaining accession of territory,' as the Spartan kings conquered Messeina.

τοῖς παραλαμβάνουσι πάτριοι, 'handing down their power from father to son to their successors.'

ἐπανάτασις, 'raising and stretching out the sceptre,' as Agamemnon does, Iliad I. 234.

§ 13. *καὶ τὰ κατὰ πόλιν*; 'both affairs in the city, and at home, and abroad.'

ὕστερον δέ. 'But afterwards the kings abdicating some of their functions, and being deprived of other by the people.'

ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσι, as Mæandrius proposed should be done at Samos, but he was induced to change his mind. Herod. III. 142.

ὅπου δ' ἄξιον εἰπεῖν εἶναι βασιλείαν, as at Sparta.

§ 14. *τετάρτη δ'*, 'and the fourth of them is the Laconian.'

§ 15. *πεμπτὸν δ' εἶδος*. 'But there is a fifth kind of monarchy, when the king being one is supreme in every thing, as each nation and each city is supreme over the public property, and this corresponds to household management.' *τεταγμένη* agrees with *βασιλεία* instead of *εἶδος*.

CHAP. XV. "Practically, these five kinds of monarchy reduce themselves to two, the last, and the Laconian.

The others all lie between them. There are two questions to be considered, (1) whether it is expedient for a man to be perpetual dictator in war, whether by birth or succession, or not; (2) whether it is expedient that one man should have absolute power in all things. With regard to (1), this is a question of law and internal arrangement. As to (2), there comes another question, whether it is better to be governed by the best man or by the best laws. Now the law can only lay down general rules. In any art, to act entirely by written instruction is absurd. In Egypt, physicians are not allowed to deviate from prescriptions till after the patient has been ill for four days. If they do so before, it is at their own risk. But passion should be excluded from the ruler. He ought to be impassive, and this is impossible. Then as to the particular cases where the law cannot decide, but the ruler must, should there be one ruler or many? Is monarchy or aristocracy better? The latter. For 1. many are better than one. The contributions which each may make to the common stock may be small, but, as a feast to which all pay their quota is better than that furnished by one man, so a multitude collectively is better able to judge than an individual. 2. A multitude is less liable to be corrupted, (like a large sheet of water). 3. One is more liable than many to be swayed by passion or anger, which would warp his judgment. It is difficult for all to be angry at once, and in the wrong. And by the multitude are meant all who are free-born. They must not act contrary to the law, but only in cases where the law omits to specify. Or

(1), if this is difficult for many to do, yet one is more liable to be corrupted than many. To the objection (2) that one is free from faction (ἀστασίαστος), while the many are divided by faction, it may be answered that the many are supposed to be good, just as the one is. So aristocracy on the whole is better than monarchy. But monarchy is more ancient, for of old it was rare to find men superior in virtue, especially in small states. Another reason for its establishment was that men wished to reward those, who had rendered great service to the community, by making them kings. But when men became more equal, monarchy passed into aristocracy, or a republic. Then when the citizens began to degenerate, and to make money by governing the state, oligarchies arose, and wealth was honoured. From oligarchy sprang tyranny, and thence democracy. For the oligarchy, always trying through avarice to get the government into fewer hands, strengthened the power of the multitude, till the latter attacked them and established a democracy. There cannot be any farther change after that, if the city continues to increase in size.

"An objection to monarchy is, that it is impossible to secure the children being good. And it is too much to expect that a king will not transmit his power to his son, if he sees he is ill-disposed. Another question raised is that of the king's body-guard. The king ought to have power to maintain his authority, but the force at his disposal must, though stronger than individuals and many combined, yet be weaker than the multitude. Thus a body-guard was appointed for a dic-

tator or tyrant, and when Dionysius asked for guards, one man advised the Syracusans not to give him too many."

§ 1. *ἐλαττόνων γὰρ.* 'For their authority is less extensive than that of absolute monarchy, but greater than that of the Laconian kind.'

§ 2. *ἢ κατὰ γένος ἢ κατὰ μέρος,* 'either by birth or in turns,' i.e. by election. Susemihl reads *αἵρεσιν* for *μέρος,* but there is no necessity for this.

νόμων ἔχει μᾶλλον εἶδος, 'is a question concerning the nature of laws rather than the form of constitution. Bernays proposes *ἔχεται* for *ἔχει εἶδος,* thinking probably that *ἔχεται* got corrupted into *ἔχει,* and that then some copyist added *εἶδος* to complete the construction. But the text appears satisfactory.

§ 4. *τὰ προσπίπτοντα,* 'incidental circumstances.'

δοκοῦσι δὴ τοῖς νομίζουσι. Plat. Polit., pp. 294—297. *τὸ δ' ἄριστον οὐ τοὺς νόμους ἐστὶν ἰσχύειν, ἀλλ' ἄνδρα τὸν μετὰ φρονήσεως βασιλικόν* (294 A).

§ 5. *Ἀλλὰ μὴν κἀκεῖνον.* 'To this however we may reply that those who rule ought to have that general principle, and that that which has no element of passion in it, is better than that which is born with passion. The law is thus impassive, but every human being is liable to passion.'

ἀντὶ τούτου goes with *κάλλιον,* 'better than this, i.e. the law.'

§ 6. *ᾗ παρεκβαίνουσιν,* 'where they err.' For the para-

graph, cf. Plat. Polit. 294, A, B. *τρόπον μέντοι τινὰ δῆλον ὅτι τῆς βασιλικῆς ἐστὶν ἡ νομοθετική.*

§ 7. *ἐστίασις συμφορητός.* Cf. xi. 2, *οἷον τὰ συμφορητὰ δεῖπνα τῶν ἐκ μιᾶς δαπάνης χορηγηθέντων.*

κρίνει ἄμεινον ὄχλος πολλά. Cf. xi. 2, and Thuc. vi. 39, where Athenagoras says, *ἐγὼ δέ φημι, πρῶτα μὲν δῆμον ξύμπαν ὠνομάσθαι, ὀλιγαρχίαν δὲ μέρος, ἔπειτα φύλακας μὲν ἀρίστους εἶναι χρημάτων τοὺς πλουσίους, βουλεῦσαι δ' ἂν βέλτιστα τοὺς ξυνετοὺς, κρῖναι δ' ἂν ἀκούσαντας ἄριστα τοὺς πολλοὺς, καὶ ταῦτα ὁμοίως καὶ κατὰ μέρη καὶ ξύμπαντα ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ ἰσομοιρεῖν.* The whole of Greek literature abounds in these discussions as to the comparative merits of oligarchy and democracy. The whole of Greece was divided into rival factions of oligarchs and democrats, who strove together with a deadly animosity, which it is hardly possible to conceive now, when a government of whatever description is acquiesced in by the people, if it be not intolerably bad. Cf. Herod. III. 80—82.

§ 8. *ἑτέρου πάθους τοιούτου,* such as *ἐπιθυμία,* desire, especially. Cf. xvi. 5, *ἥ τε γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοιοῦτον, καὶ ὁ θυμὸς ἄρχοντας διαστρέφει.*

§ 9. *ἀλλ' ἢ περὶ ὧν,* 'except in cases where the law is necessarily insufficient.'

ἀλλ' οἱ μέν. 'But it may be said that the many are factious, while one man is free from faction.'

§ 10. *σπουδαῖοι τὴν ψυχήν,* 'morally virtuous,' and therefore not likely to be influenced for evil by faction.

Aristotle presumes that the πλῆθος, composed of all the free-born citizens, is also composed of men who have had a good moral training. How this is to be secured forms the subject of the next two books.

ἀριστοκρατίαν θετέον. There seems to be an inconsistency between this passage and ch. vii. 3, 4, where he defines ἀριστοκρατία and πολιτεία. There he says that aristocracy is government by the best men, being few, but more than one; but that when the government is in the hands of the multitude, and directed to the common interest of all, it should be called *par excellence*, πολιτεία. Only, he says, it is difficult for men to be perfect in every kind of virtue, and since courage, or excellence in war, is the virtue easiest of attainment by a large body of men, in such a state the warrior class will be paramount. He seems to have Sparta in his mind. And we shall find in the next book that he condemns those states which bestow too much attention on war. Here he calls aristocracy τὴν τῶν πλειόνων ἀρχὴν ἀγαθῶν δ' ἀνδρῶν πάντων. Practically then he dismisses all consideration of ἡ πολιτεία, as distinct from ἀριστοκρατία.

καὶ μετὰ δυνάμεως, 'whether his government be supported by an armed body of men, or exist without it.

§ 11—13. This is a well-known passage of Aristotle, describing the changes of government which actually took place in several of the states of Greece. But it is by no means a universal process. In Europe, for instance, we find that in the earliest times neither

the Germans, nor Celts, were governed by kings, but by chiefs; and it was only after a long period of time that kings were established, and it was still longer before the hereditary principle became fully recognised among the Germanic nations. Then in European history the change has certainly not been from monarchy to aristocracy, but rather the other way; the power of the nobles in most kingdoms has gradually grown weaker, while the power of the commons has gone on increasing, even in those states where the power of the king has also increased. So far as it is safe to predict the future, it would seem to be more probable that the transition will be direct from monarchy to democracy, as it was in France and America. There is nothing in modern politics answering to the Greek *τυραννίς*; the Empire in France is sometimes spoken of as resembling it, but the differences are too obvious to need pointing out. All over the civilized world the tendency is towards democracy; in all countries the people are becoming better educated and more fitted for government; and as they become so, they demand a share of it, and they obtain it. Take, for instance, the empires of Germany and Austria; and Russia has taken the first step in the same direction, by emancipating her serfs. The opposition really now is not between oligarchy and democracy, or even between monarchy and democracy, but between centralization and bureaucracy on the one hand, and local self-government on the other.

§ 11. *ἀπ' εὐεργεσίας*, cf. xiv. 12.

ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἔργον, 'for to rule is the function of good men.'

ἐζήτουν κοινόν τι, 'they began to look out for a commonwealth, and to establish a polity.'

§ 12. ἐχρηματίζοντο, 'they began to enrich themselves at the public expense.'

ἔντιμον. Aristotle, in Eth. VIII. x. 2, calls these states timocracies.

ἀεὶ γὰρ εἰς ἐλάττους. 'For the oligarchs, always trying to concentrate power in fewer hands, through avarice strengthened the people, so that at last the latter rose against them, and democracies ensued.'

§ 13. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ μείζους, 'but now that the cities have developed in size.'

εἰ δὲ δή τις ἄριστον θείη. After tracing the changes of government in Greece, he returns to the subject of monarchy, and states two objections to it, (1) that it is impossible to secure the children being good, if a monarchy is hereditary and absolute, (which is the only kind here considered), (2) the danger of entrusting an absolute king with an armed body-guard.

πῶς ἕξει, 'how will it be with regard to the children?'

ἀλλὰ γιγνομένων. 'But when they prove to be of such a character as many have been found to be, the result is mischievous.'

§ 14. ἀλλ' οὐ παραδώσει. 'But, it may be urged, in that

case the king, being absolute, will not transmit his power to his children.'

§ 15. From this description of the king it is clear that he does not entirely answer to our idea of an absolute monarch. The latter, like the Roman emperors, or the later kings of France, is able to do just as he pleases, the senate or other legislative body either merely registering his decrees, or being never even consulted or convened. But Aristotle's king is subject to the laws, and he needs a body-guard, as a means of guarding the laws, as a safeguard to the constitution. The limit to this force is that, though strong enough to overpower any one individual, or many combined together, it should always be inferior to the mass of the citizens. This body-guard, it will be seen, is a very different thing from a modern standing-army, and much less effectual for the prevention of a revolution. The equilibrium of ancient constitutions was very unstable. Very slight disturbances of the system produced violent effects. Hence the importance of ostracism as a safety-valve, and hence the delicacy to be observed in the appointment of a body-guard, so as to preserve and not to endanger the laws.

§ 16. Διωνυσίῳ, the elder Dionysius, tyrant of Syracuse from B.C. 406—367. He was mentioned in I. xi. 12. as having ordered an iron monopolist to leave Syracuse.

CHAP. XVI. "The constitutional king, as said before, may exist in any kind of state. He is merely the

chief executive magistrate, as at Epidamnus and Opus. But παμβασιλεία, absolute monarchy, appears to some unnatural and unjust. For (1) where a state consists of those who are by nature equal, it is unfair that they should have an unequal share in the government, just as it is hurtful for those who are unequal in size to have equal food or clothing. (2) It is better that the law should govern, than any one of the citizens, and that the law should be carried out by many rather than by one, where all are equal. The law is like a god; a man with arbitrary power, swayed by passion and desire, is like a brute. The law is intellect without appetite. The analogy of the arts does not apply here. In medicine it is absurd to follow written prescriptions entirely. A man will always consult his physician, who is not influenced by private liking, but is paid to cure his patient. In politics, on the other hand, men are often influenced by malice or favour. Even in medicine, when men suspect their physicians of wishing to poison them, they have recourse to written treatises. Moreover in the arts, too, more than one man is employed. One physician consults another; he cannot trust his own judgment. There is always reference made to a standard, the law. Again (3), one man cannot see to many things; he must have subordinates. (4) If the good man is fit to govern, yet two good men are more fit. The law cannot take in all possible cases; hence the need of judges and magistrates to interpret it. And several such are better than one. For we see monarchs, as it is, employ many subordi-

nates. If they are not their friends, they will not carry out their wishes; if they are, they are their equals, and ought to rule; for friendship implies equality."

§ 1. ὅ τε λόγος ἐφέστηκε, 'the question arises.'

καθάπερ εἴπομεν, ch. xv. 2.

τῆς διοικήσεως, 'the administration.'

§ 2. δοκεῖ δέ; δέ marks the return of the sentence after the parenthesis beginning at αὕτη δ' ἐστί.

τὸ ἴσην ἔχειν τοῖς ἀνίσοις τροφήν. Cf. Eth. II. vi. 7. τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐχ οὕτω λεπτέον· οὐ γὰρ εἴ τῳ δέκα μναῖ φαγεῖν πολὺ δύο δὲ ὀλίγον, ὁ ἀλείπτης ἐξ μνᾶς προστάξει· ἔστι γὰρ ἴσως καὶ τοῦτο πολὺ τῷ λεψομένῳ ἢ ὀλίγον· Μίλωνι μὲν γὰρ ὀλίγον, τῷ δὲ ἀρχομένῳ τῶν γυμνασίων, πολύ.

§ 3. καὶ τὸ ἀνὰ μέρος, 'and so it follows in like manner that they should rule and be ruled successively in turns. And where there is succession, there is already law; for law is regular order.'

§ 4. ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ εἶναι, 'for there must be certain magistrates (owing to the unavoidable imperfection of laws).'

ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅσα γε. 'But it may be objected that, in all instances where the law appears unable to decide, neither would a man be able to form a right judg-

ment.' The reply to this is (1) that it is the business of the law to educate men to judge and act in the wisest manner in all cases of doubt. (2.) 'The law allows the citizens to correct errors in it, and to substitute what is found by experience to be better than the actual enactments.' The law is really everything. It educates men by the study of it to grasp its principles and spirit, so as to apply them to particular cases, and also to supplement the defects in it. Compare this fine passage on the majesty of the law, and the reverence with which the Greeks regarded it, with the speech of Cleon in Thuc. III. 37. 4, where see Arnold's note on the *νόμος γεγραμμένος*. Cf. also Herod. VII. 104, where Demaratus, speaking to Xerxes of the Spartans, says: *ἔπεστι γάρ σφι δεσπότης νόμος, τὸν ὑποδειμαίνουσι πολλῷ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ σοὶ σέ.* Cf. Herod. III. 38. *ὀρθῶς μοι δοκέει Πίνδαρος ποιῆσαι, νόμον πάντων βασιλέα φήσας εἶναι.*

§ 5. *παιδεύσας.* Cf. § 12. *κρίνει γὰρ ἕκαστος ἄρχων πεπαιδευμένος ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου καλῶς.*

ὁ μὲν οὖν τὸν νόμον κελεύων. This is better than the old reading of Bekker, *νοῦν* for *νόμον*. Also *νοῦν μόνους* in what follows makes much better sense than *νόμους*, the old reading. For the sentiment, cf. Eth. V. vi. 4. *διὸ οὐκ ἐῶμεν ἄρχειν ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ τὸν λόγον, ὅτι ἑαυτῷ τοῦτο ποιεῖ καὶ γίνεται τύραννος.*

ἥ τε γὰρ ἐπιθυμία. Cf. xv. 8.

§ 6. *τὸ δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν παράδειγμα.* Cf. xv. 4. *ὅτι* = viz. that.

§ 8. *διὰ τὸ κρίνειν περί τε οἰκείων.* Cf. ix. 2. *σχεδὸν δ' οἱ πλεῖστοι φαῦλοι κριταὶ περὶ τῶν οἰκείων.*

τὸ μέσον, 'what is impartial.'

§ 9. A farther distinction is introduced between the written and the moral law. If it be granted that a man's judgment is more to be relied on in particular cases than the written law, yet the unwritten law, which depends on the character, is safer still; that is, the man is only to be trusted if he has been morally educated. *ἔθος* is here equivalent to *ἦθος.* For the sentiment, cf. Soph. Ant. 450—457, on the *ἄγραπτα κἀσφαλῆ θεῶν νόμιμα,* which live for ever, and have been from everlasting.

§ 10. *ὃ καὶ πρότερον εἰρημένον ἐστίν.* xi. 2.

τοῦ δ' ἑνός. *δὲ* marks the apodosis.

σύν τέ δύ' ἐρχομένω, Il. x. 224. The words are those of Diomedes, asking for a comrade to help him in the proposed attack on the Trojan camp:—

ἀλλ' εἴτίς μοι ἀνὴρ ἅμ' ἕποιτο καὶ ἄλλος
μᾶλλον θαλπωρὴ καὶ θαρσαλεώτερον ἔσται.
σύν τέ δυ' ἐρχομένω καί τε πρὸ ὁ τοῦ ἐνόησεν,
ὄππῃ κέρδος ἔῃ· μοῦνος δ' εἴπέρ τε νοήσῃ,
ἀλλά τέ οἱ βράσσων τε νόος λεπτὴ δέ τε μῆτις.

ἡ εὐχὴ τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος, Il. II. 372, concerning Nestor:—

αἲ γὰρ Ζεῦ τε πάτερ καὶ Ἀθηναίη καὶ Ἄπολλον,
τοιοῦτοι δέκα μοι συμφράδμονες εἶεν Ἀχαιῶν·
τῷ κε τάχ' ἠμύσειε πόλις Πριάμοιο ἄνακτος
χερσὶν ὑφ' ἡμετέρῃσιν ἁλοῦσά τε περθομένη τε.

§ 11. νομοθετῆσαι. 'Legislation on the matters of detail about which men deliberate is impossible.'

§ 12. πεπαιδευμένος, cf. § 5.

καὶ χεῖρας καὶ πόδας. Cf. xi. 2. πολύποδα καὶ πολύχειρα καὶ πολλὰς ἔχοντ' αἰσθήσεις.

τῇ ἀρχῇ καὶ αὐτοῖς. αὐτοῖς must evidently be right, and not αὐτοῦ, as Bekker reads in the Oxford Edition.

§ 13. μὴ φίλοι μὲν οὖν ὄντες. 'If they are not their friends, then, they will not act according to their intention; but if they are friends of the monarch and his government, a friend at least is equal and like oneself.' This is a mere quibble on the word φίλος.

CHAP. XVII. Having stated the arguments against monarchy as the best form of government, Aristotle now says that it may be so in some cases, though not in others. He defines the three kinds of government over again, and then says that where there is a family, or one man, superior to all the rest of the citizens in virtue, so that their virtue is greater than that of all the rest, they ought to rule exclusively. And this for

two reasons; (1) on the general ground of justice, on which each of the *ὀρθαὶ πολιτείαι* is established, (2) on moral grounds; for it is not becoming to put to death or banish a man of transcendent virtue, nor to demand that he should be ruled by others. For the whole ought to rule the part, and the one man who has the whole of virtue ought to rule those who only have it partially. Thus Aristotle comes round to the opinion he had expressed in Eth. VIII. x. 2, that monarchy is the best form of government. But we see that here, as in other passages of the Politics, he does not assert it so dogmatically as he does in the Ethics.

§ 1. *ἔστι γάρ τι φύσει δεσποστόν.* 'For there is by nature a special principle both of justice and expediency for the relation of master and slave, and another for monarchy, and another for the citizen-state.'

§ 2. *οὔτε μὴ νόμων ὄντων,* 'neither when there are no laws, but the king is himself as the law, nor when there are laws, nor when he is good himself and rules over good men, nor when he is bad and rules over bad men, not even if he is better in moral excellence, except in a certain manner.'

§ 3. *εἴρηται δέ πως ἤδη,* ch. xiii. 24, 25.

§ 4. *βασιλευτὸν μὲν οὖν.* 'The ground for monarchy, then, is found where the people is such that it is disposed to submit to the rule of a family of superior excellence, fitted for taking the lead in the state,

And aristocracy is justified where there is a people capable of submitting to be ruled as free men by those who are fitted by virtue to take the lead in the government of the state. Lastly, the citizen-state is justified, where there is a numerous warrior-class, capable of ruling and being ruled according to law, which assigns the offices in the state, according to worth, to the wealthy.' The words which Bekker in his last edition has put in brackets should be struck out of the text, viz. *πλῆθος ὃ πέφυκε φέρειν* after *ἀριστοκρατικὸν δέ*, and *πλῆθος ἐν ᾧ πέφυκε καὶ ἓν ἐγγίνεσθαι* after *πολιτικὸν δέ*. They have been left untranslated. *εὐπόροις* and not *ἀπόροις* is undoubtedly right. It is only in a democracy that the poor hold office. Cf. xi. 7. *τὸ μὲν γὰρ μετέχειν αὐτοὺς τῶν ἀρχῶν τῶν μεγίστων οὐκ ἀσφαλές*. Cf. ch. vii. with these definitions.

§ 6. *καθάπερ γὰρ εἴρηται πρότερον*, ch. ix. 15.

κατὰ τὸ πρότερον λεχθέν, ch. ix. 4.

§ 7. *οὐ γὰρ πέφυκε*, 'for it is not the nature of the part to be superior to the whole, but with the man who possesses such transcendent excellence this would be the case, if he were ruled.'

CHAP. XVIII. Recapitulation. "Since there are three right forms of constitution, and the best is that where the state is governed by the best men, whether one or a whole family, or a number of men excelling in virtue, and it has been shewn (ch. iv.) before, that in the best state the virtue of the good man and the good citizen are the same, it is plain that one may so

frame a state, either an aristocracy or a monarchy, that the same education and training shall produce a good man and a good citizen. Such a state we now proceed to describe in the next book."

§ 1. *πολιτικὸν καὶ βασιλικόν.* Bernays reads *βασιλευτόν*, i.e. a subject of a king. But why not *βασιλικόν*, 'one fitted to be a king?'

SUMMARY OF BOOK IV(VII).

THE MODEL STATE.

CHAP. I. Concerning the best life. It is shewn to be that which is in accordance with virtue and wisdom.

CHAP. II. The happiness of the individual and of the state is the same. Conquest by war not the highest object for a state to aim at.

CHAP. III. Comparison of the active and the philosophic life. The highest form of life is not unpractical.

CHAP. IV. Concerning the size of the state and the number of its inhabitants.

CHAP. V. The territory of the state.

CHAP. VI. On proximity to the sea, commerce, and naval defence.

CHAP. VII. On the nature and character of the citizens.

CHAP. VIII. The several classes in the state.

CHAP. IX. Of the warriors, judges, and priests.

CHAP. X. Of the Συσσίτια. Their origin in Italy. Ancient boundaries of Italy. The division of the land of the state. Of the farmers.

CHAP. XI. The situation of the city and the style of building. The fortifications.

CHAP. XII. About public places and markets.

CHAP. XIII. What constitutes happiness in a state, and in an individual. On the means to secure it.

CHAPS. XIV., XV. On education, which should not be

directed merely to train men in the art of war, and to be brave, as at Sparta, but should encourage the cultivation of the intellect and the arts of peace.

CHAP. XVI. On marriage.

CHAP. XVII. On the care and nurture of infants.

In this book, we get more of details and less of general principles than in the first and third books. Comparing the model state as described by Aristotle with that of Plato, we miss the imagination and humour of the latter; while on the other hand, there is nothing, except one passage, which is absurd, or revolting to the feelings of morality. Aristotle is matter-of-fact, and thoroughly sensible and judicious in his remarks, as in what he says of the importance of fresh air and pure water. But we do not rise from a perusal of the work with exalted and elevated feelings, such as we experience in reading the Republic of Plato.

NOTES TO BOOK IV.

CHAP. I. "What is the best life? On the answer to this question depends another, viz. What is the best state? There are three kinds of advantages which men enjoy, (1) external ones, (2) those of the body, (3) those of the mind. A man to be happy must have some of all of these: no one would call a man happy who has no virtue, and shrinks from no vice, if he wishes to satisfy his desires. All men agree so far; but they differ as to the quantity of these advantages requisite to make a man happy. They hold that some virtue is necessary, but they want also endless wealth, power and honour. But we say that happiness belongs to those who are moderate in the use and acquisition of external and bodily good things. The latter are only means to an end, not an end in themselves. Of intellectual good we cannot have too much. As the mind is the highest part of our nature, so its pleasures are the highest. It is only on account of the soul that the other pleasures have any value. A man, then, attains to happiness in proportion as he attains to virtue and wisdom; and a proof of this is, that we say God is happy, and yet He has no external advantages, but He is so through His own nature. Chance may produce external prosperity, but no one is just or temperate by chance. So it is in the case of a state. A state can-

not be happy, unless its citizens perform good and virtuous actions. It must have virtue and wisdom (ἀρετὴ καὶ φρόνησις).

§ 1. ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων αὐτοῖς, 'from the means at their disposal.'

§ 2. πότερον κοινῇ καὶ χωρὶς, 'whether the same is best for states collectively as for each individual separately, or another.' Cf. § 13.

ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις. Cf. III. vi. 5, where it means 'in unscientific discussion,' and see the note there. Here, in all probability, we have an extract, in what follows down to the end of the chapter, from one of Aristotle's own earlier writings, one of the dialogues, perhaps, which he is supposed to have written. See Sir Alexander Grant in Appendix B of his edition of Aristotle's Ethics, vol. i. p. 404. He quotes a remark of Bernays on the fluency of this passage, in contrast to the severity of Aristotle's ordinary style.

§ 3. πρός γε μίαν διαίρεσιν, 'with respect to one mode of dividing things good.' The division of τὰ ἀγαθὰ into τὰ ἐκτὸς, τὰ ἐν τῷ σώματι, and τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, is also adopted in Eth. I. viii. 2. In Eth. I. xii. 1, there is another διαίρεσις into δυνάμεις (potential goods) and actual goods, which latter are subdivided into τὰ ἐπαινετὰ (praiseworthy) and τὰ τίμια (admirable). In his note on the former passage just quoted, Grant says: "This classification is attributed by Sextus Empiricus *adv. Ethicos*, XI. 51, to the Platonists and Peripatetics. Examples of external goods are wealth,

power, and honour; of bodily goods, health, strength, food; of those of the soul, the various virtues.

§ 4. ἀνδρίας. Wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice, are the four cardinal virtues of Plato's Republic. The way in which they are mentioned here is almost sufficient to shew that this passage is earlier than the Ethics, earlier, that is, than the division of virtues into moral and intellectual.

τῶν ἐσχάτων, 'of the vilest actions.'

τεταρτημορίου, 'the fourth part of an obol.'

§ 5. ὅσπερ has no business in the text, but it is probably genuine. It must be left out in translation. ἁπλῶς has been proposed, and comes in well.

§§ 6, 7. "External goods are inferior to the virtues, (1) because we see as a matter of fact that men acquire the former by the latter, and not *vice versâ*, and that those men who have a moderate amount of the former, but are well adorned with the moral and intellectual virtues, are actually happier than those who are deficient in the latter, but have a larger share of the former; (2) from a consideration of the nature of the case, because external goods, being an instrument, have a limit, beyond which they are injurious, or of no use, whereas of the goods of the mind there cannot be an excess."

§ 6. διὰ τῶν ἔργων, opposed to κατὰ τὸν λόγον lower

down. 'It is easy to receive proof of this from what we actually see.'

τὸ ἦθος, 'the moral character;' *τὴν διάνοιαν*, 'the intellect.'

κατὰ τὸν λόγον, 'not however but that it is easy to see it also, if we consider it theoretically.'

§ 7. *ἔχει πέρας, ὥσπερ ὄργανόν τι*, cf. I. viii. 15. *οὐδὲν γὰρ ὄργανον ἄπειρον οὐδεμιᾶς ἐστι τέχνης οὔτε πλήθει οὔτε μεγέθει.*

αὐτῶν, redundant after *ὧν*. In the Greek of the New Testament this is very common. "Whose shoe's latchet I am not worthy to unloose," *οὗ οὐχ ἱκανός εἰμι λῦσαι τὸν ἱμαντα τῶν ὑποδήματων αὐτοῦ*. St. Luke iii. 16.

εἰ δεῖ καὶ τούτοις ἐπιλέγειν, 'if one must pronounce these to be not only right, but expedient.' Aristotle here seems half to recognise a utilitarian basis of morality. *εἶναι* in the text is rightly put in brackets.

§ 8. *ὅλως τε δῆλον*. 'And generally, it is evident that we shall say that the best state of everything in relation to other things depends on its superiority, in the gradation which naturally exists in those things to which we say the states themselves belong,' i.e. if one thing is naturally superior to another, its highest development will be superior to the highest development of that other. *εἴληχε* is the right reading, not *εἴληφε*. *διάστασιν* is in apposition to *ὑπεροχήν*.

§ 10. This is one of the few passages where Aristotle speaks of the nature of God. In his later works (supposing this to be an extract from an earlier one) he does not speak with such confidence. Cf. Eth. X. viii. 7. *τοὺς θεοὺς γὰρ μάλιστα ὑπειλήφαμεν μακαρίους καὶ εὐδαίμονας εἶναι.*

ἡ τύχη. Aristotle reckons chance, along with nature, necessity, and intellect, as an agent of causation. See Eth. III. iii. 7.

§ 12. *δύναμιν καὶ μορφὴν,* 'inward meaning and outward form.'

§ 13. *ἐπεξελθεῖν,* 'to pursue it in detail.'

§ 14. 'But with regard to those who dispute this point, leaving it in the present enquiry, we must consider it afterwards, if any one is not convinced by what has been said.'

CHAP. II. "All will admit that happiness is the same for the individual and for the state, in whatever happiness may be thought to consist. But two points require consideration, (1) whether public life is preferable, or private life, apart from politics; (2) what form of government is best:—where all participate in the government, or only the majority. The former question is secondary in a treatise on politics, or the public life of the citizens. As to the second, while all admit that a life in accordance with virtue is best, there is a dispute as to whether the active or con-

templative life is better. Opinions differ. 1. Some think that ruling over others, if it is done despotically, is unjust; if constitutionally, it is a hindrance to a man's happiness. 2. Others hold the practical life of the citizen to be the best, in the exercise of the moral virtues, for citizens no less than for individuals. 3. Others think the despotic life, to rule over others, is alone happy. And so war is honoured in different countries, as in Sparta and Crete, where the whole system of education is founded on this idea. In Carthage, men receive rings according to the number of campaigns they have served. In Macedonia, a man who has not killed an enemy in battle has a halter bound round him. In Scythia, he is not allowed to drink of the cup handed round at a feast. In Spain, they fix as many spears round a man's grave as he has killed enemies in battle. But it is absurd to say that it should be the aim of a statesman to rule over others against their will. We do not see this in other sciences,—a pilot or a physician exercising his art to compel others to act in a certain way. Yet some men think they are justified in applying a rule in politics, which they would not think of using in private life. Injustice cannot be right in any sphere. Besides, it is ignoring the distinction we have been laying down that there is a class of men naturally *δεσπότον*, another naturally *δεσποστόν*. It is not right for those of the former class, free citizens, to be subject always to others, any more than it is right to hunt men, to feast on them, or to sacrifice them instead of wild animals.

Moreover, a state which is well governed can be happy by itself without war. The pursuit of war is honourable, but it is not the highest end. The object of a good legislator should rather be to make the citizens partake of a virtuous life. But laws and institutions will vary in different states. He must also consider how they ought to conduct themselves towards their neighbours. But the consideration of the end at which the state should aim must be deferred for the present."

§ 3. *ὁ ξενικὸς*, 'the life of a stranger and of one discharged from political association.'

§ 4. *ἐκεῖνο μὲν πάρεργον*, 'the former question will form an appendix, and the latter will be the proper business of this enquiry.'

§ 5. *θεωρητικός τις*. In Ethics, I. v. 1, 2, Aristotle says there are three modes of life; that of enjoyment (*ἀπολαυστικὸς*), corresponding to *τυραννικὸς* in § 2 above, that of the citizen (*πολιτικὸς*), and the contemplative life (*θεωρητικός*). "In Plato a similar division occurs, Repub. ix. 581 C: *Διὰ ταῦτα δὴ καὶ ἀνθρώπων λέγωμεν τὰ πρῶτα τριττὰ γένη εἶναι, φιλόσοφον, φιλόνεικον, φιλοκερδές.*" (Grant, in his note on the passage referred to in the Ethics.)

§ 6. *οἱ φιλοτιμότατοι*, 'who strive most earnestly after virtue.'

συντάττεσθαι, 'address himself to.'

§ 7. *τούτων δ' ὥσπερ ἐξ ἐναντίας*, 'but others hold an opinion the very opposite of these.'

§ 8. *ὅρος*, 'the aim,' = *τέλος* here.

§ 9. *χύδην*, 'in a promiscuous manner,' 'without any definite aim.'

§ 11. *ἀπεκταγκότα*, an unusual form of the perfect of *ἀποκτείνω*; *ἀπεκτονότα*, the second perfect, would be the ordinary form.

περιεζῶσθαι τὴν φορβειάν, 'should have a halter round his waist.'

ἐν δὲ Σκύθαις, cf. Herod. iv. 66.

§ 12. *κατειλημμένα*, 'enforced.'

§ 13. *κρατεῖν δ' ἔστι καὶ μὴ δικαίως*, cf. I. vi. 5.

§ 14. *τὴν δεσποτικὴν πολιτικὴν*, 'seem to think that despotic rule is constitutional.'

§ 15. *ἄτοπον δὲ εἰ μή*, cf. I. v. 11.

ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς τοῦτο θηρευτόν, 'but that which is lawful game; and any wild animal which is good for food is game.'

§ 16. *μηθὲν γὰρ ὑπαρχέτω τοιοῦτον*, 'let no such principle be admitted.'

§ 18. *ποῖα πρὸς ποίους ἀσκητέον*, 'what conduct must be observed to each, or what is the proper course to adopt towards each,' i.e. what rules of international law are to be observed,

κἂν ὕστερον τύχοι τῆς προσηκούσης σκέψεως, i.e. in chap. xiv.

CHAP. III. "Then as to the respective merits of the active and contemplative life, those who advocate the one or the other are both right. The life of the free citizen is better than that of the despot. But all rule is not despotic. On the other hand, inaction ought not to be praised more than action. For happiness is action. The acts of the just and temperate have a noble character. To this it may be objected that in order to do the most noble actions, one must have great power; and so the man who is able to rule, ought not to give up power to another. This, however, assumes that might is right, the point which we deny. One free man does not differ from another so much as a man from a woman, or a master from a slave. The essence of political freedom is that power should be held and submitted to by turns. Unless, as has been said, a man is of transcendent virtue and power to accomplish the best things, he must obey as well as rule. The practical life of virtue, then, is the best both for the state and the individual. But practical life is not necessarily concerned with others, nor is it for the sake of results; it will include actions that are ends in themselves, and thoughts. It is the great thinkers who are really most practical. Cities, too, that live to themselves, and are not engaged in commerce with others, are not necessarily unpractical. The several parts of the state may have intercourse with one another. The deity has no external actions

with others besides himself." There is a good deal in these two chapters that has been said already in various parts of Books I. and III.

§ 1. *τῆς χρήσεως αὐτοῦ*, 'the practice of it.'

ἀποδοκιμάζουσι, 'discard political offices.'

οἱ μὲν ὅτι, 'on the one hand those are right who say that, &c.' To this corresponds *τὸ δὲ μᾶλλον ἐπαινεῖν* in § 3.

τοῦ ἐλευθέρου, 'the free man,' one who is free from the task of government.

§ 2. *οὐθὲν γὰρ τό γε δούλῳ*. cf. I. vii. 4.

ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις, i.e. in I. v.

§ 3. *ἔτι δὲ πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν*, 'and moreover the actions of the just and temperate have the character of much that is noble.' *τὸ καλὸν* is the end (*τέλος*) of the moral virtues, according to Aristotle. For a similar use of *τέλος* to that which it has in this passage, cf. Eth. III. i. 6. *τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς πράξεως κατὰ τὸν καιρόν ἐστιν*, and III. vii. 6. *τέλος δὲ πάσης ἐνεργείας ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν*. See Grant's notes on the passages.

§ 4. *ὑπολογεῖν* = *ὑπολογίζειν*, 'to take account of.'

§ 5. *ὑποτίθενται τοῦτο ψεῦδος*, 'this is a false principle which they assume.'

ὥστε ὁ παραβαίνων. 'So that he who violates justice can never afterwards be in the right, so much as he has

already deviated from virtue.' No amount of subsequent good government can make up for the original act of usurpation.

τοῖς γὰρ ὁμοίοις, 'for to those who are equal, the right and the just consist in ruling and being ruled by turns.'

§ 6. *διὸ κἂν ἄλλος τις ᾖ κρείττων.* Here again the man of superior virtue comes in. cf. III. xiii, 25, xvii. 7, 8.

§ 8. *ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον.* 'But much more those which are absolute in themselves, and speculations and imaginations for their own sake. For happiness (doing-well) is the end, so that it is also a kind of action (doing). And we say that men of original thought are also most practical, so as to determine even external actions.'

§ 9. *ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἀπρακτεῖν.* It is curious to observe how much the Greek philosophers were in favour of isolation in states, and how alien are their thoughts from the modern spirit of free-trade and federation. China and Japan, as it was till recently, would have commended themselves, apparently, to Aristotle.

καὶ τοῦτο συμβαίνειν. 'For it is possible for this (i.e. action) to happen partially. For there are many ways in which intercourse may take place between the different parts of the state as regards each other.'

§ 10. *ὁ θεὸς καὶ πᾶς ὁ κόσμος.* For an account of Aristotle's conceptions of God and the Universe, see Grant's Ethics, vol. i. Essay V.

καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, 'and for mankind generally.' It

is not easy to see how these words can have been interpolated by a copyist, and yet they come in very inappropriately, and would be better out.

CHAP. IV. "What is to be the size of the state, and the number of its inhabitants? The statesman and the legislator must have their proper subject-matter to work on, just as the weaver and the ship-builder have. That city which is best able to accomplish its work will be the greatest: just as we say that Hippocrates is not the greatest man in size, but the greatest physician. In reckoning the proper size of a state, we must not reckon slaves, metœcs, or strangers, but only citizens proper. A state where there are many βάναυσοι, and only a few ὁπλῖται will not be a great state. A state which is too populous, cannot be well-ordered or governed. Order is a work of the divine power, which governs the universe. A city, like an animal, or plant, or instrument, must have a proper size, which it ought not to exceed. A ship of a span long is too small, one two furlongs long would be too large. A city of a very few men would not be self-sufficient: one with a very large number of citizens cannot have a constitution. For what general could command an overwhelming multitude? what herald could make himself heard by all, unless he had a voice like Stentor? Again, to judge and appoint magistrates, are the functions of a citizen, and this cannot be done well unless the citizens are known to each other. It is dangerous to make rash experiments in this. Moreover, if a state is

too populous, there is danger of strangers and aliens partaking in the government."

§ 1. *καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας...πρότερον.* If, as seems almost certain, this book should follow the third, these words have been put in by the unskilful editor who arranged the books in the old order.

τὰς ὑποθέσεις, 'the bases,' i.e. the limits of population and territory.

§ 2. *διὸ δεῖ πολλὰ.* 'Wherefore it is necessary that as when praying we should have assumed many things beforehand, but that none of these should be impossible.'

§ 5. *Ἔστι γάρ τι καὶ πόλεως ἔργον.* The limit of the size of the state, which Plato lays down (Rep. IV. p. 423), is that it should be as large as is consistent with its being well-governed, and with its unity: *μεχρὶ οὗ ἂν ἐθέλῃ αὐξομένη εἶναι μία, μεχρὶ τούτου αὔξειν, πέρα δὲ μή.*

§ 6. *οὐ κατὰ τὸ τυχὸν πλῆθος,* 'we must not form this opinion (as to the size of the state) according to the ordinary population.'

δούλων...καὶ μετοίκων καὶ ξένων. This is in favour of the reading *δούλους καὶ μετοίκους,* in III. ii. 3.

ἐξέρχονται, 'go out to battle.'

§ 7. *ἀνειμένην πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος,* 'unlimited in population.'

§ 8. *θείας γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο.* 'For this is a work of divine power, whatever it is which keeps the universe together.' Cf. Pope, "Order is Heaven's first law." Aristotle nowhere speaks of God as the Author of the universe, nor does he here imply that He keeps it in order, but he only says that the power which keeps the universe together is godlike, like what we may imagine that of God to be. So in the Ethics, while arguing the question whether happiness is given by God, or is acquired by habit, he says that it is at all events most godlike (*τῶν θειοτάτων εἶναι*). He often, as in the last chapter, couples God and the Universe together, but he does not state what the relation between them is. He adopts neither a dualistic nor a monistic theory of creation. As Grant says, Ethics, vol. i. p. 291: "He acknowledges these two sides to the conception, 'the discipline in the army' and 'the general ruling the army,' but does not attempt to bring them together."

τό γε καλὸν ἐν πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει. It is a thoroughly Greek idea of beauty that it implies large size. We see instances of this in the statues of Zeus and Athena, and in Herodotus' description of Phye, who appeared before the entry of Peisistratus into Athens. Herod. I. 60. *μέγαθος ἀπὸ τεσσέρων πηχέων ἀπολείπουσα τρεῖς δακτύλους καὶ ἄλλως εὐειδής.* Cf. Ar. Poet. VII. 4. *τὸ γὰρ καλὸν ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τάξει ἐστί, κ.τ.λ.* Burke, in his Essay on the Sublime and Beautiful, makes littleness, on the contrary, an element of beauty. This seems superficial. But, if beauty consists in a due proportion of parts, it is clear that what exceeds the normal

size, will seldom, if ever, be thoroughly well-proportioned.

§ 9. ὁ λεχθεὶς ὅρος, i.e. in III. ix. 12, ἡ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν κοινωνία καὶ ταῖς οἰκίαις καὶ τοῖς γένεσι ζωῆς τελείας χάριν καὶ αὐτάρκους. Cf. III. i. 12. Translate: 'Therefore, also, that city must be the best which answers to the description which has been given, and is great besides.'

§ 11. Στεντόρειος, 'like Stentor,' the herald of the Greeks, Hom. Il. v. 785:

> ἔνθα στᾶσ' ἤυσε θεὰ λευκώλενος Ἥρη,
> Στέντορι εἰσαμένη μεγαλήτορι, χαλκεοφώνῳ,
> ὃς τόσον αὐδήσασχ', ὅσον ἄλλοι πεντήκοντα.

This notion of the number of the assembled citizens being limited by the possibility of their hearing the herald's voice, is not so absurd in the absence of representative government and a daily press.

πρώτην εἶναι πόλιν. Plato makes four or five the least number of men requisite to form a city. Rep. II. p. 369. εἴη δ' ἂν ἡ γε ἀναγκαιοτάτη πόλις ἐκ τεττάρων ἢ πέντε ἀνδρῶν. These are a farmer, a house-builder, a weaver, and a shoemaker. Aristotle, of course, would say that this was not a city. It would be like the πλοῖον σπιθαμιαῖον. This just illustrates what has been said in a note on Book I. Plato regards a city or state, as arising from a natural development of man's wants. As the community increases, the need of organised government arises, the main object being to secure the harmony of the various classes, and that each individual

may do his own work. Aristotle seems to regard man more as a being capable of governing and being governed, πολιτικὸν ζῷον. It is true that he regards the philosophic life as the highest, but this is attainable only by the few, and the ordinary life of the citizen is ὁ πολιτικός.

§ 12. μείζω would be better out of the text. If retained, translate: 'may still be a city, though larger.

ἐκ τῶν ἔργων, 'from what actually happens,' i.e. we see bad results, where the population is too great.'

εἰσὶ γὰρ αἱ πράξεις, 'for the actions of the city are those of the rulers on the one hand, and of the ruled on the other.'

§ 13. πρὸς δὲ τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τῶν δικαίων, 'but for judging of what is right.' This is not opposed to κρίσις, but is identical with it. The office of δικαστὴς and ἐκκλησιαστὴς is called ἀόριστος ἀρχὴ in Book III. The ἔργον of the ruled would be ἐπιτάττεσθαι καὶ κρίνεσθαι. In modern states, with representative systems of government, this personal knowledge of the citizens of each other is not considered necessary. A man is elected to an office, not from a consideration of his character (ποιός τις), but because the majority think he will carry out their wishes. He must generally have given some proof of ability, it is true, but this is only known to the main body of the electors through hearsay or the public press. So, too, in matters of justice, cases are decided now by evidence as to facts. In Greece, this was almost the last thing thought of; it was a man's private character,

and the number of friends he could get to support him, which determined, whether or no he gained his cause.

αὐτοσχεδιάζειν, 'to act at hap-hazard.'

§ 14. *ἔτι δὲ ξένοις καὶ μετοίκοις.* See note on III. v. 9.

ἡ μεγίστη τοῦ πλήθους, 'the greatest amount of numbers, compatible with self-sufficiency of life, able to be taken in at a glance.'

CHAP. V. "The territory of the state. It must be self-sufficient. That is, it must produce everything itself, so as to need nothing from without. In extent, it must be of such a size as to allow the inhabitants to live a life of leisure, avoiding the extremes of meanness and extravagance. It should be tolerably secure against invasion, and such as to allow the citizens ready egress. Moreover, it must be such that the whole of it can be commanded from one point of view (*εὐσύνοπτον*), and that succour can be sent readily to any point which is attacked (*εὐβοήθητον*). As to situation, it must lie well both towards the sea and to the land. It must also be of easy access by roads, for the supply of products, such as corn and timber (*εὐπαρακόμιστον*)."

§ 1. *πλήθει δὲ καὶ μεγέθει*, 'in size and extent;' the two are identical here.

ἐλευθερίως καὶ σωφρόνως, 'in freedom and sobriety.'

§ 2. *τοῦτον δὲ τὸν ὅρον.* 'But whether we are right or not in so defining it, we must consider afterwards more

accurately, when we come to mention possession generally, and the supply of the means of life, how and in what manner they are to be used.' *αὐτὴν* refers to *κτήσεως*.

τοὺς ἕλκοντας, 'those who lean to either extreme of living.'

§ 3. *τὸ δ' εὐσύνοπτον*, 'for the country to be easily commanded from one point of view, is for it to be such that succour can easily be sent to any point attacked.' *εὐσύνοπτον*, *εὐβοήθητον* are both feminine, agreeing with *χώραν*.

§ 4. *εἷς μὲν ὁ λεχθεὶς ὅρος.* 'What has been said, serves for the description on one side: for it must have communication with all the places for sending out succours. The rest of the description relates to the conveyance to the city of the fruits of the earth. And, moreover, as regards forest timber, or any other product that the country may possess of this kind, (metals, for instance), it must be such that they can be easily conveyed to it.' That is, there must be easy communication with points liable to be attacked by an enemy, and ports and landing-places for the produce of the country. It is not meant that good roads are requisite. Ancient Greece was quite as ignorant of roads, in any real sense of the word, as modern Greece is. The cities were nearly all near the sea, and depended chiefly on water-carriage. *παραπομπὰς* and *εὐπαρακόμιστον* both imply this.

CHAP. VI. "Proximity to the sea for the sake of commerce is a doubtful advantage. It brings in a host of

strangers, brought up under strange laws and customs, which is antagonistic to good government. Apart from this, it is good, especially for repelling the attacks of enemies, when to have the command of both elements is important; (2) for importing what is not of home growth, and exporting the superabundance of home supplies. But this commerce should be limited to the supply of the state's own wants. Those who throw open their market to all comers, do it for the sake of increasing their revenues (a principle to be condemned). —There is an advantage in having docks and harbours, not in the city, but close to it, in order to give it the command of what it needs, and to exclude from it by walls and fortifications all deleterious elements. As to naval force, a city must have it for self-defence, but the number of sailors must be in proportion to the ἐπιβάται, who are citizens, and by the regard it pays to war and external transactions. A large ναυτικὸς ὄχλος is a bad thing. But where a city, like Heracles, has many perioeci and husbandmen, there must be plenty of men available for sailors."

§ 1. ἐπιξενοῦσθαι, pass., 'for both for strangers to be entertained, when they have been brought up amongst other laws, is, they say, inexpedient for good order in the state, and so is a large population.'

§ 3. πολέμους is clearly right, not πολεμίους as in the Tauchnitz edition.

ἀλλὰ κατὰ θάτερον, 'and with regard to injuring those

who attack them, if it is not possible to do so on both elements, yet they will have a greater advantage on the one, if they have access to both.' For instance, a state might, like Sparta, be military rather than naval, but a fleet would enable it to land forces on points not accessible by land. Thus Sparta could not have taken part in the war in Sicily against Athens, of course, without a fleet. It was this which led to the final defeat of Athens. The Tauchnitz edition inserts *εἰ* between *ἀλλὰ* and *κατὰ*, but it destroys the sense.

§ 4. On the dangers and advantages attending proximity to the sea for a state, cf. Plat. Legg. IV. p. 704, D—705, B.

§ 5. Here Aristotle must be thinking of Athens and Corinth chiefly.

διὰ τῆς κοινωνίας, 'through their mutual intercourse,' i.e. of the harbour with the city.

§ 8. *τὸ ἐπιβατικόν*. At Athens, these were generally taken from the Thetes, or lowest class. Cf. Thuc. VI. 43. In Thuc. VIII. 24, they were taken from the higher classes, *ἐκ καταλόγου*, but this was on an extraordinary emergency. See Arnold's note on the first passage quoted.

περιοίκων, a class of men, who, as at Sparta, were the original owners of the soil, and had been dispossessed by conquest of their lands, but were still allowed to cultivate them. They had not the full rights of citi-

zens. They did not form part of the ξύλλογος, or assembly of full citizens, which decided questions of peace and war.

Ἡρακλεωτῶν, the inhabitants of Heraclea in the Pontus.

§ 9. καὶ πόλεων. These words must be wrong, and are properly bracketed by Bekker. Possibly it should be either περιπολίων (guard-houses) or ἐπινείων (sea-ports).

CHAP. VII. "What should be the nature and character of the citizens? The Greek race is the best in character, just as the country also is the best. It lies between the cold northern nations of Europe, who are full of spirit (θυμοῦ), but deficient in intellect and art, and the Asiatics, who are intellectual and artistic, but wanting in spirit. The Greek race is both spirited and intellectual. So it is always free and well-governed, and able to rule over others. But there is a difference in Greek tribes as regards each other. Some have only one side of their nature developed. The citizens must have both spirit and intellect, that they may be trained in virtue. Plato said the guardians must be disposed to love their friends, and be savage to strangers. Spirit (θυμὸς) is the principle of the mind, which produces both love and hate. We feel most angry with our friends, if we think we are wronged, because we think we are deprived of what should naturally be ours. But it is not right to say that we should be harsh to any. The high-minded man is never angry, except with injustice."

§ 1. *ὡς διείληπται τοῖς ἔθνεσιν*, 'how the nations severally occupy it.'

§ 2. *ἀπολίτευτα*, 'uncivilized.'

§ 3. *μιᾶς τυγχάνον πολιτείας*, 'if it only had one single form of government.' Aristotle no doubt wished that all Greece should be united under the rule of Alexander, whom throughout the Politics he has in view as the man of superior excellence, under whom monarchy would be better even than aristocracy.

§ 4. *τὴν φύσιν μονόκωλον*, 'have their nature one-sided,' as the Spartans, who excelled in *θυμὸς*, but were deficient in *διάνοια*.

§ 5. *φασί τινες*, Plat. Rep. II. p. 375, C. *Ἀλλὰ μέντοι δεῖ γε πρὸς μὲν τοὺς οἰκείους πράους αὐτοὺς εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς πολεμίους χαλεπούς.*

§ 6. *οὐ γὰρ δὴ περὶ φίλων ἀπάγχεο*, 'for thou wert not vexed about those dear to thee.' This appears just the opposite of the sense intended. Bergk reads *σὺ γὰρ δὴ παρὰ φίλων ἀπάγχεο*, 'for thou wert vexed by thy friends.' *οὐ γὰρ* would give a spondee in the second foot of an Iambic.

§ 8. *παρ' οἷς γὰρ ὀφεῖλεσθαι δεῖν.* This is hardly consistent with the character of the *μεγαλόψυχος* given in Eth. IV. iii. 24, where it says that "he is glad to do a benefit, and ashamed to receive one; he will wipe out a favour by doing a greater one in return."

χαλεποὶ γὰρ πόλεμοι ἀδελφῶν. This and the suc-

ceeding quotation are from a fragment of Euripides. Cf. Coleridge's Christabel:—

> 'And to be wroth with one we love,
> Doth work like madness in the brain.'

§ 9. διά τε τῶν λόγων, 'in abstract theory and in what comes under our actual observation.'

CHAP. VIII. The several classes in the state. "Those are not necessarily parts of any organism, without which it cannot exist, such as an instrument to a work, or a house to a builder. A city has need of property, but there are living parts of property, and these are the lower classes. But the end of the state is not the acquisition of property, but happiness, which consists in the energy and perfect use of virtue. First then, for food, there must be farmers, (2) artisans, for the other instruments of life, (3) soldiers, to control those at home and make them obedient, and to fight against external enemies, (4) a monied class, (5) priests, (6) judges.

§ 1. ταῦτα is the right reading, and not ταὐτὰ, as Bekker's Oxford Edition has it.

ὧν ἄνευ τὸ ὅλον οὐκ ἂν εἴη. Cf. III. v. 2. ταῦτο γὰρ ἄληθες, ὡς οὐ πάντας θετέον πολίτας ὧν ἄνευ οὐκ ἂν εἴη πόλις.

ἐξ ἧς ἕν τι τὸ γένος, 'of which there is a unity in kind.'

§ 8. ὅταν δ' ᾖ τὸ μὲν τούτου ἕνεκεν, 'but when one thing is

the means, and the other the end, there is nothing in common between these, except the fact that one produces, and the other receives.'

§ 5. ἀρετῆς ἐνέργεια. This definition of happiness is not so full as that given in the Ethics: ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ. Still the main characteristic is brought out, viz., that it is not anything external, nor a mere passive state (ἕξις), as ἀρετὴ itself is, but ἀρετῆς ἐνέργεια, the active exercise of ἀρετή. By ἀρετὴ is meant not so much virtue in our sense, as intellectual speculation (σοφία), though moral virtue is also included in it. Altogether, we miss in this book the philosophical precision of language so characteristic of the Ethics. It is hardly possible to resist the conclusion that, though the Politics is a later work than the Ethics, it is not only unfinished, but portions of Aristotle's earlier writings are worked up in it. This, we saw, was certainly the case in the first chapter. The passage on θυμὸς in the last chapter is perhaps another instance.

τοῦτο, i.e. happiness. τούς τε βίους ἑτέρους, cf. ch. iii.

§ 6. ἐν τούτοις, 'in these it would be necessary for it to consist.'

§ 7. ἱερατείαν, 'priesthood.'

τὸν ἀριθμὸν, 'in number.'

Chap. IX. "Must all the inhabitants of the city partake of all these duties? or how? In the best state, the citizens must not live the life of mechanics or tradesmen, nor must they be farmers. For they need leisure

both for virtuous action and political life. The warriors and the judges may be the same men, but at different periods of life, warriors when they are young, councillors and judges when they are older. And the possessions of the country must be in their hands, and belong to them. The farmers, who till the land, must be slaves, or foreigners, or periœci, not citizens. The priests must be citizens; for the gods must be honoured by citizens. No mechanic or farmer must be a priest. The priests will be old men, who have served as judges."

§ 1. ἢ τὰ μὲν ἴδια, 'or whether it is necessary that some of these functions belong to one class only, while others are shared by several.'

§ 3. εἴρηται πρότερον, in viii. 5.

ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ μὴ πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, 'absolutely, and not relatively to the idea of the given state.'

§ 4. τὴν γένεσιν τῆς ἀρετῆς, 'for the formation of virtue.'

§ 5. ἑτέρας ἀκμῆς, 'each of the functions belongs to a different time of life.'

δυνάμεως here means 'bodily vigour.'

ᾗ δὲ τῶν ἀδυνάτων, 'but in so far as it is impossible for those who are able to compel and prevent, to submit always to be ruled, in this way both functions should be given to the same men. For those who have the control of the arms are able to determine whether the constitution shall remain or not.'

§ 6. ἔχει τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν, 'is proper.'

§ 7. *τὰς κτήσεις* here means 'landed possessions.'

περὶ τούτους, 'vested in these.'

εὐπορίαν. The *εὔποροι*, then, are to be citizens. The only classes excluded, though *ὧν ἄνευ οὐκ ἂν εἴη πόλις*, are the farmers and artisans.

τῆς ἀρετῆς δημιουργόν, 'productive of virtue.' The expression is an oxymoron.

πάντας τοὺς πολίτας. For the city to be happy, all the citizens must partake of virtue. But the mechanic does not partake of virtue. Therefore he is not a citizen.

§ 9. *ἀπειρηκότας*, 'those who are spent with age.'

§ 10. *τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ*, i.e. the farmers and mechanics; *τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος*, i.e. the warriors and the councillors. Plato, in his Republic, makes the Guardians or Philosophers, and the Auxiliaries or Warriors, two distinct classes; so that the same man could not belong to both at different periods of his life.

CHAP. X. §§ 1—8. This is a very interesting chapter, first, from the account of the origin of the Sussitia, or common mess-tables; secondly, from the notices of ancient boundaries and races in Italy. After saying that the distinction of castes was recognised by ancient legislators, such as Sesostris and Minos in Egypt and Crete, Aristotle goes on to speak of the Sussitia, which he says originated with Italus, king of the Œnotrians, who made his subjects adopt an agricultural instead of a pastoral life, and instituted these public meals in com-

mon as a means apparently of keeping the people together in their new mode of life. Necessaries come first, then elegancies and superfluities. So in politics; at first there are rude expedients, then improved methods of government. In mentioning this king Italus, he says that the people were called Italians after him, and that their country and name extended from the toe of Italy as far as the Scylletic gulf on one side, and the Lametic on the other; and that it is half-a-day's journey between these two. He also mentions the Opici, or Ausonians, as dwelling to the north, and the Chones, who were Œnotrians by race, to the east of Italy proper. The division of castes came from Egypt. It is probable also that many other political institutions are of very ancient origin, and have been discovered and forgotten and revived in the course of the world's history. One proof of their antiquity is the fact of Egypt, which is thought to be the oldest country, having fixed laws and a political system handed down from the earliest times.

§ 1. *Σεσώστριος.* For some account of him, cf. Her. II. 102—110.

§ 2. *τῶν συσσιτίων ἡ τάξις.* The connexion between the establishment of the Sussitia and the division of the state into classes is shewn in § 7. "Men first lived a pastoral life, then Italus taught them agriculture, and gave them fixed laws and institutions, amongst others the Sussitia. So, too, there was a progress in political organism; first, all were on the same level, then gradually the division into distinct classes took place. This, too, was very ancient. It originated in

Egypt, the inhabitants of which are the most ancient people."

§ 3. *οἱ λόγιοι*, 'the learned among those who dwell there.'

Οἰνωτρίας, 'Wine-land.'

§ 5. *τὸ μὲν πρὸς τὴν Τυρρηνίαν*, i.e. towards the north. He is now mentioning the names of tribes adjoining the Œnotri, or Itali, who adopted the Sussitia. *Ὀπικοὶ* = Opsci, or Osci, or Ausones.

Σιρῖτιν, i.e. the country of the river Siris, near Heraclea.

§ 7. *Σχεδὸν μὲν οὖν*. On this curious idea of Aristotle and Plato of a series of cataclysms having occurred amongst men, and that "every art and science and philosophy has been over and over again discovered to the farthest extent possible, and then again lost," see Grant's Ethics, vol. i. Essay V. pp. 287, 288. He quotes two interesting passages on this subject: Arist. Metaphys. XI. viii. 19, and Plato, Laws, 677, A: *Τὸ πολλὰς ἀνθρώπων φθορὰς γεγονέναι κατακλυσμοῖς τε καὶ νόσοις καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς, ἐν οἷς βραχύ τι τῶν ἀνθρώπων λείπεσθαι γένος.* He does not allude to this passage. There is not, of course, a particle of evidence to be adduced in support of any such notion of a cycle in human affairs. The tendency of nature is to variation and development, not to repetition. There have been various civilizations of independent origin in the history of the world, such as the Chinese, the Mexican, the Indian, and the Mediterranean. The Mexican

has utterly perished, the Chinese is stationary, and, apparently with the Indian, likely to merge in that of Western Europe. In the case of the latter, there is a distinct line of progress to be traced from the earliest times of which we have any knowledge, but we nowhere find the faintest trace of any system of civilization having sprung up and perished, and then of a fresh system arising, resembling the old by means of fragments transmitted somehow. This theory is just on a par with that of those geologists, who maintain that there have been a number of cataclysms in nature, and endless fresh creations of species, some entirely new, and others more or less resembling those of a former epoch.

τὰ δ' εἰς εὐσχημοσύνην, 'and that those things which have to do with elegance and superabundance should receive their increase when the former are already in existence.'

§ 8. *Διὸ δεῖ.* 'Wherefore we must make efficient use of these things which have been mentioned (the institution of castes, and the Sussitia), and endeavour to search for what has been left behind.' Comparing the passage above alluded to in the Metaphysics, it is clear that Aristotle is of opinion that other fragments may be won, as it were, from the depths of former cataclysms for future use (*ταύτας τὰς δόξας ἐκείνων οἷον λείψανα περισεσῶσθαι μεχρὶ τοῦ νῦν*). He does not tell us how we are to set about searching, nor, when we have found them, how we are to know these 'fragments of an earlier world.'

§§ 9—14. "The land should belong to the military and legislative classes, but should be occupied by all, and no citizen should lack food. The Sussitia is a good institution, especially for the poor, who cannot be expected to pay their quota of taxes, and manage their own households as well. The land should be divided into two portions, one public and common, the other belonging to private citizens. Some should be set apart for the worship of the gods, and some to keep up the common messes. Of the private lands, some should be near the frontiers, some near the city, and a portion of each should be allotted to each individual. For otherwise, in time of war, those whose lands were near the city would not be disposed to fight for those whose lands were at the frontiers, while the latter would think too much about their lands, as being likely to suffer most from invasion. In some states there is a law that those who live on the frontiers should have no voice in the national councils on questions of peace and war. The farmers should be slaves, and not all of the same race, or spirited. So they will be less likely to revolt. If not slaves, they should be foreign *περίοικοι*. Those on private lands should be the property of the owners, those on public lands should belong to the state. Slaves, however, should have the prospect of freedom set before them as the price of good behaviour."

§ 9. *εἴρηται πρότερον*, ix. 7. *ὥσπερ τινες εἰρήκασιν*, Plato, in the Republic.

τῇ χρήσει, 'for use in a friendly spirit thrown open to all.'

§ 10. ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν. This promise is not fulfilled.

§ 12. παρὰ τὸ καλόν. They exhibit cowardice.

§ 13. μήτε ὁμοφύλων, 'neither chosen from those who are all of the same race.' The Tauchnitz edition reads ὁμοφύλους. It comes to the same thing.

πρὸς τὸ μηδὲν νεωτερίζειν. He is thinking of the revolts of the Helots at Sparta.

§ 14. ἆθλον προκεῖσθαι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν. He is thinking of the Neodamodes at Sparta. But is not this contrary to his own principle—once a slave, always a slave?

CHAP. XI. "The city should be built facing the east for the healthy breezes from the sunrise, and the south for warmth in winter. It should also be well situated for political and warlike actions. For war, there should be ready egress, and it should be difficult of approach, and impregnable. It should be well supplied with water, both in springs and reservoirs, that it may be independent if besieged, and also for purposes of health. There should also be plenty of fresh air. If the city has not a good supply of water, then the drinking-water should be kept apart from that for washing. Then for purposes of defence, a citadel suits an oligarchy and a monarchy—a plain, a democracy. An aristocracy should have several strong places. Private houses should be built in square blocks, according to the modern style of Hippodamus. But since the streets ought not to allow an enemy to advance rapidly, the arrangement *en échelons* will be best. A city cannot dispense with walls. But

neither should it trust entirely to its walls for defence, but only as a safeguard against being overpowered at once by superior numbers, especially in these days of improvement in the means of attack. Not to fortify a city with walls is the same as leaving the country open to invasion, and to deprive it of its hilly places. It would be just as absurd as to build private houses without walls, under the idea they make the inmates cowardly. Those who have walls can act as if they had none. Those who have not cannot act as if they had. Moreover, a city must keep up its defences. And as the means of attack are always being improved, so the improvement of the means of defence must be studied. An enemy will not attack those who are well prepared."

§ 1. *κοινὴν εἶναι*, 'have communication both by land and sea, and with all the territory alike as far as possible.'

εἴρηται πρότερον, ch. v. 3.

αὐτῆς δὲ πρὸς αὐτὴν εἶναι τὴν θέσιν, 'but with regard to its absolute position by itself, we should pray that we may succeed, keeping four objects in view. If *εἶναι* be retained, (and it is difficult to see how it can have come into the text, if it was not there originally,) it must be taken closely with *αὐτῆς πρὸς αὐτὴν*, (cf. *τὴν πρώτην εἶναι, τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, ἑκὼν εἶναι*). So Professor Eaton in his note on this passage. Susemihl, following Moerbek's Latin translation of a lost MS., proposes *εἰ κατ' εὐχὴν δεῖ κατατυγχάνειν τὴν θέσιν, πρὸς τέτταρα καθιστάναι δεῖ βλέποντας*. The four objects to be kept

in view are (1) health, (2) warmth, (3) military defence, and (4), in chap. xii., police arrangements.

§ 2. *δεύτερον δὲ κατὰ βορέαν*, 'and secondly sheltered from the north; for these have a milder winter.' For this use of *κατὰ*, cf. *κατὰ ῥόον* and Thuc. II. 99, *ὅπως κατὰ κορυφὴν ἐσβαλοῦσιν ἐς τὴν κάτω Μακεδονιάν*, where, as Classen says, the stand-point, the summit, is regarded as the point of departure, and *κατὰ κορυφὴν* = *κατάκρας*, 'from above.' The city is to have a south-eastern aspect.

πρός τε τὰς πολιτικὰς πράξεις καὶ πολεμικάς. Of these, the latter are treated in the rest of this chapter, and the former in the next chapter.

§ 3. *δυσπερίληπτον*, 'hard to encompass.'

πλῆθος οἰκεῖον, 'a natural supply.'

ἐπιλείπειν, 'so as never to fail them when shut out of the country through war.'

§ 4. *δεύτερον δὲ*, 'the next thing is to have wholesome water.' *δὲ* marks the apodosis.

μὴ παρέργως, 'as a matter of primary importance.'

§ 6. *Ἱπποδάμειον*. Hippodamus of Miletus was an architect, who laid out the Piræus in the time of Pericles.

§ 7. *τῶν ἀμπέλων συστάδας*, 'the vine-rows.' The vines are planted in the form of a quincunx, ∴, or *en échelons*, checkerwise. Cf. Virg. Geo. II. 276—283.

καὶ τὴν μὲν ὅλην, 'and not make the city all square, but only in parts and places.' This is merely a continuation of the description of the quincunx formation. The city is to be built in square blocks of houses, but there are not to be thoroughfares at right angles to each other.

§ 8. *λίαν ἀρχαίως ὑπολαμβάνουσιν*, 'entertain very antiquated ideas.'

τὰς ἐκείνως καλλωπισαμένας, 'those which prided themselves on having no walls.' The reference is to Sparta, invaded by Epaminondas, B.C. 369.

§ 9. *τὴν ὑπεροχὴν γίγνεσθαι.* 'But since it both happens and is possible that the numbers of the invaders may be too great for any human bravery, or for a few brave men to overcome.'

ἄλλως τε καὶ νῦν εὑρημένων. These were the days of the siege of Tyre by Alexander, and not long before the time of Demetrius Poliorcetes. Translate: 'especially in these days of modern inventions in artillery and engineering, which have brought to perfection the art of besieging cities.'

§ 10. *περιαιρεῖν*, 'to take away the hill-places,' i.e. to deprive it of its natural defences.

§ 12. *ἐπιμελές ἐστι.* 'For as the attacking party consider the means by which they may take advantage of the other side, so the party which is acting on the defensive

ought also to investigate and study the means of defence beyond what has been already discovered.'

φιλοσοφεῖν, 'study,'—a peculiar use of the word.

ἀρχήν, 'at all.'

CHAP. XII. "For better security, some of the Sussitia should be held in the guard-houses along the walls. There should be places for religious worship, and the common meals of the highest magistrates, and these should be one and the same, except where the law or an oracle appoints sacred places apart. Such a place should be conspicuous and strongly situated. Underneath should be what they call in Thessaly a free market; that is, where nothing is exposed for sale, and which is not trodden on by any mechanic or farmer. The gymnasia of the elders might be there. They should exercise apart from the juniors. Some magistrates should associate with the juniors, and the seniors with the magistrates. This will be productive of modesty and respect in the citizens. The ordinary market must be apart from this, in a place where the produce of sea and land can be easily brought together. Boards to superintend contracts, lawsuits, and the summoning of witnesses, superintendents of the market and city, should be near the market, and some general place of assembly. There are to be two agoræ, then, one for leisure, the other for business. There must be a similar arrangement and distribution of offices in the country, wood-reeves, and bailiffs, and guard-houses, and public

messes, and shrines to the gods and heroes. Farther details must be omitted now."

§ 1. *διειλῆφθαι φυλακτηρίοις*, 'and the walls have guard-houses and towers placed at intervals along them.' Cf. Thuc. III. 21, where we read of the guard-houses and towers on the walls of Platæa.

αὐτὰ προκαλεῖται, 'they naturally invite the preparation of some of the common meals in these guard-houses.'

§ 2. *τὰ κυριώτατα τῶν ἀρχείων*, 'the common meals of the most important boards.'

τι μαντεῖον ἄλλο πυθόχρηστον, 'or else some Pythian oracle.' Cf. Plat. Rep. 427 B, where these matters are said to be proper for Apollo at Delphi to arrange: *ἱερῶν τε ἱδρυσεις καὶ θυσίαι καὶ ἄλλαι θεῶν τε καὶ δαιμόνων καὶ ἡρώων θεραπεῖαι.* The expression itself is taken from Æsch. Choe. 901. *Λοξίου μαντεύματα τὰ πυθόχρηστα.*

§ 3. *ἐπιφάνειάν τε ἔχει*, 'which is both sufficiently conspicuous for the position of virtue,' i.e. where men of eminent virtue may sit and be seen by all, 'and which as regards the neighbouring parts of the city is more strongly situated.'

τοιαύτης ἀγορᾶς κατασκευήν, 'such a market provided, as is mentioned as existing in Thessaly, what they call a free market.'

§ 4. *παραβάλλειν*, 'approach it.'

§ 5. *τοῦτον τὸν κόσμον*, 'this institution,' i.e. the gymnasia.

τὸν τῶν ἐλευθέρων φόβον, 'the fear that the free feel.'

§ 6. *τὸ πλῆθος*. This is not meant as an exhaustive division. It is intended to assert that, besides the rulers, there was another important class to be consulted, viz. the priests. The *καὶ* in Bekker's Berlin edition seems necessary.

τὴν τῶν ἱερῶν οἰκοδομημάτων, understand *ἀγοράν*.

§ 7. *τὴν ἄλλην τὴν τοιαύτην διοίκησιν*, 'and other such administrative functions.'

ἀγορανομίαν, 'market police;' *ἀστυνομίαν*, 'city police.'

τὴν ἄνω, 'the one mentioned above.'

CHAP. XIII. "We have now to consider what the character of the citizens must be, that the state may be happy and well-governed. In all things there are two points to be considered, the end and the means. The end may be good and the means bad, or the means may be good and the end bad. Or, lastly, both may be good, or both bad. Take the instance of medicine. The end is health. But men may have a wrong idea of what constitutes health, or they may not take the right means to secure it. In life the end is happiness. This needs some external means and appliances. Some, having these, do not seek happiness aright. Happiness was defined in the Ethics as the activity and practice of virtue as an end-in-itself, not with reference to

a special object, but absolutely. For instance, just punishments may be good with reference to the object of correcting offenders, but they are necessary rather than actions really good in themselves. Actions tending to honour and advantage are absolutely good. Or, again, a good man may make a good use of poverty, disease, and other misfortunes, but he will not be happy. So here his actions are not absolutely good. From this men fly into the opposite extreme, and consider external goods, because they are absolute goods, the cause of happiness, just as if it were the lyre which makes a man play well, and not his skill. There are many things which we must pray for in the arrangement of the city, things which depend on fortune. But for a city to be good is not the work of fortune, but of knowledge and deliberate choice. A good state is that whose citizens are good, and by citizens are meant all who partake in the government. Men become good in three ways: by (1) Nature, (2) Habit, (3) Reason. Thus 1. Nature gives a man a certain disposition of mind and body. 2. Habit can change natural dispositions for better or worse. 3. Reason is peculiar to man alone. By reason he can do many things contrary to nature and habit, if he is persuaded that it is better. This constitutes the work of education, which is next to be considered." This chapter contains reminiscences of parts of Books I. and X. of the Ethics. But there are several remarkable points of difference: (1) the definition of happiness, which has been commented on in a note on ch. viii. 5; (2) the expression of τὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθά, which, as Grant has

pointed out, is characteristic of the Eudemian and Great Ethics, and is never found in the Nicomachean Ethics; (8) the substitution of λόγος for διδαχή. It is difficult to suppose that Aristotle wrote this chapter after the tenth book of the Ethics, for there is no enlargement or wider treatment of this part of the subject. Nor is it easy to regard it as an earlier sketch brought in here, for such expressions as τὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὰ are nearly conclusive against this. So that we probably here have the work of a disciple of Aristotle, as in many parts of this book.

§ 2. ἐπεὶ δέ. To the sentence thus begun there is no apodosis. ἀναγκαῖον τοίνυν in § 8 really takes it up: cf. III. xii. 1. All that follows in this section about the end and the means is very commonplace and Eudemian.

ἓν δὲ τὰς πρὸς τὸ τέλος. Understand ἐν τῷ before τάς. The style is careless.

τῶν πυιητικῶν, 'what conduces to the end laid before them.'

ἐν ταῖς τέχναις καὶ ἐπιστήμαις. Cf. III. xii. 1, which occurs in what also appears to be an interpolated passage. See the introductory note upon that and the following chapter.

κρατεῖσθαι, 'be held fast,' a late usage of the word.

§ 4. εὐθὺς, 'from the very first.'

§ 5. ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς. This cannot refer to the Nicoma-

chean Ethics, which are never called Ethics by Aristotle. Besides, it is not the definition given there. Cf. ch. viii. 5.

ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, 'with reference to the purpose in hand.'

§ 6. The language of this section is peculiarly un-Aristotelian. The illustration about rewards and punishments seems inappropriate, and it looks as though the writer had been thinking of a passage in Eth. X. x. 10, where punishments and chastisements are said to be imposed on the disobedient to lead them to virtue, and farther on, the law is said to have a compelling force, (ἀναγκαστικὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, § 12). Cf. also Eth. X. vi. 2. αἱ μὲν (ἐνέργειαί) εἰσιν ἀναγκαῖαι καὶ δι' ἕτερα αἱρεταί, αἱ δὲ καθ' αὑτάς, where observe that it is not ἁπλῶς which is opposed to ἀναγκαῖαι. But ἀναγκαῖος in this passage means necessary, in the sense of necessary to be inflicted. 'Punishment is good because it is necessary,' not, as one would rather have expected to find it expressed, 'the virtuous actions done through fear of punishment are compulsory, and therefore not really virtuous.'

τὸ καλῶς ἀναγκαίως ἔχουσιν, 'have a virtue in necessity.'

αἱ δ' ἐπὶ τὰς τιμάς, 'but actions tending to honours and advantages, i.e. to honour and reward men, are absolutely the best.' Here, again, there seems a confusion between the rewards themselves and actions done for the sake of honour (διὰ κάλοῦ ὄρεξιν). Altogether this is a very curious passage.

§ 7. ἀναίρεσις, 'the putting away of an evil.' The Oxford Edition reads αἵρεσις, which does not make any sense.

κατασκευαὶ γάρ, 'for they are the foundations and originators of good.'

χρήσαιτο δ' ἄν. Here he gives another illustration of ἀρετῆς χρῆσιν ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, bearing trials with fortitude. Aristotle would not have called this ἀρετὴ at all, though he says in one passage (I. x. 12.) that in adversity διαλάμπει τὸ καλόν.

κατὰ τοὺς ἠθικοὺς λόγους. Cf. Eud. Eth. VII. xv. 4; Mag. Mor. II. ix. 3.

τὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθά. This expression never occurs in the Nicomachean Ethics. The Oxford Edition reads τὰ ἀγαθά ἔστι τά. The first τὰ should be struck out, as it is in the Berlin Edition.

§ 8. δῆλον δ' ὅτι. 'And it is evident that the use of these (τὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθά) must be good and noble absolutely. Wherefore also men (wrongly) suppose that external goods are the causes of happiness (instead of the right use of them).'

τὰ μὲν ὑπάρχειν, i.e. τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ = τὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθά.

τὰ δὲ παρασκευάσαι, i.e. the right use of them (ἐνέργειαν καὶ χρῆσιν ἀρετῆς τελείαν ἁπλῶς).

§ 9. διὸ κατ' εὐχήν. 'Wherefore we pray that the consti-

tution of our state may be realized according to our wish in those matters, which are determined by chance. For we assume that it does determine them.'

ἐπιστήμης καὶ προαιρέσεως. Virtue so far resembles an art, according to Aristotle, that the virtuous man has a knowledge of general principles (*ἐπιστήμη*). It differs from art, in that the moral agent acts with a deliberate moral purpose (*προαίρεσις*).

§ 10. *εἰ πάντας ἐνδέχεται.* 'If it is possible for the citizens to be good generally, without each individual being so, it is better. For, of course, it follows, if each is good, that all are good.' What is meant is, that it is easier to lay down a method which will tend to make the citizens generally good, than to examine each individual citizen and see whether he is good. The latter method would be sure to fail.

§§ 11—13. Cf. Eth. X. x. 6 sqq., where however the line of argument is very different. It is difficult, on comparing the two passages, to believe they were written by the same man, because in many points they are absolutely contradictory. This passage seems partly also modelled on Pol. I. ii. 10—12. Much of what is said there is here repeated in a bald manner.

§ 11. *λόγος.* It is *διδαχή* in Eth. X. x. 6, though *λόγος* is also used, but in a different way.

τῶν ἄλλων τι ζῴων. Nothing is said about animals in

the passage referred to in the Ethics. This is a touch introduced from Politics I. ii.

ἔνιά τε οὐθὲν ὄφελος φῦναι. 'And it is no use for some qualities to be implanted by nature; for habits cause men to change. For there are some natural faculties which by habits may be turned both ways, either to better or worse.' The author appears to have mistaken Aristotle here. Aristotle says that some men are born good (*τὸ τῆς φύσεως διά τινας θείας αἰτίας τοῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐτυχέσιν ὑπάρχει*). With this, another statement is here apparently confounded, viz. that every man has a *δύναμις*, or latent capacity for virtue, which may be developed (*ἐνεργείᾳ*) either into virtue or vice.

12. *τῇ φύσει ζῇ.* Here *φύσει* is loosely used as = *πάθει.*

μόνον γὰρ ἔχει λόγον: cf. I. ii. 10.

συμφωνεῖν ἀλλήλοις. In the Ethics there is not a word said about these three being in harmony. Aristotle there says, that before *λόγος*, reason, or instruction, *διδαχὴ*, can do good, the mind of the youth must be trained in good habits. How can reason influence a man who lives in obedience to the dictates of passion? He will not listen to reason, but will only yield to compulsion. This author says a man will be persuaded by reason to change his course of conduct contrary to his nature and his habits. Aristotle had too good a knowledge of human nature to say this. In the Ethics, *φύσις*, *ἔθος*, *διδαχὴ*, or *λόγος*, are regarded as three suc-

cessive stages in the process of education. Here they are treated as three things, which have to be accommodated to each other.

§ 13. This section does not differ so much from the Aristotelian point of view, as what has gone before, except in the meaning of *φύσις* implied.

διωρίσμεθα πρότερον. Cf. ch. vii. 4: *φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι δεῖ διανοητικούς τε εἶναι καὶ θυμοειδεῖς τὴν φύσιν τοὺς μέλλοντας εὐαγώγους ἔσεσθαι τῷ νομοθέτῃ πρὸς τὴν ἀρετήν.* The division of the mind there into *διάνοια* and *θυμὸς* is quite un-Aristotelian, as was also a trait of the high-minded man, remarked in a note on that chapter.

CHAP. XIV. "If there were any marked superiority either of body or mind in one class over another, then it would be reasonable that one class should always rule, and another be ruled. But this is not the case, except in India, as Scylax says. All then, as equals, must rule and be ruled in turns. Otherwise there is danger of a revolution. It has been already said, that the older citizens should rule, and the younger be ruled. So the young must learn to govern by being governed. And they must even perform menial offices, though free-born. It is the end which determines whether an action is honourable, not the quality of the action itself. Then, since the virtue of the good ruler and the good man is the same, the legislator must endeavour to make men good by education. There are two parts of the soul, (1) that which has reason in itself, (2) that which has not, but is able to obey reason. To this

latter belong the moral virtues. But the rational part is better and nobler, and the other is for the sake of it. We should always aim at the highest object, which in this case is the activity of the speculative reason, a subdivision of the rational part of the mind. Life is divided into toil and rest, into actions, which are useful and necessary, and those which are noble. But even those states which are thought to be the best governed, and their law-givers, have inclined to the expedient and self-interested course of action, instead of aiming at the highest end. And some later writers, as Thibron, have expressed the same views, praising the Spartan constitution, for instance, where all the tendency of legislation is to superiority in war. But the fall of Sparta has shewn this to be a bad principle of government. They have lost sight of τὸ ζῆν καλῶς. The folly of training men to look to dominion over others only, is shewn by the fact that it sometimes leads them to aspire to despotic power over their own state, as in the case of Pausanias. The object of war is, (1) self-defence, not to subjugate others; (2) to rule over others for their good, not for mere despotism; (3) to rule over those who are only fit to be slaves. That states generally direct their aim too much to war, is shewn by the fact that most states, when they have acquired their empire, begin to decay and fall to pieces. They lose their temper, like steel, when at peace. The law-giver is to blame for this, in not having taught them how to employ themselves at leisure." This chapter, and those which follow, are unquestionably Aristotle's. They are in his very best style.

§ 1. *τοῦτο δὴ σκεπτέον.* This point has already been considered in ch. ix. 5. It was said there that the warrior-class, as they got older, should be admitted to a share in the legislative functions, on the ground that they were powerful, and would not submit to be governed always. Here the question is argued more on the ground of justice and equality. There is no such great difference between men, either in body or mind, as to require the political disfranchisement of any class. Precisely the same argument applies now to such a question, for instance, as that which has lately been discussed in Parliament, whether the county franchise should be assimilated to that of the boroughs. Mr. Burt, the member for Morpeth, advocated the measure on the ground, not of abstract justice and equality, but because, as he said, the average miner or agricultural labourer is fully equal in intelligence to the average tradesman in a town. Of course, Aristotle would say that none of these ought to have political privileges. They are all *βάναυσοι* or *γεωργοί*, and not to be reckoned as *πολῖται*.

§ 2. *τοσοῦτον διαφέροντες.* Cf. I. v. 8: *Ὅσοι μὲν οὖν τοσοῦτον διεστᾶσιν ὅσον ψυχὴ σώματος καὶ ἄνθρωπος θηρίου, . . . οὗτοι μέν εἰσι φύσει δοῦλοι.* Cf. also § 10 of the same chapter: *Ἐπεὶ τοῦτό γε φανερόν, ὡς, εἰ τοσοῦτον γένοιντο διάφοροι τὸ σῶμα μόνον ὅσον αἱ τῶν θεῶν εἰκόνες, τοὺς ὑπολειπομένους πάντες φαῖεν ἂν ἀξίους εἶναι τούτοις δουλεύειν.*

§ 3. *Σκύλαξ*, of Caryanda, in Caria, who went a voyage down the Indus and thence to the Red Sea, and wrote

an account of it at the beginning of the fifth century before Christ. Cf. Herod. iv. 44.

ἔστιν, supply λαβεῖν again.

χαλεπὸν μένειν τὴν πολιτείαν. This, no doubt, is universally true, but it was so especially in Greece, where the political equilibrium was peculiarly unstable, owing to the absence of many modern safeguards, such as a standing army and police, a representative government, and a free press, and right of holding public meetings for the discussion of grievances. These, in England and America, at all events, are so many political safety-valves, tending to preserve the constitution by insuring necessary changes in time.

§ 4. ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι, 'in the governing body of the state.'

§ 5. εἴρηται δὲ πρότερον περὶ αὐτοῦ, in ch. ix. 5.

τὴν αἵρεσιν, 'nature has made the distinction.' αἵρεσις = διαίρεσις.

ποιήσασα αὐτῷ τῷ γένει ταὐτὸν, 'having made them by actual birth the same, the one class younger, and the other older.' Cf. I. xii. 3: Φύσει γὰρ τὸν βασιλέα διαφέρειν μὲν δεῖ, τῷ γένει δ' εἶναι τὸν αὐτόν· ὅπερ πέπονθε τὸ πρεσβύτερον πρὸς τὸ νεώτερον καὶ ὁ γεννήσας πρὸς τὸ τέκνον. The Tauchnitz edition reads αὐτὸ for αὐτῷ. But to what can αὐτὸ refer?

τοῦτον τὸν ἔρανον, 'this reward.' ἔρανος generally

means a feast, to which all the feasters contribute their share.

ἱκνουμένης, 'proper.'

§ 6. *ἔστι μὲν ἄρα ὡς*. 'There is then one sense in which we must say.'

καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις, III. vi. 6.

§ 7. *τῶν νέων τοῖς ἐλευθέροις*, 'the young who are free-born.'

ἐν τῷ τέλει καὶ τῷ τίνος ἕνεκεν, 'in the end and the object in view.'

§ 9. *διῄρηται δὲ δύο μέρη*. Cf. Eth. I. xiii. 9, sqq.

ὧν φαμὲν τὰς ἀρετὰς εἶναι, 'to which we say the virtues belong, according to which a man is said to be good in any way.' The intellectual virtues belong to the former, the moral to the latter.

§ 10. *ἔν τε τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην*, 'both in art and in nature.'

"The rational part of the soul, again, is subdivided into the practical and the speculative reason. Of these the speculative is the highest." The virtue of the practical reason is *φρόνησις*, of the speculative *σοφία*. The action of the speculative reason is called *θεωρία*. For a fuller account of the distinction between these two, see Ethics X., vii. viii.

§ 11. *ἢ πασῶν ἢ τοῖν δυοῖν*, 'than the actions of all the virtues,' (i.e. both moral and intellectual,) 'or those of the other two parts,' (i.e. of the part which has not

reason by itself, but obeys reason, and of the practical reason). *πασῶν* agrees with *ἀρετῶν*, *τοῖν δυοῖν* with *μεροῖν*.

§ 15. *οἱ νῦν ἄριστα δοκοῦντες πολιτεύεσθαι*, i.e. the Spartans.

φορτικῶς ἀπέκλιναν, 'have vulgarly inclined to those actions which are considered as useful, and are rather self-regarding.'

§ 16. *τῶν ὕστερόν τινες*. Plato, in the Laws, and Xenophon.

τοῖς ἔργοις ἐξελήλεγκται νῦν, alluding to the defeat of the Spartans by the Thebans at Leuctra and Mantinea, referred to also in ch. xi. 8.

§ 17. *Θίβρων*. Who this can be is unknown, unless it is the Spartan general, Thimbron, who commanded in Asia against the Persians in B.C. 400, and again in 392, when he was killed in an engagement with Struthas, after marching from Ephesus.

§ 19. *μᾶλλον μετ' ἀρετῆς*, 'more virtuous.'

κρατεῖν ἤσκησεν, 'aimed at conquest with a view to rule over others.' *καρτερεῖν* is not so good as *κρατεῖν*.

§ 20. *τοῦτο πειρατέον διώκειν*, i.e. in a state trained in these principles.

Παυσανίᾳ τῷ βασίλει. He was not really king, but he ruled as such, instead of Cleombrotus, who was a minor.

§ 21. *ταὐτὰ γὰρ ἄριστα*. For the lawgiver ought to in-

stil into the minds of men the same principles, as best both for individuals and the community generally.' The Tauchnitz edition reads *ταῦτα*, which makes no sense. If the second *ταῦτα* is retained, it refers to *ταὐτὰ ἄριστα καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ κοινῇ*, 'those principles which are at the same time best both for individuals and the community at large.' But it would be better left out.

τοὺς ἀναξίους, sc. *ἄρχεσθαι*.

§ 22. *κατακτησάμεναι δὲ τὴν ἀρχήν*. Take Athens, for example, or Sparta. It was the natural tendency of Greek institutions and governments to wear themselves out rapidly. As the causes which led to certain combinations, such as the establishment of the Athenian empire over her allies, passed away, as when the Persians were swept off the Ægean sea, those combinations lost their coherence and perished. The natural tendency of the Greek states, separated as they were from each other by barren mountains and tracts of sea, and in the absence of trade and manufacture, was to isolation. It certainly was no decay of warlike spirit, or inability to enjoy leisure, which led to the subjugation of the Greeks. It was the tendency of human nature to break down the barriers which separate nations, that led to the conquest of Greece by Philip and Alexander, and afterwards to the establishment of the Achæan and Ætolian leagues, and that finally paved the way for the Roman Empire. Thus the circle of Greek ideas was ever widening, though life in the several states became less vigorous and intense. Cf. note on III. xiii. 23.

τὴν γὰρ βαφὴν ἀφιᾶσιν, 'they lose their temper, like steel.' Cf. Soph. Aj. 637: *βαφῇ σίδηρος ὡς, ἐθηλύνθην στόμα.* Cf. II. ix. 34: *Τοιγαροῦν ἐσώζοντο μὲν πολεμοῦντες, ἀπώλλυντο δὲ ἄρξαντες διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι σχολάζειν μηδὲ ἠσκηκέναι μηδεμίαν ἄσκησιν ἑτέραν κυριωτέραν τῆς πολεμικῆς.*

σχολάζειν. Aristotle's idea of *σχολή* is somewhat different from what we mean by leisure. It means freedom from occupation in the supply of necessary wants, and also from political distractions; and the absorption of the mind in the contemplation of abstract ideas. *νοῦς*, or pure intellect, is the faculty of the mind which is so employed. All men, according to Aristotle, ought to aim at this life, in which, undisturbed by passion (*ὀρέξις*), they may engage in the pure speculations of abstract thought. This is the *βίος θεωρητικός*; the *ἀρετή* of it is *σοφία*; the pursuit of it is *φιλοσοφία.*

CHAP. XV. "To begin with, a city must be taught to be temperate, brave, and enduring. Otherwise it is liable to become the slave of invaders. The next thing required is philosophy. Otherwise the citizens will become insolent in time of peace. Therefore, as the highest end, *νοῦς*, intellect, the highest faculty in the soul, must be cultivated. In education, the body must be attended to first, then the emotional part of the nature (*ὄρεξις*), including the passions of anger and desire, lastly the intellect. This agrees with what was said before as to the harmony between nature,

habit, and reason." This chapter agrees with Eth. X. ix. in the description of the process of education. There are also references in it to ch. xiii. of this book, but they are probably interpolated, that chapter having been probably written by a disciple, and incorporated in some way in the work. For the confusion in which Aristotle's works have been involved, and the causes of it, see Grant's Ethics, vol. i. Essay I.

§ 1. *ὥσπερ εἴρηται πολλάκις*, xiv. 13; ii. 17.

§ 3. *ὁ μὲν γὰρ πόλεμος.* The apologists of war plead in its excuse that it calls forth certain virtues, such as courage, generosity, and self-denial. It is impossible to deny that it does. But that is a very slight excuse for the misery it causes in the mass of the people.

§ 4. *πάντων τῶν μακαριζομένων*, 'all that is accounted happy.' It is neuter.

§ 5. *αἰσχροῦ γὰρ ὄντος.* 'For though it is disgraceful for men not to be able to make use of good things, it is still more disgraceful not to be able to use them in leisure; shewing themselves capable of virtue, while occupied and at war, but when at peace and leisure, living like slaves.'

§ 6. *τῷ γίνεσθαι.* Supply *νομίζειν*, 'in thinking that they can be best attained by a particular kind of virtue,' i.e. courage in war. Bekker here reads *γίνεσθαι* instead of *γενέσθαι.* Cf. II. ix. 34, 35: *πρὸς γὰρ μέρος ἀρετῆς ἡ πᾶσα σύνταξις τῶν νόμων ἐστι, τὴν πολεμικήν . . . τούτου*

δὲ ἁμάρτημα οὐκ ἔλαττον· νομίζουσι μὲν γὰρ γίνεσθαι τἀγαθὰ τὰ περιμάχητα δι' ἀρετῆς μᾶλλον ἢ κακίας· καὶ τοῦτο μὲν καλῶς, ὅτι μέντοι ταῦτα κρείττω τῆς ἀρετῆς ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, οὐ καλῶς. This passage shews what ἀγαθὰ ταῦτα below refers to.

ἐπεὶ δὲ μείζω. This sentence is certainly corrupt as it stands. There is nothing to govern τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν. The Tauchnitz edition supplies τοῦ πολέμου before ἀρετῶν, and αἱρετέον after it. But τῶν τοῦ πολέμου ἀρετῶν in the plural would be strange, and there is a difficulty as to what ἀγαθὰ ταῦτα could refer to. The meaning clearly is, that virtue for its own sake is to be preferred to the enjoyment of pleasure. Something has to be supplied. The conjecture of Thurot, quoted by Susemihl in his note on the passage, is good, viz. τῶν ἀρετῶν ⟨ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, ἐσώζοντο μὲν πολεμοῦντες, ἀπώλλυντο δὲ ἄρξαντες. ὅτι μὲν οὖν δεῖ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ σχολάζοντας ἀσκεῖν⟩, καὶ ὅτι δι' αὐτήν, κ.τ.λ.: 'But since they deem these (i.e. pleasures to be supplied from the idea implied in ἀνδραποδώδεις,) the greater goods, and the enjoyment of these greater than that of the virtues, they prospered while at war, but having attained to empire they began to decay. That then we ought to practise virtue, also when at leisure, and that we ought to do so for its own sake, is clear from this. But how we are to do so, and by what means this is to be secured, we must next consider.' Cf. II. ix. 34, and ch. xiv. 22. of this book.

§ 7. διῃρημένοι πρότερον, ch. xiii. 11. διώρισται πρότερον, in ch. vii. 4.

συμφωνεῖν, cf. xiii. 12. But it seems as if that chapter was a *resumé* of this. For it is not shewn there in what the *συμφωνία* consists, as it is here. If this opinion is correct, the reference to ch. xiii. is interpolated. Probably both chaps. vii. and xiii. are by a disciple of Aristotle, and were incorporated in the work by Apellicon of Teos, or Andronicus of Rhodes, who edited his works in the first century before Christ.

ἐνδέχεται γάρ. 'For it is possible for the reason to have failed in having the best basis, and likewise for a man to have been misled by his habits.' A man may go wrong either from vicious habits and training, or through want of cultivation of his reasoning powers. There seems no reason for bracketing *καὶ* before *τὸν λόγον.*

§ 8. *ἡ γένεσις*, 'the process is from the beginning, and the end is from a sort of beginning of another end.' That is, each stage in the process of education has an end, but the ends of the first stages are subordinate to the final end, and serve, each in their turn, as starting-points to a farther end, until the farthest end of all is reached. Cf. Eth. I. ii. 1: *Εἰ δή τι τέλος ἐστὶ τῶν πρακτῶν ὃ δι' αὐτὸ βουλόμεθα τἄλλα δὲ διὰ τοῦτο, καὶ μὴ πάντα δι' ἕτερον αἱρούμεθα (πρόεισι γὰρ οὕτω γ' εἰς ἄπειρον, ὥστε εἶναι κενὴν καὶ ματαίαν τὴν ὄρεξιν), δῆλον ὡς τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον.*

§ 9. *ἕξεις*, 'states,' 'conditions.'

τῇ γενέσει, 'in origin.'

ὄρεξις, 'appetite.'

CHAP. XVI. "What is the proper age for marriage, that the bodies of the citizens may be the best possible? In respect to this, it ought to be so arranged, (1) that the reproductive powers of the man and the woman may cease at the same time; (2) that they may neither be too old nor too young. For, in the first case, the parents will not live to reap the gratitude of the children, or be able to help them when young; and, in the second, there will be too little reverence on the part of the children towards their parents, and they will be disposed to find fault with reference to the management of the house. Another reason for this is, that the offspring may be vigorous, the chief object we are now considering. Men cease to beget children at seventy, women to conceive after fifty. Women should not marry too young, as they are apt to die in childbirth, and the children to be puny. The oracle to the Trœzenians, telling them not to reap their crops too soon, referred to the marriage of the women. The men, too, ought not to wed too early, or they will stop their growth. Women should not marry before eighteen, men before thirty-seven, or a little over. For then they are at their prime, and their children will be ready to take their place when they are past their prime. Marriage should take place in winter, and when there is a north, rather than a south wind. The body should have plenty of exercise, but not the violent exercise of the athlete. Women should have exercise as well as men, and women in pregnancy should take gentle exercise and plenty of food. They should pay a visit to the temple every day, and pray to the gods who

preside over birth. The mind, on the contrary, should be entirely at ease. The embryo feeds on the mother, like plants on the earth. No deformed child should be allowed to live. Abortion is to be allowed, in order to prevent too many children being born. After the parents are advanced in years, they should cease begetting children, who are sure then to be weakly. The mind is in its full maturity of vigour at fifty. The procreation of children should not go on beyond fifty-five in the male. Adultery ought to be punished."

§ 2. *ἵνα συγκαταβαίνωσι*, 'that they may come down together in their ages to the same time.'

§ 3. *ἀνόνητος γὰρ τοῖς μὲν πρεσβυτέροις.* 'For those who are too old cannot enjoy the gratitude of their children for their nurture, nor can they as parents render service to their children.'

ἔχει δυσχέρειαν, 'causes unpleasantness.'

ἐγκληματικὸν τὸ παρεγγυς, 'the slight difference in years gives rise to fault-finding about the household management.'

§ 4. *ὅθεν ἀρχόμενοι*, 'which is the point from which we made this digression at starting.'

κατὰ μίαν ἐπιμέλειαν, 'by attending to one principle.'

§ 5. *ἀριθμὸς ἔσχατος*, 'at the age of seventy as the farthest limit.'

§ 6. *θηλυτόκα μᾶλλον*, 'female rather than male.' This is an assertion made quite in the dark. Physiologists are ignorant even now of the circumstances which determine the sex of the offspring.

μικρὰ τὴν μορφήν, 'small in stature.' Cf. Soph. Œ. T. 743. *μορφῆς δὲ τῆς σῆς οὐκ ἀπεστάτει πολύ.*

§ 7. *τὸν χρησμόν.* A marginal note on two MSS. says this was *μὴ τέμνε νέαν ἄλοκα.*

§ 8. *ὃν οὐχ ὑπερβαίνει πληθῦον ἔτι*, 'beyond which it does not grow.'

§ 9. *ἢ μικρόν*, 'or a little over.' Plato, Laws, IV. p. 721, B, makes the age from thirty to thirty-five.

ἐν τοσούτῳ, 'For these are the ages at which their bodies will be in full vigour for cohabitation, and for the time at which they are to cease begetting children their ages will coincide exactly.'

§ 10. *ἔτι δὲ ἡ διαδοχὴ τῶν τέκνων.* 'And moreover the children will be ready to take their places, when, with the mothers, the critical time of life is beginning, and the age of the fathers has already arrived at the number of seventy years.'

τῆς ἀκμῆς is not used here like *ἀκμάζουσι* for the period of maturity, but for that of decline, from forty to fifty.

τοῖς δὲ περὶ τὴν ὥραν χρόνοις, 'and as to the season of the year, let it be in accordance with the present fashion,

which is quite right, when they have fixed on winter as the time for the commencement of cohabitation.' Supply δεῖ χρῆσθαι after χρόνοις.

§ 11. ἰατροί, 'physicians;' φυσικοί, 'natural philosophers.'

§ 12. ποίων δὲ τινων. 'But what condition of body in the parents would be most advantageous for the children, must be more carefully explained in what relates to the care of children. It is sufficient to state it in outline now.' Bekker has supplied ἂν before ὄφελος in his second edition *e conj.*

ἐπιστήσασι, sc. γνώμην, 'having brought the mind to a stand-still upon it,' 'having dwelt upon it,' 'having studied it with care.'

οὔτε γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἀθλητῶν. 'For neither is the habit of athletes good for political well-being, or for health and procreation of children, nor is that which is too careful and lazy, but the mean between these.'

§ 13. πεπονημένην, 'exercised.' πρὸς ἓν, 'directed to one object only.' This is a correction of Bekker in his second edition for ἕνα, which would have to agree with πόνον, very awkwardly it is true, but for all that it may be right.

§ 14. ἀραιᾷ, 'scanty,' a Homeric word.

τοῦτο δὲ ῥᾴδιον. 'And this is easy for the lawgiver to enforce, by directing that every (pregnant) woman take a walk daily to worship the gods who preside over birth.' τινὰ agrees with ἔγκυον understood.

§ 15. ἀποθέσεως, 'exposure.'

διὰ δὲ πλῆθος τέκνων. This is opposed to πεπηρωμένον: 'But, as far as the *number* of children is concerned, that no infant be exposed, if the arrangement of custom forbid it,' i.e. if it be repugnant to the national feeling. There is a reading ἐθνῶν for ἐθῶν, probably a corruption of some one who saw that something national was implied. Aristotle would seem not to have objected very strongly himself to exposure.

ὥρισται γὰρ δή. The Tauchnitz edition reads ὡρίσθαι γὰρ δεῖ. Translate: 'For there is a limit to the number of children to be begotten. But if any have more children than this in the course of cohabitation, abortion should be procured, before sensation and life takes place in the embryo. For that which is lawful or not, will be determined by sensation and life.' This cold-blooded language of Aristotle about exposure and abortion is really far more repulsive and immoral than all that Plato ever wrote in the Republic about the community of women. It is just on a par with his opinion as to slavery.

§ 17. διὸ κατὰ τήν. 'Therefore let it depend on the time at which the intellect reaches its highest point of vigour.'

τῶν ποιητῶν τινές, Solon, for instance, in a fragment (21 Bergk).

τῆς εἰς τὸ φανερὸν γεννήσεως, 'a man ought to have done with begetting children so as to live.'

§ 18. *ὅταν ᾖ καὶ προσαγορευθῇ πόσις*, 'whilst the husband is alive, and is addressed as such.'

CHAP. XVII. On the nurture of children. "Milk is the best food for them, and no wine. Their limbs should be bandaged to prevent their growing crooked. They must be accustomed to bear cold. Some, therefore, dip their children at birth in cold water, others, like the Celts, let them go thinly clad. They must be accustomed by degrees to do everything that custom will enable them to do. They should not learn before five, nor work; but exercise their limbs, and have plenty of amusements, which must not be vulgar, nor laborious, nor reckless. Their games should be in imitation of the business of their life afterwards. They should be allowed to cry when young, in order to give their lungs free play. They should not be with slaves too much, but should be kept from vulgar sights and sounds. Indecent language, and pictures, and statues, should be banished from the state. If a youth, who is not of the age to mess at the Sussitia, say or do anything forbidden, he should be flogged. After that age, he should be disgraced. They must not go to the theatre until they are of an age to sit at the public meals and drink wine. Theodorus, the tragic actor, would allow no one to go on the stage before him, since the spectators are much influenced by first impressions. So the first impressions of children should be good. From the age of five to that of seven, children should listen to the lessons they will afterwards have to learn themselves. After seven, then fourteen and twenty-one are critical ages.

First, we have to consider whether there should be a systematic course of education; next, whether it is to be undertaken privately or by the state; lastly, what the kind of education is to be." This subject is pursued in the next book.

§ 1. πληθύουσα, 'abundant.'

ἀοινοτέρα, 'with no wine, on account of the ailments it causes.'

§ 2. ἔτι δὲ καὶ κινήσεις. 'And moreover also it is good to move them about in as many different ways as possible when they are at that age.' τηλικούτων depends on κινήσεις, ποιεῖσθαι is middle.

ἀστραβές, 'straight.'

§ 3. σκέπασμα μικρὸν ἀμπίσχειν, 'to let them go lightly clad.'

ἐκ προσαγωγῆς, 'gradually.'

διὰ θερμότητα. This is a mistake. Children feel cold much more than grown persons. This system of hardening, which Aristotle advocates, has cost the lives of innumerable children.

§ 4. πρώτην, sc. ἡλικίαν. ἣν refers to κινήσεως.

§ 5. ἀνειμένας, 'unrestrained.'

παιδονόμους, 'ministers of education.'

προοδοποιεῖν, 'pave the way to.'

§ 6. διατάσεις, 'crying.'

οἱ κωλύοντες ἐν τοῖς νόμοις. Cf. Plat. Legg. VII. p. 791 E—792 A.

ἡ γὰρ τοῦ πνεύματος κάθεξις. 'For the holding of the breath gives strength to those who are working hard, as is the case with children when they cry.'

§ 8. *ἐκ τῶν νέων*, supply *ἐπισκεπτέον.*

§ 10. *παρά τισι θεοῖς*, such as Dionysus. The allusion is to the Phallic procession. See Smith's Dict. of Antiq.

τὸν τωθασμὸν ἀποδίδωσιν, 'towards whom the law also allows ribaldry.'

πρὸς δὲ τούτους, 'but with regard to these,' i.e. *τισι θεοῖς.*

πρὸς τούτοις in the Oxford Bekker, and Tauchnitz edition, 'in addition to this,' makes no sense. *τοὺς θεοὺς* at the end of the sentence after *τιμαλφεῖν* need present no difficulty to the reading of the text.

§ 12. *ἐπιστήσαντας μᾶλλον*, cf. xvi. 12.

εἴτε μὴ δεῖ πρῶτον, 'having first raised the question whether it is right or not,' viz. for the young to witness theatrical representations.

ἐμνήσθημεν ὡς ἀναγκαῖον, 'I have only made so much mention of the subject as is necessary,' viz. as coming in the list of things from which the young are to be kept.

§ 13. *προεισάγειν*, 'to enter before him.' Theodorus was an actor, contemporary with Aristotle.

οἰκειουμένων, 'inasmuch as the spectators are influenced by the first impressions.'

τὰ πρῶτα, 'our first impressions.'

§ 14. *ξένα*, 'strange,' opposed to *οἰκειουμένων* above.

ὅσα ἔχει ἢ μοχθηρίαν, 'all such as are either vicious or spiteful.'

§ 15. *οὐ κακῶς*. This is clearly the right reading, and not *οὐ καλῶς*, as the Oxford Bekker, and Tauchnitz edition have it.

τὸ προσλεῖπον τῆς φύσεως, 'that wherein nature is deficient.'

§ 16. *τάξιν τινά*, 'any system of education.'

πότερον συμφέρει κοινῇ ποιεῖσθαι. In Eth. X. ix. he had already decided that education ought to be managed by the state, though he lays down some exceptions in favour of private education, chiefly on the ground that the same system does not suit everybody equally well, just as the same prescriptions in medicine do not suit all constitutions. This objection would be practically removed by allowing the teachers freedom to deal with idiosyncracies.

APPENDIX TO NOTE ON I. ii. 10.

I AM indebted to the kindness of Professor Rolleston for "a collection of passages from Aristotle, and one from Galen, which shew that both those great men saw that there were structures and structural arrangements in living animals, the existence of which could not be explained on teleological grounds only."

(1) Ar. De Part. An. iv. 2. *καταχρῆται μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις ἐνιότε εἰς τὸ ὠφέλιμον καὶ τοῖς περιττώμασι, οὐ μὴν διὰ τοῦτο ζητεῖν δεῖ πάντα ἕνεκα τινός, ἀλλὰ τινῶν ὄντων τοιούτων ἕτερα συμβαίνει τοιαῦτα πολλὰ ἐξ ἀνάγκης.* That is, there is no waste in nature, but yet it is not necessary to search for the final cause of everything. It is enough to know that certain effects follow of necessity from certain causes.

(2) *οὔτε ἴσχια ἔχει ὡς τετράπουν ὂν οὔτε κέρκον ὡς δίπουν πλὴν μικρὸν ὅσον σημείου χάριν.* This passage shews that Aristotle was not so very far from the modern theory of evolution, and the bearing of rudimentary organs upon it.

(3) Galen, De Art. Med. ii. *Ἀδύνατον ἡμῖν ἔσται διαγνῶναι πότερον ἅπαντα διὰ χρείαν τινα γέγονεν ἢ μάτην ἔνια· καὶ γὰρ ἄμφω δύνατόν ἐστιν ἐπινοεῖν.*

(4) Ar. De Animâ, iii. 9. *εἰ οὖν μήτε μηδὲν ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ μάτην μήτε ἀπολείπει τῶν ἀναγκαίων πλὴν ἐν τοῖς πηρώμασι καὶ τοῖς ἀτελέσι.*

Still the final cause was the chief thing with him. Cf. De Part. An. i. 1. *μᾶλλον δ' ἐστι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἐν τοῖς τῆς φύσεως ἔργοις ἢ ἐν τοῖς τῆς τέχνης*, where, however, the introduction of *τὸ καλὸν* shews how widely different Aristotle's point of view was from the modern teleological conception of an all-wise and beneficent Creator. Cf. also De Gen. An. *ad fin.* *ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν φύσιν ὑποτιθέμεθα ἐξ ὧν ὁρῶμεν ὑποτιθέμενοι οὔτε ἐλλείπουσαν οὔτε μάταιον οὐδὲν ποιοῦσαν τῶν ἐνδεχομένων περὶ ἕκαστον.* De Animâ, iii. 12, 2. *τὸ δὲ ζῶον ἀναγκαῖον αἴσθησιν ἔχειν εἰ μηδὲν μάτην ποιεῖ ἡ φύσις· ἕνεκα γάρ του ἅπαντα ὑπάρχει τὰ φύσει ἢ συμπτώματά ἐστι τοῦ ἕνεκά του.*

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